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SUMMARY 
Title of thesis: 
The Impact and Influence of the Constitutional Court in the Formative Years of 
Democracy in South Africa 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of South Africa's 
Constitutional Court in the first two years of our democracy. To achieve this objective, 
some of the definitive and controversial cases already decided by the Court have been 
selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some jurisprudential perspectives of the 
Court. 
It focuses on the work of the Court over the past two years. It deals with the evolution 
of South Africa into a democracy, and analyzes the South African legal system prior to 
the beginning of the process of transformation. It briefly surveys the evolution of our 
constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period and provides a 
broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of transformation. 
It analyzes the Court from the point of view of, inter a/ia, its composition, jurisdiction and 
powers. The Court is also contrasted with courts in other jurisdictions which exercise 
full judicial review. 
The Court's emerging jurisprudence is examined. A review is made, inter alia, of the 
Court's understanding of, and approach to, the questions of the values underpinning 
the post-apartheid society and its constitutional system, and constitutional 
interpretation. 
The right against self-incrimination and South African company law and the two relevant 
Constitutional Court cases are discussed. 
The collection of evidence by the State and the constitutionality of provisions relating 
to search and seizure and the taking of fingerprints are looked into. 
The Court's approach to statutory presumptions and criminal prosecutions; some 
aspects of our appeals procedures; an accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer at 
state expense; the question of a fair trial and access to information; capital punishment; 
corporal punishment; committal to prison for debt; and the certification of constitutions 
is analyzed. 
Two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national government on the 
distribution of posers between provinces and the national government are discussed. 
The conclusion is that the Court has, overall, hitherto acquitted itself well in the handling 
of particularly the controversial quasi-political questions that arose in the cases it has 
decided. 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis June 1997 
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INTRODUCTION· 
South Africa, then with a great potential for an unprecedented racial conflagration 
caused essentially by the system of apartheid, surprised itself and the world by 
eventually embarking upon a relatively peaceful transition from apartheid to a society 
governed on the basis of the will of the majority, irrespective of race and gender. Today, 
though the period of transition is still at its nascent stage, the country is governed at all 
three levels of government by men and women appropriately elected and mandated by 
the governed. 
In addition, there are many fundamental constitutional changes that have taken place 
since the advent of non-racial and non-sexist democracy in South Africa. A political and 
constitutional miracle of ingenuity has been performed! A brief summary of some of 
these changes is provided hereunder. 
The basic objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of our 
Constitutional Court in the first two years, the formative years of our democracy that 
was ushered in by the (interim) Constitution 1 which came into effect on 27 April 1994. 
To achieve this objective, a few of the definitive, and in some instances somewhat 
controversial cases that have been dealt with and decided by the Constitutional Court 
since its inception have been selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some 
jurisprudential perspective of the Court. The Constitutional Court has, however, been 
in existence for a period which is now a little longer than two years, which, to plagiarise 
some of the work of Dennis Davis,2 "is too short a period in which to formulate a 
coherent jurisprudential framework which might assist in characterizing the work of the 
court. A longer run of cases is required before we shall understand the jurisprudence 
of the Chaskalson court." 
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It needs to be emphasised that the thesis focuses on the work of the Constitutional 
Court and other Courts over the past two years not only because at the time of 
concluding it there were no cases decided under the new Constitution, but precisely 
because I regard the first two years of the existence of the Constitutional Court as 
critical in the development of our nascent non-racial and non-sexist democracy based 
on liberty and equality. 
Though, as stated above, the basic objective of this thesis is to analyse and discuss our 
constitutional court and its impact and influence on our legal system in the course of the 
development of our democracy, the broader aspects of constitut:onal change, within 
which the constitutional court exists and functions, will be gone into as well. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
The process of constitutional transformation in South Africa brought in its train many 
fundamental changes which ushered in a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist 
society based on equality and liberty. Some of these are the following: 
A NEW GRUNDNORM 
One of the fundamental constitutional changes was the departure from parliamentary 
sovereignty3 to a constitutional state predicated upon constitutional supremacy.4 Thus, 
today, Parliament itself can make no law, and the executive (and the administration) 
can take no action or decision, or perform any act, which is at variance with the 
Constitution. 
In the new era, South African courts, particularly the new Constitutional Court, are 
destined to play an important role with regard to constitutional validity and the protection 
of human rights. Danie Olivier, then Vice President of the Transvaal Law Society, quite 
correctly observed that: 
Die begrip van 'n Konstitusionele Hof is vreemd in Suid-Afrika. V66r 27 April het 
Parlement in Suid-Afrika die absolute mag gehad om wette te maak soos wat hy 
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mag beslis. Buiten vir 'n paar uitsonderings kon geen hof uitspraak lewer oor die 
geldigheid van 'n wet van die Partement nie. 
"Maar sedert die verkiesing kan 'n hof wel uitspraak gee oor die geldigheid van 
wette. Verskeie faktore kan deur die hof in ag geneem word, soos of die wet 
inbreuk maak op iemand se fundamentele regte.5 
The era where Parliament could make any encroachment it chose upon the life, liberty 
or property or any individual subject to its sway, where the role of the courts was 
confined to enforcing its will, is gone for ever.6 A new constitutional order has been 
born, and, as Langa J put it, 
[o]ne of the implications of the new order is that old rules and practices can no 
longer be taken for granted; they must be subjected to constant re-assessment 
to bring them into line with the provisions of the Constitution.7 
A CHAPTER ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Another important change was the adoption of a chapter on fundamental rights which 
is binding upon all legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of government.8 
This chapter, the provisions of which were not absolute,9 applied to all law in force and 
all administrative decisions taken and acts performed during the period of operation of 
the (interim) Constitution,10 and no law, whether a rule of the common law, customary 
law or legislation, could limit any of the rights encapsulated and entrenched therein. 11 
Where, and to the extent that the nature of the rights contained in the chapter 
permitted, the rights were available to juristic persons as well, 12 while appropriate 
measures designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by bodies and persons other than 
the legislatures and the executive at all levels of government were not precluded. 13 
Locus STAND/ IN /UDIC/O 
Of particular note is that our law on locus standi in iudicio has been fundamentally 
impacted upon. Whereas prior to the coming into operation of the Constitution, 14 only 
a person with a peculiarly personal interest in a matter could approach our courts for 
relief, today any person acting on his or her own interest, 15 or an association acting in 
the interest of its own members, 16 or a person acting on behalf of another person or 
other persons who is/are not in a position to seek such relief in his or her or their own 
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name/s, 17 or a person acting as a member of or in the interest of a group or class of 
persons, 18 or even a person acting purely in the public interest, 19 is entitled to approach 
a competent court of law for appropriate relief, which may include a declaration of 
rights, in the face of an actual or threatened infringement of any of the rights contained 
in the chapter on fundamental rights. Thus, under the Constitution, the institutions of 
justice would be much more accessible to the ordinary person and class actions would 
be available in South Africa at long last. 
NEW ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
In addition to the courts, new human rights enforcement mechanisms, namely the office 
of a Public Protector,20 a Human Rights Commission,21 a Commission on Gender 
Equality22 and a constitutional court,23 were established. 
APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES 
Prior to to the coming into operation of the interim Constitution South African judges 
were appointed by the President.24 Today, however, they are appointed differently: The 
Constitution established a special machinery, the Judicial Service Commission25 which 
makes recommendations regarding, inter alia, the appointment of judges of the 
Supreme Court.26 Thus, today, fit and proper persons are appointed judges of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial 
Service Commission.27 A fit and proper person is appointed a Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa by the President in consultation with the Cabinet and 
after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.28 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A provincial or local division of the Supreme Court today has, in addition to its 
constitutionally guaranteed inherent jurisdiction,29 full powers of judicial review within 
its area of jurisdiction.30 Moreover, in certain circumstances, a provincial or local division 
of the Supreme Court may hear evidence on issues falling within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court before referring them to the latter court. 31 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 4 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
THE IDEA OF A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The emergence of the South African Constitutional Court was preceded and 
accompanied by a very interesting debate in political as well as legal circles. The initial 
debate took place in a particular context, where South Africa could not be described as 
a democracy by any stretch of the imagination. To paraphrase John Dugard, it could 
be aptly described as a pigmentocracy in which all political power was vested in a white 
oligarchy which was controlled by an Afrikaner elite. 32 
The judiciary, which at that stage was drawn solely from the white minority,33 was in 
many circles justifiably regarded as a handmaiden of the system of apartheid. It was at 
that stage that lawyers such as Anton Lubowski concluded that our Appeal Court had 
in various areas, but especially in that of administrative law, acted as an arm of the 
National Party and had become part and parcel of the oppression of the black 
majority.34 As Dugard had previously pointed out, our judiciary, whether they supported 
the National Party and its regime or not, had one basic premise in common - loyalty to 
the status quo ante.35 
In a nutshell, our debate about the constitutional court was, as was the case in 
continental Europe, informed by intense distrust of the judiciary that would be inherited 
from the ancien regime. Like in continental Europe after World War 11,36 it was 
unthinkable in anti-apartheid struggle circles that a judiciary inherited from the apartheid 
regime would exercise full and untrammeled judicial review. Joe Slovo, in an 
unpublished address to the South African Legal Defence Fund dinner held in 
Johannesburg on 6 November 1992, at 8, pithily pointed out that 
for us, it is inconceivable that the judiciary as at presented constituted can ever 
be the guardian of the new Constitution, the ultimate guardian of the rights of 
South Africa's citizens. Its long history as an institutionalised pillar of the 
apartheid regime makes it unfit to play this kind of role. It is for this reason that 
we are proposing that South Africa should have a Constitutional Court which 
must be the guardian of the Constitution and the final arbiter of all constitutional 
and Bill of Rights matters. For such a court to enjoy legitimacy it will have to be 
differently constituted from the present judiciary. The South African Law 
Commission and the South African government also propose a Constitutional 
Court but they see it simply as an extension of the existing Appellate Division. 
This is totally unacceptable. In our view a Constitutional Court will have to be 
completely independent of the present Appellate Division ... It must be seen from 
the very inception that this Constitutional Court is a court with a difference 
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committed to the preservation of the human rights of all South Africans - and not 
the privileges of a few. 
In the course of this debate the concept of a constitutional court for South Africa 
obviously had both proponents and opponents. 
Proponents of a Constitutional Court 
Among those persons who proposed that South Africa should have a constitutional 
court was Joe Slovo who advocated a constitutional court completely separate from the 
Supreme Court.37 John Dugard, arguing that a case could be made out for a special 
constitutional court consisting of judges and lawyers who are capable of exercising 
review powers, similarly pointed out that as all South African judges were white, they 
inevitably, consciously or sub-consciously, reflected the racial attitudes of the white 
community. In addition, their legal education and training rendered them 
'psychologically incapable of the value-oriented, quasi-political functions involved in 
judicial review'. 38 
On an earlier occasion, at the Symposium on a Bill of Rights for South Africa held at the 
University of Pretoria on 1-2 May 1986, Arthur Chaskalson, who was destined to 
become the first President of the South African Constitutional Court, had said that: 
... the power to enforce the bill of rights should be vested in a court. The judiciary 
in South Africa is presently an all-white judiciary. If the court enforcing a bill of 
rights is to enjoy the support of the population as a whole, it must reflect the 
values of all sections of the population and not merely the section which for so 
long has been the dominant group. This may be achieved more easily by the 
appointment of a special constitutional court. And although I am in principle 
opposed to the institution of special courts, and normally favour the vesting of all 
judicial powers in the ordinary courts of the land, I would favour it in this case. 
I think that in the peculiar circumstances of South Africa the special court may, 
in fact, turn out to be necessary. 39 
Anton Lubowski proposed "a special constitutional court that would decide only 
questions arising from the constitution or a Bill of Rights. If such questions arose in the 
context of an ordinary court case, they would have to be referred to the constitutional 
court for a ruling. Such a court might occupy a quasi-political position, and it could be 
composed of legally trained judges along with judges from other areas of expertise."40 
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Penuel! Maduna also expressed himself on this concept. He suggested that 
[t]he process of building the new nation and fashioning its institutions, structures, 
and values is an integral part of the struggle to eradicate the apartheid system, 
which is a negation of all individual rights and freedoms. As the struggle 
continues, the new judicial cadre, which has not soiled its hands by agreeing to 
serve the cause of the apartheid tyrants, will emerge. Then, and only then, will 
our people cease to wonder who can be entrusted with the power of judicial 
review and given the honorable title of protector of the will of the people. 
It may be worthwile to study the operation and functions of constitutional courts 
which, in some countries, employ non-lawyers.41 
Subsequently, Maduna also said that 
[t)he ANC is fully committed to a constitutionally entrenched and justiciable Bill 
of Rights. We have a problem, however, with the (SA Law) Commission's 
apparent assumption that the enforcement of the Bill of Rights will be the 
responsibility of the 'Supreme Court of the Republic of South Africa'. If this 
implies continuity of the current judiciary which has done everything to discredit 
itself and legality in the eyes of the majority of South Africans, we wonder if the 
oppressed will lend their support to the project. We would suggest that we either 
look for alternative enforcement mechanisms, such as a Constitutional Court 
(which will comprise both lawyers and lay people), or that we indeed have a fully 
representative and non-racial judiciary the basic thrust of which will be directed 
towards seeing that justice is done.42 
In its perspective of a future democratic South Africa, the African National Congress 
(ANC) made provision for a constitutional court.43 It suggested that such a court, which 
would draw on the experiences and talents of the whole population, could be appointed 
by the President (of the Republic) on the recommendations of a judicial service 
commission or by other methods acceptable in a democracy and should be composed 
of judges, legal practitioners and academics.44 
Lastly, Nicholas RL Haysom also proposed a constitutional court for South Africa that 
would help obviate a role of judicial review for a judiciary that would be stalked by the 
stigma of apartheid for a long time to come.45 As can be seen from all this, uppermost 
in the minds of all the proponents of a constitutional court for South Africa was the need 
to produce a non-racial, representative judiciary that would be granted the awesome 
power of constitutional review. 
Opponents of a Constitutional Court 
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One of the ironies of our times is that an erstwhile ardent opponent of the constitutional 
court, John Didcott, was appointed one of its eleven judges when it was established. 
Commenting on this idea at the 1986 University of Pretoria Symposium on a Bill of 
Rights for South Africa, the learned judge had said: 
[i]t is suggested sometimes that litigation under a bill of rights should be 
entrusted to a specially created constitutional court dealing with such matters 
alone. I do not like the idea in the least, I must say, for this country at all events. 
Issues concerning a bill of rights often have a strong political flavour. Often they 
are politically controversial. They have political consequences. Appointments on 
political grounds to a special constitutional court would surely prove to be likelier 
in those circumstances than politically inspired appointments to the ordinary 
courts of the land, where the need for judges with experience of and expertise 
in the daily round of litigation, much of it highly sophisticated, serves as a filter 
a good deal of the time. Nor would it be the end of the problem to devise a 
system which met satisfactorily the danger of political appointments. One would 
be left with the unhealthy situation in which, because the constitutional court did 
nothing but work noticeably political, the public suspected its decisions, imputing 
political reasons to and looking for political motives behind such. It would tend 
to be distrusted, one fears in short, much more than the ordinary courts. For 
litigation involving a bill of rights to be kept within the mainstream of the judicial 
process would, I feel sure, be much better.46 
The South African Law Commission initially rejected the idea of a constitutional court 
on the pretext that it would "be distrusted as a loaded or political court".47 Idolizing, and 
extolling the virtues of, the Supreme Court in the face of overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary, the Commission, instead, claimed that the public would have a large measure 
of confidence in the courts it already knew.48 
However, the Commission subsequently came round to accepting the need for a 
special constitutional court. 49 It conceded, albeit grudgingly, that such a court would be 
a proper tribunal for declaring invalid all legislation and executive or administrative acts 
which violated a bill of rights. It proposed that the constitutional court should be "a fully 
fledged Chamber of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court."50 As such, the 
constitutional court would deal with appeals in constitutional questions adjudicated upon 
by the lower courts in the ordinary manner. Such appeals would be referred to the 
constitutional court by the Chief Justice if he was of the opinion that they solely or 
predominantly involved constitutional disputes.51 
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THE SITUATION TODAY 
Today South Africa has a constitutional court. As stated above, its impact upon our 
legal system and its influence upon the development of democracy in South Africa will 
constitute the primary objective of this thesis. The basic thrust of this exercise will be 
directed towards an analysis of some of the most important decisions the court has 
made since its inception. Wherever possible and necessary, an attempt will be made 
to contrast the relevant court's decisions with decisions of courts in other jurisdictions 
on similar issues. 
For this purpose, the thesis is divided into the following chapters: 
Chapter 1, which deals in brief with the evolution of South Africa into a democracy. The 
first portion of this chapter grapples with the basics of the South African legal system 
prior to the beginning of the process of transformation. A brief survey of the evolution 
of our constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period through 
Union as well as the apartheid-based Republic of South Africa established in 1961 and 
its bantustan satellites as well as its self-governing territories, is provided. The second 
part gives a broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of 
transformation, which, as was stated above, was ushered in by the (interim) 
Constitution. 
Chapter 2 analyses the Constitutional Court from the point of view of, inter alia, its 
composition, jurisdiction and powers. The court is also contrasted with similar courts in 
other jurisdictions. The Court is further contrasted with the supreme courts of Canada 
and the United States which also exercise full judicial review. 
Chapter 3 looks at the Constitutional Court from the point of view of its emerging 
jurisprudence. For this purpose, the Court's understanding of, and approach to, the 
question of the values, including "African values such as ubuntu", underpinning the 
post-apartheid society and its constitutional system is first looked into. In this regard, 
a case is made that the Constitution allowed the Court and, in effect, all our other 
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Courts, a locus of open-ended values and invited them to embrace substantive 
reasoning in reaching their decisions. 
After that, the "values" are contrasted with "natural law", taking into account the views 
expressed by some of the judges of the Constitutional Court. The conclusion reached 
in this regard 1s that the Court was referring not to some platonic ideals, but to the 
values of South African society as encapsulated in the Constitution and our law. 
The next issue considered in this chapter is the issue of constitutional interpretation, 
which is contrasted with that of ordinary interpretation of stat:.Jtes. It is, inter alia, 
emphasised that under the new constitutional system, where the Constitution, and not 
the Legislature, is supreme, it is no longer proper to be trying to decipher the subjective 
intention of the latter; our Courts are now required to determine the purpose of the law 
being interpreted, be it the Constitution or some other ordinary statute. For this reason, 
the conclusion is reached that there is basically no material difference between the 
interpretation of ordinary statutes and constitutional interpretation. 
A brief look is also taken at how our Courts, including the Constitutional Court, have 
grappled with the place and role of comparable foreign case law. The conclusion 
reached is that comparable foreign case law does not constitute canonical texts or 
formal reasons for the decisions of our Courts ·and must be approached with 
circumspection because of the difference between our new constitutional system and 
those of various other jurisdictions. 
The way some of our Courts and the Constitutional Court's various judges looked at the 
verticality-horizontality dichotomy is then considered. The conclusion reached is that 
this question has since been settled by the Constitutional Assembly in favour of a 
horizontal application of the new Bill of Rights "if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, 
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the 
right."52 
The last but one issue looked into is whether or not our statutes have any retrospective 
application under the new constitutional system. The conclusion reached after a careful 
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scrutiny of the Constitutional Court's view is that our common law in this regard has not 
undergone any fundamental metamorphosis in this regard. 
Last but not least, the issue of equality before the law is looked at from the point of view 
of some of our courts. The views expressed by our Courts in this regard bring one to 
the conclusion that to some of our judges the question of equality turns on something 
much more fundamental than "an abstract, formal equality which prescribes equal 
treatment of individuals regardless of their actual circumstances",53 which "is blind to 
entrenched, structural inequality."54 At the same time, to others, mere formal equality 
suffices. I spelt out my own personal predilection, namely that both forms of equality 
are, or should be, applicable. 
Chapter 4 deals with the now constitutionally guaranteed right against self-incrimination 
and our company law. This was done because in the two Constitutional Court cases 
discussed in this chapter, namely Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; and Vryenhoek 
and Others v Powell NO and Others,55 and Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and 
Others,56 the gist of the issue was the effect of certain provisions of the Companies 
Act57 on the right against self-incrimination, though in both instances the applicants 
were not accused persons as envisaged in Section 25(3) of the (interim) Constitution. 
In my view the Court correctly held that the phrase" ... and any answer to any such 
question may thereafter be used in evidence against him" in the relevant provisions was 
in conflict with the (interim) Constitution. 
The views of some of the judges of the Constitutional Court on the issue of standing are 
also discussed. Needless to say, I agree with Chaskalson P that the Courts have to 
adopt a broader approach to the issue of standing, which accords with the Courts' 
mandate to uphold the Constitution. 
Chapter 5 too deals with the right to a fair trial as guaranteed in our new constitutional 
order and collection of evidence by the State. The constitutionality of questions such 
as provisions relating to search and seizure, and the taking of fingerprints, is looked 
into. For this purpose, decisions of both the Supreme Court (as it then was referred to) 
and the Constitutional Court are analysed. The conclusion reached is that it is better to 
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leave the question of the admissibility of evidence gathered in violation of the rights of 
an accused person to the discretion of trial officers who are better situated to assess 
the impact of such evidence on the substantive fairness of each trial. 
Chapter 6 involves an analysis of the way the Constitutional Court grappled with certain 
statutory presumptions which worked in favour of the State in criminal prosecutions. 
The starting point in the chapter is an analysis of the presumption of innocence, an old 
integral component of our criminal justice system which has since been accorded 
constitutional recognition and protection; the presumption of innocence is contrasted 
with the relevant statutory presumptions the validity of which was raised in the cases 
discussed therein. 
The first case dealt with in this instance is that of S v Zuma and Others,58 in which the 
Constitutional Court quite correctly held that the presumption in the provisions of 
Section 217(1 )(b)(it) of the Criminal Procedure Act was inconsistent with the (interim) 
Constitution and therefore invalid. The next one is that of S v Mhlungu and Others,59 
where, in addition to reaffirming its decision in Zuma, the Constitutional Court held that 
in casu the (interim) Constitution applied retrospectively. The position of the Court 
regarding statutory presumptions in general is also analysed. 
Then a cluster of cases dealing with the validity of certain provisions of the Drugs and 
Drug Trafficking Act,60 starting with the Constitutional Court's decision in S v 
Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso.61 While my conclusion is that the Court correctly held that the 
relevant provisions were in conflict with the (interim) Constitution, I am unreservedly 
critical of its tendency to concentrate only on what it has been called upon to decide 
when it is convenient to do so. I show through subsequent cases that if it had in 
Bhulwana dealt with all similarly worded presumptions in Section 21 of the Act, it would 
have been unnecessary to revisit the issue. 
The last reverse onus presumption dealt with is that contained in Section 40(1) of the 
Arms and Ammunition Act,62 in terms of which the presumption of possession by an 
occupant arose from proof that a relevant article had at any time been on or in such 
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premises. I fully accept the Constitutional Court's decision that the said provisions were 
in conflict with the (interim) Constitution. 
In sum, in respect of all the reverse onus presumptions the Constitutional Court, the 
position of our common law63 has basically been reinstated. However, as the chapter 
shows, I am indeed critical of the Court's cautious and narrow approach and preference 
to deal with each of the similarly worded reverse onus presumptions. 
In Chapter 7 an analysis of two cases, namey S v Ntuli,64 and S v Rens,65 in which the 
Constitutional Court deat with the constitutional validity of some aspects of our appeals 
procedures, is done. This, in each case, follows the state of the law prior to the 
intervention of the Court. 
While I accept the Court's ruling in S v Ntuli, I am unreservedly critical of its failure to 
deal once and for all time with the provisions of Section 305 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act which have the same discriminatory effect as the successfully impugned provisions 
of Section 309(4)(a) of the Act. This was yet another instance where the Court, 
presumably because of its tendency to be cautious, left an obvious element of 
unconstitutionality for future determination merely because it had not been called upon 
to deal with it. 
I fully accept the ruling by Madala J in S v Rens. An absolute right of appeal, which, in 
any event, was not envisaged in the (interim) Constitution, would compound 
cumbersome work, and increase the load, of our appeal courts, thus unjustly delaying 
the conclusion of even worthy cases. 
Chapter 8 deals with the Constitutional Court's approach to an indigent accused 
person's right to be assisted by a lawyer at state expense "where substantial injustice 
would otherwise result". 66 Before discussing the Court's ruling in S v Vermaas; S v Du 
Plessis,67 a brief discussion of the state of the law and an analysis of some of our 
judgments prior to the commencement of the (interim) Constitution are indulged in. 
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While I lament the fact that the Court, and Didcott J in particular, missed the very first 
opportunity to address one of the major flaws in our legal system, I accept that it is 
probably better to leave at the discretion of the trial court the decision as to whether in 
a particular case "substantial injustice would otherwise result" if an indigent accused 
person is not represented by a lawyer at state expense. However, cases subsequent 
to the Court's decision in S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis demonstrate the problems and 
controversies that might ensue as the Courts begin to exercise their discretion in this 
regard. 
Chapter 9 deals with the Constitutional Court's approach to the question of a fair trial 
and access to information. An analysis is done of the way the Court handled the special 
common law privilege68 which operated in favour of the State and in terms of which, in 
general, an accused person had no right of access to information in the possession of 
the State which was relevant to his or her case. 
The Constitutional Court, in Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of the 
Transvaal and Another,69 whilst rejecting the special common law privilege in favour 
of the State, which was confirmed by the Appellate Division in R v Steyn,70 correctly 
held that the accused does not have a blanket right of access to relevant information 
and State witnesses. The matter is now left to the trial court which is required in each 
case to balance the accused person's right to a fair trial against the legitimate interests 
of the State and, exercising its discretion, to decide whether to grant or deny the 
accused such access. In view of the Court's decision where the State refuses an 
accused person access to relevant information in its possession or to State witnesses, 
our Courts should decide objectively whether or not to use their discretion in favour of 
such an accused person. 
A critical view is taken of the Court's suggestion that the whole question turns solely on 
the right to a fair trial, and the apparent relegation of the right to access to information 
to a lesser status. 
Chapter 10 involves an analysis of the way the Constitutional Court dealt with the 
thorny issue of the death penalty in S v Makwanyane and Another. 71 The chapter first 
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looks at how each of the judges who delivered their own judgments arrived at the 
conclusion that the death penalty was in conflict with the (interim) Constitution. In this 
regard, it is interesting that, whilst for Chaskalson P the death penalty was 
unconstitutional primarily because it was a form of "cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment", for many of the judges who concurred in his judgment it was 
unconstitutional primarily because it violated the constitutionally guaranteed right to life. 
Secondly, the chapter looks at the inexplicabte way the otherwise cautious Court was 
prepared to go beyond what it was called upon in casu to deal with, namely the 
constitutionality of the provisions of Section 277 ( 1 )(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 72 
While I accept this decision, I am needless to say critical of the Court's reluctance to go 
the whole hog and declare the whole death penalty unconstitutional instead of limiting 
its order to the provisions of Section 277(1 )(a), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Act. 
Chapter 11 deals with the way the Constitutional Court handled corporal punishment 
in S v ·Williams. 73 I note with regret that Langa J decided not to follow the Court's 
approach in Makwanyane and declare that corporal punishment in its entirety as 
sanctioned by our law is unconstitutional precisely for the reasons the Learned Judge 
gave in his judgment. Instead, the Learned Judge ignored even the views many of our 
judges had expressed on this question and the human rights jurisprudence that has 
accumulated in neighbouring states on it, and preferred to concentrate on what the 
Court had been called upon to decide, namely whether juvenile whipping was 
consistent with the (interim) Constitution. The chapter then demonstrates the absurdity 
this cautious and narrow approach unavoidably leads to. 
Chapter 12 analyses the Constitutional Court's decision in Coetzee v Government of 
the Republic of South Africa; Matiso and Others v Commanding Officer, Port 
Elizabeth Prison and Others,74 in which it declared committal to prison for debt 
unconstitutional and therefore invalid. The chapter, inter alia, looks at the application 
of the two-stage approach to constitutional adjudication, as well as the question of 
severability as it arose in casu. The chapter then looks at the debt collection system 
in the aftermath of the Court's decision that the arrest and incarceration of persons for 
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contempt of court arising solely from failure to comply with a court order ad pecuniam 
solvendam was unconstitutional and therefore invalid. 
Chapter 13 looks at two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national 
government on the distribution of powers between provinces and the national 
government. While in the one case75 the applicants achieved a pyrrhic victory, in the 
other one76 the applicants were not successful at all. The two cases are instructive as 
they deal, inter alia, with the Constitutional Court's approach to the thorny issues of the 
nature of the South African state, the place of our provinces in the polity and the 
distribution of powers between the provinces and the national government. 
The last chapter, Chapter 14, deals with the Constitutional Courts's approach to its work 
pertaining to the certification of two constitutions, namely the Constitution of the 
Province of KwaZulu-Natal77 and the new Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa.78 The two cases where certification of constitutions was involved were 
instances where the Court dealt with critical issues that were not necessarily concerned 
with the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. 
In both instances the salient features are analysed. The conclusion arrived at is that the 
Court acquitted itself well in handling the controversial quasi-political questions that 
arose in both cases. 
Penuell M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 16 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION 
1 . The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 200 of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 
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63 .. Namely that, as was held in R v Ndhlovu, 1945 AD 369 at 386, "[i]n all criminal cases it is for the 
Crown to establish the guilt of the accused, not for the accused to establish his innocence. The onus is 
on the Crown to prove all averments to establish his guilt." 
64 .. 1996 (1) BCLR 141 (CC). 
65 .. 1996 (2) BCLR 155 (CC). 
66 .. Section 25(3)(e) of the (interim) Constitution. It is noted that Section 35(3)(g) of the (new) 
Constitution is a rehash of this provision. 
67 .. 1995 (7) BCLR 851 (CC). 
68 .. For which see R v Steyn, 1954 (1) SA 324 (A), inter alia. 
69 .. 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 (CC). 
70 .. Supra. 
71 .. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
72 .. That is whether, stricto sensu, the death penalty was an appropriate penalty for murder. 
73 .. Op cit. 
74 .. 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC). 
75 .. Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others,1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC). 
76 .. Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and Others v President of the Republic and Others, 1995 (12) BCLR 
(CC). 
77 .. Which was required in terms of Section 160(4) and (5) of the (interim) Constitution. 
78 .. As required under Section 71 (2) of the (interim) Constitution. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
FROM THE OLD TOA NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
University of South Africa 
0 n 27 April 1994 the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, 1 came into effect. This Constitution brought to an end the old constitutional 
system, the main features of which dated back to the very foundation of the Union of 
South Africa.2 For the purposes of this chapter, a synopsis of the constitutional 
development of South Africa from the colonial days, through the period of the Act of 
Union, to the constitutional order established in 1993, will be provided. This, needless 
to say, is essential if one is to fully grasp and understand the impact of the fundamental 
changes brought about by the 1993 Constitution. 
In addition to that, a summary of the basic features of the 1993 Constitution will also 
be given. These are the features which set the scene for the functioning of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic. 
FROM THE ACT OF UNION TO 1961 
The Union of South Africa was a culmination of a process of unification3 which brought 
together under one flag4 the four British colonies consisting of the two Boer Republics, 
namely the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, as well as the Cape5 and Natal. 
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Before then, the four colonies were disparate polities, a brief summary of the 
constitutional systems of which is presented below. The importance of this exercise will 
become self-evident below. 
THE PRE-UNION SITUATION 
The Cape Colony 
The second British occupation of the Cape in 1806 finally brought the the rule of the 
Dutch East India Company to an end. For the first two decades thereafter, virtually all 
powers of government were vested in the Governor, whose legislative and executive 
powers were subject only to orders in council, letters patent and the royal instructions.6 
In 1825 a nominated Advisory Council, comprising the Chief Justice and leading 
officials, was created. Legislation was now technically in the hands of the Governor-in-
Concil, but the Council had such limited powers of control over the Governor that it 
proved ineffectual. 7 The subsequent addition of two unofficial members two years later 
did not help improve the situation. 
In 1827, the legal system was transformed when magistrates replaced the Janddrosten 
and heemraden who had been inherited from the Dutch era. Despite this development, 
however, practice still lagged behind policy - and at first anyone could become a 
magistrate on payment of a fee. Consequently, legal procedure, particularly in the rural 
areas, was often casual and slipshod. What helped improve the situation was the 
introduction of the first Charter of Justice in 1827. 
Under the Charter of Justice, which inter a/ia introduced trial by jury, the courts, for the 
first time, could hear complaints from servants and receive evidence from Christian 
slaves. Because the Charter made no reference to the colour or class of litigants or 
witnesses, it could be concluded that technically there was no discrimination. However, 
in practice, with the exception of a few law agents and court interpreters, the 
administration of justice was exclusively white. Most civil disputes involved white 
litigants, whereas most criminal prosecutions were against black accused persons. The 
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"local public" referred to in numerous proclamations and ordinances in practice meant 
the local white public. Slaves and Khoisan servants had little access to the law, and 
juries, in practice, consisted of white men only. 
One of the major grievances of the Boers was that disputes which had once been 
settled by informal discussion and negotiation were now debated in court. Regular 
circuit courts which were established in 1811 were conducting proceedings in public. 
It was a rude shock for whites to find that their black employees could now take them 
to court and theoretically win a suit against them.8 A farmer would now have to travel 
long distances to lodge a complaint against an offending servant, whereas previously 
he could have dispensed his own version of justice literally from the comfort of his 
home. Now, if he chose that course, he could well find himself the defendant rather than 
the plaintiff. 
A new constitution for the colony was introduced in 1834. It provided for a non-elective 
legislative council comprising the Governor, the four most senior officials, the Attorney-
General and from five to seven unofficial nominees of the Governor. The legislative 
council was competent to legislate on a restricted number of topics. Furthermore, the 
British Crown could still legislate for the colony, disallow legislation or even allow it to 
lapse by not approving it within three years as was required. 
The 1834 Constitution further provided for an executive council which consisted of the 
Governor and the four most senior officials. The Governor presided over the executive 
council's meetings. Although the Executive Council exercised control over the 
Governor's powers in theory, he remained extremely powerful in practice, since he had 
both a deliberative and a casting vote in the Council and, moreover, retained the power 
of disallowance.9 
This state of affairs was to continue till 1853 when a new constitution was introduced. 
For the first time, the colony saw a Parliament consisting of the Governor10 and two 
elective Houses, an upper House, the Legislative Council, and a lower House, the 
House of Assembly. 11 Franchise qualifications were, by the standards of those days, 
low 12 and the franchise was thus theoretically generally enjoyed by all men on a non-
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discriminatory basis. This was one of the few most notable virtues of British liberalism 
of that age, a movement that began by seeking the abolition of slavery and went on to 
seek a more representative government, that found its way to the Cape Colony in the 
early years of the 19th century. 
However, as Jack and Ray Simons pointed out, precisely because class and colour 
coincided so closely that the constitutional system was colour-blind only in form, this 
Parliament was a parliament of masters which showed small sympathy with the working 
man (sic!), 13 who in the majority of cases was non-white. In the Eastern Cape, where 
in some constituencies the "Kaffir vote" made up around 40% after the annexation of 
the Transkeian territories, many liberals favoured individual land tenure in the stead of 
the traditional system of collective or communal ownership. The Registration Act of 
1887 made it clear that communal land tenure did not count as a qualification towards 
the franchise, thus effectively excluding many blacks. 
By 1892 the qualification had been raised, thus requiring voters to occupy premises 
valued at at least seventy-five Pounds or to earn at least fifty Pounds per annum. In 
addition, each voter had to be able to write his name, address and occupation. 14 In 
practice, therefore, the franchise discriminated against a colour-class, so that even at 
the best of times non-whites in the Cape Colony never succeeded in returning any of 
their own people to Parliament. Parliament effectively"remained at all times a bourgeois 
institution of white landowners, merchants, company directors and professional men, 
in which the working class, white or coloured, had no representative of their own. 15 
The 1853 constitution of the Cape Colony also made provision for an executive 
authority, the Executive Council. Members of the Executive Council could sit and speak, 
but not vote, in both Houses of Parliament. However, other than the Governor, the 
members of the Executive were not eligible for membership of Parliament. 
While the new constitution gave the Cape Colony a representative government, unlike 
Canada and Australia, it did not give the colony a responsible form of government until 
1872.16 
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Natal 
Before the British occupied Natal in 1842, thus subjecting the territory to British colonial 
rule till the establishment of the Union of South Africa, the majority of the Boer trekkers17 
who had settled in Natal in 183818 had established the Republic of Natalia and drafted 
the Grondwet of Natal which took the form of Instructions for the Council of 
Representatives of the People. 19 The Grondwet made provision for the annual election 
of a Volksraad which sat in Pietermaritzburg, and theoreticaly under the jurisdiction of 
which fell the trekkers who had remained behind in Winburg as well as those who had 
settled in Potchefstroom. 
This situation was not to last long; as stated above, the British annexed Natal in 1842 
following military intervention,20 and allegiance to Britain was accepted in 1843 and the 
territory was to remain a British Colony till Union. Initially, from late in 1845, Natal under 
British colonial rule was governed as a district of the Cape by a Lieutenant-Governor 
and an Executive Council of five officials.21 However, governing the territory from the 
Cape soon became too cumbersome. 
In 1847 a nominated Legislative Council consisting of the Officer Administering the 
Government and two or three other persons was set up by letters patent. Three persons 
were subsequently added to the Council in terms of Royal instructions. 22 This stuation, 
despite incessant demands for representative institutions, continued till 1856 when the 
Charter of 1856 was granted following the recommendations of Sir George Grey, then 
Governor at the Cape.23 
Following the precedents of New South Wales and the West Indies, a unicameral 
legislature, the Legislative Council, three quarters of the members of which were 
elected and one-quarter of whom were nominated, was established.24 Though initially 
there was no explicit colour bar, "the franchise qualifications were high enough to 
ensure that virtually no Non-Whites would qualify."25 The Natal Constitution effectively 
denied the franchise to blacks, although, theoretically, a black male could obtain a vote. 
First, he had to be literate and be the owner of fixed property. He could then petition the 
Lieutenant-Governor for exemption from customary law, which was granted or denied 
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at the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor. If granted the exemption, the man was 
then placed under the restraints and penalties of Roman-Dutch law and, after a period 
of seven years - provided he had resided in Natal lawfully for at least twelve years - he 
could then apply for registration as a voter. The application had to be accompanied by 
a certificate of recommendation endorsed by at least three white voters and signed by 
a Justice of the Peace. Again, the final arbiter in this regard was the discretion of the 
Lieutenant-Governor. 
Thus, all in all, only three blacks were granted the vote in the entire life of the colony of 
Natal. Eventually a law disenfranchising all non-whites, including Indian indentured 
labourers who had come to Natal in 1860, was passed in 1896. 
The Orange Free State 
The 1854 Constitution26 of the Orange Free State created a unitary state with a 
unicameral legislature, the Volksraad.21 The American influence was palpable.28 A non-
sovereign legislature29 was established; certain rights, such as the right to vote,30 the 
right of peaceful assembly and petititon,31 the right to private property, the right of 
personal freedom, the right of freedom of the press and equality before the law,32 were 
guaranteed. Of particular note is that there was no guarantee of freedom of worship 
under the Grondwet. The Volksraad was compelled to promote and support the 
Nederlandsche Hervormde Kerk, later called the Nederduitsch Gereformeerde Kerk.33 
The franchise was given to "citizens" only. Citizenship was granted to all white 
persons34 who had been resident in the Orange Free State for not less than six months. 
As was to be expected, the unicameral legislature, the Volksraad, provided for under 
the Grondwet was elected by whites only. 35 
Under the Grondwet, which was the fundamental law of the Orange Free State, the 
Volksraad was elected for four years, with half the members retiring every two years as 
was the case under the Dutch Constitution. Until 1866, candidates for Volksraad 
membership did not have to be citizens of the Orange Free State. White persons who 
had attained the age of twenty-five years, who had been resident in the Orange Free 
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State prior to their election, and who possessed unencumbered immovable property 
worth at least two hundred pounds, were all eligible for Volksraad membership. 
As stated above, the Volksraad was a non-sovereign legislature. Judge JBM Hertzog, 
later to become Prime Minister of South Africa, had in effect held in The State v 
Gibson36 that though the Volksraad was beyond any doubt the highest legislative 
authority in the Orange Free State, it was still not unqualifiedly the highest authority. 
Above the Volksraad stood the constitution-giving authority, the sovereign people, to 
whom the majesty belonged. 
Persons entitled to vote for the Volksraad were also entitled to vote for the President 
of the Orange Free State, who was elected by popular vote, who held the office for five 
years,37 and whose main function was executive,38 but who was also expected to advise 
the Volksraad, at the meetings over which he did not preside. Candidates for the 
presidency were not subject to any qualifications whatsoever - they did not even have 
to be "citizens" or be domiciled in the territory of the Orange Free State. 
The President alone, and not the Executive Council, was responsible to the Volksraad. 
He was responsible for the functioning of government departments and the public 
service and had many other executive responsibilities. 39 According to Carpenter,40 in 
practice, the President of the Orange Free State "was the dominant figure in both the 
executive and the legislature. Even though the legislature appeared in theory to be in 
a strong position vis-a-vis the President, the latter called the tune ... ". 
However, the Volksraad did have some judicial powers. As is the case with the 
Congress of the US, it could, for example, decide on the validity of the election of a 
member and could impeach the President. If it mustered a three-quarters majority of its 
members present at a full Volksraad, it could try the President and other public officers 
for treason, bribery and other "serious crimes" and, if they were found guilty, dismiss 
them from office and bar them from future public office. Moreover, any appeal against 
the actions of the President had to be lodged with the Volksraad. 41 
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The Constitution was a rigid one, with an onerous amendment procedure42 to prevent 
it from being amended at the whim of any ruling party. Like the Constitution of the 
United States of America, it made no specific provision for judicial review and, therefore, 
like in the United States of America, judicial review was assumed to be an inherent 
feature of the Constitution.43 
Shorn of the racism and sexism immanent within it, the Grondwet, in the words of 
James Bryce,44 
came as near as any set of men ever have come to the situation which 
philosophers have so often imagined, but which has so rarely in fact occurred -
that of free and independent persons uniting in an absolutely new social compact 
for mutual help and defence, and thereby creating a government whose authority 
has had, and can have had, no origin save in the consent of the governed. 
The South African Republic {the Transvaal) 
The Constitution of the Transvaal,45 on the other hand, was blatantly racist and less 
sophisticated than the one of the Orange Free State. It expressly provided that: 
the People desire to permit no equality between coloured people and the white 
inhabitants, either in Church or State.46 
Article 9 of the Grondwet of the South African Republic actually provided that "[t]he 
people will not permit equality between coloured persons and the white inhabitants, 
either in Church or State."47 
From this it followed that, as was the case under the Constitution of the Orange Free 
State, both citizenship and the franchise were confined to whites. 
Though there were a few provisions in the Grondwet which vaguely suggested that it 
contained some level of entrenchment of civil liberties, it would be erroneous to 
conclude from that it guaranteed basic civil rights. It was not clear either whether the 
Grondwet was fundamental legislation superior even to the legislature (ie the 
Volksraad), though there were several articles from which it could be gleaned that the 
people (and not the Volksraad) were the sovereign. 
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Vague procedures were prescribed for the enactment of ordinary legislation, and more 
often than not such procedures were dispensed with. The validity of such informal laws 
(the Volksraad besluiten) later led to a constitutional crisis when Chief Justice JG Kotze, 
the first Chief Justice of the Transvaal High Court which was established in 1877, 
clearly acting under the influence of American jurisprudence, asserted the right to 
judicial review.48 
Before the constitutional crisis, the Vo/ksraad besluiten were upheld as valid in cases 
such as those of Nabal v Bok N.0.,49 McCorkindale's Exors v Bok N.0.,50 and Dom's 
Trustees v Bok N.0.,51 despite their glaring incompatibility with the Grondwet. 
However, Kotze CJ began adopting a different attitude in an obiter dictum in Hess v 
The State.52 His vacillation precipitated the constitutional crisis which began with his 
decision in Brown v Leyds N.0.,53 in which the Chief Justice and Ameshoff J held that 
the affected besluiten were incompatible with the Grondwet and therefore invalid. In this 
judgment the court had further held that sovereignty vested in the people and not in the 
Volksraad, that the Grondwet was a fundamental law with which the Volksraad had to 
comply, and that the Court, therefore, had a bounden duty to declare invalid all 
legislation that was not in conformity with it (ie the Grondwet). The effect of this decision 
was to nullify quite a large body of legislation which was incongruous with the 
Grondwet. 
Needless to say, Paul Kruger, then President of the Transvaal, was not amused:54 he 
swiftly pushed a bill55 through the Volksraad denying the right of the Court to exercise 
judicial review and empowering the President to dismiss any judge who failed or 
refused to give him the assurance that he would not exercise the testing right. The 
judges themselves responded by simply adjourning the High Court sine die, after which 
the Chief Justice of the Cape Colony, Sir Henry de Villiers, came to persuade both the 
President and the judiciary of the Transvaal to iron out their differences. 
A compromise was reached and the judges agreed to forego the testing right in 
exchange for an undertaking that the Grondwet would be amended to guarantee the 
independence of the judiciary as well as to ensure protection of the Constitution from 
amendment except by special procedure. When the government procrastinated, Kotze 
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CJ informed President Kruger that his undertaking to foreswear the testing right had 
since lapsed, whereupon he was summarily dismissed as a judge. 
When President Kruger was swearing in the new Chief Justice, R Gregorowski, he 
delivered a homily in which he described the testing right as a principle of the Devil 
which had been introduced to test the word of God.56 President Kruger had thus won 
the day and the Transvaal had rejected the notion of a rigd constitution in favour of the 
idol of parliamentary supremacy and the entrenchment of racial inequality. 
The other basic features of the Transvaal Grondwet were the following: 
A clear separation of powers between the three organs of state; a unicameral 
legislature (the Volksraad) elected by popular universal white male vote, the members 
of which had to belong to the Dutch Reformed Church;57 a popularly elected State 
President58 who presided over an Executive Council comprising a popuarly elected 
Commandant-General, officials and nominees of the Volksraad, all of whom had to 
belong to the Dutch Reformed Church, and which executive was not responsible to the 
Vo/ksraad; an independent judiciary which comprised elected landdrosten and 
heemraden, all of whom had to be members of the Dutch reformed Church. Unlike in 
the Orange Free State, there were no constitutionally guaranteed civil rights.59 
FROM 1902 TO 1909 
. THE FRANCHISE 
The most intractable question in the constitutional debate of those days proved to be 
the franchise. As Heinz Klug60 summarised the issue, 
[w]hile each of the territories that came together in the Union had its own franchise 
system, their notions of citizenship were fundamentally at odds. The Cape, with its 
qualified, non-racial franchise, recognized equal rights for 'all civilized men'. The 
Transvaal , with its racial but otherwise unqualified franchise, specifically declared that 
no equality shall be permitted between 'coloured people and the white inhabitants, either 
in Church or State'. The Cape franchise reflected a notion of citizenship not unlike 
contemporary British norms, in which adult males who met certain cultural or property 
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standards had a right to participate in governance. The Transvaal maintained a clearly 
racist distinction and even attempted to restrict franchise rights in presidential and 
Volksraad elections to those who, besides being naturalized citizens, had lived in the 
Republic for fourteen years. Natal formally adopted a 'civilized' standard, but the colony 
was able, through 'a number of ingenious conditions attached to the franchise', to ensure 
that by 1907 over 99 per cent of registered voters were white and only six Africans had 
managed to register as voters. The Orange Free State liad a racially exclusive franchise. 
Citizenship in the Cape and Natal was thus formally tied to a process of assimilation to 
colonial standards of education and property, while in the Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State citizenship had an expressly racial construction. 
After a lengthy debate, a compromise was reached, in terms of which the Cape was 
allowed to retain its "colour-blind" franchise qualifications,61 while the three northern 
provinces were constitutionally permitted to exclude blacks from participation in the 
electoral process.62 This compromise was given constitutional entrenchment.63 The 
Coloured and (Cape) African males64 thus retained their voting rights till their removal 
as described below. 
As part of the Vereeniging settlement, the victorious Brits gave the vanquished Boers 
an assurance that the franchise would not be extended to blacks in the ex-republics 
before the restoration of self-government. Thus, when the representatives of the 
parliaments of the four colonies met to discuss the possibility of unification, the strong 
hand of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, allied with Natal, was able to keep 
blacks effectively off the common voters' roll;65 the Cape merely secured the 
constitutionally entrenched continuance of the existence of its "colour-blind" franchise.66 
Thus, just after eight years of their defeat at the hands of British imperialism, a new 
breed of Afrikaners who dominated the process leading to unification established the 
Union of South Africa as a whiteman's country, "a state which was already providing 
more than a quarter of the world's gold."67 
Thus emerged a modern capitalist state in southern Africa that was "supported by the 
power of the mining magnates and identified with the interests of British imperialism."68 
As will appear more fully below, the exercise of power and all the organs, agencies and 
institutions of state were based on race, with the black majority lingering on the fringes 
of society, in conditions akin to slavery, with no vote and no say on public affairs. 
On the basis of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,69 which made it clear that 
colonial legislatures were subordinate to the British Parliament and that any colonial law 
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repugnant to a British Act of Parliament extending to the affected colony was null and 
void, the Parliament of the Union of South Africa was, at least in theory, subject to 
British control. In practical terms, however, this situation was not problematic for those 
who wielded race-based power as there was, at the same time, a commonwealth 
convention which prevented Britain from legislating for the Dominions without their 
consent. 
Twenty-one years after the formation of the Union in 1910, the enactment of the 
Statute of Westminster, 1931,70 which repealed the Colonial Laws Validity Act and 
thus effectively placed the Union of South Africa out of British suzerainty, a debate 
arose as to whether the entrenched clauses of the South Africa Act were not affected 
by the repeal of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. It was argued that now that South 
Africa had a sovereign Parliament, she could no longer be subjected to entrenched 
legislative procedures "as in some quarters they were seen to be entirely dependent 
upon an Act of the British Parliament. "71 
In 1924 the (Afrikaner Nationalist) National Party and the (white working class) Labour 
Party formed the "Pact" government. Government efforts to remove Africans from the 
common voters' roll started in earnest immediately thereafter. In 1927 Parliament 
enacted the Native Administration Act72 which, according to Klug,73 "implemented the 
system of bureaucratic governance over African communities implicit in the Union 
Constitution". The Act was unsuccessfully challenged in R v Ndobe74 as an illegal 
attack on the Cape franchise. 
In 1936, Barry Hertzog had finally persuaded Jan Smuts to support a package that 
stripped the indigenous Africans of the vote, setting up a Natives' Representative 
Council and consolidating the land proposals made in 1913. Africans were thus left with 
only 13% of the land.75 Despite all the assurances76 that any proposed legislative 
changes would not derogate from the entrenched clauses, the unicameral procedure 
prescribed in the entrenched clauses was used to pass the Representation of Natives 
Act, 1936,77 which removed Africans from the Cape common voters' roll and gave all 
of them separate, race-based representation. 
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In terms of the new political configuration, the indigenous Africans were allowed to 
elect three white representatives to the House of Assembly. At the same time, provision 
was made for four white Senators, elected by electoral colleges, to represent the 
Africans in the whole national territory. 
The Representation of Natives Act was challenged by one Albert Ndlwana, a 
registered Cape Native voter,78 who sought an interdict against the removal of his name 
from the Cape common voters' roll on the basis that the unicameral procedure was no 
longer applicable in the aftermath of the enactment of the Statute of Westminster in 
1931. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal in 
Ndlwana, held per Stratford ACJ (as he then was) that: 
Parliament, composed of its three constituent elements, can adopt any 
procedure it thinks fit; the procedure expressed or implied in the South Africa Act 
so far as the Courts of Law are concerned is at the mercy of Parliament like 
everything else ... Parliament's will ... as expressed in an Act of Parliament 
cannot now in this country, as it cannot in England, be questioned by a Court of 
Law, whose function is to enforce that will, not question it ... It is obviously 
senseless to speak of an Act of a Sovereign law making body as ultra vires. 
There can be no exceeding of power when that power is limitless.79 (my 
emphasis) 
The major premise in the Ndlwana judgment was that the effect of the Statute of 
Westminster was to make the Union Parliament a sovereign Parliament of exactly the 
same nature and status as the Parliament of the United Kingdom. 80 In the light of 
Ndlwana, it was generally accepted that the entrenched clauses of the South Africa 
Act had lost their legal efficacy and were at the mercy of a transient parliamentary 
majority.81 
Twelve years after the disenfranchisement of the Cape indigenous Africans, OF Malan, 
the new Prime Minister, obviously "fortified by the decision in Ndlwana's case",82 
announced that the Coloureds too would be disenfranchised.83 Buoyed by this,84 and 
yet as they surely lacked the necessary support for the unicameral procedure 
prescribed in the entrenched clauses, the Malan apartheid regime thought the 
legislative changes they sought could be effected by a simple majority vote in both 
Houses of Parliament sitting separately. In 1951, despite massive and vigorous 
opposition, they pushed through both Houses, sitting separately, the Separate 
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Representation of Voters Act85 which sought to remove the Coloured community from 
the mainstream of South African political life. 
This Act was promptly challenged in the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court 
by four Coloured persons who sought to have it declared null and void. The Court, 
however, felt it was bound by the Appellate Division decision in Ndlwana and, 
therefore, gave judgment for the respondents. The matter went on appeal and the 
process culminated in the first 'Vote case", Harris v Minister of the lnterior,86 in which 
the Court, in a judgment delivered by Centlivres CJ, unanimously upheld the contention 
that the Separate Representation of Voters Act was null and void and overruled the 
Ndlwana decision. 
In a swift response to this development, Malan fulminating in the House of Assembly 
on the same day as the Harris judgment was passed, declared that: 
Neither Parliament nor the people of South Africa will be prepared to acquiesce 
in a position where the legal sovereignty of the lawfully and democratically 
elected representatives of the people is denied, and where appointed judicial 
authority assumes the testing right, namely, the right to pass judgment on the 
exercise of its legislative powers by the elected representatives of the people ... 
It is imperative that the legislative sovereignty of Parliament should be placed 
beyond any doubt, in order to ensure order and certainty.87 (my emphasis) 
After the Appellate Division had declared the Separate Representation of Voters Act 
invalid, the apartheid regime responded by enacting, again by the ordinary bi-cameral 
method, the High Court of Parliament Act,88 in terms of which a High Court of 
Parliament was established to consider the legality of Acts of Parliament. The High 
Court of Parliament, comprising all the members of Parliament, from both the Senate 
and the House of Assembly, was empowered to review any judgment of the Appellate 
Division invalidating an Act of Parliament. 
This brings us to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
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THE DOCTRINE OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY 
When the South Africa Act was drafted, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,89 
a concept which was inherited from English legal tradition, was a predominant feature 
of the jurisprudence espoused by the founders of the Union of South Africa.90 For those 
persons, steeped as they were in English legal history and jurisprudence, which they 
venerated, no other form of constitution was possible.91 The resultant bi-cameral 
Parliament was an institution that was omnipotent, that could legislate on any subject 
and in any terms it chose, and no other institution constituted a source of legislation 
superior to Parliament or was empowered constitutionally to declare its Acts invalid;92 
the institution was /egibus solutus. To paraphrase Dicey, there was no power which, 
under that system, could come into rivalry with the legislative sovereignty of 
Parliament.93 The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty had thus become the 
grundnorm of the South African constitutional system. 
The High Court of Parliament,94 as was to be expected, reversed the decision of the 
Appellate Division in Harris v Minister of the lnterior.95 Subsequently, the validity of 
the High Court of Parliament itself was challenged in the Cape Provincial Division, 
where the applicants' contention was upheld. The Minister of Interior then took the 
matter on appeal in Minister of the Interior v Harris.96 The Appellate Division refused 
the appeal on the grounds that Section 152 of the South Africa Act guaranteed certain 
rights; that these rights would be meaningless if the Supreme Court could not protect 
them against infringement; and the so-called High Court of Parliament was not a court 
of law, but simply Parliament masquerading in the robes of a court of law. After 
carefully analysing and comparing the High Court of Parliament with other courts, 
Centlivres CJ concluded that: 
[w]hen ... one looks at the substance of the matter, the so-called 'High Court of 
Parliament' is not a Court of Law but simply Parliament functioning under 
another name ... Parliament cannot by passing an Act giving itself the name of 
a Court of Law come to any decision which will have the effect of destroying the 
entrenched provisions of Section 152 of the Constitution.97 
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Having thus once again been defeated, and in its determination to remove every 
vestige of non-white representation in Parliament, the National Party government 
resorted to enlarging the Senate98 from forty-eight to eighty-nine members to provide 
the ruling party with the necessary two-thirds majority. Furthermore, legislation99 was 
enacted to reconstitute the Appellate Division itself, so that it would consist of eleven 
(and not five) members when adjudicating upon constitutional matters. 
The Constitution was amended by the South Africa Act Amendment Act, 100 which 
reinstated the Separate Representation of Voters Act, removed the provisions of 
Section 35 of the Constitution from the entrenching procedure and provided explicitly 
that: 
no court of law shall be competent to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity 
of any law passed by Parliament other than a law which alters or repeals or 
purports to alter or repeal the provisions of Section 137 or 152 of the South 
Africa Act, 1909. 
The reconstituted Appellate Division then heard an appeal against the Cape Provincial 
Division decision in Collins v Minister of the Interior, 101 refusing to declare invalid both 
the Senate Act and the South Africa Act Amendment Act. The Court held the 
legislation valid by a majority of ten to one, 102 the dissenting judge being Schreiner 
JA. 103 To paraphrase Centlivres CJ, the fact that the Senate had been enlarged solely 
to obtain a two-thirds majority for the purpose of altering the Coloured 104 franchise was 
irrelevant. The learned Chief justice held, inter a/ia, that: 
[i]f a legislature has plenary power to legislate on a particular matter, no question 
can arise as to the validity of any legislation on that matter and such legislation 
is valid whatever the real purpose of that legislation is. If Parliament sitting 
bicamerally has power to reconstitute the Senate, ie if its powers are not 
restricted by any other provision in the South Africa Act, then evidence as to the 
purpose of the Senate Act is irrelevant. 105 (my emphasis) 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court had thus capitulated and the National 
Party government had achieved its aspirations, not so much by sticking to its old guns 
and returning to the Transvaal-type constitution or its 1942 draft constitution,106 as by 
simply accepting and using the British doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty "in its 
pristine purity, cleansed of the devilish testing right". 107 The foundation had thus been 
laid for the future constitutional order which began in 1961, when white South Africa, 
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without bothering to consult the other inhabitants of the national territory, 108 established 
the Republic of South Africa. 
THE CONSTITUTION 
The end product of the process that culminated in the adoption of the Act of Union was, 
in a nutshell, a flexible British-type constitution which would not brook any attempt at 
political subordination of Parliament to any checks and balances. In a word, no bill of 
rights was provided for in the document. Having learnt that a flexible constitution 
provided no legal safeguards against arbitrary government, and being men with such 
a great penchant for racism, it is not surprising that none of them was prepared to press 
for a rigid constitution with as much as a semblance of a bill of rights. With both the 
collusion and the connivance of the British Empire, they ushered in a race-based 
oligarchy, the chief violator of human rights and freedoms, that ravaged and lorded it 
over the country for eighty-four years. 
There was no distinction between the Constitution and ordinary legislation; the South 
Africa Act was an ordinary statute and not a fundamental law of the Union. 
However, though the Constitution was modeled on the British constitutional system, it 
was not absolutely flexible; it had elements of rigidity, namely the issues of the 
franchise and the equal status accorded to English and (initially Dutch) Afrikaans. 
These two issues were guaranteed under Sections 35 and137 respectively, with 
Section 152 thereof providing explicitly that none of these two sections could be 
amended, save by a two-thirds majority vote of members of both Houses of Parliament 
in a joint sitting at the third reading of the Bill seeking an amendment. 
BLACKS AND NATIONAL PARTY RULE 
As Dugard pointed out, for some time after the National Party had won the 1948 
election, "[n]o real effort was made to provide an institutional framework for the 
promised vertical separate development ... "109 However, an indication of the direction 
things would take with regard to participation of the indigenous Africans in public affairs 
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was given by the enactment of the Bantu Authorities Act110 which gave recognition to 
traditional, tribal authorities, all of which were confined to thirteen per cent of the 
national territory. 
Subsequently, after HF Verwoerd had become Prime Minister in 1958, the white 
parliamentary representatives of Africans were removed, thus preparing for the launch 
of apartheid's Grand Design, namely separate development. The first step in this 
direction was the enactment of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 111 in 
terms of which the so-called Bantu peoples of South Africa, who, according to the 
preamble to the Act, did not form one homogenous group but constituted eight separate 
national units according to language and culture, which would one day form separate 
self-governing national units. 
During the 1960s, the traditional, tribal authorities that were given recognition under the 
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 were substantially developed. In 1963, one such 
political entity, the Transkei, was hurriedly given the status and the trappings of 
constitutional self-government. The territory's Constitution,112 which remained in force 
till 26 October 1976, when the Transkei acquired 'independence' from Pretoria, 113 was 
the constitutional model for the rest of the bantustans that subsequently acquired the 
status of self-government from 1971.114 Under its Constitution, the Transkei established 
its own Legislative Assembly, 115 its own executive led by a Chief Minister, acquired its 
own flag, anthem and lsi-Xhosa was recognised as an official language in addition to 
Afrikaans and English. While under international law they remained citizens of the 
Republic, blacks 'nationals' of the Transkei acquired Transkeian 'citizenship'. 
While the Transkei Legislative Assembly thus established had certain legislative 
competences, 116 including the power to repeal the laws of the Republic dealing with 
matters falling under its jurisdiction, the Parliament of the Republic remained supreme 
over the whole of South Africa. The power of the South African Parliament to legislate 
over the Transkei was not ousted. 117 As such, the statutes of the Republic might not be 
challenged in the light of the provisions of Section 59(2) of the South African 
Constitution of 1961 . 
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Moreover, the South African Government retained an ultimate veto over Transkeian 
legislation because all enactments of the Legislative Assembly required the imprimatur 
of the State President, acting on the advice of his white executive. This, indeed, was 
the height of the politics of domestic colonialism. 118 
The principal objective of Pretoria in all this was to lead the bantustans/homelands to 
self-government and eventually to independence. Thus, in 1970, the South African 
Parliament enacted the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act119 which 120 provided that 
every indigenous African who was not a 'citizen' of a self-governing territory would 
become a 'citizen' of the bantu territorial area to which he/she was attached by birth, 
domicile or cultural affiliation. In 1971, the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, 121 
which empowered the South African Government to grant constitutions substantially 
similar to the 1963 Transkeian Constitution to the other territorial areas after 
consultation with them, was enacted. 
The basic objective of the National Party Government was then to grant 'independence' 
to all the ten bantustans it had thus created. While the 'independence' was recognised 
only by the affected bantustans and the National Party Government, some scholars of 
constitutional law were tempted to accord respect to it. Carpenter, for example, 
erroneously assumed that, as a result, the constitutions of the four bantustans that had 
opted for full independence did not belong in a discussion of South African 
constitutional law .122 
An 'Independent' Transkei 
The so-called Republic of Transkei came into being on 26 October 1976. Carpenter 
quite correctly observed that, whereas the South Africa Act was an Act of the British 
Parliament, the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act was an enactment of the 
Transkeian Parliament. To pave the way forthe independence of the territory, the South 
African Parliament had to pass legislation empowering the Transkeian legislature to 
take this step. The legislative assembly then adopted a motion requesting 
independence and establishing a recess committee and a working committee of experts 
to negotiate independence and devise an independence constitution. 123 The 
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independence of the Transkei was granted and given recognition by the National Party 
Government through the Status of the Transkei Act of 1976.124 In terms of this Act, 
the Republic of South Africa relinquished sovereignty over Transkei. The Act further 
provided for the continued existence of the treaties, conventions and agreements 
applicable to Transkei, for the validity of all agreements entered into by the Republic of 
South Africa and Transkei prior to the latter territory's acquisition of 'independence', as 
well as for the change-over from South African to Transkeian citizenship. 125 
The Status of the Transkei Act provided for mandatory denationalisation: It provided 
that, in addition to those persons born in the Transkei or directly descended from 
Transkeians, any person who was a 'citizen' of the Transkei before 'independence' or 
who had cultural or linguistic ties with the territory ceased to be a citizen of the 
Republic. 126 This was an act of denationalisation which Leonard Gering 127 likened to the 
Nazi decree of 1941 which deprived Jews of German citizenship. 
The independence constitution adopted by Transkei, though it had "African 
characteristics", was basically modeled on the South African Constitution of 1961 , 128 a 
Westminster-type of constitution in many respects. 129 Like that Constitution, it was a 
flexible, and not a rigid, Act. 
The Transkei constitution provided for a legislature which comprised the President, 130 
and the National Assembly, half of the members of which were elected and the rest of 
whom were "traditional headmen and captains."131 Like the pre-1994 South African 
Parliament, the legislature of Transkei was supreme; the grundnorm of Transkei was 
parliamentary sovereignty. As such, no court could impugn the validity of its 
enactments. 
The Transkeian constitution, like the pre-1994 South African constitution, made no 
provision for a bill of rights. There were no guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms 
that could serve as a benchmark for the Courts. 
Three other bantustans subsequently acquired 'independence' from Pretoria. These 
were Bophuthatswana, 132 Venda 133 and the Ciskei.134 Though Bophuthatswana and the 
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Ciskei had bills of rights and pretended to be protective of basic human rights and 
freedoms, a cursory analysis of their constitutions and/or their human rights records 
would prove otherwise. 
Bophuthatswana 
The Bophuthatswana Constitution, 135 an inflexible law which required a two-thirds 
majority vote of members present in the National Assembly for amendment, in its 
Chapter II, contained an impressive 'Declaration of Fundamental Rights', which were 
"binding on the legislature, the executive and the judiciary" and were "directly 
enforceable law". 136 However, most of those fundamental rights were subject to 
limitations imposed by an Act of Parliament, leaving a wide scope for interpretation. 
The Bophuthatswana Constitution, therefore, provided "a powerful tool for the judiciary 
to test any Executive orders and even Acts of Parliament against the bill of rights." 137 
Indeed, the (South African) Appellate Division took advantage of the space thus 
provided and held that the (South African) Terrorism Act, 138 which Bophuthatswana 
had inherited when it became 'independent', was inconsistent with the Bophuthatswana 
Constitution and, therefore, invalid in the bantustan. 139 
Bophuthatswana also had established the office of an ombudsman who was appointed 
by the legislature to hear complaints from individuals about exective action. The office 
was vested with powers to advise the executive, but not to overrule or compel it. 
The Ciskei 
The Ciskei provided for a number of basic human rights and freedoms in Chapter 111 of 
its Constitution, titled 'Declaration of Fundamental Rights'. The collection of human 
rights and freedoms was not much different from many that could be found in bills of 
rights belonging to democracies. However, the provisions of Section 19(3), which were 
to the effect that no law made by the National Assembly or which continued in force in 
the Ciskei under the Constitution could be declared invalid by any court of law by 
reason of the fact that it contravened or was contrary to Chapter 111, virtually nullified 
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their value. In such circumstances, the Ciskei government had little to fear from the 
courts, and if the courts ruled against government abuses and issued orders to stop 
them, the authorities simply ignored them. 140 
Venda 
The Venda self-governing territory was granted 'independence' on 13 September 1979 
in terms of the Status of Venda Act, 1979.141 The Venda National Assembly enacted 
an 'independence' Constitution which was "neither a Westminster-type constitution like 
that of Transkei nor a rigid constitution with an entrenched bill of rights like that of 
Bophuthatswana. "142 
There were no entrenched provisions in the Venda Constitution. All legislation might be 
passed by a simple majority of votes of members present. No courts of law were 
competent to adjudicate upon the validity of any law passed by the National 
Assembly, 143 a body which, like the legislatures of the other bantustans, was not a 
wholly elected institution. 
The Venda President, who did not act on the advice of his Cabinet but in consultation 
with it, 144 had a real veto over bills passed by the National Assembly. He could withhold 
his assent or return a bill to the National Assembly with his recommendations. If the 
amended bill was not acceptable to the National Assembly, the Assembly could pass 
its own bill by a two-thirds majority vote of members present, in which event the 
signature of the Speaker would replace that of the President. 145 
Indians and Coloureds 
Though in anti-apartheid circles the term 'black' is normally used in a generic sense to 
denote all non-white persons, for purposes of this chapter it is useful to treat the Indians 
and Coloureds separately. This is because under white rule these nationality group had 
their own separate political institutions. However, no provision was made for territorial 
homelands for these two groups; denied the right to participate in the mainstream of 
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public life, they were, instead, given councils with limited powers over 'their own 
people'. 
Coloureds 
The Coloureds, 146 who, as was stated above, had lost their franchise after the Appellate 
Division ruling in Collins v Minister of the Interior, were given separate white 
representation in the House of Assembly. In 1968 the National Party repealed this token 
representation 147 and replaced it with a Coloured Persons' Representative Council. 148 
This Council, which consisted of forty elected and twenty nominated members, was 
intended to represent all Coloured persons in the Republic. 
The Council had power to make laws affecting Coloureds on agriculture, community 
welfare and pensions, education, finance, local government and rural settlements. 
However, bills could not be introduced in the Council prior to, and without, approval by 
the Minister of Coloured Relations. Moreover, bills passed by the Council had to be 
approved by the (white) cabinet to become law. If a Council bill conflicted with an Act 
of Parliament, it was invalid ab initio. 
Administrative functions relating to Coloureds were to be performed by an executive of 
five persons, four of whom were elected by the Council, and chairman nominated by 
the (white) State President on the advice of his white cabinet. 
Indians 
In 1946 lndians149 were, in terms of the Asiatic Land Tenure [and Indian 
Representation] Act, 150 granted separate representation by three white members of 
Parliament and two Senators in the central Legislature. After the rejection of this token 
representation by the Asiatic people, the National Party Government repealed it in 
terms of the Asiatic Laws Amendment Act, 1948.151 
In 1968, a non-legislative and initially non-elective South African Indian Council, initially 
consisting of twenty-five Indian persons appointed152 by the Minister of Indian Affairs, 
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was established under the South African Indian Council Act, 1968. In 1974, the 
Council was increased in size, in terms of the South African Indian Council 
Amendment Act, 1972, 153 to thirty Indian persons, fifteen of whom were appointed by 
the Minister of Indian Affairs, while the rest were elected indirectly through electoral 
colleges in the four provinces composed largely of elected members of Indian local 
authorities. 
The Indian Council had an executive committee consisting of a chairman appointed by 
the Minister of Indian Affairs from among members of the Indian Council, and four 
members elected by the Indian Council. The Minister of Indian Affairs was empowered 
to delegate certain executive powers relating to Indian education and community 
welfare to the executive committee of the Indian Council. 
In 1976 the South African Prime Minister announced the formation of an Inter-Cabinet 
Council as a liaison machinery consisting of white, coloured and Indian members drawn 
from the white cabinet, the Coloured Person's Representative Council and the South 
African Indian Council. He rejected the notion of urban indigenous Africans, the 'Bantu', 
participating in the Council and emphasised that Africans would have to exercise their 
political rights in the respective homelands, 154 with which they were required to maintain 
a healthy relationship. As MC Botha declared, Government policy then was that all 
'Bantu' persons in the White area, whether they were born there or not, remained 
members of their respective nations; the basis on which they were in the White area 
was to sell their labour, and nothing else. 155 
The Prime Minister explained that the Inter-Cabinet Council would operate like all 
Cabinets and its decisions would be based on consensus purportedly reached after 
incisive discussion. However, the Council would have no legislative authority, though 
decisions of the (white) cabinet would ultimately become legislation. 156 
On an earlier occasion, on 23 March 1973, the Government had appointed the Theron 
Commission, 157 which was required to make recommendations within eighteen months 
on all matters relating to the Coloured people. 158 Questioned in the House of Assembly 
in April 1976, the Prime Minister said that the Commission had not been appointed to 
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devise a Coloured policy for his Government as it already had a policy. He had merely 
wanted the Commission to identify objectively, and bring to his attention, all points of 
friction to his Government. Whatever recommendations the Commission made were to 
be submitted to National Party congresses for decision. 159 Of critical importance, the 
Commission recommended that "[p]rovision should be made for satisfactory forms of 
direct Coloured representation and decision-making at the various levels of authority 
and of government."160 (my emphasis) 
Needless to say, the response of the Government to this was predictable: It declared 
that any recommendation to the effect that direct representation be granted to 
Coloureds in Parliament, provincial and local government institutions was unacceptable 
to it.161 
FROM 1961 TO 1983 
By a narrow margin, 162 white South Africa had, in an all-white referendum, elected to 
become a republic. However, the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 163 
brought about very little change in institutional terms: The (British) Queen was replaced 
as Head of State by the State President who retained virtually all the powers and 
prerogatives of the Queen. 
PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY 
The Constitution of the Republic164 reaffirmed that Parliament would remain the 
sovereign legislative authority. Seemingly with the purpose of eliminating once and for 
all time the right of the courts to test the validity of Acts of Parliament, the provisions of 
the South Africa Act Amendment Act165 were mutatis mutandis reenacted: The 
document provided that: 
{n]o court of law shall be competent to enquire into or pronounce upon the 
validity of any Act passed by Parlaiment, other than an Act which repeals or 
amends or purports to repeal or amend the provisions of section one hundred 
and eight or one hundred and eighteen. 166 (my emphasis) 
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The ruling party had found it politically expedient to retain the flexibility of the British 
constitutional model predicated upon the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Pleading utter powerlessness in the face of that constitutional system, Didcott J, who 
was destined to be one of the first judges of our new Constitutional Court, ruefully 
proclaimed that: 
... under a constitution like ours, Parliament is sovereign, and the Courts can no 
more assume a power which it has decreed that they shall lack, or set its 
enactments at nought, than can anyone else . . . Our Courts are powerless to 
legislate or to veto legislation. They can only interpret it, and then implement it 
in accordance with their interpretation of it ... effect must likewise be given to 
stringent enactments which are positively shown by Parliament's choice of plain 
words to have been meant, however offensive to conventional legal standards 
they may may be. 167 (my emphasis) 
THE UNENTRENCHED PROVISIONS 
An example of an unentrenched provision was Section 114 of the 1961 Constitution, 
which was a replica of the amended Section 149 of the South Africa Act. This 
provision, which, according to Carpenter, 168 was a procedural 'manner and form' issue, 
was concerned with protection of both the territorial integrity of the four original 
provinces and the provincial system. 
Needless to say, the territorial integrity of the four original provinces was affected when 
the various bantustans were created as stated above. 169 The provincial councils 
themselves were eventually abolished by Section 2 of the Provincial Government Act, 
1986.170 According to Carpenter, who referred to the Supreme Court decision in 
Mpangele v Botha (1)171 and Mpangele v Botha (2), 172 our Courts readily accepted 
that "s 114 was not entrenched and that, therefore, the procedure prescribed was not 
binding on Parliament but depended for their observance on good faith, the electorate 
or public opinion ... the court simply held that Parliament could amend or repeals 114 
either expressly or by necessary implication - by not following the prescribed 
procedure."173 
However, not all South African jurists accepted this viewpoint. Jurists such as Van der 
Vyver174 and Bou lie, Harris and Hoexter, 175 held a contrary view, namely that Parliament 
could not be allowed to flout its own procedures at the expense of human rights. A 
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judge of the Supreme Court, Van der Heever J also stated in an obiter dictum in 
Cowburn v Nasopie (Edms) Bpk176 that: 
Ek het, met eerbied, bedenkenge oor die hof a quo se besliste bevinding ... dat die 
Parlement nie gebind is deur art 114 van die Grondwet 32 van 1961 nie. Dit kan betoog 
word dat vir so lank as wat die Parlement art 114 ongewysig laat, is hy gebonde aan die 
reels wat hy self bepaal het ... 
A BILL OF RIGHTS? 
Once again, pleas for the inclusion of an entrenched bill of rights 177 were dismissed as 
the ruling party felt that such a scheme would mean sacrifing the holy cow of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Taking the doctrine to its logical and brutal 
conclusion, the government of the day rode roughshod over individual human rights and 
basic freedoms with impunity. The black majority, the voiceless victims of rampant 
apartheid were, not surprisingly, having no faith in any of the structures and institutions 
of the regime. 
The courts, having deliberately decided to confine their role to interpretation and 
enforcement of the will of the omnipotent sovereign which had the power to make any 
encroachment it chose "upon the life, liberty or property of any individual subject to its 
sway", 178 expected the individual to find solace in the unreliable tradition of 
interpretation of statutory ambiguities in favorem libertatis. As Hugh Corder, after a 
seminal examination of the record of the judiciary between 1910 and 1985, observed, 
the Supreme Court, while maintaining a formal impartiality, had in effect consistently 
acted in the interests of the dominant group in the social structure of which it was a 
critical part. 179 
In such circumstances, without the shield of a bill of rights, while there can be no doubt 
that the apartheid legislature and executive were the primary sources of many of the 
shackles on the South African judicial process, there was equally no doubt that the 
judiciary was too easily prepared to accept such limitation and to add a few of its own 
making. 180 In other words, judicial activism and creativity were on occasion used to 
further state lawlessness, rather than inhibit it.181 
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THE FRANCHISE 
Needless to say, the franchise in the common area was reserved for whites only. A 
unique feature of the South African constitutional system then was the exclusion from 
any participation in government of the great majority of its citizens. This was so even 
if one regarded as valid the bantustan policy, which had led to the unilateral 
denationalisation of some eight million South Africans who had been fobbed off with a 
dubious bantustan citizenship. 
FROM 1983 TO 1993 
In 1983 (the South African) Parliament adopted a new Constitution, the Republic of 
South Africa Constitution Act, 182 which replaced Act 32 of 1961. The 1983 
Constitution, like its predecessors, did not enjoy an enhanced status in relation to other 
legislation, despite the presence of entrenched clauses. It was not a higher law to which 
all other laws were subordinate, and which served as a touchstone for other laws. 
Furthermore, the Constitution was a flexible when compared to the rigid US 
Constitution, although it was less so when compared with its two predecessors. 
New political institutions were established under the 1983 Constitution. 
PARLIAMENT 
As a result of the adoption of the 1983 Constitution, Parliament was drastically altered; 
a single Parliament, consisting of three race-based Houses, the House of Assembly 
for whites, the House of Representatives for Coloureds, and the House of Delegates 
for Indians, was created. 'Blacks' (ie the indigenous African majority) were presumed 
to be politically catered for in the bantustans and thus excluded completely from the 
central government. 
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Though, in terms of the Constitution, the State President and Parliament constituted 
"the sovereign legislative authority in and over the Republic,"183 the legislation passed 
by a single House was, like that passed by the whole of (the tri-cameral) Parliament, 
Acts of Parliament. Acts of the central Parliament, therefore, did not enjoy a superior 
status. 
AN EXECUTIVE STATE PRESIDENT 
With merger of the positions of State President and Prime Minister, the State President 
under the 1983 Constitution ceased being a figure-head with few real powers, 
performing largely neutral tasks or merely placing the formal seal of office on decisions 
actually taken by party political leaders; he was both head of State and government. He 
was not popularly elected; he was elected by a parliamentary 'college', the majority of 
which was white. 184 He was assisted by a President's Council185 which was heavily 
weighted in favour of whites and the ruling National Party. The State President was not 
a member of (the tri-cameral) Parliament. However, together with Parliament, the State 
President formed the legislative authority of the Republic. 186 
The powers of the State President were not confined to those stipulated in Section 6 
of the Constitution Act. He also had a legislative role; he had the sole discretion to 
decide whether a bill was affecting the 'own affairs' of a particular population group; he 
was constitutionally required to give his assent to all bills passed by Parliament and the 
three Houses before they became law. 187 As the so-called supreme chief of the black 
population, 188 he had considerable legislative powers and could even repeal or amend 
Acts of Parliament by proclamation. He was even authorised, under the National 
States Constitution Act, 1971, to promulgate legislation creating constitutions for the 
six bantustans which did not acquire 'independence' .189 
The State President also had the power to convene and prorogue Parliament, 190 which 
he exercised in consultation with the (whites-only?) Cabinet. 191 
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THE EXECUTIVE 
The executive consisted of the State President as head of the executive authority, and 
was divided into four entities, namely the central Cabinet, and three executive entities 
(Ministers' Council) serving each of the three race-based Houses of Parliament. 
In terms of Section 24( 1 ) of the Constitution Act, the State President appointed 
members of the Cabinet to administer state departments or to perform such other 
functions as he might determine. Such persons might either be members of a House 
of (the tri-cameral) Parliament or, if not, become one within twelve months of 
appointment as a Minister.192 The Cabinet was responsible for 'general affairs', which 
included the administration of the affairs of the indigenous African majority. All such 
persons held office as Ministers of the Republic during the State President's pleasure. 193 
There was no requirement that members of the Cabinet should be members of the 
ruling party, unless they were members responsible for 'own affairs', in which event they 
had to be members of their respective population groups. 194 
Chairpersons of Ministers' Councils were designated as such by the State President if, 
in his opinion, they had the support of the majority in their respective Houses;195 
members of the various Ministers' Councils were appointed on the advice of such 
Chairpersons. Members of the Ministers' Councils were politically responsible for the 
'own affairs' of their respective population groups. 
No distinction was made between the Ministers who were members of the Cabinet and 
those who were members of the three Ministers' Councils; all were simply referred to 
as 'Ministers of the Republic' .196 The State President either acted in consultation with 
the (central) Cabinet197 or on the advice of the Ministers' Council affected,198 except in 
regard to certain specific matters or where otherwise expressly stated or by necessary 
implication. 199 
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THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL 
The President's Council, a substitute legislator which was established under Section 
70(1) of the 1983 Constitution to deal with, and resolve, conflicts among the three 
Houses of Parliament, was an important institution in the legislative process. 
The Council's function was to advise the State President on any matter which he 
referred to it, and on any matter, except for draft legislation, which it regarded as a 
matter of public interest.200 Of particular note was its power to decide whether a bill (or 
where there were more than one version thereof, which version) should be signed by 
the State President in the event of a conflict between the three Houses of Parliament 
over 'general affairs' legislation.201 
Though neither the State President nor the President's Council was part of (the tri-
cameral) Parliament, and though Parliament as an institution was described as "the 
sovereign legislative authority in and over the Republic",202 it was thus possible under 
the previous constitutional order for a bill to become law despite its rejection by two of 
the three Houses of (the tri-cameral) Parliament. A glaring example of the utilisation of 
that undemocratic constitutional device was the Further Indemnity Act, 1992,203 the 
provisions of which were passed this way when the special session of Parliament held 
in October 1992 could not enact it. 
PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE TESTING RIGHT 
The grundnorm of South African constitutional law, parliamentary sovereignty, was 
essentially preserved, albeit in diluted form. Section 34 of the 1983 Constitution, a 
rehash of its predecessor, Section 59(2) of the the previous Constitution, provided that, 
save as was provided in subsection (2), thereof, no court of law was competent to 
inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of an Act of Parliament. 
During the debates on the Constitution, the Government had actually rejected the idea 
of a testing right in regard to the contents of legislation as, according to Chris Heunis, 
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then Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, it implied that the courts 
would perform a typically legislative function and in certain cases would be the final 
legislator. 204 
However, unlike its predecessors, the 1983 Constitution added an express exception 
to the rule that courts did not have any competence to inquire into or pronounce upon 
the validity of Acts of Parliament. In terms of Section 34(2)(a) thereof, any division of 
the Supreme Court of South Africa was competent to inquire into and pronounce upon 
the question as to whether the provisions of the Constitution were complied with in 
connection with any law which purported to have been enacted by the State President 
and Parliament. This limited testing right was subject to the provisions of Section 18 of 
the Constitution. 
Section 18 manifestly excluded judicial review of the substance of the State President's 
decision as to whether a bill dealt with 'own' or 'general' affairs. It also sought to restrict 
the court's role to the issue of whether or not the State President had, in terms of 
Section 17(2)(a) of the Constitution, consulted the Speaker of Parliament or, as the 
might have been, the Chairpersons of the various Houses of Parliament. Otherwise the 
courts could enquire into matters covered by Section 18(2)205 of the Constitution when 
there was a suggestion of ma/a tides, or to determine whether the State President's 
decision was made fairly and in good faith. 
Section 34(2)(a) granted the Supreme Court a limited testing power to examine the 
procedure whereby legislation had been passed. The Supreme Court was not granted 
the full testing right to consider the merits, the substance, of an Act of Parliament. To 
paraphrase JD van der Vyver, provided the structural requirements of legality were 
complied with, Acts of Parliament could thus not by reason of their contents be 
invalidated by the Suprme Court. The Supreme Court was entrusted with the power of 
procedural review only.206 
Thus, the Supreme Court could declare invalid all legislation passed by incorrect 
procedure.207 The Court could thus declare that Parliament had not acted where correct 
procedures had not been followed;208 in other words, no Act had been passed because 
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correct procedures or methods had not been observed.209 This limited testing right was 
intentionally extended to both entrenched and unentrenched provisions of the 
Constitution. 210 
However, the Constitution,211 ex abundanti caute/a, 212 expressly excluded this limited 
testing right in respect of rules and orders of a House of Parliament and joint rules and 
orders of the three Houses of Parliament. 
As is clear from what has been said above, there was, stricto sensu, no change in the 
testing rights of the courts regarding the content or substance of legislation. The 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty still constituted the grundnorm of our legal 
system. The end result was that the courts could not police legislation; they could not 
enquire into the reasonableness or fairness of legislation. As long as Parliament 
observed the prescribed procedures, it was both omnicompetent and omnipotent and 
could still make laws on any subject-matter and in any terms it chose. There were no 
legal restraints upon Parliament's will.213 
THE TESTING RIGHT AND OTHER ACTS OF GOVERNMENT 
However, it needs to be pointed out that, in principle, our Courts were competent to 
examine the validity of any act of the executive, whether the act was performed by 
virtue of a statute or by virtue of a common-law power such as a prerogative. 214 
Furthermore, our Courts had the power of judicial review, in terms of our administrative 
law, over the exercise of delegated power. The grounds upon which they could do so 
were established in our common law. Thus, for instance, the Courts could exercise 
judicial review over executive action in the case of ma/a tides or if an executive official 
or body had exceeded his or her or its power, ie acted ultra vires. I respectfully submit 
that, in such circumstances, they could use their inherent power even in the face of 
ouster clauses expressly excluding their jurisdiction. 
At the same time, the Courts would generally not interfere if a discretionary power had 
been validly exercised; they would not go into the merits of an executive action unless 
there were irregularities. 'Reasonableness' was, unfortunately, not recognised in our 
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common law as one of the grounds of review. As Lawrence Baxter pointed out, from 
1894, our Courts had "often appeared anxious to disavow any power to set aside 
administrative action on the ground of unreasonableness."215 They tended to confine 
the use of their inherent jurisdiction to "matters involving the legality of administrative 
action."216 
In addition to the power to review delegated power, the Courts, had review power over 
delegated legislation, such as regulations. However, delegated legislation, unlike 
executive action, could be declared invalid by the Courts, including the magistrates' 
courts, on much wider grounds, though there was said to be a doctrine of benevolent 
interpretation 217 applicable to delegated legislation emanating from municipal councils 
and other local authorities.218 
Lastly (in this regard), the Courts had review power over provincial legislation, on both 
substantive and procedural grounds, just like ordinary delegated legislation discussed 
above. The Supreme Court also had the power of substantive judicial review over laws 
enacted by the legislative assemblies of self-governing territories created under the 
National States Constitution Act. 219 As such territories were not sovereign entities, 
their laws could also be challenged and declared invalid on the basis of the ultra vires 
doctrine, though the Courts could not easily and lightly declare that Acts of such a 
legislative assembly were ultra vires. 220 
PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE STATE PRESIDENT 
Parliamentary sovereignty was, however, further diluted, to a large extent, by the 
extensive powes and competences of the executive State President on the legislative 
terrain. A careful analysis of the matters referred to in the first schedule221 to the 
Constitution would suggest that, though the list consisted of matters that could be 
regarded as 'own affairs' of a particular population group, such matters were subject to, 
and could be overridden by, any 'general affairs' legislation on them. 
The State President had the sole discretion to decide whether a matter was an 'own 
affair' of a particular population group or a 'general' affair'.222 Of particular note was the 
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fact that the State President's discretion in this regard was not subject to judicial 
review,223 except in the limited sense explained earlier, on procedural grounds. If he so 
wished, the State President could refer a matter being considered by him under Section 
16 to the President's Council for its advice,224 which was not binding upon him.225 
Before the State President could decide to certify a bill dealing with a matter as an 'own 
affair' bill in terms of Section 31 (1) of the 1983 Constitution, he was required to consult 
with the Speaker of the whole of Parliament and with the Chairpersons of the three 
Houses of Parliament in a manner he deemed fit.226 It was not clear from the word 
'consult' whether he was constitutionally obliged to heed the advice of such persons.227 
Moreover, as the decision whether a matter was an 'own affair' of a particular 
population group, the State President was required to make in consultation with the 
Ministers who were members of the (whites-only) Cabinet.228 
As stated above, the decisions of the State President in this regard, the making of 
which was simply an administrative function, were not subject to judicial review.229 
According to Bou lie, Harris and Hoexter,230 Section 18(1) of the Constitution was 
designed to exclude judicial review of the substance of the State President's decision 
on the question of whether a Bill dealt with 'own affairs', and to confine the courts' 
review powers to the issue of whether the State President had consulted with the 
Speaker of Parliament and with the Chairpersons of the various Houses as he was 
required to do under Section 17(2) of the Constitution Act. 
THE FRANCHISE 
The right to vote in the common territory of the Republic of South Africa was confined 
to the whites, Coloureds and Indians, all of whom were expected to vote for candidates 
to represent them in their respective Houses of (the tri-cameral) Parliament. The 
indigenous African majority were expected to exercise their right to vote in their 
respective bantustans. 
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A BILL OF RIGHTS? 
The 1983 Constitution contained no bill of rights furnishing protection against both 
legislative and executive encroachment.231 A proposal by the Progressive Federal Party 
that a bill of rights and a constitutional court, to protect the rights of the individual, be 
included in the 1983 constitutional bill, was firmly rejected by the ruling National Party, 
with the New Republic Party voting against the view and the Conservative Party 
abstaining. The PFP had argued that that the constitutional court would be ttie final 
arbiter in the protection and enforcing of the constitution and its conventions and would, 
as such, pronounce upon the validity of certain presidential decisions and protect the 
rights of individuals and groups.232 
The idea of a bill of rights was rejected for one simple reason: parliamentary 
sovereignty facilitated constitutional domination of a disenfranchised black majority. A 
white-controlled Parliament was empowered to enact any legislation it deemed fit for 
the unrepresented black majority, without the restraints associated with a bill of rights 
and judicial review.233 
None of the Constitution's provisions could be regarded as sacrosanct. The entrenched 
provisions of the Constitution simply meant that certain amendments to the Constitution 
might be achieved only by means of a specific procedure, not that legislation in general 
could be declared invalid because it was in conflict with the spirit and values of the 
Constitution. 
FROM 1994 TO 1996 
After a long period of negotiations, the World Trade Centre, Kempton Park talks gave 
birth to the (interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993,234 under 
which South Africa was governed till the beginning of 1997, when the (new) 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,235 became law. The (interim) 
Constitution replaced the apartheid constitutional order which was predicated upon 
a division of the national territory into the common area, four provinces, numerous local 
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government entities, and the ten bantustans, four of which had opted for, and been 
granted, apartheid-style independence.236 
A new, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist constitutional order and a united country 
were thus established.237 Such an order would be predicated upon a common South 
African citizenship, a constitutional state, equality between men and women and people 
of all races and a condition that would enable all citizens to enjoy and exercise their 
fundamental rights and freedoms. A few of the salient features of the (interim) 
Constitution warrant mention for purposes of this chapter. 
PARLIAMENT 
The tri-cameral Parliament, the legislatures of the four 'independent' bantustans, as well 
as the legislative assemblies of the six (non-independent) self-governing territories were 
abolished by the (interim) Constitution.238 In their place was established a new, non-
racial and democratically constituted Parliament consisting of two Houses, namely the 
National Assembly and the Senate,239 in which institution vested the legislative authority 
of the Republic. 240 
Parliament exercised its legislative power as such subject to, and in accordance with, 
the (interim) Constitution.241 In other words, it did not have any power to do anything 
that was not, either expressly or by necessary implication, sanctioned by the document. 
THE PROVINCES 
The (interim) Constitution established nine new provinces in the stead of the original 
four provinces and ten bantustans.242 Each of the provinces had its own legislature243 
and executive authority which vested in a premier244 and his/her executive council.245 
Each provincial legislature had "the power to make laws for the province in accordance 
with" the (interim) Constitution,246 as well as "laws reasonably necessary for or 
incidental to the effective exercise of such legislative competence."247 Unless otherwise 
sanctioned by an Act of Parliament, the laws made by a provincial legislature would not 
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have any extra-territorial effect; they would "be applicable only within the territory of the 
province" concerned.248 The legislative249 and executive250 competencies of the 
provinces were subject to the (interim) Constitution. 
Parliament was entitled to intervene and make laws with regard to the spheres of 
legislative competence of the provinces.251 
THE CONSTITUTION 
A Fundamental Law 
First and foremost, the (interim) Constitution252 was "the supreme law of the 
Republic";253 it was, unlike in the previous constitutional orders254 discussed briefly 
above, not an ordinary Act of Parliament subject to the will of that institution. In the new 
order, the (interim) Constitution as "the supreme law of the Republic" ruled, and all 
law, including laws passed by Parliament and other legislatures, had to conform to "the 
highest law". The document specifically provided that "any law or act inconsistent with 
its provisions ... unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication", was 
"of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency."255 (my italics) The country and 
its people were, for the first time ever since the founding of the Union, no longer 
subjected to the whims of a transient parliamentary majority or, for that matter, of the 
President of the Republic and the executive authority. 
A Rigid Constitution 
Secondly, unlike its predecessors, the (interim) Constitution was a rigid, and not a 
flexible, constitution. As an inflexible constitution enjoying an elevated status, it could 
be amended or repealed only by a special procedure. As part of such a procedure, a 
Bill seeking to amend the (interim) Constitution "required to be adopted at a joint sitting 
of the National Assembly and the Senate by a majority of at least two-thirds of the total 
number of members of both Houses" for its passing by Parliament.256 (my italics) 
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There was, in addition to that, a special procedure affecting the amendment of the 
legislative competencies and executive authority of the provinces. The (interim) 
Constitution provided that amendments affecting these two areas would "be of no 
force and effect unless passed separately by both Houses by a majority of at least two-
thirds of all the members in each House".257 (my italics) Moreover, the boundaries and 
legislative and executive competencies of a province could "not be amended without 
the consent of a relevant provincial legislature."258 
Constitutionalism 
Finally, constitutionalism was accepted in the South African political scene. From the 
time when the (interim) Constitution became our supreme law, our politicians accepted 
that the output of the majoritarian legislature and executive would "be filtered by 
radically different concepts of constitutio.nal law."259 Notwithstanding Parliament's and 
the executive's democratic pedigree, their acts and decisions would from then on be 
subject to the Constitution and the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. In short, the 
Republic had accepted to bind itself "to certain values which trump the output of a 
transient legislature. "260 
The Franchise 
For the first time in the history of South Africa, the vote was constitutionally extended 
to all South Africans, on a non-racial basis, over the whole of the national territory. 
Thus, every South African citizen,261 or non-citizen where appropriate,262 of or over the 
age of eighteen years263 and not subject to any disqualifications as might have been 
prescribed by law,264 became entitled "to vote. in elections of the National Assembly, a 
provincial legislature or a local government and in referenda or plebiscites" 
contemplated in the (interim) Constitution "in accordance with and subject to the laws 
regulating such elections, referenda and plebiscites."265 
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A Bill of Rights 
Unlike its predecessors again, the (interim) Constitution contained a set of entrenched 
fundamental rights and freedoms. A good network of institutions, in addition to the 
courts of law, was established under the (interim) Constitution for the promotion and 
protection of the fundamental rights. 266 
The Chapter on Fundamental was binding "on all legislative and executive organs of 
state at all levels of government."267 The (interim) Constitution268 defined an 'organ of 
state' as including 'any statutory body or functionary'. Thus, the chapter was binding on 
any body that performed a state function and not only on bodies established by statute. 
In addition, it applied "to all law in force and all administrative decisions taken and acts 
performed during the period of the operation of' the (interim) Constitution.269 Thus, 
other than labour relations laws which were temporarily insulated from the application 
of the chapter,270 Acts of Parliament, statutes and ordinances of provincial government, 
municipal bye-laws, regulations, customary law and the rules of the common law were 
affected by the chapter. 
Making the chapter applicable to 'a/I law in force', including the common law, made it 
applicable horizontally to relations between persons and not merely to the vertical 
relationship between the state and a subject of the state. This approach, which made 
'all law in force' the focus, introduced the German concept of drittwirkung and subjected 
our private law to the strictures of the chapter. 
Juristic Persons 
After a lengthy debate in the course of the constitutional negotiations, the issue of 
whether juristic persons ought to be the bearers of fundamental rights and freedoms 
was, unfortunately, left to interpretation by the courts of law and, therefore, to litigation. 
The (interim) Constitution merely provided that juristic persons should be entitled to 
the rights it guaranteed where, and to the extent that the nature of the rights 
permitted. 271 
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However, the very nature of some of the rights enshrined in the chapter clearly weighed 
in favour of the inclusion of juristic persons in their enjoyment, while the nature of other 
rights made them incapable of enjoyment by juristic persons.272 Even where a juristic 
person clearly does not enjoy a right because, by its very nature, the right cannot be 
enjoyed by any person other than a natural person, Cachalia et al,273 citing the 
Canadian case of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd,274 argued that a juristic person would not 
lack locus standi merely because of that. In that case, it was the law, and not the status 
of the accused, that was in issue, the Court pointed out.275 
Locus Standi 
Before the changes effected by the (interim) Constitution, our common law on 
standing required the challenger to establish that some direct, personal (and possibly 
special) legal right or recognised interest, and not a mere 'sentimental prejudice',276 was 
at stake. In order to succeed, the applicant or challenger was required to show that he 
or she had a sufficient, personal and direct interest in the case; "a legally recognised 
reason, as it were, for claiming the court's attention."277 
The recognised interest was supposed to be capable of individuation. Fortunately, 
however, a legally recognised interest was not supposed to be capable of being 
measured in pecuniary278 or proprietary terms for this purpose. Personal liberty, as was 
demonstrated by the Appellate Division decision in Wood and Others v Ondangwa 
Tribal Authority,279 was one of the strongest of all, and litigation based on any invasion 
of any of the rights and civil liberties traditionally recognised under our common law was 
seldom, if ever, met with a challenge to the locus standi of the complainant. 
With certain limited exceptions, the law was that, in order to have standing, an 
individual was required to prove that he/she had suffered some 'direct injury or 
damage',280 or some 'material injury',281 or that he/she had some 'valid interest',282 or a 
'direct interest',283 or a 'sufficient interest',284 among others. 
The (interim) Constitution introduced important and substantial changes to the 
common law on locus standi in iudicio. A list of persons who would, under the (interim) 
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Constitution, be entitled to apply to a competent court of law for appropriate relief, 
including a declaration of rights, was given.285 Naturally, the list included "a person 
acting in his or her own interest". 286 
Of particular note, however, is that it also included "an association acting in the interest 
of its members".287 Thus, the jurisprudential hostility of the past towards granting 
standing to an association which had no direct substantial interest in the subject matter 
of a dispute, which was exhibited in cases such as Ahmadiyya lshaati-lslam Lahore 
(SA) v Muslim Judicial Council (Cape) and Others,288 and South African 
Optometric Association v Frames Distributors (Pty) Ltd t/a Frames Unlimited, 289 
was ended. 
Standing was also given constitutionally to any "person acting as a member of or in the 
interest of a group or class of persons".290 This constitutionalisation of the principle in 
Patz v Greene & Co291 certainly helped in the development of our democracy and 
jurisprudence. 
By allowing locus standi to "a person acting on behalf of another person who is not in 
a position to seek ... relief in his or her own name",292 the (interim) Constitution 
reaffirmed a South African common law position, namely that, as an exception to the 
ordinary rules of standing, in cases affecting individual liberty a person might approach 
an appropriate court of law to seek the release of a detained person. This approach had 
previously been adopted in cases such as Bozzoli v Station Commander, John 
Vorster Square, Johannesburg,293 and Wood and Others v Ondangwa Tribal 
Authority. 294 
Finally, the (interim) Constitution, by also allowing standing to any "person acting in 
the public interest,"295 gave recognition to actio popularis. Before that development, our 
common law was as spelt out by Innes CJ in Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer;296 put 
simply, except in limited, exceptional circumstances, our law did not recognise the right 
of any person who could not establish that he/she had either been owed a duty by the 
wrongdoer or that he/she had been caused some damage in law.297 
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Interpretation 
Firstly, in this regard, all the courts were required to pomote the values which underlie 
an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. Secondly, a court 
interpreting the Chapter on Fundamental Rights was enabled to have regard to 
principles of international law and comparable foreign case law.298 Thus, even though 
some of the international human rights instruments, treaties and conventions may 
indeed not confer enforceable rights upon individuals in the Republic as they are not 
part of our law, in so far as they are relevant, they may now be referred to and used "as 
an aid to construction of enactments, including the Constitution".299 
At the same time, courts of law were required to presume impugned legislation to be 
constitutionally valid till a litigant who asserts that an Act or a regulation is 
unconstitutional has established that. 300 The presumption of constitutionality is 
recognised in many democracies. 301 
Lastly in this regard, the (interim) Constitution subjected all South African law, 
including the common law and customary law, "to the spirit, purport and objects" of the 
Chapter on Fundamental Rights, which courts of law would have regard to in 
interpreting, applying and developing our law.302 Thus, if a law fell foul of such "spirit, 
purport and object", it ought to be struck down as invalid. This praiseworthy innovation 
could have tremendous repercussions for our common law and customary law in 
particular. 
Limitation 
It was accepted by the founders of the new Republic of South Africa as trite that no 
right, whether entrenched or not, could be absolute. Thus, the fundamental rights and 
freedoms entrenched in the (interim) Constitution were subject to limitation by law of 
general application. 303 However, such limitation was permissible only if it was, first and 
foremost, "reasonable",304 "justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality",305 and if it would "not negate the essential content of the right in 
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question".306 Secondly, in respect of certain rights and freedoms, it was a requirement 
that the limitation, in addition to being reasonable, should be "necessary".307 
State of Emergency and Suspension 
The (interim) Constitution further provided for the suspension of certain rights under 
a state of emergency. It should be observed that our law on states of emergency 
underwent a fundamental transformation.308 Subject to minor omissions, the new regime 
tended to follow international human rights law and jurisprudence in regard to 
emergency powers. 309 
THE EXECUTIVE 
The National Executive established under the (interim) Constitution consisted of the 
President, the Head of State,310 who was to exercise his or her powers and perform his 
or her functions subject to the provisions of the Constitution. 311 The first President, 
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, was elected by the National Assembly at its first sitting. 312 
The President was to be assisted in the execution of his or her executive authority by 
Executive Deputy Presidents, Ministers and Deputy Ministers. The executive authority 
of the Republic, till the departure of the National Party from the Government of National 
Unity, consisted of members of the African National Congress, the majority party, the 
National Party and the lnkatha Freedom Party, the latter two parties having won not 
less than 10% of the national vote in the April 1994 elections. 
THE JUDICIARY 
The judicial authority of the Republic vested in the courts established by the (interim) 
Constitution and any other legislation.313 In particular, the Supreme Court, which 
consisted of the Appellate Division and the rest of the Divisions established prior to the 
coming into effect of the (interim) Constitution,314 as well as other pre-1994 courts, 315 
were given constitutional recognition. 
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A new Court, the Constitutional Court, was established by Section 98(1) of the 
(interim) Constitution. The new Court would "have jurisdiction in the Republic as the 
court of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and 
enforcement of the provisions of' the (interim) Constitution.316 
The Constitutional Court was further vested with the power to certify that all the 
provisions of a new constitutional text that was then to be passed by the 
Constitutional Assembly complied with a set of Constitutional Principles which were 
contained in Schedule 4 to the (interim) Constitution. Unless so certified, the new 
constitutional text would be of no force and effect. 317 The Court's decision certifying 
the new constitutional text as being in accordance with the Constitutional Principles 
would be final and binding; no court of law, not even the Constitutional Court itself, 
wourd "have jurisdiction to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of such text or 
any provision thereof." 318 
Similarly, the Constitutional Court had the power to certify that the text of a provincial 
constitution or any provision thereof, was not inconsistent with the (interim) 
Constitution.319 Failing such certification, a provincial constitution would be of no 
force and effect. The Court's decision to certify a provincial constitution or any 
provision thereof as being not inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution would be 
final and binding; no court of law, not even the Constitutional Court itself, would 
"have jurisdiction to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of such text or any 
provision thereof."320 
Details about the Constitutional Court are dealt with in the neXt chapter. 
Judicial Independence 
The independence and impartiality of the Courts were spelt out and guaranteed in 
the (interim) Constitution. 321 No person and no organ of state was allowed to 
"interfere with judicial officers in the performance of their functions."322 
To further enhance the independence and impartiality of our Courts, judges, who were 
to be fit and proper persons, could only "be appointed by the President acting on the 
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advice of the Judicial Service Commission".323 Their remuneration could not be reduced 
during their term of office. 324 They could "only be removed from office by the President 
of the Republic on the grounds of misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence 
established by the Judicial Service Commission and upon receipt of an address from 
both the National Assembly and the Senate praying for such removal."325 While the 
Judicial Service Commission was investigating a judge's misbehaviour, incapacity or 
incompetence, the President could, however, without an address from Parliament, 
suspend the judge pending the conclusion of the investigation.326 
Judicial Review 
The legal effect of making the Chapter on Fundamental Rights applicable to 'all law in 
force' subjected 'all law in force' during the currency of the (interim) Constitution to 
judicial review. A textual litmus against which the constitutional validity of 'all law', 
including Acts of Parliament, was to be tested, was thus established. From then on, any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, executive or administrative action, the common law and 
customary law, or any provision or rule thereof that was in conflict with the rights 
guaranteed in the Chapter might be struck down by the Courts as unconstitutional. 
The provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court were, in particular, given the 
power of judicial review to inquire into the constitutional validity of bills and statutes or 
ordinances of provincial legislatures within their jurisdiction.327 The Constitutional Court, 
"as the court of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection 
and enforcement of the provisions of' the (interim) Constitution,328 was given the 
power to inquire "into the constitutionality of any law, including an Act of Parliament",329 
passed or made prior or subsequent to the commencement of the (interim) 
Constitution, and to adjudicate "any dispute over the constitutionality of any Bill before 
Parliament or a provincial legislature".330 
ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION MECHANISMS 
The Courts were not the only mechanisms for enforcing the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in the (interim) Constitution. Three additional mechanisms, namely the 
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office of the Public Protector,331 the Human Rights Commission332 and the Commission 
on Gender Equality,333 were established. 
The Public Protector 
The Public Protector, a fit and proper South African citizen,334 a person "nominated by 
a joint committee of the Houses of Parliament ... and approved by the National 
Assembly and the Senate by a resolution adopted by a majority of at least 75 per cent 
of the members present and voting at a joint meeting", 335 was to be appointed by the 
President of the Republic whenever it became necessary; but the first such officer 
would be appointed as soon as possible after the first sitting of the Senate under the 
(interim) Constitutio~.336 Unless the new constitutional text would provide otherwise, 
the Public Protector would hold office for a period of seven years. 337 
Like judges, the Public Protector, an independent and impartial person subject solely 
to the (interim) Constitution,338 could be removed from office by the President of the 
Republic "on the grounds of misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence, determined by 
a joint committee of the Houses of Parliament ... and upon receipt of an address from 
both the National Assembly and the Senate requesting such removal."339 Again like 
judges, a Public Protector who might be subject to an investigation with the view to 
removal from office might be suspended by the President pending a decision in such 
investigation. 340 
The powers and functions of the Public Protector were stipulated in the (interim) 
Constitution. 341 In addition to such powers and functions, Parliament could, by law, 
give powers and functions to the Public Protector.342 However, the Public Protector was 
specifically precluded from investigating "the performance of judicial functions by any 
court of law."343 
Provincial legislatures too were empowered to, if they so wished, provide for the 
establishment, appointment, powers and functions of their own provincial public 
protectors. 344 Provincial public protectors could be appointed by the Premiers in 
consultation with the (national) Public Protector;345 after that, confirmation "by a 
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resolution of a majority of at least two-thirds of all the mebers" of the relevant provincial 
legislature was required before the appointment could be effected.346 
A law providing for a provincial public protector should not in any way derogate from the 
powers and functions of the (national) Public Protector.347 Moreover, a provincial public 
protector should exercise his or her powers and perform his or her functions in 
consultation with the (national) Public Protector who was given concurrent jurisdiction 
in the provinces.348 
The Human Rights Commission 
The Human Rights Commission was to consist of a chairperson and ten members, all 
of whom were to be fit and proper South African citizens, broadly representative of the 
South African community.349 The members of the Commission were to elect one person 
from their own ranks as Chairperson and another as Deputy Chairperson. 350 
The powers and functions of the Commission could be assigned by an Act of 
Parliament, in addition to those that were stipulated in the (interim) Constitution. 351 In 
particular, if the Commission was of the opinion that any proposed legislation might be 
contrary to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights or to norms of international human 
rights law which form part of South African law or to other relevant norms of 
international law, it was required to immediately bring that fact to Parliament or the 
relevant legislature.352 The Commission could also take up the cudgels for victims of 
human rights violations. It was even constitutionally obliged to assist such victims and 
other persons adversely affected by such violations to secure redress. Where 
necessary, it could even approach a competent court for the necessary relief.353 
The Commission on Gender Equality 
This Commission, which should consist of a chairperson and a number of members 
determined by Parliament, all of whom should be fit and proper South African citizens 
"broadly representative of the South African community",354 was intended "to promote 
gender equality and to advise and to make recommendations to Parliament or any other 
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legislature with regard to any laws or proposed legislation" affecting gender equality and 
the status of women.355 Its composition, powers, functions and functioning and all 
related matters would be provided for in an Act of Parliament. 356 
CONCLUSION 
A new politico-legal system, which, though mired in the socio-economic consequences 
of our country's past characterised by extreme and grinding poverty resulting from a 
maldistribution of wealth, resources, opportunities and income, was unpolluted by 
apartheid, was thus born. Civil and political rights and freedoms, and to some extent 
socio-economic rights, were guaranteed to the individual on a non-racial basis for the 
first time in the history of South Africa. This, in a nutshell, was the Republic of South 
Africa in which the Constitutional Court functioned for a period of two years before the 
adoption of the new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
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169. 0 . See JD van der Vyver, 'The Section 114 Controversy - And Governmental Anarchy', in (1980) 
97 SALJ 363 at 365. Note that, according to LJ Boulle, 'The Resurrection of Section 114 of the 
Constitution', in (1978) 95 SALJ 583 at 584-585, the provisions of Section 114 and its predecessor had 
been violated so many times that a challenge to central legislation contravening Section 114 would have 
been an exercise in futility. 
170. 0 . Act No. 69of1986. 
171. 0 . 1982 (3) SA 633 (C). 
172. 0 . 1982 (3) SA 638 (C). 
173. 0 . Introduction to South African Constitutional Law, supra at 149. 
174. 0 . In 'The Section 114 Controversy - And Government Anarchy', supra at 369. 
175. 0 . Op cit 144-145. 
176. 0 . 1980 (2) SA 547 (NC) at 554. 
177. 0 . See the Report of the Molteno Commission, Donald Molteno, Chairman, 'Franchise Proposals 
and Constitutional Safeguards', (Johannesburg, 1960), (1960) Annual Survey of South African Law 
at 12; and Ellison Kahn The New Constitution (supplement to Hahlo and Kahn, South Africa: The 
Development of its Laws and Constitution) (Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1962) at 2. 
178. 0 . See Sachs v Minister of Justice, 1934 AD 11 at 37. 
179. 0 . 'The Record of the Judiciary' in H Corder (ed) Democracy and the Judiciary (IDASA, Cape 
Town, 1989) at 50. See also John Dugard 'The Quest for a Liberal Democracy in South Africa' in Law 
Under Stress: South African Law in the 1980s (Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1988) at 254-255. 
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180. 0 • Corder, ibidem at53-54. See, for example, R v Pitje, 1960 (4) SA 709 (AD) and Rossouw v 
Sachs, 1964 (2) SA 551 (AD), where Steyn CJ and Ogilvie Thompson JA respectively made law against 
individual liberty where, otherwise, none existed. 
181. 0 • Corder, ibidem. 
182. 0.ActNo.110of1983. 
183. 0 • Ibidem, Section 30. 
184. 0 . Sections 7 and 8 of the Constitution Act. The electoral college, which was chaired by the Chief 
Justice who was not a member and who did not possess a vote, consisted of eighty-eight members of 
Parliament, ie fifty members of the (white) House of Assembly, twenty-five members of the (Coloured) 
House of Representatives and thirteen members of the (Indian) House of Delegates. The whites had a 
built-in majority in the college as the Coloureds and the Indians put together (thirty-eight) constituted a 
minority. 
185. 0 • Discussed briefly below. 
186. 0 . Section 30 of the Constitution Act. 
187. 0• Ibidem, Section 33(1 ). 
188. 0 . Ibidem, Section 93. 
189. 0 . As the Appelate Division decision in Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Government of KwaZulu, 1983 (1) SA 164 (A) amply demonstrated, the State President did not possess 
any authority to retract the legislative freedom of those bantustans once he had granted it. 
190. 0 . Section 38( 1 ) of the Constitution Act. 
191. 0 . It is noted in passing that, because of the provisions of Section 20(d) of the Constitution Act, it 
was theoretically possible for non-white members of Ministers' Councils to be members of the Cabinet. 
192. 0 . Section 24(3)(a) of the Constitution Act. 
193. 0 . Section 24(2) of the Constitution Act. 
194. 0 • Section 24(3)(b)(1) and (it) of the Constitution Act. 
195. 0 . Section 21(2) of the Constitution Act. 
196. 0 . Section 24(2) of the Constitution Act. 
197. 0 . In regard to matters that were regarded as 'general affairs'; Section 19( 1 )(b) of the Constitution 
Act. 
198. 0• In regard to matters that were regarded as 'own affairs'; Section 19(1 )(a) of the Constitution Act. 
199. 0 . Section 19(2) of the Constitution Act. 
200. 0 . Section 78(1) of the Constitution Act. 
201. 0 . Ibidem, Section 78(5). 
202. 0 • Ibidem, Section 30. 
203. 0.ActNo.151 of1992. 
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204. 0 . See the House of Assembly Debates, col 11369, 16 August 1983. 
205. 0• That is whether matters mentioned in a decision of the State President were 'own affairs' or not 
'own affairs' of a population group. 
206. 0. 'Judicial Review under the New Constitution' in (1986) 103 SALJ 241-242. See also Dion 
Sasson and Henning Viljoen South African Constitutional Law (Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1988) at 194. 
207. 0. See GM Cockram Interpretation of Statutes (2nd ed, Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1983) at xxx. See 
also Van der Vyver, 'Judicial Review under the New Constitution', supra at 237. 
208. 0• Interestingly enough, this was a return to the pre-Union position which Kotze CJ had stated in 
an obiter dictum in Hess v The State, ( 1895) 2 Off Rep 112 at 116, namely that 
the Court could indeed declare an instrument which had not been passed according to constitutional law 
procedures as not being a statute. 
209. 0• Sasson and Viljoen, op cit 178. 
210. 0 • Boulle, Harris and Hoexter, op cit 147. 
211. 0 . Section 34(2)(b). 
212. 0 • Boulle, Harris and Hoexter, op cit 147 (footnote 94), quite correctly pointed that this was 
unnecessary as, in terms of the common law, the courts had "never had the power to enquire into whether 
Parliament had adhered to its own internal rules of procedure." 
213. 0 . Bindman, op cit 7. 
214 .. Prerogatives were no longer immune from judicial review. See Friedman Jin Boesak v Minister of 
Home Affairs, 1987 (3) SA 665 (C) at 681, for a ruling that the withdrawal of a passport, by way of 
exercising a prerogative power, was subject to judicial review. 
Note, however, that a special category of prerogatives, acts of State, defined by Dumbutshena CJ in 
Patriotic Front-ZAPU v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, 1986 (1) SA 532 (ZSC) 
at 539 as the type of prerogatives "connected and concerned with external affairs or, more specifically, 
with foreign states and their subjects", were immune from judicial review. 
215 .. Administrative Law (1984) at 478. See also Stratford JA in Union Government (Minister of Mines 
and Industries) v Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) Ltd, 1928 AD 220, at 236-237 in this regard. 
216 .. Baxter, ibidem, at 305. 
217 .. Ibidem, at 492. See also Lord Russell in Kruse v Johnson, [1898] 2 QB 91 at 99. 
218 .. See Lord Russell in Kruse v Johnson, supra at 99-100 for the four basic grounds of attack in this 
regard. See also Schreiner JA in Sinovich v Hercules Municipal Council, 1946 AD 783, at 802-803. 
219 .. Section 19(1) and (2) of Act 21 of 1971 as amended. 
220 .. See Grosskopf JA in Makhasa v Minister of Law and Order, 1988 (3) SA 701 (A), at 723. 
221. 0 . Read with Section 14(2) of the Constitution. 
222. 0• Ibidem, Section 16(1 )(a). See also Carpenter, op cit 302-303; and Boulle, Harris and Hoexter, 
op cit 158ff on this question. 
223. 0 • Ibidem, Section 18(2). 
224. 0 . Ibidem, Section 17(1 ). 
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225. 0 • See Boulle, Harris and Hoexter, op cit 167. 
226. 0• Section 17(2) of the Constitution Act. 
227. 0 • See Boulle, Harris and Hoexter, op cit 160. 
228. 0 • Section 19(1 )(b) of the Constitution Act. 
229. 0• See in this regard JD van der Vyver 'The 1983 Constitution -An Exercise in Consociationalism?', 
in (1986) 2 SAJHR 341at346. 
230. 0 . Op cit 148. 
231. 0 . The idea was in fact rejected by the Constitutional Committee of the (original) President's 
Council. See The Adaptation of Constitutional Structures in South Africa (PC 3/1982, Ch 6); see also 
the (1982) 36 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (South African Institute of Race Relations) at 
4. The views of HJ Coetsee, then Minister of Justice, were expressed in this regard in an article by him 
entitled 'Hoekom Nie 'n Verklaring van Mensregte Nie!' in (1984) 9 Tydskrifvir Regswetenskap at 5. 
232. 0 . See the (1983) 37 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (South African Institute of Race 
Relations) at 77. 
233. 0 . See John Dugard 'A Bill of Rights for South Africa?' in (1990) 23 Cornell International Law 
Journal 441 at 443. 
234. 0 • Act No. 200 of 1993 which, it must be pointed out, was enacted by the tri-cameral Parliament 
which consisted of whites, coloureds and Indians and which excluded the indigenous African majority. 
235. 0 . Act No. 108 of 1996. 
236. 0 . Section 230(1) of the (interim) Constitution, read with Schedule 7 thereto, for a list of the 
apartheid laws that were repealed with immediate effect. 
237. 0 . See the preamble to the (interim) Constitution. 
238. 0 • See Schedule 7 to the (interim) Constitution for the list of laws, under which such institutions 
were established, which were repealed. 
239. 0 . Section 36, read with Sections 40(1) and 48(1 ), of the (interim) Constitution. 
240. 0 . Section 37 of the (interim) Constitution. 
241. 0 . !bidem. 
242 .. Section 124(1 ), read with Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the (interim) Constitution. 
243 .. Section 125( 1 ), read with Section 127. 
244 .. Section 144(1 ), read with Sections 145(1 )(a), 146 and 147. 
245 .. Section 144(1), read with Section 149(1). 
246 .. Section 125(2), read with Section 126(1). 
247 .. Section 126(2). 
248 .. Section 125(3). 
249 .. Section 126(1) and (2), read with Schedule 6 to the (interim) Constitution. 
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250 .. Section 144(2). 
251 .. Section 126(2A). 
252. 0 . Which, in terms of Section 4(2), bound "all legislative, executive and judicial organs of state at 
all levels of government." 
253. 0 . Section 4(1) of the (interim) Constitution. 
254. 0 • In which the will of the legislature was supreme - even over the constitution. 
255. 0 • Ibidem. 
256. 0• Section 62(1 ). 
257. 0 . Section 62(2). 
258. 0 • See the proviso to Section 62(2). 
259 .. Dennis Davis, Mathew Chaskalson and Johan de Waal 'Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role 
of Constitutional Interpretation' in Dawid van Wyk et al Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South 
African Legal Order (Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1994) at 1. 
260 .. Ibidem. 
261 .. Section 6(a)(1). 
262 .. Section 6(a)(il). 
263 .. Section 6(b). 
264 .. Section 6(c). 
265 .. Read the Section 6 in its entirety. 
266 .. See Chapter 8 of the (interim) Constitution for these institutions. 
267.. Ibidem, Section 7(1 ). 
268 .. Ibidem, Section 233(1 )(ix). 
269 .. Section 7(2). 
270 .. Section 33(5). 
271 .. Section 7(3). 
272 .. See Azhar Cachalia et al, Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution (Juta & Co, Cape Town, 
1994) at 22-23 for a brief discussion of the categories of rights that were thus affected. 
273 .. Ibidem, at 22. 
274 .. 18 DLR (4th) 321 at 336-337. 
275 .. Ibidem. 
276 .. Per Buchanan ACJ in Clark v Cape Town Council, (1896) 6 CTR 365, at 367. 
277 .. See Boulle, Harris and Hoexter, op cit 266. 
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278 .. See Innes CJ in Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer, 1910 TS 372, at 377. See also Director of 
Education, Transvaal v McCagie, 1918 AD 616, at 629; and Bitcon v City Council of Johannesburg 
and Arenow Behrman & Co, 1931 WLD 273, at 288-290. See further Henri Viloen (Pty) Ltd v 
Awerbuch Bros, 1953 (2) SA 151 (0) at 169H; United Watch and Diamond Co (Pty) Ltd v Disa Hotels 
Ltd, 1972 (4) SA 409 (C) at 415E-H; and PE Bosman Transport Works Committee v Piet Bosman 
Transport (Pty) Ltd, 1980 (4) SA 801 (T} at 8048-E. 
279 .. 1975 (2) SA 294 (A) at 310, where this liberal approach to standing was extended by the Court to 
the case of an application not for habeas corpus, but for a prohibitory interdict in anticipation of an unlawful 
arrest. 
280 .. Bagnall v The Colonial Government, (1907) 24 SC 470 at 476. 
281 .. Ibidem, at 470. 
282 .. Riddelsdell v Hall, (1883) 2 SC 356 at 358. The concept of a personal interest was obviously a 
conveniently flexible one, consonant with "the ever-varying circumstances of our social life", as was noted 
by Juta AJA in Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie, 1918 AD 616 at 627. 
283 .. Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties {Pty) Ltd, 1933 AD 87, at 101. 
284 .. Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie, supra at 628. See also Smalberger v Cape Times 
Ltd, 1979 (3) SA 457 (C) at 462; and The Administrator, Transvaal and The Firs Investments (Pty) 
Ltd v Johannesburg City Council, 1971 (1) SA 56 (AD) at 70. 
285 .. Section 7(4)(a). 
286 .. Section 7(4)(b}(1). Cachalia et al, op cit 23, noted that 'interest' was not defined, however. 
287 .. Section 7(4)(b)(il). 
288 .. 1983 (4) SA 855 (C). 
289 .. 1985 (3) SA 100 (0). 
290 .. Section 7(4)(b)(iv). 
291 .. 1907 TS 427 at 433. 
292 .. Section 7(4)(b){iil). 
293 .. 1972 (3) SA 934 (W), in which the principal of the University of the Witwatersrand was accorded 
standing to apply for an interdictum de libero homine exhibendo. 
294 .. Which has been referred to and commented upon above. 
295 .. Section 7(4)(b)(v). 
296 .. Supra, at 379. See also Bagnall v The Colonial Government, (1907) 24 SC 470. 
297 .. See, for example, Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary 
Services, 1981 (3) SA 1054 at 1059E-G; and Kendrick v Community Development Board, 1983 (4) 
SA (W) at 539-540. 
298 .. Section 35(1) of the (interim) Constitution. 
299 .. Per Aguda JA in Unity Dow v A-G Botswana (Civil Appeal 4/91 ). 
300 .. Section 35(2). 
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301 .. See, for instance, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court's decision in Zimbabwe Township Developers 
(Pvt) Ltd v Lou's Shoes (Pvt) Ltd, 1984 (2) SA 778 (ZS) at 783A-D on the presumption of 
constitutionality. As the Ontario Court of Appeal in Haig v Canada, (1992) 9 OR (3d) 495 (CA) also 
demonstrates, Canadian courts have even been prepared to read words into a statute in order to preserve 
its constitutionality. 
302 .. Section 35(3). 
303 .. Section 33(1 ). 
304 .. Section 33(1 )(a}(t). See Cachalia et al, op cit 111-114 for a brief discussion of this requirement. 
305 .. Section 33(1 )(a)(it). See Cachalia et al, ibidem, at 114-115 for a brief discussion of this requirement. 
306 .. Section 33(1 }(b). 
307 .. Section 33(1 }(b}(aa) and (bb}. See Cachalia et al, ;bidem at 115-116 for a brief discussion of this 
requirement. 
308 .. See Anthony Mathews Freedom State Security and the Rule of Law: Dilemmas of the Apartheid 
Society (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1988) at 192-215 for a discussion of emergency powers under the 
ancien regime. 
309 .. Section 34. See Cachlia et al, ibidem at 116-121 for a brief discussion of this topic. 
310 .. Section 76. 
311 .. Section 75, read with Section 82. 
312 .. In terms of Section 77 ( 1 )(a) of the (interim) Constitution. 
313 .. Section 96(1 ). 
314 .. Section 101(1), read with Sections 241and242. 
315 .. Section 103(1), read with Sections 241 and 242. 
316 .. Section 98(2). 
317 .. Section 71 (2). 
318 .. Section 71(3). 
319 .. Section 160(4). 
320 .. Section 160(5). 
321 .. Section 96(2). 
322 .. Section 96(3). 
323 .. Section 104(1 ), read with Section 105. 
324 .. Section 104(2). 
325 .. Section 104(4). 
326 .. Section 104(5). 
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327 .. Section 101(3)(c) and (e). 
328 .. Section 98(2). 
329 .. Section 98(2)(c). 
330 .. Section 98(2}(d}. 
331 .. Section 11 0( 1 ) . 
332 .. Section 115(1 ). 
333 .. Section 119( 1 ). 
334 .. See Section 11O(4) of the (interim) Constitution for the basic qualifications required. 
335 .. Section 110(2}(a) and (b). 
336 .. Section 110(3). 
337 .. Section 110(5). 
338 .. Section 111 (1 ). 
339 .. Section 110(8). 
340 .. Section 110(9). 
341 .. Section 112(1 ). 
342 .. Ibidem. 
343 .. Section 112(2). 
344 .. Section 114(1 ). 
345 .. Section 114(3). 
346 .. Ibidem. 
347 .. Section 114(2). 
348 .. Section 114(4). 
349 .. Section 115(1) read with Section 115(3). 
350 .. Section 115(5). 
351 .. Section 116. 
352 .. Section 116(2). 
353 .. Section 116(3). 
354 .. Section 119(1) and (2). 
355 .. Section 119(3). 
356 .. Section 120. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT 
INTRODUCTION 
T he confusion and controversy that preceded the establishment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa continued as the Court was being launched. 
The Finance Week, 1 commenting on the (then) new Constitutional Court said the Court 
faced the devil of a time. Its role would be central to the democratic state particularly 
as the Chapter on Fundamental Rights would rely on it for interpretation. Its onerous 
burden would be compounded by the fact that it would operate parallel to, rather than 
as a part of the Supreme Court. Disputes pertaining to rights entrenched in the 
Constitution would be taken directly to the Constitutional Court, from which there would 
be no appeal. The Constitutional Court was destined to become a most practical 
instrument of societal change. 
There was a lot of speculation as to who would be appointed as the first judges of the 
Court. What made speculation about appointments particularly tantalising was the fact 
that judges of the new Court would not be drawn exclusively from the Bench, the Bar 
or the Side Bar.2 Law lecturers who had worked as such for a cumulative period of at 
least ten years, 3 and, at the most, two persons who, by virtue of their training and 
experience, had acquired expertise in the field of constitutional law relevant to the 
application of the Constitution4 and the law of the Republic, could be appointed to the 
Court. 5 Needless to say, there was general befuddlement about the precise 
interpretation of the latter provision, with some people believing that it might have been 
designed to accommodate returning exiles who might have qualified or practised 
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outside the Republic and others suggesting that it could clear the way for some 'wise 
person'.6 
Willem Venter, then President of the Association of Law Societies, was quoted as 
having said that we would be "continuing with judicial structures which we had always 
had. We have superimposed on those the notion of a Constitutional Court ... A difficulty 
is whether the Appellate Division should be placed next to the Constitutional Court or 
below it."7 
An unnamed senior legal academic was also quoted as having complained that the 
Constitutional Court would marginalise the existing judiciary. The academic complained 
that the Magistrates' courts would have no constitutional jurisdiction; neither would the 
Appeal Court. The provincial divisions of the Supreme Court might decide on some 
constitutional questions but not others. The Constitutional Court would have exclusive 
jurisdiction over some matters and be a Court of Appeal for others.8 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
These concerns notwithstanding, there was a public perception and an expectation that 
the Constitutional Court would help the nascent democracy to restore public confidence 
in the South African legal system. The majority of ordinary people, whose lives had 
become unbearable under the yoke of apartheid, would be looking to the Court for 
protection of their rights. 9 It was for this reason that Anne-Marie Mischke said the 
following about it: 
Die Konstitusionele Hof is nie sommer net n6g 'n hof nie. Dis oak nie sommer 
net n6g 'n rat in die nuwe stelsel nie ... 
Die hof - soos oak die landdroshowe en die Hooggeregshof in meer plaaslike en 
provinsiale sake - is die toevlug vir elke burger wat reken die Regering (op enige 
vlak) tas sy regte aan.10 
It was also expected that the Constitutional Court would be utilised to speedily and 
spectacularly bring suitably qualified blacks and women on the Bench in order to 
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address the imbalance inherited from our apartheid past. According to the Finance 
Week, 11 Tony Leon had even argued that in our abnormal society affirmative action was 
imperative in this regard because people had been barred from posts through 
discrimination in the past. Carmel Rickard, noting that four members of the 
Constitutional Court would come from the Supreme Court and that Arthur Chaskalson, 
a white, had already been appointed its President, then remarked that: 
[f]or the sake of legitimacy, most if not all the remaining six places will go to 
candidates who will help the court better to reflect the composition of society -
in other words, probably no more white men. 12 
According to The Star, 13 Neil Coleman of the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) expressed a fear that the Constitutional Court could serve as a counter-
weight to the new Government and Parliament, and become a site of resistance to 
democratisation if it were to be dominated by conservatives. Susan Russell reported 
that Coleman also said that as the Constitutional Court would play an important role in 
the realisation of the objectives of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, 
the public needed to be satisfied that its judges would be sensitive to issues of concern 
to a broad spectrum of the public. 14 
In this chapter, the composition, place, powers and functions of the Constitutional 
Court, as well as how it was to relate to the ordinary courts of the land, will be grappled 
with. Wherever necessary and possible, an attempt will be made to compare our 
Constitutional Court with similar courts in countries such as Austria, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Turkey. 
Furthermore, an attempt will be made to contrast the Constitutional Court to courts in 
countries such as Canada, the United States of America and Venezuela,15 where 
judicial or constitutional review is allowed. France, which does not have a constitutional 
court par excellence but a Constitutional Council16 and a Council of State,17 will also be 
considered. 
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THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT 
The South African Constitutional Court consists of a President and ten other judges, 18 
all of whom were initially appointed for a non-renewable period of seven years, 19 unless 
the new constitutional text provided otherwise. 20 
THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE COURT 
The President of the Constitutional Court was appointed by the President of the 
Republic in consultation with the Cabinet and after consultation with the Chief Justice.21 
The (interim) Constitution, ex abundanti cautela in my opinion, specifically provided 
that the first appointment of the President of the Constitutional Court after its 
commencement would not be made on the recommendations of the Judicial Service 
Commission. 22 
The (interim) Constitution prescribed that the President of the Constitutional Court, like 
all the judges of this Court, had to be a South African citizen,23 who was fit and proper 
to be appointed to the Court,24 and who was either a judge of the Supreme Court, or 
was qualified to be admitted to practise as an advocate or attorney and had, for a 
cumulative period of not less than ten years after having so qualified, practised as an 
advocate or attorney or lectured in law at a university.25 In theory at least, even a 
person who, by virtue of his or her training and experience, had acquired expertise in 
a field of constitutional law relevant to the application of the Constitution and the law 
of the Republic could, with the approval of the Cabinet, be appointed as the President 
of the Constitutional Court. 26 
Some concern was raised about the old-style secret process of the appointment of the 
President of the Constitutional Court. It was commented that the President, unlike the 
rest of the judges of the Court, would not be appointed after public hearings, with the 
input of the Judicial Service Commission.27 This, as will be observed below, was not 
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accurate as public scrutiny would also not apply to the four judges of the Supreme 
Court who were similarly appointed by the President of the Republic.28 
At the request of the President of the Constitutional Court, the President of the Republic 
should appoint a Deputy President of the Court from its own ranks.29 The Deputy 
President of the Court, who might be appointed either for the duration of his or her 
membership of the Court or for such shorter period as might be determined by the 
President of the Republic, 30 was, in the absence of the President of the Court, to 
perform the functions of the latter, as well as any functions the President of the Court 
might assign to him or her. 31 
IN THE OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
It is noteworthy that South Africa seems to have followed, but adapted, the example of 
Austria where the President and Vice President of the Constitutional Court are 
appointed by the Federal President on the recommendations of the Federal 
Government. They are selected from among judges, administrative officials and 
professors holding a chair in law.32 
In Spain the President of the Constitutional Court is appointed by the King from the 
ranks and on the recommendations of the members of the Court. 33 He or she is 
appointed for a period of three years. 34 
In Germany, Portugal and Turkey, the executive do not play much of a role in the 
appointments. The President and the Vice President of the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht35 are not appointed36 by the executive but are elected by the 
two federal legislative bodies, namely the Bundestag37 and the Bundesraf8 from the 
ranks of the five highest federal courts of Germany.39 Once elected, the President of the 
Court (as well as the rest of its judges) is formally appointed by the Federal President 
to serve, under oath, for a period not exceeding twelve years, whereafter he or she may 
not be re-elected. 
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In Portugal the President of the Constitutional Court is appointed by the other judges 
of the Court from their own ranks.40 In Turkey, while all the judges of the Constitutional 
Court, which was established in 1982,41 are appointed by the President of Turkey in a 
convoluted system of nominations,42 its President and Vice President are elected by the 
Court from its own ranks for a renewable term of four years (and, like all the judges of 
the Court, both serve in a full-time capacity till retirement age of sixty-five, unless they 
are dismissed).43 
In France the President of the Republic selects the President of the Constitutional 
Council who has a deciding vote in the event of a tie.44 
THE TEN OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COURT 
The rest of the members of the Constitutional Court, all of whom should be 
appropriately qualified South African citizens would be appointed as follows: 
Appointments from Serving Judges of the Supreme Court 
The President of the Republic would appoint four judges of the existing Supreme Court 
in consultation with the Cabinet and with the Chief Justice.45 It should be noted that the 
Judicial Service Commission would play no role in the selection of these four judges; 
all that would be required would be the approval of the Cabinet and the Chief Justice. 
Neither would these judges submit to public scrutiny as was demanded by the likes of 
Dennis Davis,46 since the President of the Republic would not consult the Cabinet and 
the Chief Justice in public on these appointments. 
Appointments on the Recommendations of the Judicial Service 
Commission 
The last six of the judges were appointed by the President of the Republic in 
consultation with the Cabinet and after consultation with the President of the 
Constitutional Court.47 Of these, not more than two persons should be appointed solely 
on the basis of their having, by virtue of their training and experience, acquired 
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expertise in the field of constitutional law relevant to the application of the Constitution 
and the law of the Republic.48 
The President of the Republic made these appointments from the recommendations of 
the Judicial Service Commission which submitted a short list of ten nominees.49 In the 
event the President of the Republic and the Cabinet did not approve of a nominee, the 
Judicial Service Commission would have been told as much and furnished with reasons 
therefor.50 The Judicial Service Commission would thereupon be required and entitled 
to submit further recommendations, "whereafter the appointing authorities shall make 
the appointment or appointments from the recommendations as supplemented ... "51 
Precisely because the World Trade Centre negotiators and drafters of the Constitution 
as well as Parliament were aware of our past and the popular expectations, a 
constitutional injunction was imposed upon the Judicial Service Commission to ensure 
that, when making its recommendations, it had to have "regard to the need to constitute 
a court which is independent and competent and representative in respect of race and 
gender."52 This was in addition to the requirement that the nominees, like the President 
of the Court, had to be fit and proper53 as well as appropriately qualified54 South African 
citizens.55 In other words, as was pointed out above, even among the negotiators and 
drafters of the Constitution there was an expectation that the appointment of the last 
six of the judges of the Court could be used to redress the apartheid-created 
imbalances in respect of race and gender. 
CRITICISM 
The involvement of the executive in the appointment of judges, even from the 
recommendations of a body such as the Judicial Service Commission may be 
problematic in future particularly when the constraint of a government of national unity 
predicated upon the need to strive for consensus is no longer there. As is known, the 
appointment of the judges of the South African Constitutional Court by the President 
of the Republic in consultation with the Cabinet is not a mere formality; the "appointing 
authorities" may reject all or some of the recommendations of the Judicial Service 
Commission, even though they have to furnish reasons therefor.56 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 92 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
Furthermore, in our system no room is left for lay participation. Virtually all the members 
of the Constitutional Court are lawyers or, in the case of not more than two of them, 
persons with a legal background of some sort at the very least. 
Lastly, the negotiators and drafters of the Constitution inadvertently did not state what 
categories of persons would be excluded from membership of the Constitutional Court. 
Thus, theoretically, it is, for example, possible for members of Parliament and/or of the 
provincial legislatures with the prescribed qualifications to become members of the 
Court if not now, then immediately after they have ceased being such members, as is 
apparently the case in Germany. Arguably, though, the Judicial Service Commission 
will not recommend such persons to the President who must appoint members of the 
Constitutional Court; however, legal certainty in this regard is preferable. 
It is, in my opinion, instructive for South Africa to study how matters of this nature are 
handled in countries with similar courts. 
APPOINTMENTS IN THE OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Austria 
The Austrian Constitutional Court consists of a President, a Vice President, twelve 
additional members and six substitute members. The President, the Vice President, half 
of the additional members of the Court, and half of the substitute members are 
appointed by the Federal President on the recommendations of the Federal 
Government, from the ranks of judges, administrative officials and professors holding 
a chair in law. The rest of the members and substitute members are appointed by the 
Federal President on recommendations of each of the two Houses of Parliament listing 
three candidates for each position, with the lower House of Parliament submitting three 
names of additional members and two names of substitute members and the upper 
House submitting three names of additional members and one substitute member. The 
voting in the two Houses in this regard is based on proportional representation. Those 
thus selected "must have completed their studies in law and political science and for at 
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least ten years have held a professional appointment which prescribes the completion 
of these studies."57 
Furthermore, unlike in South Africa, members of the Austrian Federal or Land 
governments, members of either House of Parliament, employees of, or office bearers 
in political parties, or members of "any other popular representative body", are excluded 
from membership of the Constitutional Court for the duration of their membership of 
such bodies. In addition, any person who held office or appointment in such bodies for 
the preceding four years is not eligible for appointment to the Constitutional Court.58 
France 
The French Constitutional Council comprises nine judges, all of whom serve for a non-
renewable period of nine years. Three of the judges are appointed by the President of 
the Republic, while three are appointed by the Chairperson of the Senate and the 
remainder by the Chairperson of the National Assembly. One third of the membership 
of the Council is renewable every three years. 
Unlike under Article 3(2) of the German Law on the Federal Constitutional Court, 1951, 
there is no requirement that members of the Council should have legal qualifications 
or be eligible for appointment to judicial office. Former Presidents of the Republic are 
de jure members of the Council, though none of them has served thereon since 1962. 
Mauro Cappelletti59 concluded from this (ie that former presidents serve on the 
Council), inter a/ia, that this Council is, stricto sensu, not a judicial organ. 
Membership of the Council precludes membership of certain offices. For instance, 
members of the Council cannot be members of Parliament or the Government.60 Neither 
can they be members of the French Economic and Social Council or be appointed to 
any public office for the duration of their membershp of the Council. 
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Germany 
The German Federal Constitutional Court is a "twin court" consisting of two panels, 
each of which has eight judges and which are independent each of the other. Together, 
however, the sixteen judges of the Court constitute its plenum.61 
The composition of the German Federal Constitutional Court is laid down in the Basic 
Law62 as well as in the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court of 1951.63 In terms of 
the Basic Law, half of the judges of each of the two panels of the Court are elected by 
each of the two federal legislative bodies, namely the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. 
In each case the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court requires the presence of at 
least two thirds of the members of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat respectively when 
judges of the Court are elected. 
While the Bundestag sets up an electoral committee of twelve64 to elect its half of the 
judges of the Court, the Bundesrat, on the other hand, does so directly. To ensure that 
the Court includes members with long standing as judges, three of the judges of each 
panel are selected from the ranks of the five highest federal courts.65 
Once elected, each of the judges of the Federal Constitutional Court is formally 
appointed by the Federal President to serve for a period not exceeding twelve years, 
whereafter he or she may not be re-elected. In all instances, however, a judge of the 
Federal Constitutional Court has to retire once he or she reaches the age of sixty-eight. 
Judges of the Court may at any time request to be released from service, and they may 
be retired or forced to resign against their will only pursuant to a plenary decision of the 
German Parliament subject to stringent conditions.66 
The Law on the Federal Constitutional Court67 requires that each candidate must have 
reached the age of forty, be eligible for election to the Bundestag, have stated in writing 
that he or she is willing to become a member of the Court, and be qualified to exercise 
the functions of a judge pursuant to the Law on German Judges. While in office, a judge 
of the Court may not be a member of the Bundestag or the Bundesrat, or the Federal 
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government, or any of the corresponding organs of any Land.68 His or her position and 
functions as a judge of the Court preclude any other professional occupation except 
that of a lecturer of law at a German institution of higher learning; the latter position 
should not take precedence over his or her position as a judge of the Court. 
Italy 
The Italian Constitutional Court consists of fifteen judges, five of whom are appointed 
by the Italian President, five by Parliament in a joint sitting, and the rest by the Supreme 
Courts (ie the Council of State, the Court of Cassation and the Court of Auditors).69 
Those judges appointed by the President and Parliament must be magistrates of the 
superior courts (even if retired), or attorneys of at least twenty years' standing, or full 
university law professors. The rest are selected by the judges of the Supreme Courts 
from their own ranks. All the judges of the Italian Constitutional Court hold office for a 
period of nine years and are not eligible for immediate reappointment. 70 
Portugal 
The composition of the Portuguese Constitutional Court is governed by the 1982 
Portuguese Constitution.71 The Court comprises thirteen judges, ten of whom are 
appointed by the legislature, the Assembly, on a two-thirds majority basis, while the rest 
are co-opted by the appointed members. 
Three of the ten appointed members of the Court, as well as all the co-opted ones, are 
compulsorily selected from the ranks of the other courts of Portugal while the rest come 
from the ranks of jurists. The Constitution, albeit opaquely, also allows for the inclusion 
of non-specialised sections of society for the purposes of concrete scrutiny of legislation 
for constitutionality and legality.72 
Judges of the Portuguese Constitutional Court, as pointed out above, select the 
President of the Court from their own ranks. All of them serve for a period of six years, 
which is renewable without any limit. 
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Spain 
The Spanish Constitutional Court consists of twelve members appointed by the King. 73 
Four of these judges are elected by the Congress of Deputies (the lower House) by a 
special majority of three-fifths of its members, four by the Senate with the same special 
majority, two by the Government and the rest by the General Council of the Judiciary. 74 
Judges of the Spanish Constitutional Court are elected and formally appointed for a 
period of nine years, with one third of their seats being renewable every three years. 
They are appointed from the ranks of judges, magistrates and prosecutors, university 
professors of law, public officials and lawyers, all of whom must be jurists of recognised 
standing with at least fifteen years' experience in the exercise of their professions. 75 
The Spanish Constitutional Court is independent and its members may not be removed 
from office for the duration of their term of office. Membership of the Court is 
incompatible with any representative function, any political or administrative office, 
political party employment or office, a career as a judge or prosecutor, and any 
professional or commercial activity. 76 
Turkey 
The Turkish Constitutional Court consists of eleven regular judges and four substitute 
members, all of whom are appointed by the President of Turkey through a rather 
intricate process of nomination.77 The High Court of Appeals (from the ranks of which 
two regular members and one substitute member are chosen), the Council of State, the 
highest reviewing body for administrative matters (from the list of which two regular 
members and one substitute member are chosen), the Military High Court of Appeals 
(which provides one member), the High Military Administrative Court (which provides 
one member), the Audit Court (which also provides one member), the Higher Education 
Council (from the list of which one member is chosen), senior administrative officials 
and lawyers (from whose list three regular members and one substitute member are 
chosen), all participate in the nomination of members of the Constitutional Court. 
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The non-judicial members of the Court must be over forty years of age or have worked 
for a period of fifteen years as higher education teachers or public servants or must 
have practised law for the same period before they become eligible for nomination and 
appointment. 78 All the members of the Court serve in a full-time capacity until they reach 
retirement at the age of sixty years, and can be dismissed if convicted of offences 
requiring dismissal from judicial office or for failure to perform their duties due to ill-
health (after a decision of the majority of the members of the Court).79 
THE PLACE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER COURTS 
Since the adoption of the interim Constitution the role of South African courts has 
been tremendously enhanced. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was replaced 
by the concept of a rechsstaat, a state based on constitutional supremacy, thus 
enabling both the newly established Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court8° to 
exercise the full power of judicial review of law and administrative acts. Therefore, the 
question of the place of the Constitutional Court in the new judicial configuration 
became an extremely important one. 
The Finance Week81 stated that the South African Constitutional Court would operate 
"parallel to, rather than as part of, the Supreme Court". On the other hand, The Star82 
called it "the highest court in the land". In the meantime, Danie Olivier said 
... daar is besluit Suid-Afrika moet 'n afsonderlike Konstitusionele Hofkry om 
uitspraak te !ewer oar verskeie grondwetlike kwessies. 
Die nuwe hof is dus nie deel van enige van die hofstrukture wat tot 26 April 
bestaan het nie.83 (my italics) 
THE HIERARCHY OF SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS 
Prior to the 27 April 1994 elections, our judiciary in general terms consisted of the 
following courts: 
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The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court, during the first two years of the existence of the Constitutional 
Court was,84 consisting of:-
the Appellate Division, which in 1950 replaced the Privy Council as the highest 
appellate tribunal in the land and which would have only an appellate role in both 
civil and criminal matters;85 
the Provincial Divisions of the Supreme Court which functioned as courts of first 
instance as well as as courts of appeal from the lower courts (ie the magistrates' 
courts and regional magistrates' courts), with both civil and criminal jurisdiction; 
and 
the Local Divisions of the Supreme Court which were staffed by judges of the 
provincial courts of their respective provinces and which function as courts of 
first instance only.86 
In addition to those divisions, provision was made in the Supreme Court Act87 for 
circuit local divisions of the Supreme Court which would go on circuit at least twice 
every year to the outlying districts of a province to hear mainly criminal cases.88 
Whereas the Constitution prescribed the qualifications of members of the 
Constitutional Court,89 it was noticeably silent on the qualifications of judges of the 
Supreme Court. All that it provided for was that they should be fit and proper persons.90 
In terms of Constitutional Principle VII ,91 members of the judiciary should, inter alia, be 
appropriately qualified for appointment to the bench. This, over time, has tended to 
mean that our judges are basically selected from the ranks of senior practising 
members of the bar, though senior attorneys and legal academics have been appointed 
to the bench since the advent of the interim Constitution. 
Lastly, whereas members of the Constitutional Court were appointed for one non-
renewable term of seven years, judges of the Supreme Court enjoy tenure for life, 
though they customarily retire at the age of seventy. 
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Other Superior Courts 
The (interim) Constitution further provided that "[t]he establishment, jurisdiction, 
composition and functioning of all other courts shall be as prescribed by or under a 
law. "92 This was in recognition of the fact that the Republic had other courts, superior 
and inferior. For the purposes of this thesis, it should suffice merely to list the other 
superior courts. 
Special Criminal Courts 
The President has power to constitute a special criminal court if an attorney-general 
decides to arraign an accused before a superior court upon a charge relating to the 
security of the state, and the Minister of Justice is of the opinion that in view of the 
circumstances relating to such charge, the interests of justice will be best served if such 
a court is established.93 Such a court consists of three judges,94 and may sit anywhere 
within the jurisdiction of the attorney-general of the relevant province.95 An appeal from 
such a special criminal court lies to five judges of the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court.96 
Water Courts 
Chapter IV of the Water Act97 constitutes water courts which correspond to the 
provincial divisions of the Supreme Court,98 and which are presided over by judges of 
the relevant division of the Supreme Court.99 The jurisdiction of the water courts enables 
them to make orders in respect of public and subterranean water and public streams. 100 
Some of the orders of a water court are not appealable. 101 Moreover, parties to a water 
matter may agree to accept a decision of the water court as final. 102 Otherwise, appeals 
from water courts lie directly to the Appellate Division, without leave thereto having to 
be obtained from any court. 103 
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Special Income Tax Courts 
The Income Tax Act104 provides for special courts105 with jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from persons dissatisfied with rulings of the commissioner for inland revenue pertaining 
to their income tax assessments. 106 Since 1991, these courts also hear appeals from 
persons dissatisfied with decisions of the recently instituted regional tax boards, 107 the 
jurisdiction of which is limited to cases where the disputed tax amount does not exceed 
the sum of R20 000. 
These courts are each presided over by a judge of the Supreme Court as president, 
sitting together with an accountant of not less than ten years standing, and a 
representative of the commercial world. 108 
Decisions of these special courts are appealable by or at the instance of either the 
commissioner for inland revenue or the taxpayer affected. 109 Appeals from these courts 
lie either to the provincial division of the Supreme Court with jurisdiction in the province 
where each of the special income tax courts sits, or, with special leave obtained from 
the president of the special court, directly to the Appellate Division. 110 It is worthy of note 
that both questions of fact and questions of law may form the subject matter of an 
appeal against a decision of the special income tax courts. 111 
Courts Dealing with Patent Rights, Trade Marks and Copyright 
Under the Patents Act 112 a judge of the Transvaal Provincial Division 113 may be 
appointed as commissioner of patents. 114 As such, the judge thus appointed acts as a 
court of first instance to hear all cases involving patent rights, including appeals against 
decisions of the registrar of patents. 115 Appeals against decisions of the judge acting as 
commissioner lie to the full bench of the provincial division, 116 although further appeals 
to the Appellate Division are also possible. 117 
Similar appeal provisions were made in respect of trade marks. 118 
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The judge who is the commissioner of patents is also authorised to act as the copyright 
tribunal from time to time. 119 As the copyright tribunal the judge adjudicates disputes 
between licensing bodies and persons requiring licenses or organisations claiming to 
be representatives of such persons.120 Decisions of the copyright tribunal are reviewable 
by a full bench of the provincial division having jurisdiction. 121 
The Special Court Set up under the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition 
Act122 
This special court, which consists of a judge of the supreme court who acts as president 
thereof and two other members who are specially qualified in economic and business 
matters generally,123 hears appeals by persons affected by executive decisions which 
are to the effect that restrictive practices or acquisitions are unlawful. While the judge 
alone decides questions of law, decisions of the majority are otherwise decisions of the 
special court. 124 Its decisions are not subject to appeal or review by any other court of 
law.12s 
The Lower Courts 
The lower courts were, and still are, divided into the magistrates' courts (formerly 
District Courts), which have both civil and criminal jurisdiction, and Regional 
Magistrates' Courts, which have criminal jurisdiction only. 
Judgments of these courts are reviewable by and appealable to the Supreme Court. 
Furthermore, the magistrate of each district is ex officio a commissioner of child 
welfare. 126 As such, he or she presides over the children's court in his or her district, and 
performs tasks outlined in the Child Care Act and regulations promulgated in terms 
thereof. 127 
In addition, every magistrate's court is a maintenance court for the area in which it has 
jurisdiction. 128 Appeals against decisions of a maintenance court lie to the provincial 
division of the Supreme Court having jurisdiction in the court's area.129 
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Miscellaneous 
Provision is also made for short process courts 130 and small claims courts.131 Both these 
courts are, stricto sensu, not civil courts, however. 
Lastly, since the inurement of the Special Courts for Blacks Abolition Act, 132 chiefs' 
and headmen's courts are all that remain of the rump of an extensive system of courts 
that were specifically created in the nineteenth century to cater solely for the indigenous 
Africans under traditional and customary law. These courts have both civil and criminal 
jurisdiction and appeals against their decisions lie to the magistrates' courts in their 
districts. 133 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The (interim) Constitution, as stated earlier on in this thesis, established a new court, 
the Constitutional Court, in addition to this hierarchy. The Supreme Court was, subject 
to the Constitution, allowed to retain and exercise the jurisdiction it had immediately 
before the 27 April 1994 elections, including its inherent jurisdiction.134 The provincial 
and local divisions also had comprehensive jurisdiction regarding constitutional review 
extended to them, 135 while the Appellate Division was, inexplicably, expressly precluded 
from exercising such jurisdiction. 136 Furthermore, parties to matters falling outside the 
additional jurisdiction of the provincial and local divisions could extend the jurisdiction 
of such divisions to such matters even if such matters involved questions of 
constitutionality which otherwise fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court. 137 
An even more interesting development in this regard was that, as a result of the 
provisions of Section 101 (6) of the Constitution, provincial and local divisions of the 
Supreme Court had arguably acquired the power to enquire into the validity of Acts of 
Parliament. Whilst acknowledging that the jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity 
of Acts of Parliament vested solely in the Constitutional Court, Levinsohn J remarked, 
with regard to Section 101 (6), in S v Shangase and Another138 that: 
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After giving this subsection some anxious consideration, I was satisfied that 
indeed it does confer jurisdiction upon this Court by consent. I think that the 
words 'The parties' referred to in that subsection can mean parties to both civil 
and criminal proceedings and there seems to me to be no bar to an accused 
concluding such an agreement within the meaning of this subsection ... 
I therefore hold that this Court has jurisdiction and I now proceed to determine 
the constitutionality of s 217(1 )(b)(ii) of Act 51 of 1977.139 (my italics) 
This was subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional Court in S v Zuma and 
Others 140 where Kentridge AJ held that "[b]y reason of the consent of the parties under 
s 101 (6) the issue of the constitutionality of s 217(1 )(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
no longer remained within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, and fell within the 
jurisdiction of Hugo J."141 Appeals affecting decisions of the provincial or local divisions 
in this regard lie to the Constitutional Court, 142 and not to the Appellate Division. 143 
The question of the place of the Constitutional Court in our judicial hierarchy was not 
covered in the Constitution. It was not expressly or implicitly stated whether or not the 
Court would be the highest court in the land, or whether it would operate parallel to the 
Supreme Court. All that was stated expressly was that the Court would be "the court of 
final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement 
of the provisions of' the Constitution. 144 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
was expressly denied "jurisdiction to adjudicate any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court";145 it was further emphasised146 that the Constitutional Court would 
basically be the only court having the jurisdiction allotted to it in the Constitution. 147 
In my opinion, the Constitutional Court, "the most powerful constitutional body"148 in the 
country, with power to overturn parliamentary legislation deemed unconstitutional, was 
the highest court in the land with regard to issues of constitutional validity; 149 as such, 
this Court was the guardian of the Constitution. 150 
However, this left unanswered the question of what court was responsible for the 
development of our ordinary criminal law, private law, and of the rights deriving from our 
common law, indigenous law or ordinary legislation.151 The Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court, 152 which was headed by the Chief Justice of the Republic, was the final 
authority with regard to the latter. 153 The unfortunate thing, however, is that, in terms of 
this constitutional configuration, the Chief Justice and the Appellate Division did not 
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have any role in the development of our constitutional law and human rights 
jurisprudence. This situation has, fortunately, changed to a certain extent in the (new) 
Constitution. 154 
THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The (interim) Constitution allocated several powers and functions 155 to the 
Constitutional Court. These included the power to certify the new constitutional text or 
a provincial constitutional text as not being inconsistent with the Constitution or the 
Constitutional Principles set out in Schedule 4 of the Constitution; the power to decide 
with finality all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the 
provisions of the Constitution; the power to adjudicate upon the constitutional validity 
of Acts of Parliament and executive or administrative acts; and the power of judicial 
preview .156 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS 
In this regard, the South African Constitutional Court was meant to play a vital role in 
two areas, namely in the making of the new constitutional text for the whole of the 
Republic and in the making of provincial constitutions in cases where provinces wished 
to have their own constitutions as well. 
The New Constitutional Text 
For the new Constitution to be valid, the Constitutional Court had to certify that it 
complied with the 34 constitutional principles enshrined in the (interim) Constitution. 157 
Without such certification, the new constitutional text would be of no force and effect. 158 
The certification by the Constitutional Court that the provisions of the new constitutional 
text complied with the Constitutional Principle would be final and binding and no court 
of law159 would have jurisdiction to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of such 
text or any of its provisions. 160 
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In addition, if, during the proceedings of the Constitutional Assembly, a dispute arose 
over whether a proposal complied with any of the 34 principles, it could be referred to 
the Constitutional Court if the chairperson of the Assembly was petitioned to do so by 
at least 20% (ie 98) of the members of the Constitutional Assembly. 161 
Provincial Constitutions 
The Constitution allowed the legislature of each of the nine provinces, if it so wished, 
to make and pass a constitution for its province "by a resolution of a majority of at least 
two-thirds of all its members. "162 So long as a provincial constitution thus made was not 
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Constitution, "including the Constitutional 
Principles set out in Schedule 4", 163 a provincial legislature could make such 
arrangements as it deemed appropriate in connection with its proceedings relating to 
the drafting and consideration of a constitution for its province. 164 
It was expressly provided that no constitutional text passed by a provincial legislature 
or provisions thereof would be of force and effect unless the Constitutional Court had 
certified it or them as not being inconsistent with the Constitution. 165 Further, it was 
expressly provided that a decision of the Constitutional Court to the effect that a 
constitutional text passed by a provincial legislature was not inconsistent with the 
Constitution or any provision thereof would be final and binding; no (other) court of law 
would "have jurisdiction to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of such text or 
any provision thereof. "166 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
As stated above, the Constitutional Court had "jurisdiction in the Republic as the court 
of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and 
enforcement of the provisions of' the Constitution. As such, it had wide powers in this 
regard and is the ultimate court which can say with authority and precision what the 
Constitution of the Republic is. 167 
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Save where otherwise provided in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court was the 
only court having jurisdiction over all matters referred to in Section 98(2) of the 
Constitution.168 In other words, in certain respects, the Constitutional Court had 
exclusive jurisdiction while in other constitutional matters it had concurrent jurisdiction 
with the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, as 
was pointed out previously, was expressly precluded from dealing with and adjudicating 
any matter which fell within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 169 
Exclusive Jurisdiction 
The Constitutional Court, as pointed out above, had exclusive jurisdiction in respect of 
certain constitutional matters. 170 However, even in respect of such matters, which are 
discussed below, parties thereto could agree to the jurisdiction of a provincial or local 
division of the Supreme Court. 171 In such instances, appeals would still lie to the 
Constitutional Court. 172 
In my opinion, even if none of the parties appeals in such a case, the provincial or local 
division disposing of the matter might, in appropriate circumstances, refer the 
constitutional issue to the Constitutional Court for a decision, "notwithstanding the fact 
that the matter has been disposed of'. 173 
Constitutionality of Acts of Parliament 
The Constitutional Court was granted the exclusive power to deal with "any inquiry into 
the constitutionality of any law, including an Act of Parliament, irrespective of whether 
such law was passed or made before or after the commencement of' the 
Constitution. 174 A cursory analysis of this suggests that no law was immune to or 
insulated from the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court. Thus, the Constitutional Court 
could be approached to test the validity of any law, including Acts of Parliament, 
subordinate legislation (such as proclamations), provincial legislation, bye-laws made 
by local governments, the common law as well as customary law. 
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The provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court, notwithstanding their "inherent 
jurisdiction", 175 did not have jurisdiction to enquire into the constitutionality of Acts of 
Parliament. 176 They did, however, have jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutionality 
of any laws passed or made by the legislatures of the former TBVC States if such laws 
were applicable within their jurisdiction, 177 because such laws were not Acts of 
Parliament. 178 
The decisions of the Constitutional Court, which bound "all persons and all legislative, 
executive and judicial organs of state", 179 would annul a law or a statute which was 
adjudged to be constitutionally invalid (either completely or to the extent of its 
inconsistency with the Constitution)180 with general, erga omnes, ex nunc and pro 
futuro effects.181 In other words, the Court's decisions would have a constitutive effect; 
they would determine that a statute or any provision thereof was a nullity because, and 
to the extent, of its unconstitutionality. The Court might, "in the interests of justice and 
good government", also make an order invalidating anything done or permitted under 
a law or a provision thereof which existed at the commencement of the Constitution.182 
However, the Constitutional Court also had a discretion to put Parliament or any 
competent authority on terms if the interests of justice and good government so require. 
Thus, instead of declaring a law or any provision thereof invalid, it might require 
Parliament or any competent authority, within a period it might specify, "to correct the 
defect in the law or provision, which shall then remain in force pending correction or the 
expiry of the period so specified. "183 
It is not clear, however, whether the Constitutional Court was confined to the assertions 
or averments of applicants or to the issues referred to it when reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws. 184 Consequently, as will become clear in the next chapters of 
this thesis, the Court in general tended to follow the United States "cases and 
controversies" approach.185 Due to this approach, it is my contention that the Court had 
in certain instances tended, wittingly or unwittingly, to leave intact glaring elements of 
unconstitutionality in some of the laws it had been called upon to review. 186 
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Adjudication over the Constitutionality of Bills before Parliament 
The Constitutional Court was given exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes over the 
constitutionality of any bill before Parliament. 187 The provincial or local divisions of the 
Supreme Court were not given this jurisdiction; they were confined to adjudicating 
disputes over the constitutionality of bills before provincial legislatures.188 
This jurisdiction, however, could be exercised only at the request of the Speaker of the 
National Assembly, the President of the Senate or the Speaker of a provincial 
legislature, all of whom were constitutionally constrained to "make such a request to the 
Court upon receipt of a petition by at least one-third of all the members of the National 
Assembly, the Senate or such provincial legislature, as the case may be, requiring him 
or her to do so."189 In other words, without such a request, the Court could not 
adjudicate any dispute over the constitutionality of a bill before Parliament or a 
provincial legislature. 
It is noteworthy that there was no requirement for the petitioners to, at the very least, 
state a prima facie case before the relevant authority's request could be made to the 
Constitutional Court. All that they were required to do was to cobble together the 
support of at least one-third of all the members of the National Assembly, the Senate 
or, as the case may be, a provincial legislature. Neither was the Constitutional Court 
given power to take punitive measures against frivolous or vexatious uses of this 
procedure. In other words, there was no disincentive to those who might seek to abuse 
it and minority parties could, therefore, use the procedure for political reasons rather 
than to deal with elements of unconstitutionality in a Bill before Parliament or before a 
provincial legislature. 
The Portuguese Constitutional Court is another example of a court which has this 
power. It may be called upon by the Portuguese President - or, in certain 
circumstances, by the Prime Minister or one-fifth of all the members of Parliament - to 
scrutinise contested legislation for constitutionality before it is passed. 190 
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Adjudication of Disputes between National Organs of State 
The Constitutional Court was the only Court that could adjudicate disputes of a 
constitutional nature between organs of state at the national level of govemment. 191 
Thus, for instance, any dispute of a constitutional nature between the President of the 
Republic and Parliament could be dealt with only by the Constitutional Court. 192 
Concurrent Jurisdiction 
In certain areas, the Constitutional Court and provincial and local divisions of the 
Supreme Court had concurrent jurisdiction. Consequently, as will be shown below, the 
Constitutional Court allowed direct access to it only in exceptional cases. It also did not 
take kindly to referrals that were made to it in relation to matters which the provincial 
and local divisions were competent to deal with. 
Protection of Human Rights 
The Constitutional Court, as the court of first and final instance, 193 was given the power 
to adjudicate with finality any alleged violation or threatened violation of any 
fundamental right entrenched in the Constitution. 194 Thus, as a competent court of law, 
in the event of an infringement of or threat to any of the constitutionally entrenched 
rights, it might be approached for appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. 195 
Provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court too had this authority within their 
areas of jurisdiction. 196 Thus, persons could bring actions before these courts in respect 
of any violation or threatened violation of their entrenched fundamental rights. Appeals 
against their decisions in this regard went direct to the Constitutional Court, 197 and not 
to the Appellate Division. 198 
Adjudication of Disputes over the Constitutionality of Executive and Administrative 
Actions 
The Constitutional Court and provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court were 
constitutionally empowered to adjudicate any dispute over the constitutionality of any 
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executive or administrative act or conduct or threatened executive or administrative act 
or conduct of any organ of state. 199 
For the Supreme Court this was not a new power; it had always had inherent jurisdiction 
to examine the validity of executive and administrative actions. Exercising as they do 
statutory or delegated powers, the decisions of the executive and the administration, 
notwithstanding numerous statutory attempts to oust the courts' jurisdiction, have 
always been reviewable by the courts under our common law on various grounds 
established in administrative law.200 
For example, under the (interim) Constitution the Transvaal Provincial Division201 and 
subsequently the Durban and Coast Local Division202 of the Supreme Court indeed 
used this jurisdiction to test the validity of a Presidential Act.203 In the two cases the 
learned judges came to two interesting and yet diametrically opposed conclusions on 
whether or not fathers in prison with children under twelve could benefit from the 
provisions of the Presidential Act. 
Enquiry into the Constitutionality of Provincial and Subordinate Legislation 
Both the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme 
Court had jurisdiction to enquire into the constitutionality of any law of a provincial 
legislature, or any subordinate legislation, irrespective of whether such law was passed 
or made before or after the commencement of the Constitution. 204 
Again it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has always had jurisdiction to enquire 
into the validity of subordinate legislation.205 For example, in Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Government of KwaZulu,206 the Appellate Division, 
exercising this power, held that in issuing a proclamation without first consulting the 
then KwaZulu Government as required in terms of the National States Constitution 
Act,207 the State President had acted ultra vires and that, therefore, the proclamation 
was invalid. 
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What is clear is that, in the light of the provisions of Section 101 (5) of the Constitution, 
the Appellate Division lost this power. In the light of these provisions and the provisions 
of Section 102(12), it indeed lost the power to deal with appeals regarding the 
constitutionality of even subordinate legislation. For from then on, all "[a]ppeals arising 
from matters referred to in section 101(3) and which relate to issues of constitutionality" 
lay to the Constitutional Court.208 
Adjudication of Disputes between the Lower Rungs of Government 
The Constitutional Court209 and provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court210 
had concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes of a constitutional nature between 
local governments and also between a local government and provincial government. 
Adjudication of Disputes over the Constitutionality of Bills before Provincial Legislatures 
The Constitution gave both the Constitutional Court211 and the provincial and local 
divisions of the Supreme Court212 jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute over the 
constitutionality of a bill before a provincial legislature. In both instances, this power 
could be exercised only pursuant to a request made by a Speaker of the relevant 
provincial legislature who was constrained to make such a request upon receipt of a 
petition by at least one-third of all the members of the legislature requiring him or her 
to do so.213 
Lastly, both the Constitutional Court and provincial and local divisions of the Supreme 
Court had concurrent jurisdiction to determine whether any matter fell within their 
respective jurisdiction214 as well as to determine any other matters entrusted to them by 
the Constitution or by any other law. 215 
While the Constitutional Court and provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court 
had concurrent jurisdiction on all these matters, for some unfathomable (political?) 
reasons the Appellate Division was specifically precluded from dealing with any matter 
falling within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. As Carpenter pointed out, 
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[t]his is one of many anomalies in the constitution. It certainly strikes one as 
strange that a single (possibly fairly junior) judge of a provincial or local division 
has the jurisdiction to deal with constitutional issues and a panel of five of the 
most senior appellate judges (possibly including the country's chief justice) does 
not.21s 
ENGAGING THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The Constitutional Court might be approached either by way of direct access, or by 
reference or by appeal. 
Direct Access 
The Constitution allowed the Constitutional Court to formulate its own rules regarding 
direct access to it if it was in the interest of justice to do so in respect of any matter over 
which it had jurisdiction.217 In this regard the Rules of the Constitutional Court218 
provide that: 
(1) The Court shall allow direct access ... in exceptional circumstances only, 
which will ordinarily exist only where the matter is of such urgency, or otherwise 
of such public importance, that the delay necessitated by the use of ordinary 
procedures would prejudice the public interest or prejudice the ends of justice 
and good government. 
(2) The special procedure referred to in subrule (1) may be sanctioned by the 
Court on application made to it in terms of these Rules.219 
Due to the liberalisation of our law on locus standi in the area of entrenched rights, it 
is no longer necessary for a person to establish a personal and direct interest in the 
matter before approaching the Constitutional Court for appropriate relief. Any person 
acting on his or her own behalf, any association acting in the interest of its members, 
any person acting on behalf of another who is not in a position to do so in his or her 
own name, any person acting as a member of or in the interest of a group or class of 
persons, and any person acting in the public interest, may approach the Constitutional 
Court as a competent court for an appropriate remedy.220 It would appear that even 
public officials would be entitled to approach the Constitutional Court directly and raise 
constitutional matters. 221 
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However, the Constitutional Court does not encourage a resort to Rule 17(1) just in any 
setting. It must be satisfied that the circumstances are indeed of a truly exceptional kind 
before it can allow direct access to it.222 Ordinarily the other courts, including the 
Appellate Division, were required to deal with matters before them and conclude them, 
if possible, without reaching any issues of a constitutional nature.223 
An example of a case where a successful application for direct access to the 
Constitutional Court was made is S v Zuma and Others.224 This was despite the fact 
that the referral to the Court by Hugo J in that case was wholly incompetent.225 The 
Court accepted that there were indeed special circumstances which warranted the grant 
of audience in that instance.226 
Another instance where direct access to the Constitutional Court was granted was 
Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature, and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others.227 The dispute in that case involved the validity 
of certain presidential proclamations which provided the framework for the holding of 
local government elections. The Court, in granting direct access on the basis of 
urgency, considered the possibility that invalidation of the proclamations could 
jeopardise the whole electoral process. 
Reference 
Disputes228 could also reach the Constitutional Court by way of reference. However, not 
all persons were entitled to refer disputes to the Court; the Constitution mentioned 
specifically who or what institutions could, or were constrained to, do this, subject to the 
Constitution. 
It should be noted that, though the Constitutional Court did have features of the power 
of abstract review, 229 more emphasis was put on concrete cases or disputes. It frowned 
upon being utilised by anyone or by any organ of the state as a sounding board; neither 
could it be used by anyone merely soliciting an opinion on any matter. In Zantsi v 
Council of State, Ciskei and Others,230 the Constitutional Court made it clear that: 
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It is not ordinarily desirable for a Court to give rulings in the abstract on issues 
which are not the subject of controversy and are only of academic interest.231 
However, I am prepared to venture an opinion that the Court might be approached by 
any organ of state on an ex parte basis to, for example, determine the constitutionality 
of any law, including an Act of Parliament or any provision thereof. A careful reading of 
Section 98(2)(c) of the Constitution suggests that there need not have been a dispute 
or a controversy before this could done.232 
The following personages and institutions were allowed to refer matters or disputes to 
the Constitutional Court: 
Reference by the Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly 
The Constitution allowed the Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly233 to, during 
the course of the proceedings of the Constitutional Assembly, refer to the Constitutional 
Court any proposed draft, or any part or provision, of the new constitutional text, if 
petitioned to do so by at least one fifth of all the members of the Assembly.234 This 
would enable the Chairperson of the Assembly to obtain an opinion from the Court as 
to whether the proposed new text, or part or provision thereof, would, if adopted by the 
Assembly, comply with the Constitutional Principles235 contained in Schedule 4 of the 
Constitution. The procedure to be followed in this regard was outlined in the Rules of 
the Constitutional Court.236 
Reference by the President of the Republic 
The President of the Republic might, as stated above, refer disputes of a constitutional 
nature between parties represented in Parliament or between organs of state at any 
level of government to the Constitutional Court, inter alia, for resolution.237 The Court's 
jurisdiction was wide enough to encompass this,238 and its decision on a matter thus 
referred to it was, needless to say, binding upon "all persons and all legislative, 
executive and judicial organs of state."239 The procedure to be followed in this regard 
was laid out in the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 240 
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The President's power in this regard, limited as it was to referring disputes of a 
constitutional nature to the Court, did not allow him or her to use this to solicit the 
Court's views on the constitutionality of any law, including an Act of Parliament.241 He 
or she could, therefore, not use it to intervene even in cases of palpable 
unconstitutionality. There must first have been a dispute of a constitutional nature either 
between parties represented in Parliament or between organs of state at any level of 
government before he or she could consider. using the power to refer disputes to the 
Constitutional Court. 
Reference by Parliament and Provincial Legislatures 
Disputes relating to the constitutionality of Bills before Parliament or provincial 
legislatures might, as stated above, also reach the Constitutional Court by way of 
reference. 242 The Constitution provided that the Speaker of the National Assembly, the 
President of the Senate, or the Speaker of a provincial legislature, should, upon receipt 
of a petition by, at the very least, one-third of all the members of their respective bodies, 
request the Constitutional Court to exercise its power of judicial preview and adjudicate 
upon such disputes.243 The procedure to be followed in this regard was outlined in the 
Rules of the Constitutional Court. 244 
It is arguable that the President of the Republic too could use his or her constitutional 
power to refer disputes on the constitutionality of Bills before Parliament or provincial 
legislatures, without being limited by any of the constraints affecting the Speaker of the 
National Assembly and the other officials. 245 
Reference by the Supreme Court 
The Appellate Division, in the course of exercising its appellate jurisdiction, might hear 
all appeals against civil and criminal decisions of provincial and local divisions of the 
Supreme Court, even in cases where constitutional issues had arisen, if such appeals 
could be disposed of without it adjudicating upon the constitutional issues.246 However, 
if it was necessary, in order to dispose of an appeal, for the constitutional issue to be 
decided, the Appellate Division was required to "refer such issue to the Constitutional 
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Court for its decision."247 The procedure to be followed in this regard was outlined in the 
Rules of the Constitutional Court.248 
Matters might also reach the Constitutional Court by way of reference from provincial 
and local divisions of the Supreme Court. A decisive issue which fell within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court was required to be referred to the 
Constitutional Court for its decision if a provincial or local division hearing a matter 
considered it to be in the interest of justice do so. 249 The relevant court might do so after 
hearing evidence and making a finding thereon, if the court deemed it necessary for 
evidence to be heard for the purposes of deciding the case.250 
The Constitutional Court did not allow the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme 
Court to resort to referrals too quickly.251 It insisted that they should make their own 
decisions on constitutional issues within their jurisdiction.252 As Kentridge AJ put it in S 
v Zuma and Others, 253 
Even if a rapid resort to this Court were convenient that would not relieve the 
judge from making his own decision on a constitutional issue within his 
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction conferred on Judges of the Provincial and Local 
Divisions of the Supreme Court under s 101 (3) is not an optional jurisdiction. The 
jurisdiction was conferred in order to be exercised. (my italics) 
Kentridge AJ, commenting further on the practice of referrals to the Constitutional Court 
under Section 102(1) of the Constitution correctly pointed out in S v Mhlungu and 
Others254 that: 
[t]he fact that an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court arises in a 
Provincial or Local Division does not necessitate an immediate referral to this 
Court. Even if the issue appears to be a substantial one, the Court hearing the 
case is required to refer it only 
(i) if the issue is one which may be decisive for the case; and 
(ii) if it considers it to be in the interest of justice to do so.255 
In other words, issues not falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court might not be referred to it by a provincial or local division.256 Moreover, it was not 
sufficient that an issue fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 
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Regarding the provisions of Section 102( 1 ), the Constitutional Court also emphasised 
in S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis257 that: 
[w]hat we have to decide on a referral ordered under the subsection is a specific 
"issue" falling within our exclusive jurisdiction which has arisen in the "matter'' so 
referred, and not the "matter" in its entirety. To solicit a decision on an "issue" of 
that sort is the very purpose of any such referral, after all, and the only one. The 
subsection recognises the restricted ambit of the enquiry when it directs the 
referring court to hear and make findings on any evidence needed "for the 
purposes of deciding such issue".258 
If, on the other hand, a constitutional issue falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court was properly referred to it, it was provided that the relevant court 
"shall suspend the proceedings before it, pending the decision of the Constitutional 
Court."259 
Furthermore, any division of the Supreme Court which disposed of a matter in which 
a constitutional issue had been raised might, if it was "of the opinion that the 
constitutional issue is of such public importance that a ruling should be given thereon", 
refer the relevant constitutional issue to the Constitutional Court for a decision, even 
after the matter itself had been disposed of.260 As Chaskalson P pointed out in Zantsi 
v Council of State, Ciskei and Others,261 however, 
[b]efore an issue can be referred to this Court in terms of section 102(8) three 
requirements must be satisfied. First, a constitutional issue must have been 
raised in the proceedings; secondly, the matter in which such issue was raised 
must have been disposed of by the Supreme Court; and thirdly, the division of 
the Supreme Court which disposed of the matter must be of the opinion that the 
constitutional issue is of sufficient public importance to call for a ruling to be 
made thereon by this Court.262 
Lastly, the Constitution263 allowed disputes arising between organs of state264 
regarding the constitutionality of any executive or administrative act or conduct or any 
threated executive or administrative act or conduct of one of those organs to be referred 
by provincial or local divisions of the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court for its 
decision. If the provincial or local division approached by way of application granted the 
order sought in this regard, the party who or which requested such a dispute to be 
referred to the Constitutional Court was required to lodge with the registrar of the 
Constitutional Court the order of court and a proper notice within fifteen days of the 
order.265 
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Reference by the Other Courts 
The other courts266 did not adjudicate matters of constitutionality. Such matters were 
dealt with only by the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court and by the 
Constitutional Court subject to the Constitution.267 Where it was alleged in a matter 
before a court falling in this category that a law or a provision thereof was incompatible 
with the Constitution and therefore invalid, such a court should essentially decide the 
matter on the assumption that the relevant law or provision was valid.268 Such a court 
might also not refer any matter to the Constitutional Court.269 
Although the other courts might not directly refer any dispute to the Constitutional Court, 
it is arguable that they might do so in a rather circuitous and, needless to say, 
expensive manner. Provision was made for this in the sense that if the presiding officer 
of any of the other courts was of the opinion that the interests of justice so warranted, 
and where there were reasonable prospects of success,270 the proceedings before the 
court might be postponed to enable a party whose case turned on the question of 
constitutional validity of a law to approach a provincial or local division of the Supreme 
Court for appropriate relief. The provincial or local division itself should then refer the 
matter to the Constitutional Court if the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
latter court.271 Even if the issue did not fair within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court, it might still be referred to it under the Constitution.272 
Needless to say, the decisions of the Constitutional Court in all the matters thus 
referred to it were binding on "all persons and all legislative, executive and judicial 
organs of state. "273 
With regard to all referrals from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court, the 
Constitutional Court cautioned our judges against hastily referring matters to it; it 
wanted them to decide issues, wherever possible, without constitutional issues having 
to be addressed.274 Kentridge AJ stressed this in S v Mhlungu and Others275 when he 
pointed out that: 
[t]he reasonable prospect of success is ... to be understood as a sine qua non 
of a referral, not as in itself a sufficient ground. It is not always in the interest of 
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justice to make a reference as soon as the relevant issue has been raised. 
Where the case is not likely to be of long duration, it may be in the interests of 
justice to hear all the evidence or as much of it as possible before considering 
a referral. Interrupting and delaying a trial, and above all a criminal trial, is in 
itself undesirable, especially if it means that witnesses have to be brought back 
after a break of several months. Moreover, once the evidence in the case is 
heard, it may turn out that the constitutional issue is not after all decisive. I would 
lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, 
civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which 
should be followed ... In any event, the convenience of a rapid resort to this 
Court would not relieve the trial Judge from making his own decision on a 
constitutional issue within his jurisdiction. (my italics) 
Lastly, disputes could also reach the Constitutional Court by way of appeal. It was 
stated explicitly in the Constitution that all appeals arising from the exercise of 
additional jurisdiction by the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court "which 
relate to issues of constitutionality shall lie with the Constitutional Court."276 
In this regard, the Constitutional Court functioned more like the Supreme Court of the 
United States. This meant that a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court was 
empowered to decide certain constitutional issues, but subject to the final say of the 
constitutional court. 277 
Furthermore, if a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court decided not to refer 
a dispute arising between organs of state regarding the constitutionality of an executive 
or administrative act or conduct or threatened act or conduct,278 the appeal against its 
decision would lie to the Constitutional Court.279 The same applied to a refusal by a 
provincial or local division to refer a constitutional issue arising in a matter in which the 
constitutional issue, which fell within the Constitutional Court's exclusive jurisdiction, 
was the only issue to be decided.280 
In all these matters or appeals, leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court was a basic 
requirement.281 
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Lastly in this regard, 
[i]f an accused person who has been convicted and sentenced at a criminal trial 
before a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court, wishes to appeal 
against such conviction or sentence only on a constitutional issue and no other 
court has jurisdiction to hear and determine such appeal, the accused person 
shall be entitled to appeal to the Court.282 (my emphasis) 
The same applied to appeals against decisions of provincial or local divisions of the 
Supreme Court in criminal matters deriving from decisions of magistrates' courts, in 
which accused persons wished to appeal against the conviction er sentence solely on 
the grounds of a constitutional question which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court. 283 As, in any case, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate any matter which fell within the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court,284 this Rule, in my opinion, was made ex abundanti cautela. 
Intervention 
By Governments and Executive Authorities 
In matters in which the validity of laws, including Acts of Parliament, was in dispute, the 
(interim) Constitution285 entitled governments286 not cited as parties in proceedings 
relevant to their line functions to intervene as parties before our courts, including the 
Constitutional Court, or to submit written arguments to the courts in question. As the 
Constitution specifically restricted this right to intervene to issues involving the validity 
of laws, it could be assumed that the various governments could not intervene if the 
validity of a Bill before Parliament or of a provincial legislature was in dispute. 
In addition, the Rules of the Constitutional Court287 required a party challenging the 
constitutionality of any executive or administrative act or conduct or any threat thereof, 
or of any law, including an Act of Parliament, to serve notice and the relevant papers 
upon the executive authority responsible for the executive or administrative act or 
conduct or threat thereof, or for the administration of any such law (if not cited as a 
party to the proceedings), within five days of lodging same with the Registrar of the 
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Constitutional Court. The relevant executive· authority might then decide whether to 
exercise its constitutional right to intervene. 
By Amici Curiae 
The Rules of the Constitutional Court288 also entitled any person interested in an 
appeal or a reference or any other matter before the Constitutional Court to, with or 
without the written consent289 of all the parties in the relevant matter to be admitted 
therein as an amicus curiae. For this purpose, such a person was required to, in an 
appropriate application, briefly describe his or her interest in the matter, briefly identify 
his or her proposed position in the proceeding.sand clearly, succintly and briefly set out 
his or her submissions, their relevance to the proceedings and the reasons for his or 
her belief that the submissions would be useful to the Court and be different from those 
made by the other parties.290 
ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND NOT OF FACTS 
In all instances, the Constitutional Court concerned itself only with questions of law, 
constitutional validity, and not of facts. 291 The German Federal Constitutional Court too 
decides only whether or not an impugned statute is constitutionally valid; it does not 
decide on the legal dispute and the merits of the case referred to it. As Ipsen pointed 
out, "[t]he decision of the pending case is left to the court which put the issue before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht."292 
A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AS OPPOSED TO 
A SUPREME COURT 
It is importanf93 to, in a few words, contrast our Constitutional Court with the Supreme 
Court of the United States of America and that of Canada. As was pointed out earlier 
on, in the initial debate about whether or not South Africa should have a constitutional 
court, there were views that its powers and functions could be given to the ordinary 
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courts, particularly the Supreme Court, for, it was argued, it would be better for litigation 
involving a bill of rights to be kept within the main stream of the judicial process.294 
Though the Constitutional Court was a new court, it was to a great extent created in 
such a manner that the jurisdiction of the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme 
Court was extended (as shown above). However, as was also pointed out above, the 
Appellate Division was, as was pointed out above, expressly precluded from dealing 
with matters of constitutionality. 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdiction 
The United States is a classical example of a country that pursues the diffuse system 
of judicial review.295 It does not have a special constitutional court or tribunal dealing 
solely with constitutional matters. All United States courts exercise judicial review in the 
course of their ordinary day-to-day activities as such; the consideration and adjudication 
of constitutional issues is part of their normal jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, "the tribunal of final review",296 and the chief 
interpreter of the Constitution of the United States, "is more than just an ordinary court. 
It is empowered to decide whether the other two branches of government live within the 
Constitution."297 It is the centre of coordination of the federal and state court systems 
with respect to questions which fall within the competence of the federal judicial power 
as defined in the Constitution. As the organ that speaks with the ultimate voice of 
authority298 in the determination of questions arising under the Constitution, treaties and 
laws of the United States, its nine unelected justices, like those of our own 
Constitutional Court, wield what has been described as an undemocratic and counter-
majoritarian power.299 
The US Supreme Court has very little by way of original jurisdiction,300 and it is settled 
that Congress cannot add to such jurisdiction.301 Its original jurisdiction is as defined in, 
and governed by, the Constitution and is confined to cases affecting ambassadors, 
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other public ministers and consuls, controversies between the United States and a 
state, as well as cases to which a state is a party.302 
The bulk of its work, consequently, arises in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. As 
AV Dicey pointed out more than a century ago, the Supreme Court of the United States 
derives its importance from its appellate character; it is on every matter which 
concerns the interpretation of the Constitution a supreme and final Court of 
Appeal from the decision of every Court ... throughout the Union. It is in fact the 
final interpreter of the Constitution, and therefore has authority to pronounce 
finally as a Court of Appeal whether a law passed either by Congress or by the 
legislature of a state ... is or is not constitutional.303 
Congress and the Supreme Court 
Appeals to the Supreme Court of the US are permitted as a matter of right only in a 
limited category of cases, most of which involve discretionary review by the writ of 
certiorari. 
Congress has tremendous power over the Court's jurisdiction to deal with constitutional 
matters.304 Although Congress has not used this power in more than a century, it 
remains a potentially significant threat to the Court's independence. At the same time, 
the nine justices, as the collective chief interpreter of the Constitution, are not a bunch 
of pushovers; for one thing, the US Constitution is what they said it is.305 Due to their 
power of judicial review, they have the final say on what the document means. 
Within the limits of its appellate jurisdiction as regulated by Congress,306 the Supreme 
Court is free for the most part to determine what cases to review and, therefore, to 
determine the size and nature of its docket, and has been doing so especially since 
1925.307 
The Supreme Court, Abstract Review and Advisory Opinions 
The US Constitution makes it clear that judicial power shall be exercised only in respect 
of "cases and controversies".308 Judicial power is thus invoked only in respect of 
adversary proceedings. 
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The Supreme Court does not have authority to issue advisory opinions309 whether at the 
instance of Congress with respect to the constitutionality of proposed legislation or at 
the instance of the President in respect of matters pertaining to executive authority. 
While this position is followed in the majority of the component states of the US, in a 
few states the highest courts are authorised expressly by state constitutions to render 
advisory opinions, in non-adversary proceedings, on the constitutionality of proposed 
legislation at the request of the governors or other state officials. 310 These advisory 
opinions, which thrust the courts into political controversy, are not regarded as legally 
binding judicial precedents when the same issues arise again in adversary proceedings. 
Neither does the US Supreme Court practise abstract judicial review. 311 Thus, for 
instance, Congress, the President, state legislatures or state governors cannot initiate 
suits to have Acts of Congress or state laws declared invalid on the grounds that they 
are unauthorised under the Constitution, or that they are in conflict with an Act of 
Congress, or that they exceeded the delegated powers of Congress. 312 
Effect of Declaration of Invalidity 
As constitutional questions are dealt with only in so far as they are relevant to the 
disposition of concrete cases or controversies, and even then only when they are ripe 
for judicial determination,313 it is clear that in the United States no proceedings can be 
directed at a statute as such. In other words, when the question of constitutionality of 
a statute arises in a case before a court, the proceeding is not an in rem proceeding 
directed against the statute as such. 
Consequently, the finding that a statute is valid or invalid, as the case may be, gives 
rise to no special form of decree relating to the statute itself. The effect on the statute 
is that it is not applicable in the particular case. Stricto sensu, a decision on a 
constitutional question has relevancy only for the parties to the case before the court,314 
ie its effects are inter partes and not erga omnes. The result of the decision is not that 
the statute is repealed or annulled since, according to American constitutional theory, 
only the legislature which enacted the statute has the power to repeal it.315 
Penuell M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 125 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
The statute actually remains on the statute book, notwithstanding the adverse decision 
on its validity.316 In practice, however, though it is not repealed, it is no longer 
enforceable317 since it may be supposed that if any other proceedings are brought 
before a court under it, they too will result in dismissals by reference to the principle of 
stare decisis et quieta non movere. Moreover, a court which finds a statute 
unconstitutional and unenforceable in one instance will, it can be assumed, find it 
unconstitutional in subsequent proceedings too. 
Lastly, American courts use their power of judicial review sparingly;318 they are not too 
quick to pass judgment on the issue of constitutionality and generally presume a law's 
constitutionality. 319 Where a statute is partly valid, they save the valid part, unless the 
invalid part is so central to the statute that the remaining part becomes meaningless, 
or if otherwise it is clear that the enforcement of the truncated statute would be a 
distortion of the legislative intent.320 
The principle of severability, as this procedure is known, was given constitutional 
recognition in our new legal system by the Constitutional Court in the judgment of 
Kriegler J in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa; Matise and 
Others v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and Others.321 As will appear 
more fully below, this principle is accepted in Canada too. 
CANADA 
Introduction 
Canadian courts, unlike their British counterparts, began exercising the power of judicial 
review in the nineteenth century, 322 and assumed the power to declare Acts of 
Parliament or of provincial legislatures invalid323 if they found that the relevant 
legislature had acted outside its competence. They in the process also held invalid 
executive acts which judges found to be ultra vires. 
However, unlike their US counterparts, Canadian courts324 for a long time exercised 
truncated judicial review. They were, till recently, confined to dealing with the division 
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and distribution of powers between the federal and provincial organs of government. 
For a long time they 
refused to concern themselves with the wisdom or fairness of legislation, or even the 
possibility of abuse of legislative power, so long as the impugned legislation was not 
being used as a means of invading a forbidden area under the guise of exercising a 
power given to the enacting Legislature. That is, provided that the federal authorities did 
not infringe upon provincial powers, nor the provinces on the federal powers, the courts 
would not interfere.325 
The adoption of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982326 brought about the possibility 
of the courts enforcing wide-ranging and qualitative limitations on all legislative and 
administrative powers. 
Jurisdiction 
Canada, like the United States of America, follows the diffuse, and not the Austro-
Germanic concentrated, system of judicial review. Generally speaking, therefore, no 
Canadian courl has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional matters: The law precludes 
no court from dealing with constitutional issues. 
All Canadian bodies which exercise judicial power, including administrative tribunals, 
and at all levels, possess the power, and are in fact duty bound, to review the validity 
of legislation when the issue arises in proceedings before them. The exercise of judicial 
review, in other words, is not confined to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
All Canadian courts are obliged to apply the 1982 Canadian Constitution327 whenever 
necessary or relevant in cases over which they, in terms of their constitutive laws, have 
jurisdiction in respect of the (non-constitutional) subject matter, the parties and the 
remedies sought. They only have to be "a court of competent jurisdiction".328 
Constitutional Issues 
A constitutional issue arises whenever the constitutionality of a statute which is 
applicable to the proceedings before a court is challenged. It arises in a civil case if, for 
instance, a party resisting the application avers that it is invalid. It may also arise when 
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a party seeks to overturn the decision of an executive official or an administrative 
tribunal on the basis that the executive official or the tribunal, as the case may be, has 
acted under or applied an invalid statute. 
In a criminal case it arises if an accused argues that the statute under which he or she 
has been charged is invalid. It is also possible to bring proceedings before a Canadian 
court in which the only relief sought is a declaration that a statute is invalid. 
Unlike in the United States, in Canada government can refer matters to the courts for 
a determination of constitutional issues. The various levels of government (and not 
individuals or groups) benefit from the unique procedure of reference whereby they may 
raise questions of law, including constitutional questions, in a court of law and acquire 
an advisory opinion. 
In all these instances, the constitutional issue has to be settled by the relevant court 
handling the proceedings. However, while Canadian courts play a major role in ensuring 
that all governmental action generally corresponds to constitutional requirements and 
limitations, they do not have the power to initiate a review of governmental action. The 
process of judicial review is, in other words, commonly initiated by someone, an 
individual, a corporation, or frequently another level of government, with an interest in 
stopping an unconstitutional action. The courts intervene only after they they have been 
appropriately approached for a ruling or an advisory opinion as to whether or not the 
legislative or administrative governmental action in question is valid. 329 
"Reading Down" a Statute 
When a statute or a provision thereof appears on the face of it to be generally valid but 
also contains some broad terms which can be applied in a way that may contravene the 
Constitution, Canadian courts use a peculiar procedure called "reading down". This 
procedure enables them to accord the affected statute or provision the meaning that 
does not contravene the Constitution. 330 
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The courts have, however, refused to use this procedure and read provisions into 
statutes in order to bring them into line especially with the provisions of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. They take the view that, generally, it is not proper for any court 
to usurp the basic functions of the legislatures. 331 It is generally believed that it would 
be too presumptuous of the courts to supplement the words used by the law-makers 
with the words of people who have no legislative mandate. 
The Courts and the Governments 
Like in South Africa332 and everywhere else, the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms are not absolute but must yield to certain 
limitations.333 As the limits need to be prescribed by law, the legislatures are at liberty 
to limit the entrenched rights and freedoms if the limits they impose on them are 
demonstrably reasonable and justified in a free and democratic society. 334 
In the exercise of their power of judicial review, Canadian courts will ordinarily legally 
and factually presume an impugned statute to be valid and intra vires till the contrary 
is established. Thus, a person seeking to establish a conflict between such a statute 
and the Canadian Constitution or the Charter bears the initial burden to demonstrate 
such conflict. Once a court finds that a right or freedom guaranteed in the Charter has 
indeed been infringed, the presumption of validity lapses and the government agency 
seeking to rely on the provisions of Section 1 of the Constitution bears the burden to 
demonstrate that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic 
society. 
In addition, a direct denial of rights and freedoms otherwise constitutionally guaranteed 
can be effected by both the federal and provincial legislatures under Section 33(1) of 
the Canadian Charter. 335 This section336 allows the legislatures override powers with 
regard to fundamental freedoms, legal rights and equality rights, though democratic, 
mobility or linguistic rights are not affected.337 
Unlike the Section 1 limits, the override powers provided for under Section 33(1 ), if 
exercised, remove the statute containing the express declaration from the reach of the 
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relevant provisions of the Charter without the need to demonstrate 'reasonableness' or 
'justification'. Once a Charter provision has thus been overridden by a statute, the 
Charter provision has no application whatsoever, for the duration of the override 
declaration.338 
Lastly, Canadian law generally insists on the right of the various attorneys-general to 
be given appropriate notice advising them of impending attacks based on the validity 
of legislation. 339 Thus, the Canadian government has a general right340 to be heard 
when the validity of legislation is in question, and the affected attorneys-general have 
to be notified of, and are entitled to appear in, matters dealing with constitutional 
litigation. The courts do not deal with any case involving the validity of legislation unless 
the constitutional issues have been stated clearly and the appropriate notice has been 
given to the affected attorneys-general. The underlying philosophy of this procedure 
seems to be that constitutional issues transcend the interests of the immediate parties 
before court and that, therefore, it is crucial that the public interest be protected by 
allowing the affected government/s sufficient opportunity to address the courts and be 
heard on issues of constitutional validity. 
Effect of Declaration of Invalidity 
In general, in Canadian jurisprudence, the consequence of a finding that a law or 
government action is inconsistent with the Constitution is total invalidity of such a law 
or action.341 In short, a law enacted, or a government action taken, outside authority 
granted by the Constitution is ultra vires, invalid, void and a nullity. 
However, a strict application of this approach would obviously result in untold injustice 
and misery and certainly not conduce to the development and maintenance of an 
orderly society. Canadian jurisprudence has thus developed the de facto doctrine to 
ameliorate the consequences of a declaration of invalidity in certain instances. The de 
facto procedure constitutes the basis for validating actions of unauthorised officials who 
have acted under colour of authority. 
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In terms of the de facto procedure, if a law is administered and is subsequently found 
by a court to be invalid, rights acquired, duties or obligations incurred, and steps taken 
thereunder remain valid, despite the finding of invalidity.342 It is crucial to note that the 
law itself is void ab initio and that the de facto procedure cannot change that. 343 
Moreover, the authority of those who act under an impugned statute ceases 
immediately upon a finding of invalidity.344 
Though a finding of invalidity is in general retroactive, 345 in the Reference Re 
Language Rights in Manitoba346 case the Supreme Court of Canada devised a 
solution amounting to a prospective overruling of the affected statutes of Manitoba as 
a means of maintaining good government and an orderly society.347 It gave the province 
of Manitoba sufficient time to remedy the situation and pass laws in keeping with the 
Constitution and ordered that all statutes which were otherwise invalid were deemed 
to be temporarily valid till the expiry of the period necessary for the legislature to 
address the problem identified.348 
"Severance" 
When Canadian courts realise that a statute or a provision can be saved by excising 
that portion of it which is invalid without affecting the validity of the rest thereof, they 
use, with great reluctance and scepticism,349 the procedure allowing them to do so, 
which is referred to as "severance". In this regard, as the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council pointed out in A-G Alta v Attorney-General Canada, 350 
[t]he real question is whether what remains is so inextricably bound up with the 
part declared invalid that what remains cannot independently survive or, as it has 
sometimes been put, whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be 
assumed that the legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting 
the part that is ultra vires at all. 351 
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151 .. The entrenchment of the Chapter 3 rights was not at the expense of other rights recognised and 
conferred by the common law, customary law and legislation. See Section 33(3) of the Constitution. 
152 .. Which is now called the Supreme Court of Appeal. See Section 168 of the (new) Constitution. 
153 .. Carpenter, op cit 1017 confirms this. See also Section 168(3) of the (new) Constitution. 
154 .. Sections 168(3) and 172(2}(a) of the (new) Constitution. 
155 .. According to Carpenter, ibidem at 1016, the Constitutional Court was allotted two basic functions, 
namely adjudication of the constitutionality of laws and executive acts, and certification of constitutions. 
The way the Court has handled the certification of constitutions is discussed more fully in Chapter 14 
below. 
156. That is the power to review Bills before they become legislation. 
157 .. See Schedule 4 for these constitutional principles. 
158 .. Section 71 (2) of the Constitution. 
159 .. Not even the Constitutional Court itself! 
160 .. Section 71 (3) of the Constitution. 
161 .. Section 71 ( 4) of the Constitution. 
162 .. Section 160(1) of the Constitution. 
163 .. Section 160(3) of the Constitution. Note the proviso to this subsection. 
164 .. Section 160(2) of the Constitution. 
165 .. Section 160(4) of the Constitution. 
166 .. Section 160(5) of the Constitution. 
167 .. Like the German Federal Constitutional Court, its decisions are, in terms of Section 98(4) of the 
Constitution, binding upon all persons, and upon all legislative, executive and judicial organs of the State. 
See Walter F Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, Comparative Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Commentaries (Macmillan, London, 1977) at 31-32 about the position in Germany. 
168 .. Section 98(3). 
169 .. Section 101 ( 5) of the Constitution. 
170 .. Section 98(3) of the Constitution. Note from the provisions of this section that an Act of Parliament 
could arguably confer jurisdiction upon provincial or local divisions of the Supreme Court to adjudicate 
matters which otherwise fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 
171.. Section 101 (6), read with Section 98(3), of the Constitution. See also Carpenter, op. cit. 1019. 
172 .. Section 102(12). 
173 .. Section 102(8) of the Constitution. The remarks of Chaskalson Pin Zantsi v Council of State, 
Ciskei and Others, 1995 (10) BCLR 1424 (CC) at 1427-1428 are referred to below. 
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174 .. Section 98(2)(c) of the Constitution. Note that, in terms of Section 101(3)(c) of the Constitution, 
provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court were expressly precluded from adjudicating upon the 
constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. 
175 .. Which was entrenched in Section 101(2) of the Constitution. Commenting on this, Trengove AJ, 
speaking for the Constitutional Court, said in Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei and Others, 1995 (10) 
BCLR 1424 (CC) at 1436, paragraph 32, that: "whatever the scope of the Supreme Court's inherent 
jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of the Constitution might have been, its inherent 
jurisdiction as entrenched in section 101 (2) does not include the power of review of the constitutionality 
of Acts of Parliament." (my italics) 
176 .. See Section 101(3)(c), read with Sections 98(2)(c) and 98(3), of the Constitution. Commenting on 
this, Trengove AJ, ibidem at 1438, paragraph 38, remarked that the clear purpose of these "provisions 
was to ensure that the Constitutional Court would be the only Court with jurisdiction to set aside an Act 
of Parliament." See also 1439, paragraph 41, on this question. 
However, as pointed out above, Section 101(6), read with Section 101(3)(c), of the Constitution might 
arguably enable a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court to adjudicate the constitutionality of 
an Act of Parliament if the parties to a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court agreed thereto. Section 101(3)(c) was, after all, "subject to the Constitution", ie it was in the context 
of the Constitution subordinate to Section 101 (6), which allowed parties to agree to the jurisdiction of a 
provincial or local division of the Supreme Court to adjudicate any matter otherwise falling within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, "notwithstanding any provision to the contrary". See Miller 
JA in S v Marwane, 1982 (3) SA 717 (A) at 747H-748A, whose reasoning in this regard was quoted with 
approval by Trengove AJ in Zantsi, op cit 1434, paragraph 27. 
177 .. Trengove AJ, ibidem. 
178 .. According to Trengove AJ, ibidem at 1437, paragraph 35, "In the context of the Constitution as a 
whole, 'Act of Parliament' means an act of the South African Parliament sitting in Cape Town." Thus, it 
would not be proper for Parliament or anyone to refer to the (new) Constitution as Act 108 of 1996 as 
it was passed by the Constitutional Assembly and not by Parliament. The (new) Constitution, in other 
words, is, stricto sensu, not an Act of Parliament. 
179 .. Section 98(4) of the Constitution. 
180 .. In terms of Section 98(5) of the Constitution, it had the power to declare any law or any provision 
thereof, which it had found to be inconsistent with the Constitution, invalid to the extent of the 
inconsistency. 
181 .. See Section 98(6)(b) of the Constitution. 
182 .. This is deduced from the provisions of Section 98(6)(b) of the Constitution. 
183 .. See the proviso to Section 98(5) of the Constitution. This power was used in S v Ntuli, 1996 (1) 
BCLR 141 (CC) at 153, paragraph 30, for instance. Interestingly enough, the directive of the Court was 
not complied with, and when an extension of time was applied for, the Constitutional Court would not grant 
it. See S v Ntuli, CCT 15/97 (of 5 June 1997). 
184 .. The German Federal Constitutional Court, for instance, is specifically authorised by Article 78 of the 
(German) Law on the Federal Constitutional Court of 1951, to review an impugned law in every 
conceivable aspect. If, in the process, it finds other provisions of the same law to be incompatible with the 
Basic Law or federal legislation, it declares them null and void even if not asked to do so by applicants or 
in a referral. 
185 .. See, for example, Chaskalson P in Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei and Others, 1995 (10) BCLR 
1424 (CC) at 1427-1429. 
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186 .. See, for example, S v Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) where the Court, for the 
right reasons, declared unconstitutional and invalid the provisions of 277(1 )(a), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977, and yet left Section 277(1)(b) of the Act intact, thus not 
abolishing the death penalty as a form of punishment in our criminal justice system. In particular, note that 
the Court was, however, prepared, mero motu, to extend its decision beyond the validity of Section 
277(1)(a) of the Act which it had been called upon to decide. 
See also S v Williams and Others, 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC) where the Court, once again for the right 
reasons, declared juvenile corporal punishment meted out by our Courts unconstitutional while leaving 
adult corporal punishment intact. If anything, this decision amply demonstrates the absurdity of this US 
approach, which, while it may be correct when followed by ordinary courts of law, including the Appellate 
Division, may lead to absurdity when pursued and applied by our Constitutional Court. 
187 .. Section 98(2)(d) of the Constitution. It is noted that the Constitutional Court was also given similar 
jurisdiction with regard to bills before any provincial legislature, so that provincial legislatures could also 
refer to it disputes over the constitutionality of bills before them. This section was used in In re: The 
National Education Policy Bilf No 83of1995, 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC). 
For examples of cases where the provisions of this section were used in connection with bills before 
provincial legislatures, see In re: The School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng), 1996 (4) BCLR 537 
(CC) and In re: KwaZulu-Natal Amakhosi and lziphakanyiswa Amendment Bill of 1995; In re: 
Payment of Salaries, Advances and Other Privileges to the lngonyama Bill of 1995, 1996 (7) BCLR 
903 (CC). 
188 .. Section 101(3)(e) of the Constitution. 
189 .. Section 98(9) of the Constitution. See In re: National Education Policy Bill No 83of1995, 1996 
(4) BCLR 518 (CC); and In re: The School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng), 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC) 
for examples where this power was exercised by the Constitutional Court. 
190 .. See Maduna, in Judicial Control of Executive Legislative Powers of Government, supra at 342. 
191.. Section 98(2)(e) of the Constitution. 
192 .. See Carpenter, op cit 1019. 
193 .. See Carpenter, op cit 1016. 
194 .. Section 98(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
195 .. Section 7(4)(a) of the Constitution. 
196 .. Section 101 (3)(a) of the Constitution. 
197 .. Section 102(12) of the Constitution. 
198 .. Section 101 (5) of the Constitution. 
199 .. Sections 98(2)(b) and 101(3)(b), read with Sections 98(7) and 101(4), of the Constitution 
respectively. 
200 .. See Lawrence Baxter, Administrative Law (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1984 ), at 304-305. See also 
Marinus Wiechers, Administrative Law (Butterworths, Durban, 1985), at 266; Gretchen Carpenter, 
Introduction to South African Constitutional Law (Butterworths, Durban, 1987), at 269-270; and 
Laurence Boulle, Bede Harris and Cora Hoexter, Constitutional and Administrative Law: Basic 
Principles (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1989), at 172. 
201 .. In Kruger and Another v Minister of Correctional Services and Others, 1995 (2) SA 803 (T). 
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202 .. See Magid Jin Hugo v State President, 1996 (6) BCLR 876 (D). 
203 .. Act No. 17 of 1994, in terms of which, inter alia, most mothers in prison on 1 O May 1994 with children 
under the age of twelve had the remainder of their sentences remitted. 
204 .. Sections 98(2)(c) and 101(3)(c) of the Constitution respectively. 
205 .. See Boulle et al, Constitutional and Administrative Law, supra at 350-351. See also Carpenter, 
Introduction to South African Constitutional Law, supra at 160; and Dion Sasson and Henning Viljoen, 
South African Constitutional Law (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1988) at 277. 
206 .. 1983 (1) SA 164 (A). 
207 .. Act 21 of 1971 (which, as the rechristened Self-governing Territories Act, was repealed as a 
whole in April 1994 by the Constitution. 
208 .. Section 102(12) of the Constitution. 
209 .. Section 98(2)(e) of the Constitution. 
210 .. Section 101 (3)(d) of the Constitution. 
211 .. Section 98(2)(d) of the Constitution. 
212 .. Section 101{3)(e) of the Constitution. 
213 .. Section 98(9) of the Constitution. 
214 .. Sections 98{2){f) and 101(3)(f) of the Constitution respectively. 
215 .. Sections 98{2)(g) and 101 (3)(g) of the Constitution respectively. 
216 .. In Hosten et al, op. cit. 1019, footnote 35. However, this has, as stated above, been addressed in 
the (new) Constitution. 
217 .. Section 100(2) of the Constitution. 
218 .. For which see Government Gazette No. 16204 dated 6 January 1995. 
219 .. Rule 17(1) and (2). Rule 17(7) allows the Court to order that the costs of an action contemplated in 
this Rule be paid by the State or a particular party. 
220 .. Section 7(4){b) of the Constitution. It is noteworthy that in Germany Article 93(1) 4a of the Basic 
Law allows any person, including a body corporate and a commune, to submit to the FCC a complaint of 
unconstitutionality concerning alleged violations by public authorities of the basic rights of the individual 
guaranteed under Article 1 (3) of the Basic Law. Thus, persons claiming that public officials, including 
judges, have deprived them of their rights are entitled to file constitutional complaints with the Federal 
Constitutional Court, without the need to pay court fees and without the need for lawyers. 
However, "the requirement for lodging such a complaint is that there should be no other remedy (or other 
means of eliminating the violation) available to the complainant; the complainant must first have, in other 
words, exhausted all the remedies available within the relevant judicial branch before having direct 
recourse to the Federal Constitutional Court." See Maduna, Judicial Control of Executive and 
Legislative Powers of Government, supra at 320. Furthermore, Article 93(1) of the Law on the Federal 
Constitutional Court prescribes that the FCC must be approached within one month after a decision of the 
lower court. For this purpose, according to Ipsen "Constitutional Review of Laws", op cit 126, "[l]eave must 
be granted to the individual complainant by the Bundesverfassungsgericht before the actual review can 
start." 
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221 .. The Attorney-General of the Republic of Namibia, for instance, did this in Ex Parte Attorney-
General, Namibia: In Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State, 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmSC). 
222 .. See Kentridge AJ in S v Zuma and Others, 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 650, paragraph 11; and Didcott 
Jin S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis, 1995(7) BCLR 851 (CC) at 858, paragraph 13 on this. See further 
O'Regan Jin Besserglik v Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism and Others, 1996 (6) BCLR 745 
(CC) at 748, paragraph 6; and Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Land Affairs and Another, 
1996 (12) BCLR 1573 (CC) at 1579-1580, paragraphs 16-18. 
223 .. S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis, op cit 856. 
224 .. 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (A). 
225 .. See Kentridge AJ at 649, paragraph 10. 
226 .. Ibidem, at 649-650, paragraph 11. 
227 .. 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC). 
228 .. A dispute is defined by AS Homby in the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current 
English as an argument, a controversy, a debate or a quarrel. It was not clear whether any significance 
attached to the use of the word "dispute/s" in, inter alia, Sections 22, 82(1 }(d), 98(2}(b}, (d) and (e), as 
opposed to the word "matter/s" which was used in, inter alia, Sections 98(2}(f) and (g}, 100(2), and 101 (3) 
of the Constitution. From the look of things, none did; the two words seem to have been used 
interchangeably to mean matters in dispute and, by implication, the existence of parties to the disputes. 
However, see S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis, op cit 855, paragraph 7 and 857, paragraph 12. 
229 .. Carpenter, in Hosten et al, op. cit. 1015-1016 cites the provisions of Sections 7(4}(b}(v), 82(1(d) and 
102(8) of the Constitution as proof of this. 
South Africa, however, does not have a provision similar to Article 93(1 )2 of the German Basic Law which 
allows the Federal Constitutional Court the power of abstract judicial review to determine the compatibility 
of any Federal or Land (State) law in form and substance with the Basic Law or the compatibility of Land 
law with federal law at the instance of the Federal Government, or a Land Government or of one third the 
members of the Bundestag. In such proceedings, the Federal Constitutional Court decides the issue of 
constitutionality without a specific dispute. Despite this however, according to Murphy and Tanenhaus 
Comparative Constitutional Law op. cit. 29, "[a] decision in an abstract judicial review proceeding, even 
though non-adversary, is binding and so is not an advisory opinion." The Federal Constitutional Court 
does not hear a moot case; its power to give advisory opinions was abolished in 1956. 
It should be noted that in Germany, abstract judicial review affects only statutes which have already been 
passed and not Bills, and is therefore, not available prior to the enactment of a piece of legislation. 
However, see Jorn Ipsen, "Constitutional Review of Laws", in Christian Starck (ed) Main Principles of 
the German Basic Law: The Contributions of the Federal Republic of Germany to the First World 
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-
Baden, 1983) 107 at 120 for an exception to this rule covering treaties. 
In Venezuela, the President has the power, in terms of Article 173 of the 1961 Venezuelan Constitution, 
to request the Supreme Court of Justice to consider questions of validity prior to the promulgation of laws. 
In France, like in Venezuela, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the presidents of the two 
Houses of Parliament and (since a 1974 constitutional amendment) sixty members of either House of 
Parliament are allowed a discretion to submit laws to the Constitutional Council before their promulgation. 
In other words, as Cappelletti "Comparative Cases and Materials on Constitutional Guarantees Governing 
Judicial Proceedings", in Merriman and Clark op. cit. 759, pointed out, the Council may only review 
legislation between its enactment and promulgation; after its promulgation, the Council is without 
jurisdiction. 
230 .. 1995 (10) BCLR 1424 (CC). 
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231 .. Per Chaskalson P, ibidem at 1429. 
232 .. A quintessential example the Court might have had to follow in such a case is Ex Parte Attorney-
General, Namibia: In Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State, 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmSC). 
In Germany, for example, the power of abstract judicial review is used by the Federal Constitutional Court, 
when asked to do so by the Federal Government, a Land government, or one-third of the members of the 
Bundestag, to determine the constitutionality of any law. 
233 .. That is the National Assembly and the Senate sitting jointly, under Section 68(1) of the Constitution 
for the purpose of making a new constitutional text for the Republic. 
234 .. Section 71(4) of the Constitution. 
235 .. Ibidem. 
236 .. See Rule 12. 
237 .. Section 82(1 )(d) of the Constitution. 
238 .. Section 98(2)(e) of the Constitution. 
239 .. Section 98(4) of the Constitution. 
240 .. See Rule 14. In an appropriate case, the Court may, in terms of Rule 14(3), order that the costs of 
such a reference be paid by the State or by a particular party. 
241 .. Thus, the President, unlike the President of the Republic of Venezuela for example, cannot request 
the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of a law passed by Parliament before its 
promulgation. See Article 173 of the 1961 Venezuelan Constitution, which allows the President of 
Venezuela to request the Supreme Court of Justice to consider questions of constitutionality before laws 
are promulgated. 
242 .. As this procedure is confined to Bills, it is different from the German procedure of abstract judicial 
review (abstrakte Normenkontrolle) which, as stated above, allows the Federal Government, a State 
(Land) Government or one third of the membership of the Bundestag (the lower House of the Federal 
Legislature) to request a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the question whether a certain 
statute or executive order is valid or not. 
In this regard, it needs to be emphasised that the German Federal Constitutional Court does not hear a 
moot case. There must exist a difference of opinion or doubts on the formal and material compatibility of 
a statute with the Basic Law before the abstrakte Normenkontrolle procedure can be set in motion. 
243 .. Section 98(9), read with Sections 98(2)(d) and 101 (3)(e), of the Constitution. 
244 .. See 13. Of particular note is that, in terms of Rule 13(5), the Constitutional Court may make an order 
for the costs of the type of reference contemplated in Section 98(9), read with Sections 98(2)(d) and 
101(3)(e), of the Constitution, to be paid by the State or a particular party. This may go some way in 
curbing any potential abuse of the Section 98(9) procedure. 
245 .. Section 82(1 )(d) of the Constitution allows for this, in my opinion, as such disputes are disputes 
of a constitutional nature. 
246 .. Section 102(4) and (5) of the Constitution. 
247 .. Section 102(6) of the Constitution. 
248 .. See Rule 23. 
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249 .. Section 102(1) of the Constitution. See Rule 22 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court for the 
procedure to be followed in this regard. 
Note that, in terms of Section 101 (7) of the Constitution (added by Section 3 of Act 44 of 1995), any 
division of the Supreme Court has, in addition, jurisdiction to grant an interim interdict or similar relief 
in respect of matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, "notwithstanding 
that such interdict or relief might have the effect of suspending or otherwise interfering with the application 
of the provisions of an Act of Parliament." 
250 .. Section 102(1) of the Constitution. See Rule 22 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court for the 
procedure to be followed in this regard. 
251 .. In Germany too this is the case when judges are dealing with actual cases or controversies by 
means of concrete judicial review provided for in Article 100( 1 ) of the Basic Law read with Article 13( 11) 
of the Federal Constitutional Court Act, 1951. All German judges are entitled, and in effect duty-bound, 
to examine whether legal provisions are constitutionally valid. 
They only suspend proceedings and refer matters to the FCC if they are of the opinion that a relevant 
statute or provision is unconstitutional. As Hans H Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Republic of Germany", 
(reprinted) in John Henry Merriman and David S Clark Comparative Law: Western and Latin American 
Legal Systems - Cases and Materials (The Michie Company, Charlottesville, 1978), 742 at 743 put it, 
"Every court, a municipal magistrate as well as higher federal court, no matter what type of case or what 
amount of money - if any - is involved, is required to refer the constitutional issue to the Federal 
Constitutional Court if it deems the statute invalid. Contrary to American practice, it is not necessary that 
the constitutional question be raised by one of the parties to the proceeding, nor is it required that the 
question be put in issue in the court of first instance." (my emphasis) 
Furthermore, as Ipsen "Constitutional Review of Laws", op cit 114 pointed out, "The procedure of concrete 
judicial review provided for in Article 100( 1) of the Grundgesetz is ... only permitted if the supposedly 
unconstitutional statute is relevant to the issue." 
It needs to be pointed out that in Venezuela, Article 20 of the Venezuelan Civil Proceedings Code allows 
all courts and tribunals to declare all normative state acts inapplicable in a given case if they consider 
them to be unconstitutional. Judicial review is not only the responsibility of the Supreme Court of Justice; 
Venezuelan judges in general, whatever their rank, are a collective custodian of the Constitution, which 
they apply preferentially over ordinary laws. 
252 .. See Kentridge AJ in S v Mhlungu and Others, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at 895, paragraph 59. 
253 .. 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 649, paragraph 10. 
254 .. Supra. 
255 .. At 894-895, paragraph 59. 
256 .. See Kentridge AJ, ibidem at 894, paragraph 56, where he said that he could not read "s 102 as 
entitling the Judge to refer to this Court a constitutional issue which is within his own jurisdiction." 
See also Didcott Jin S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis, 1995 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) at 855, paragraph 7, and 
at 857, paragraph 12, where the learned judge said: "no issue which the division has the power to decide 
may properly be referred to us while the litigation raising it remains in progress there. The judge hearing 
the case must determine the issue for himself or herself. It may be presented to us on appeal, should it 
fall within our field, when the litigation has ended in the court below. Or, in the special situation covered 
by section 102(8), the judge may refer it to us after disposing of the case." (my italics) 
257 .. Supra. 
258 .. Per Didcott J, ibidem at 856, paragraph 10. 
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259 .. Section 102(2) of the Constitution. 
260 .. Section 102(8) of the Constitution. See Rule 24 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court for the 
procedure to be followed in this regard. In terms of Section 102(9) of the Constitution the Minister of 
Justice is under a constitutional constraint to appoint counsel to argue such an issue before the 
Constitutional Court. 
261 .. Op cit. 
262 .. At 1427-1428, paragraph 1. 
263 .. Section 102(13), read with Sections 102(14) and 102(15). 
264 .. Note that disputes of a constitutional nature between local governments or between a local 
government and a provincial government referred to in Section 101(3)(d) of the Constitution were, in 
terms of Section 102(13), specifically excluded from this. 
265 .. See Rule 22(1) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court in this regard. 
266 .. Section 103(1) of the Constitution. 
267 .. In this regard South Africa was unlike the Republic of Venezuela where, as stated above, all judges, 
as the collective custodian of the Constitution, are, in certain instances, allowed to ex officio raise 
constitutional issues in concrete litigation and declare all normative state acts inapplicable in a given case 
if they consider them to be unconstitutional. 
268 .. Section 103(2) of the Constitution. 
269 .. This was unlike in Germany where, according to Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Republic of 
Germany", in Merriman and Clark op cit 743, constitutional questions are directly referred from even 
municipal magistrates to the Federal Constitutional Court by the trial judge without an intermediary. 
270 .. See Kentridge AJ in S v Mhlungu and Others, op cit 895. 
271 .. Section 103(3) and (4) of the Constitution. See Rule 22 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court 
for the pocedure to be followed in this regard. 
272 .. The relevant court may arguably act under the provisions of Section 102(1) and (8) of the 
Constitution in this regard. 
273 .. Section 98(4) of the Constitution. 
274 .. See Chaskalson Pin Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei and Others, op cit 1429. 
275 .. Op cit 895. 
276 .. Section 102(12) of the Constitution. See Rule 19 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court for the 
appropriate procedure to be followed in this regard. 
277 .. Carpenter, in Hosten et al, op cit 1015. 
278 .. See Sections 102( 13) and 102( 14) of the Constitution. 
279 .. Section 102(16) of the Constitution read with Rule 19 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
280 .. Section 102(17) of the Constitution read with Rule 19 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
281 .. Section 102( 11) of the Constitution, read with Rule 18 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
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282 .. Rule 20(1) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. Note that, in terms of Rule 18, leave to appeal 
is not a requirement in this instance. 
283 .. Op cit Rule 21 ( 1 ). Note that Rule 18 dispenses with the requirement of leave to appeal in such a 
case. 
284 .. Section 101(5), read with Section 102(5) and (6), of the Constitution. 
285 .. Section 102(10). 
286 .. That is the national, provincial and local tiers of government. 
287 .. See Rule 4(8). 
288 .. See Rule 9, which was subject to Section 102(10) of the Constitution. 
289 .. If, for any reason, the consent required in terms of Rule 9(1) could not be obtained, the affected 
person might, in terms of Rule 9(4), apply to the President of the Constitutional Court to be admitted as 
an amicus curiae in the matter before the Court. 
290 .. Rule 9(6). Rules 9(7), 9(9) and 9(11) are also of great importance. It is noted that intervention by 
amici curiae occurred in many matters before the Constitutional Court. 
291 .. For example, Section 102(1) of the Constitution made it clear that provincial and local divisions of 
the Supreme Court should hear all evidence and make a finding thereon, before referring a matter to the 
Constitutional Court. See also Section 102(6) and (12) of the Constitution. The remarks of Didcott Jin 
S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis, loc cit 856, are important in this regard. 
292 .. In "Constitutional Review of Law", op cit 116. 
293. Because, for one thing, though our system differs somewhat from those of these countries, our 
Courts tend to refer to decisions of their Courts. 
294 .. See, for example, the South African Law Commission, Working Paper 25 at 479. See also John 
Didcott, "Practical Workings of a Bill of Rights", in JV van der Westhuizen and HP Viljoen (eds), A Bill of 
Rights for South Africa, 52 at 53-54; RN Leon, ·~Bill of Rights for South Africa", in (1986) 2 SAJHR 60 
at 64-65; and Michael Cowling, "Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: Articulating 
the Inarticulate Premiss", in (1987) 3 SAJHR 177 at 184-187. 
295 .. As opposed to the concentrated system of judicial review characterised by the existence of a special 
constitutional court dealing solely with constitutional matters. 
296 .. Walter F Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, Comparative Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Commentaries (Macmillan, London, 1977) at 5. 
297 .. Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law (McGraw-Hill Inc, 1990) at 49. 
298 .. See Everett C Ladd, The American Polity: The People and Their Government (2nd edition, WW 
Norton & Co, New York, 1987) at 258-259. 
299 .. Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Minersville School District v Gobitis, 310 US 586 (1940) described 
this power as a limitation upon popular government. 
300 .. See Ladd, loc cit at 280. 
301 .. The Supreme Court itself held in Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 2 L Ed 60 (1803), that 
Congress could not validly enlarge this jurisdiction. 
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302 .. See Section 2 of Article Ill of the Constitution of the United States. 
303 .. In Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, 1982), 
at89. 
304 .. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, William M Seaney and Donald Grier Stephenson, American 
Constitutional Law: Introductory Essays and Selected Cases (7th ed, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 
1983) at 33. 
305 .. See Mason, Seaney and Stevenson, ibidem at 27 where it was said that: "Charles Evans Hughes 
bluntly asserted that 'The Constitution is what the Judges say it is'." 
306 .. Section 2 of Article Ill of the US Constitution provides that the Court's right to hear appeals on 
federal questions is subject to "such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make". 
In short, as Louis Henkin, "Judicial Power'', in HW Chase (ed) The Guide to American Law (West 
Publishing Co, New York, 1984 ), 364 at 365 pointed out, "the Supreme Court ... has the power to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction only as conferred on it by Congress." 
Congress has vested the Supreme Court with a broad appellate jurisdiction, and may, by constitutional 
amendment, change the Court's decisions on constitutional issues [see, for example, United States v 
Southeastern Underwriters, 322 US 533 (1944) and Jencks v United States, 353 US 657 (1957)], or 
even alter or deny its jurisdiction. Congress did this, for example, to prevent the Court from adjudicating 
the constitutionality of the reconstruction Acts. 
307 .. Murphy and Tanenhaus, op cit 5. 
308 .. Section 2, Article Ill. 
309 .. Fellman, "Judicial Review", op cit 375, observed that: "the Court will hear only cases or 
controversies; that is to say, actual live disputes between adversary parties asserting valuable legal rights. 
Therefore, the Court will not consider abstract or purely hypothetical issues or give advisory opinions as 
distinguished from binding judgments." (my italics) See also Henry J Abraham, The Judiciary: The 
Supreme Court in the Governmental Process (6th ed, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1983), at 177. 
310 .. See Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob and Robert B Albritton, Politics in the American States: A 
Comparative Analysis (1990) at 278. 
311 .. Fellman, foe cit. It is important to distinguish abstract judicial review from the declaratory judgment 
procedure which is available in federal courts [for which see US Code, Section 2201; Nashville C & St 
L Ry Co v Wallace, 288 US 249 (1933); and United Public Workers of America v Mitchell, 330 US 75 
( 194 7)] as well as in some state courts. 
312 .. See, for instance, Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447 (1923). 
313 .. See Burger CJ in Laird v Tatum, 408 US 1 (1972). 
314 .. See AR Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989), at 149. 
315 .. See the South African Law Commission, Interim Report on Group and Human Rights (1991) at 
619. 
316 .. A legislature may, in the exercise of its power, amend or repeal such a statute. If this is not done, 
the statute lies dormant and may be enforceable if in a later case or controversy, the court, either because 
it regards the earlier decision as incorrect or because new circumstances have intervened, now finds it 
not unconstitutional. 
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317 .. In fact, Field J, in Norton v Shelby County, 118 US 425 (1986) at 442, said that: "An 
unconstitutional Act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates 
no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." 
318 .. Abraham, The Judiciary: The Supreme in the Governmental Process, supra at 163. Fellman, 
"Judicial Review", op cit 375 said that: "[t]he Court has usually exercised its great power to invalidate 
legislation with great restraint. Prior to the Civil War there were only two cases holding acts of Congress 
unconstitutional." 
319 .. Fellman, "Judicial Review", op. cit. 375 said that: "the most important rule of judicial self-restraint is 
that statutes are presumptively valid, which means that judges assume that the legislators did not intend 
to violate the Constitution. It follows that the burden of proof is on the party who raises the issue of 
unconstitutionality." 
As Chief Justice Hughes put it in National Labour Relations Board v Jones and Laghlin Steel Corp, 
301 US 1 (1937), they endeavour to "save and not to destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between 
two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and the other valid, 
our plain duty is adopt that which will save the act." 
320 .. See Williams v Standard Oil Co of Louisiana, 278 US 235 (1929) for a discussion of this problem. 
321.. 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) at 1392, paragraph 16 and at 1393-1394, paragraph 19. This case is 
discussed in a different chapter in this thesis. 
322 .. Two years after the creation of the Dominion of Canada on 1 July 1867 by Britain by means of the 
British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet c 3 (UK) of 29 March 1867. 
323 .. See, for instance, R v Chandler; Re Hazleton, [1869} 12 NBR 556 (CA); L'Union St-Jacques de 
Montreal v Belisle, [1872] LC Jur 29 (Que QB); Severn v The Queen, [1878] 2 SCR 70; and Valin v 
Langlois, [1879] 3 SCR 1 affd 5 App cas 115 (PC). 
324 .. Hampered as they were by parliamentary sovereignty which, as A Bayefsky "Parliamentary 
Sovereignty and Human Rights in Canada", (1983) 3 Political Studies, at 239, pointed out, played a 
crucial role in, and had a tremendous influence upon, the development of Canadian constitutional law and 
jurisprudence. 
325 .. Barry L Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts - The Function and Scope of 
Judicial Review (3rd ed Butterworths, TorontoNancouver, 1988), at 4-5. 
326 .. Which incorporates the entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
327 .. This Constitution, like our Constitution, is, in terms of Section 52(1) thereof, the supreme law of 
Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with its provisions is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no 
force or effect. 
328 .. Section 24(1) of the Canadian Constitution. 
329 .. Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts, supra at 1. 
330 .. The South African equivalent of this is Section 35(2) of the Constitution of the Republic. 
331 .. See, for instance, R v Rao, [1984] 9 DLR (4th) 542 (Ontario CA); and R v Coombs, [1985] 6 Nfld 
& PEIR 12, 23 CCC (3rd) 356. 
332 .. Section 33(1) of the Constitution. 
333 .. See Section 1 of the Canadian Constitution which provides that: "The ... Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 
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As Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts, op cit 60, pointed out, however, there is a 
presumption in favour of the entrenched rights and freedoms which will necessarily prevail if the 
legislatures do not specifically pay attention to their limitation and also if the legislatures cannot 
demonstrate the need for their limitation before the courts of law. 
334 .. See R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 137-138, on how Canadian courts approach the problems 
emanating from the application of the provisions of Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
335 .. In terms of which "Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate 
notwithstanding a provision included in Section 2 or Sections 7 to 15 of this Charter." See, for example, 
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 353. 
336 .. Note that there is no South African equivalent of this. In our jurisdiction, it is only the Constitutional 
Court, acting under the provisions of Section 98(5) of the Constitution, which can, in the interests of 
justice and good government, preserve an Act or a provision thereof which it has otherwise adjudged to 
be inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid, for a specified period, to enable Parliament 
or the relevant legislature to correct the flaw or flaws identified in it. 
337 .. See Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts, op cit 65-66; and Peter W Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed, The Carswell Co Ltd, Toronto, 1985) at 691-692, for the rights 
that fall under these categories. See also JD van der Vyver, 'Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid 
South Africa', in ( 1991) 40 Emory Law Journal, 7 45 at 818-819. 
338 .. Unless re-enacted, Section 33(3) of the Charter provides that the Section 33(1) declaration "shall 
cease to have effect five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the 
declaration." See Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada, op cit 692 on this. 
339 .. Section 8 of the Saskatchewan Constitutional Questions Act, as amended in 1984, is a 
quintessential example of this. This requirement too has no equivalent in South Africa. If the government 
wishes to join or intervene in an action, it was, however, entitled to do so as was envisaged in Section 
102(10) of the (interim) Constitution. 
340 .. Which dates back to 1882 when Quebec passed An Act to Facilitate the Intervention of the Crown 
in Civil Cases in which the Constitutionality of a Federal or Provincial Act is in Question, SQ 1882, c 4 s 
1 . 
341.. See In Reference Re: Language Rights in Manitoba, [1985] 1 SCR 721. 
In this regard, see Section 98(5) of the Constitution of the Republic, the provisions of which were, 
unfortunately, confined to questions of validity of legislation. 
342 .. See Section 98{6){a) of the Constitution of the Republic for our equivalent of this. 
343 .. In Reference Re Language Rights in Manitoba, op cit 756-757, it was held that: "The application 
of the de facto doctrine is ... limited to validating acts which are taken under invalid authority; it does not 
validate the authority under which the acts took place. In other words, the doctrine does not give effect 
to unconstitutional laws. It recognises and gives effect only to the justified expectations of those who have 
relied upon the acts of those administering the invalid laws and to the existence and efficacy of public and 
private bodies corporate, though irregularly or illegally organised." (my italics) 
344 .. See Section 98(4) of the Constitution of the Republic in this regard. 
345 .. In the sense that it invalidates the impugned law from the very outset. 
346 .. Supra. 
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347 .. As Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts, op cit 305 pointed out, this helped in 
"avoiding legal chaos but ultimately ensuring the enforcement of the Constitution." 
In the Republic this is catered for in the proviso to the provisions of Section 98(5) of the Constitution. 
348 .. For the implications of this unique situation, see Gibson and Lercher 'Reliance on Unconstitutional 
Laws: The Saving Doctrines and Other Protections', (1986) 15 Manitoba Law Journal 305. 
349 .. Even where legislatures provided that if they found a statute or a provision thereof invalid, if they 
could save the remainder thereof by excising the invalid portions thereof they could do so, they have 
generally refused to do so. See, for example, Attorney-General BC v Attorney-General Canada, [1937] 
AC 377 at 388. 
350 .. [1947} AC 503. 
351 .. At 518. 
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CHAPTER THIIBE 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND A NEW 
JURISPRUDENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
As the death knell of the apartheid system sounded, the interim 1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act2 ushered in a Rechtsstaat, a state based on 
constitutionalism, 3 which replaced the former state which was predicated upon the 
sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament.4 Section 4(1) of the Constitution made it 
clear that the document was the supreme law of the Republic and that any law or act 
inconsistent with its provisions was, unless otherwise provided expressly or by 
necessary implication in the Constitution, of no force and effect to the extent of the 
inconsistency. Its provisions were binding upon all legislative, executive and judicial 
organs of state at all levels of government. 5 Thus, as stated in Chapter 1 , a state based 
upon the supremacy of the Constitution6 and buttressed by a Chapter on Fundamental 
Rights7 emerged from the rubble of the apartheid constitutional system. For the first 
time in the history of South Africa, the rights of the ind iv id ual would, subject to Section 
33(1) of the Constitution,8 prevail over the interests of the state. To paraphrase Dennis 
Davis, Mathew Chaskalson and Johan de Waal,9 a legal revolution was produced: 
South African law, which hitherto had been dominated by English antecedence, both 
in its structure and content, was bound to change fundamentally. A new social compact 
was established, in terms of which the majority of the citizenry had agreed to abandon 
their struggle for political change in exchange for the new State, a constitutional State, 
which assumed the obligation to protect and promote the rights of all South Africans 
irrespective of race, colour, gender, social status or origin. 
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As the supreme law of the land, the Constitution was not only dealing with the 
institutional structures of government and regulating the distribution and utilisation or 
exercise of state power, but was basically a value-laden document.10 In interpreting the 
provisions of its Chapter on Fundamental Rights, our courts were obliged to promote 
the values underlying an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. 11 
Because the Constitution was the supreme law against which all law was to be tested, 
Froneman J quite rightly pointed out in Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and 
Another12 that 
it must be examined with a view to extracting from it those prir .ciples or values 
against which such law ... can be measured.13 
As such, the document had a tremendous impact on our jurisprudence. 14 The response 
of the Constitutional Court, the guardian and chief enforcer of the Constitution, 15 to 
this historic development, constitutes the theme of this chapter. The role of this Court 
and its contribution to the establishment of a human rights culture in the Republic and 
the general development of our human rights jurisprudence are crucial; its decisions will 
define what our constitutional order is. In particular, it will be necessary to observe 
whether, to paraphrase Hiemstra CJ in Smith v Attorney-General, 
Bophuthatswana, 16 this Court exercises its powers of controlling legislation with a 
scalpel or with a sledgehammer, ie whether it tends to confine itself to those matters it 
has been called upon to decide or it extends its powers and strikes down even those 
provisions of an Act it has not been called upon to consider17 if it finds them to be 
unconstitutional. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ENTERS THE 
SCENE 
As Alfred Cockrell18 pointed out, in the first year of its existence the Constitutional Court. 
was "faced with the task of creating a theory of constitutional review from nothing." 
While this was in one sense a bane, it was, in another, a boon in that it "presented an 
opportunity for the Constitutional Court to write the first chapter in the great South 
African novel of constitutional review."19 The Court thus had ample opportunity to 
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fundamentally transform our jurisprudence in the course of its interpretation of the 
Constitution and the law. 
The questions canvassed below are, for various reasons, extremely important. For one 
thing, they constitute the gist of the jurisprudence that is emerging in our fledgling 
democracy. The Constitutional Court's approach to each one of them is, therefore, 
crucial for it may, in certain instances, impact upon the way each one of them was dealt 
with by our Courts in the previous constitutional era. 
"VALUES" 
The Constitution introduced a legal system in which certain fundamental rights were 
given greater weight than decisions of Parliament; South Africans thus bound 
themselves to certain values which would "trump the output of a transient legislature."20 
As Froneman J pointed out in Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another,21 
the Constitution was to be interpreted so as "to give clear expression to the values it 
seeks to nurture for a future South Africa." These values, to paraphrase Nwabueze, 
should be the fundamental values of a given society which express its way of life and 
uphold its members' personality and individual rights. 22 
In order to understand the response of the Constitutional Court to this mammoth task, 
namely the transformation of our jurisprudence, the starting point should be its 
understanding and use of the concept "values". The Constitutional Court itself stated 
in many cases that the interpretation of Chapter 3 of the Constitution involved "the 
making of a value judgment".23 In other words, as Sachs J pointed out in Coetzee v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa: Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port 
Elizabeth Prison,24 the Courts must adopt a "holistic, value-based" view in 
constitutional adjudication. 
According to Langa J, the values underlying the Constitution were "the values of South 
African society as articulated in the Constitution and in other legislation, in the decisions 
of our Courts and, generally, against our own experience as a people",25 "the values we 
find inherent in or worthy of pursuing in this society, which has only recently embarked 
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on the road to democracy."26 Sachs J, obviously bearing in mind that the values that 
underlay South African society in the apartheid era when the majority of the population 
were denied their basic democratic rights on the basis of race and colour were not the 
values that could bind all South Africans,27 qualified this and stated that "[t]he values 
that must suffuse the whole process are derived from the concept of an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality."28 
Thus, in the adjudicative process, our Courts have now been compelled to make a 
transition from the era when they were preoccupied with "formal reasons" to the post-
apartheid era where they are required to grapple with "substantive reasons" in the form 
of moral and political values.29 They now have to interpret all legislation in the light of 
fundamental rights such as were initially enumerated in Chapter 3 of the Constitution.30 
Our law has indeed shifted significantly from S v Rudman and Another; S v 
Mthwana, 31 in which Nicholas AJA had stated authoritatively that a court of criminal 
appeal did not enquire whether the trial was fair in accordance with notions of basic 
fairness and justice or with the ideas underlying the concept of justice which are the 
bases of all civilised systems of criminal administration,32 to S v Zuma and Others,33 
where Kentridge AJ observed that the provisions of Section 25(3) of the Constitution 
precisely required criminal trials to be conducted in accordance with just those notions 
of basic fairness and justice. 34 
To paraphrase Cockrell, 35 the significance of Chapter 3 of the Constitution lay in the 
fact that it functioned as a locus of open-ended values and invited our Courts to 
embrace substantive reasoning in reaching their decisions. Suddenly, our judges were 
confronted with a situation where they could no longer conveniently latch onto 
determinate rules and apply formal reasoning in reaching their decisions "irrespective 
of the underlying reasons of substance."36 They were from then on required to go 
behind the textual rules and engage with the substantive reasons underlying them; in 
their day-to-day activities as judges, they could no longer avoid engaging "in a particular 
variant of moral and political reasoning."37 
However, the task of our Courts has not become easy as a result of the adoption of the 
first Chapter on Fundamental Rights in the history of our country as some values may 
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indeed conflict intrinsically; our Courts will thus have to accept that in concrete 
situations there will always be a need to choose between conflicting values, and to 
sacrifice some values to others in the course of adjudication.38 As CockrelP9 pointed out, 
"constitutional adjudication is about hard choices, where some values will have to be 
preferred over others and in the course of which some members of the community will 
necessarily be left to feel disappointed." The brave and publicly controversial decision 
of the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane and Another,40 as will appear more 
fully in Chapter 10 below, is a striking example of a case when the Court did this. 
Needless to say, the transition was traumatic virtually for all our judges, none of whom41 
had any constitutional adjudication experience to write home about. 42 Cockrell43 
suggested that the Constitutional Court itself, consisting as it did of products of our legal 
system, did not in the first year of its existence consistently adhere to the paradigm shift 
towards the substantive vision of law. In his view, "the most striking feature of the record 
of the Constitutional Court in the first year has been the absence of ... a jurisprudence 
of substantive reasoning. Or, rather, the absence of a rigorous jurisprudence of 
substantive reasoning, for what we have been given is a quasi-theory so lacking in 
substance that I propose to call it rainbow jurisprudence".44 There was, in other words, 
no visible jurisprudential theory exhibited and pursued by the Court in that year. 
VALUES AND NATURAL LAW 
HR Hahlo and Ellison Kahn45 defined "natural law", a concept which has meant different 
things to different people at different times, as "an ideal system of law founded in the 
nature of the universe and the essence of men as rational beings", a plan and norm, 
an ideal to which all positive law should conform.46 An obviously important question is 
whether the values we are talking about derive from such an ideal system of law or from 
our nascent constitutional system. In other words, are they part of such a superior body 
of legal principles or part of the actual body of our positive law which "is but an 
imperfect reflection"47 thereof? 
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the South African Law Commission48 and our 
Courts were certainly "tempted to cast their eyes towards the mountains of natural 
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law."49 Thus, for example, two years before the historic 27 April 1994 elections, 
Friedman Jin Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana,50 remarked with regard 
to the Bophuthatswana Bill of Rights that "[t]he belief in natural law and humanity is the 
basic source of human rights and human rights is the expression of that belief ... It 
consists of universal laws, approximating to political morality, which if they had not been 
committed to writing would have had to be written down."51 Subsequent to the April 
elections, Friedman JP once again remarked52 that "[fjreedom of contract is ... is 
regarded as having its origins in natural law".53 Sachs J's view too54 was that 
constitutionalism was the historical product of an enlightenment idea that "all persons 
had certain inherent rights that come with their humanity". 
However, it would appear from the remarks of Chaskalson P that "[w]ithout law, 
individuals in society have no rights"55 that the Constitutional Court was focussed on 
institutional rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Indeed, as Sachs J pointed out in 
Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa,56 "rather than speak of 
values as platonic ideals, the Judge must situate the analysis in the facts of the 
particular case, weighing the different values represented in that context." To 
paraphrase Langa J,57 it is the values of South African society as articulated in the 
Constitution and in other legislation that our Courts were talking about. In other words, 
it is the values underlying, inter alia, the text of our Constitution, the model of the state 
and legal order brought about by the Constitution, the historical evolution and context 
of the new constitutional system, the principles of our common law, the rules of natural 
justice, tradition and usage, the (erstwhile) legal presumptions and, where appropriate 
principles derived from legal-comparative sources, that should guide and inform our 
Courts as they go about their work. 58 
"VALUES" VERSUS "RULES" 
It is also noteworthy that, on the assumption that a constitution is sui generis and, 
therefore, requires its own rules of interpretation, the Constitutional Court may have 
been tempted to juxtapose "values" to "rules". For example, Sachs Jin S v Mhlungu 
and Others,59 stated that the Constitution "is a momentous document, intensely value-
laden. To treat it with the dispassionate attention one might give to a tax law would be 
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to violate its spirit as set out in unmistakeably plain language." This dictum gives one 
the impression that to Sachs J ordinary legislation, which is less value-laden than the 
Constitution, consists merely of a series of rules with its own appropriate style of 
interpretation and requires nothing more than the dispassionate attention that is more 
akin to "ad hoc technicism" .60 
The reasoning of Sachs J suggested that it was permissible to put an artificial screen 
between constitutional interpretation and ordinary interpretation of statutes. The logic 
of this was that the substantive approach was applicable only to constitutional 
interpretation, and that judges could use formal reasoning in the interpretation of 
ordinary statutes. This, despite a clear constitutional injunction that in the interpretation 
of any law and in the application and development of the common law and customary 
law our Courts should have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of Chapter 3 
of the Constitution.61 
"LEGAL REASONING" VERSUS "SUBSTANTIVE REASONING" 
Sachs J's consistency was further confirmed when he said in S v Makwanyane and 
Another62 that: 
[w]e are not called upon to decide between these positions. They are essentially 
emotional, moral and pragmatic in character and will no doubt occupy the 
attention of the Constitutional Assembly. Our function is to interpret the text of 
the Constitution as it stands. Accordingly, whatever our personal views on this 
fraught subject might be, our response must be a purely legal one. (my 
emphasis) 
However, Sachs J seems to have contradicted himself when he said in Coetzee v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa63 that: 
[t]here is no legal yardstick for achieving this. In the end, we will frequently be 
unable to escape making difficult value judgments where ... logic and precedent 
are of limited assistance ... what must be determinative in the end is the Court's 
judgment, based on an understanding of the values our society is being built on 
and the interests at stake in the particular case; this is a judgment that cannot 
be made in the abstract, and, rather than speak of values as platonic ideals, the 
judge must situate the analysis in the facts of the particular case weighing the 
different values represented in that context. 
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Kriegler J too fell into the same groove. He said in S v Makwanyane and Another that: 
... the methods to be used are essentially legal, not moral or philosophical. To 
be true the judicial process cannot operate in an ethical vacuum. After all, 
concepts like "good faith", "unconscionable'', "reasonable" import value 
judgments into the daily grind of courts of law. And it would be foolish to deny 
that the judicial process, especially in the field of constitutional adjudication, calls 
for value judgments in which extra-legal considerations may loom large. 
Nevertheless, the starting point, the framework and the outcome of the exercise 
must be legal. The incumbents are Judges, not sages; their discipline is the law, 
not ethics or philosophy and certainly not politics.64 (my emphasis) 
The first impression these statements give is that constitutional adjudication in the 
Republic comes in its pristine, unsullied, "legal" condition. Our judges seem to have 
been eager to emphasise that they have a different, purely legal role to play in society. 
By virtue of their legal training and experience, and as the collective ostensibly guided 
and propelled by objectivity,65 they pride themselves in being able to guard against what 
Didcott J called "the trap of undue subjectivity."66 So the transcendental objects called 
value judgments entailed in constitutional adjudication and intepretation can only be 
identified and articulated by them67 and them alone presumably because politicians, in 
particular, are prone to subjectivity. 
The second impression is that our Constitutional Court fell into the trap of denying that, 
precisely because a bill of rights is a constitutional and therefore a political document, 
interpreting it "is in consequence a political activity, and inescapably so. But it is a 
political activity of a special kind",68 and differs from party political activity. 
This approach, however, was clarified and perhaps even ameliorated by Mahomed J 
(as he then was) who acknowledged this truism and pointed out that: 
[t]he difference between a political election made by a legislative organ and 
decisions reached by a judicial organ, such as the Constitutional Court, is 
crucial. The legislative organ exercises a political discretion, taking into account 
the political preferences of the electorate which votes political decision-makers 
into office. Public opinion therefore, legitimately plays a significant, sometimes 
even decisive, role in the resolution of a public issue ... The judicial process is 
entirely different. 69 
Indeed, there is a fundamental distinction between the legislative and judicial organs 
of state; their roles in society differ in many essential ways and must never be conflated 
if tyranny is to be avoided.70 However, the distinction must not be exaggerated; 
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inasmuch as the legislative organ cannot ignore what the judicial organ does and the 
consequences of what it does as such, the judicial organ cannot pretend that the rules 
the judges interpret and apply in many different situations are completely free from the 
politics of their day.71 Neither can the two organs pretend that there is no relationship 
between themselves and between their respective roles. The development of our 
constitutional jurisprudence ultimately depends on a proper understanding and 
management of this relationship, rather than on a denial of its existence. 72 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 
An important development in the advent of the Constitution is that our Courts73 will 
now indulge in constitutional interpretation in addition to ordinary interpretation of 
statutes. Our Courts, which, stricto sensu, are neither makers of law nor the formulators 
of policies, will now be required to strike a fine balance between strict positivism and 
mere subjective value judgments when interpreting either our Grundnorm-type and 
value-laden Constitution or ordinary legislation. 
Constitutional Adjudication 
In his seminal article, Du Plessis said that: 
a constitution, professing to be the supreme law of a country and including a 
justiciable bill of rights, is a legislative instrument sui generis which requires, for 
its proper construction, an equally sui generis hermeneutical approach. 74 
This suggests that there is a basic difference between the approach to be adopted in 
interpreting a constitution and interpreting an ordinary Act.75 Botha76 even instructed us 
that "constitutional interpretation is a complex field of study", while Cachalia et al said 
that: 
[t)he constitution cannot be read clause by clause nor can any clause be 
interpreted without an understanding of the framework of the instrument. In 
interpreting a constitutional instrument courts have to strike a balance between 
allowing the democratic process of an elected parliament to take its natural 
course while ensuring that the framework of values as contained in the 
instrument continue to form the broad context within which social, political and 
economic activity take place. 77 (my emphasis) 
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And yet one of the basic consequential changes in our jurisprudence was that, unlike 
in the past, our Courts were in the new constitutional order that was ushered in by the 
Constitution required to establish the purpose of the legislation being construed and 
give effect to it,78 instead of searching for the subjective "intention of the legislature"79 
in the interpretation of statutes. The purposive mode of interpretation has been 
established, and our Courts now have to interpret all legislation in the light of 
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. Thus, today, even if the words of the 
particular statute may seem to have one unambiguous meaning, "the most important 
rule of statutory interpretation is: the interpretation must ultimately reflect the purpose 
of the legislation."80 fn other words, our judges are now required to "function in an 
unapologetically purposive fashion and not be afraid to acknowledge that they can and 
do rectify the text when the words used in a particular formulation defeat or go against 
the general purpose of the statute."81 Furthermore, as was stated above, in the 
interpretation of any law and the application and development of the common law and 
customary law, the Courts were constrained to have due regard to the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. 82 
However, whilst approving of an approach that is generous and purposive, in a 
judgment in which all the judges of the Constitutional Court concurred, Kentridge AJ in 
S v Zuma and Others83 cautioned against ignoring all the principles of law which had 
hitherto governed our Courts. In their attempt to address the "mischief' that was 
represented by the previous constitutional system, our Courts were advised to bear 
such principles in mind as they "obviously much of lasting value."84 
In other words, according to Kentridge AJ, the basic rules of statutory interpretation 
which our Courts were guided by prior to the enactment and coming into effect of the 
(interim) Constitution are still applicable, save that our Courts now search for and 
apply the purpose of the relevant statute85 in the light of the Bill of Rights. 
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Language 
Thus, for a example, our Courts cannot ignore the language of a statutory instrument, 
including the Constitution,86 though a constitution is sui generis, 87 and thus calls for 
"principles of interpretation of its own". 88 As Kentridge AJ observed in S v Zuma and 
Others, "[w)hile we must always be conscious of the values underlying the Constitution, 
it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written instrument ... a constitution is a legal 
instrument, the language of which must be respected. If the language used by the 
lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to 'values' the result is not interpretation 
but divination."89 
Mahomed J (as he then was) too did not improve the position when he observed in S 
v Mhlungu and Others,90 that "[a)n interpretation ... which withholds the rights 
guaranteed by chap 3 of the Constitution .. . would not give to that chapter a 
construction which is most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude and should 
therefore be avoided if the language and context ... reasonably permits such a course." 
(my emphasis) In his remarks, the learned Deputy President of the Constitutional Court 
merely reiterated a position of the Botswana courts which is that in general, a 
constitution "embodying fundamental rights should as far as its language permits be 
given a broad construction". 91 
I sense in all this a tendency on the part of the Constitutional Court to equate language 
and meaning, or even to elevate language over meaning. It certainly did not take our 
law beyond the position propounded by Miller JA who had prior to the enactment and 
coming into force of the Constitution concluded in S v Marwane92 that: 
[w]hether our Courts were to regard an Act creative of a Constitution as it would 
any other statute, or as an Act sui generis, when construing a particular provision 
therein, they would give full effect to the ordinarily accepted meaning and effect 
of the words used and would not deviate therefrom unless to give effect to the 
ordinary meaning would give rise to glaring absurdity; or unless there were 
indications in the Act (considered as a whole in its own peculiar setting and with 
due regard to its aims and objects) that the legislator did not intend the words to 
be understood in their ordinary sense. 
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As for me, while language is important in both constitutional interpretation and ordinary 
interpretation of statutes, nothing much turns solely on it; I am personally inclined to 
agree with Du Plessis that: 
[m]eaning is not inherent in the language of the text only. Language is but a 
medium of meaning and not meaning itself. To equate language and meaning 
is to confuse a means of meaning with meaning itself as an end . 
. .. There is, as a matter of fact, no such thing as clear and unambiguous 
language in the abstract or even 'in context' prior to meaning having been 
established 'with the help of the context'. The language of a statute can in other 
words only be said to be clear once its meaning . . . has somehow been 
determined. 93 
While the importance of language is acknowledged, our Courts have recognised that 
the Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, must be given a generous and 
purposive interpretation.94 In other words, while it is recognised that historical context 
and comparative interpretation do not in themselves reflect a purpose that is not 
supported by the constitutional text, a mechanical adherence to the strict austerity of 
literal legalism must be avoided like a plague.95 To paraphrase Dickson J (as he then 
was) in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd,96 the interpretation should, as far as possible, be a 
generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the individual 
rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. This goes to show that 
constitutional interpretation97 is "an open-ended process of elucidation and commentary 
which explores, reads into, derives and attaches significance to every word, section or 
clause in relation to the whole context."98 
The same, in my opinion, applies to ordinary statutory interpretation. Though the 
Constitution as the supreme law of the land is not identical to other legislation, in terms 
of the Constitution all law must be interpreted in the light of the spirit of the 
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. Thus, as Botha99 quite rightly pointed 
out, "the method used to interpret ordinary legislation belongs to the same theoretical 
family (contextual and purposive) as the prevailing approach to constitutional 
interpretation." The most important rule of interpretation of statutes today being the 
determination of the purpose of the legislation, the need to continuously maintain a 
balance between the words or language used in the text being interpreted and the 
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context of the legislation in the determination of the purpose of the legislation cannot 
be over emphasised. 
Context 
Secondly, as our Courts have held in the past, it is indeed permissible in interpreting 
a statute to consider the purpose and background of the legislation in question. 100 Thus, 
the words used in the statute "must be interpreted in the light of their context. But it may 
be useful to stress two points in relation to the application of this principle. The first is 
that the 'context', as here used, is not limited to the language of the rest of the statute 
regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted. Often of 
more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, 
within limits, its background."101 
However, though Chaskalson P was prepared to accept that in other countries where 
the constitution is similarly the supreme law of the land it is not unusual for the courts 
to have regard to debates in Parliament, including statements by Ministers responsible 
for legislation, and explanatory memoranda providing reasons for new Bills in the 
interpretation of statutes, he was not prepared to extend the same approach to South 
Africa. 102 The learned President of the Constitutional Court instead remarked that 
whether or not our Courts should follow such examples and extend the scope of what 
is admissible as background material for the purpose of interpreting a statute did not 
arise in S v Makwanyane and Another103 for the Court was dealing with the 
interpretation of the Constitution and not the interpretation of ordinary legislation. 104 
It is my contention that the Constitutional Court thus missed a golden opportunity to 
use the provisions of Section 35(1) of the Constitution and benefit from comparable 
foreign case law. 
It should be clear from the aforegoing remarks that, as for me, there is not a 
fundamental difference between constitutional interpretation and ordinary interpretation. 
While constitutional interpretation relates to the authoritative interpretation of the 
Constitution by our Courts in the course of judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation and government action, both forms of interpretation deal with the 
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interpretation of legislative instruments and are interrelated. The difference is that, as 
Froneman J observed in Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, 105 
while constitutional interpretation is directed at ascertaining the foundational values 
inherent in a constitution, 
the interpretation of the particular legislation will be directed at ascertaining 
whether that legislation is capable of an interpretation which conforms with the 
fundamental values or principles of the Constitution. 
Thus, nothing much turns on the mere assertion that a constitution is a sui generis 
statute which requires a sui generis hermeneutical approach. The common law 
principles of interpretation, in sum, require the interpreter to ascertain what the position 
was before the enactment of a relevant statute, identify the "mischief' which the statute 
seeks to remedy, ascertain the remedy provided by the new provisions and ascertain 
the reason for the remedy. There is, in my view, no material difference between that 
common law approach and the special approach to constitutional interpretation being 
advocated by some. 106 
VALUES AND POPULAR MORALITY 
It has been stated above that our Courts now have to grapple with "substantive 
reasons" in the form of political and moral values. The Constitutional Court in the first 
year of its existence was also preoccupied with the extent to which it is appropriate for 
it to have regard to popular morality in the interpretation of statutes and the protection 
of rights in the context of a bill of rights regime. It adopted the position that popular 
morality and public opinion in essence have no role in the interpretation of a bill of rights 
as the very purpose of a bill of rights is to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to put them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and establish them as principles to be applied by the Courts. 107 As Chaskalson 
P pointed out, 
[i]f public opinion were to be decisive, there would be no need for constitutional 
adjudication. The protection of rights could then be left to Parliament, which has 
a mandate from the public, and is answerabe to the public for the way its 
mandate is exercised, but this would be a return to parliamentary sovereignty, 
and a retreat from the new order established by the 1993 Constitution ... The 
very reason for establishing the new legal order, and for vesting the power of 
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judicial review of all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of 
minorities and others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the 
democratic process.108 
However, in the same breath, Chaskalson P seems to have been prepared to defer to 
some degree to the place and role of legislators when it came to the weighing up of 
competing interests in the interpretation of the general limitation clause.109 The learned 
President of the Constitutional Court said that: 
[i]n the process regard must be had to the provisions of s 33( 1 ) and the 
underlying values of the Constitution, bearing in mind that, as a Canadian Judge 
has said, "the role of the Court is not to second-guess the wisdom of policy 
choices made by legislators".110 
There does not appear to be any real and logical reason for confining this to the general 
limitation clause. On the contrary, it may indeed be proper in certain circumstances for 
the Courts to leave decision-making to the elected law-makers. 
For the learned President of the Constitutional Court, particularly in matters of policy, 
it would not be appropriate for an unelected court to second-guess the executive or 
legislative organs of government and to substitute its own opinion of what is reasonable 
or necessary for that of the legislators. Obviously endorsing Canadian jurisprudence, 
Chaskalson P declared that: 
[w]here choices have to be made between "differing reasonable policy options", 
the courts will allow the government the deference due to legislators. 111 
Furthermore, for Kentridge AJ, if public opinion on a particular question is clear, it 
cannot be totally ignored. The accepted mores of a judge's society do have some 
relevance in the interpretation of statutes, in other words. 112 
"AFRICAN VALUES AND INDIGENOUS LAW" 
Is there a place and a role for "African values" in the interpretation of statutes and in the 
determination of the constitutionality of laws in the new era? In this regard, Mokgoro J 
declared that: 
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when our Courts promote the underlying values of an open and democratic 
society in terms of s 35 when considering the constitutionality of laws, they 
should recognise that indigenous South African values are not always irrelevant 
nor unrelated to this task.113 (my emphasis) 
The learned judge of the Constitutional Court indeed regarded the indigenous value 
systems as "a premise from which we should proceed", 114 while Langa J spoke of "a 
spontaneous call ... among sections of the community for a return to ubuntu". 115 Sachs 
J also committed himself to "the need to take account of the traditions, beliefs and 
values of all sectors of South African society when developing our jurisprudence."116 
Madala J accepted that there was indeed a need "to bring in the traditional African 
jurisprudence to these matters, to the extent that such is applicable, and would not 
confine such research to South Africa only, but to Africa in general."117 
Needless to say, this perspective is laudable. It would help in properly locating in the 
new constitutional order indigenous values and indigenous law, which, like the common 
law, according to the Constitution, should be recognised and applied by the Courts, 
subject to the provisions of the Constitution and legislation dealing specifically with 
it. 118 It would indeed help give "long overdue recognition to African law and legal 
thinking as a source of legal ideas, values and practice", 119 and generally to "the value 
systems of the formerly marginalised sectors of society in creating a South African 
jurisprudence". 120 As Cockrell said, "African sources can provide a valuable repository 
of values to be trawled in the process of constitutional adjudication."121 
However, as Madala J quite rightly pointed out, if this perspective would entail that the 
Courts have to canvass public opinion among blacks before they make their decisions, 
then it would be unacceptable.122 Furthermore, such values do not justify themselves 
merely by virtue ot their being "African" and, as Sachs J said, 
[w]e do not automatically invoke each and every aspect of traditional law as a 
source of values, just as we do not rely on all features of the common law ... 
there are many aspects and values of traditional African law which will also have 
to be discarded or developed in order to ensure compatibility with the principles 
of the new constitutinal order. 123 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND COMPARABLE FOREIGN CASE LAW 
Lastly, it behooves us to take a brief look at how our Courts have dealt with public 
international law and comparable foreign case law. Section 35(1) of the Constitution 
provided that: 
[i]n interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law ... shall, where 
applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of 
the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable 
foreign case law. (my emphasis)124 
The Constitutional Court has had occasion to comment on the usefulness of 
comparable foreign case in the development of our jurisprudence. In the light of my 
remarks above, it is important to canvass this area as well. Langa J, in a curious obiter 
dictum in S v Williams, 125 said that: 
[t]he decisions of the Supreme Courts of Namibia and of Zimbabwe are of 
special significance. Not only are these countries geographic neighbours, but 
South Africa shares with them the same English colonial experience which has 
had a deep influence on our law; we of course also share the Roman-Dutch legal 
tradition. 126 
It is, however, not clear from the reasoning of Langa J why the decisions of the 
Supreme Courts of Namibia and of Zimbabwe should be preferable to those of the 
Courts of other countries if there is no formal reason for following foreign case law in 
the first place. It seems as though the learned judge of the Constitutional Court was 
suggesting that, merely because there is indeed a lot in common between us and our 
neighbours, our Courts are obliged to implicitly follow the decisions of their Courts 
without any substantive grounds. In this regard, however, the trend-setting remarks of 
Chaskalson P127 are of extreme importance: 
[c]omparative "bill of rights" jurisprudence will no doubt be of importance, 
particularly in the early stages of the transition when there is no developed 
indigenous jurisprudence in this branch of the law on which to draw. Although we 
are told by s 35{ 1) that we "may" have regard to foreign case law, it is important 
to appreciate that this will not necessarily offer a safe guide to the interpretation 
of chap 3 of our Constitution. This has already been pointed out in a number of 
decisions of the Provincial and Local Divisions of the Supreme Court, and is 
implicit in the injunction given to the Courts ins 35(1 ), which in permissive terms 
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allows the Courts to "have regard to" such law. There is no injunction to do more 
than this ... 
We can derive assistance from public international law and foreign case law, but 
we are in no way bound to follow it. (my emphasis)128 
In other words, the approach of our Courts to foreign case law is that, whUe such case 
law may be a useful guide and indeed a store-house, a repository of principles to be 
raided for guidance when necessary and appropriate, it does not provide canonical 
texts or formal reasons for the decisions of our Courts. 129 Though our Courts may be 
too eager at times to turn to the experience of other countries, foreign case law is 
generally approached "with circumspection because of the differing contexts within 
which foreign constitutions were drafted and operate in, and the danger of 
unnecessarily importing doctrines associated with those constitutions into an 
inappropriate South African setting."130 
THE VERTICALITY-HORIZONTAL/TY DICHOTOMY 
The question whether the Chapter on Fundamental Rights was applicable vertically131 
only or both vertically and horizontally132 came before the Supreme Court in a few cases 
before it was eventually dealt with by the Constitutional Court. For example, in Mandela 
v Falati, 133 Van Schalkwyk J had held that the Chapter 3 constitutionally guaranteed 
rights operated horizontally, between citizen and citizen, 134 while Van Dijkhorst J, in De 
Klerk and Another v Du Plessis and Others, 135 after an analysis of certain provisions 
of the Constitution had held that they were of vertical application only. 136 In Motala 
and Another v University of Natal137 Hurt J held that at least the equality clause as 
well as the clause on education 138 had horizontal application as well "against individuals, 
natural or juristic, who may be disposed to threaten them or interfere with the exercise 
of them."139 
Constitutional Provisions 
Before dealing with how this dichotomy was resolved by the Constitutional Court, it is 
imperative to look at certain sections of the Constitution.In the first place, it provided 
explicitly that Chapter 3 "shall bind all legislative and executive organs of state at all 
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levels of government."140 This clearly indicated, as LM du Plessis quite rightly pointed 
out, 141 that the Chapter was predominantly vertical in its application and was, as such, 
an instrument essentially intended to protect the individual against abuse of State 
power. 142 
However, Chapter 3 was also specifically made applicable "to all /aw in force ... during 
the period of operation of this Constitution."143 (my emphasis) Furthermore, the 
common law and customary law were specifically subjected to the rights contained in 
the Chapter, 144 with any common-law or customary-law limitation being rendered 
unconstitutional unless it conformed to the general limitation clause. 145 Moreover, our 
Courts were required to "promote the values which underlie an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality"; 146 they were also explicitly enjoined to have 
"due regard to the spirit, purport and objects" of the Chapter when interpreting any law 
and when applying or developing the common law and customary law. 147 
It is further noteworthy that, under the Constitution, "measures designed to prohibit 
unfair discrimination by bodies and persons other than those" constituting organs of 
state, could be adopted. 148 As Friedman J pointed out in Baloro and Others v 
University of Bophuthatswana and Other, 149 this was a clear encroachment on the 
domain of private law, with a horizontal dimension. Thus, for example, "a school, 
whether public or private, would not be entitled to refuse a pupil admission on the 
grounds of the pupil's race or colour. This would amount to unfair discrimination."150 
Lastly, the Constitution also provided that the entrenchment of the rights in terms of 
Chapter 3 should not be construed as denying the existence of any other rights or 
freedoms recognised or conferred by our common law, customary law or legislation to 
the extent that they were not inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter 3. 151 
Furthermore, save as was provided in the general limitation clause or in any other 
provision of the Constitution, "no law, whether a rule of the common law, customary 
law or legislation", could limit any of the rights entrenched in Chapter 3. 152 (my 
emphasis) 
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The Constitutional Court's Decision 
In view of the conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, Van Dijkhorst J referred the 
constitutional issues to the Constitutional Court for its decision.153 The question 
unleashed a very interesting jurisprudential debate among the judges of the 
Constitutional Court which is summarised below. As will become clearer later, the 
idiosyncrasies and predilections of some of our Constitutional Court judges became 
manifest in the course of this debate. 
In Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another, 154 Kentridge AJ, after carefully 
considering the provisions of Section 7(1) and (2)155 of the Constitution, concluded that 
the Chapter 3 constitutional rights could "be invoked against an organ of government 
but not by one private litigant against another."156 In other words, as the learned acting 
judge pointed out, Chapter 3 was 
not intended to be applied directly to common law issues between private 
litigants. 157 
In private litigation any litigant could nonetheless contend that a statute (or executive 
act) relied upon by his or her opponent was invalid as being inconsistent with the 
limitations placed upon the legislature and the executive under Chapter 3. 158 
Furthermore, as the Chapter applied to the common law, governmental acts or 
omissions in reliance on the common law could be attacked by a private litigant as 
being inconsistent with the Chapter. 159 
The learned acting judge further stated that the powers of the Constitutional Court to 
enquire "into the constitutionality of any law, including an Act of Parliament", 160 were 
confined to statutes as Section 98161 of the Constitution nowhere provided for a 
declaration that a rule of the common law was invalid. 162 While conceding that Section 
35(3), which as stated above obliged the Courts to "have due regard to the spirit, 
purport and objects of' Chapter 3, introduced the indirect application of the fundamental 
rights to private law, Kentridge AJ significantly pointed out that: 
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[t]he lawgiver did not say that courts should invalidate rules of common law 
inconsistent with Chapter 3 or declare them unconstitutional. The fact that courts 
do no more than have regard to the spirit, purport and objects of the Chapter 
indicates that the requisite development of the common law and customary law 
is not to be pursued through the exercise of the powers of this Court under 
section 98 of the Constitution. The presence of this sub-section ensures that the 
values embodied in Chapter 3 will permeate the common law in all its aspects, 
including_ private litigation. 163 (my emphasis) 
Of particular note was the fact that the learned acting judge quoted with approval the 
views of a Canadian judge, Lacobucci J, who said in R v Salituro164 that while judges 
can and should develop and adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral 
and economic fabric of the country, 
in a constitutional democracy ... it is the Legislature and not the courts which has 
the major responsibility for law reform ... The Judiciary should confine itself to 
those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step 
with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society.165 (my emphasis) 
Kentridge AJ then came to the conclusion that Chapter 3 of the Constitution did not 
have a general direct horizontal application though it could and should have an 
influence upon the development of the common law and customary law governing 
relations between individuals. 166 He conceded (grudgingly perhaps?) however, that in 
a proper case it might be open to a private litigant to argue that some particular Chapter 
3 provisions might by necessary implication have direct horizontal application. 167 
In particular, the learned acting judge pointed out that Section 15(1) of the 
Constitution, which protected the right to freedom of speech and expression, did not 
have horizontal application. 168 Its provisions were, in other words, conf!ned to the 
vertical relationship between the state and the individual. 169 
For Mahomed DP (as he then was), the starting point was the society the Constitution 
sought to establish after the demise of the system of apartheid, namely a defensible 
society based on freedom and equality, setting its face firmly and vigorously against 
racism. From this perspective, the learned Judge correctly reasoned that: 
[t]o leave individuals free to perpetuate advantages, privileges and relations, 
quite immune from the discipline of Chapter 3, would substantially be to allow the 
ethos and pathology of racism effectively to sustain a new life, subverting the 
gains which the Constitution seeks carefully to consolidate. 170 
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However, when the Learned Deputy President of the Constitutional Court looked at the 
provisions of Section 7(1) and (2) of the Constitution, he pointed out that he found it 
difficult to understand why, if it was the intention of the lawmakers to resolve the 
verticality/horizontality dichotomy, they did not say so "in clear terms or at least in 
language which clearly permitted that inference to be made."171 He was "not persuaded 
that the lawmakers would wish such a crucial issue to be left for discovery and 
inference by astute judicial craftmanship and nimble argumentation."172 
The learned Deputy President of the Constitutional Court proffered the view that the 
lawmakers could indeed use the provisions of Section 33( 4) of the Constitution to pass 
substantive legislation designed to extend to other bodies and persons the duties 
placed on government in terms of Section 7(1) in order prohibit unfair discrimination by 
such other bodies and persons. 173 In other words, Mahomed DP too accepted the 
approach adopted by Iacobucci J in R v Salituro, 174 namely that law reform should 
rather be left to the Legislature. He agreed to the order proposed by Kentridge AJ .175 
However, his concern that the approach of Kentridge AJ might mean, "in practice, that 
the Constitution was impotent to protect those who have so manifestly and brutally 
been victimised by the private and institutionalized desecration of the values now so 
eloquently articulated" still lingered on. 176 He was certain that 
those responsible for the enactment of the Constitution never intended to permit 
the privatisation of Apartheid or to allow the unfair gains of Apartheid or the 
privileges it bestowed on the few, or the offensive attitudes it generated amongst 
many to be fossilized and protected by courts rendered impotent by the 
language of the Constitution. 177 (my emphasis) 
He then reasoned that, fortunately, 
most of the common law rules, upon which reliance would have to be placed by 
private persons seeking to perpetuate unfair privilege or discrimination, would 
themselves be vulnerable to invasion and re-examination in appropriate 
circumstances."178 
This, the Learned Deputy President of the Court maintained, could be done without 
necessarily extending the application of the provisions of Section 7(1) of the 
Constitution, but under Section 35(3) thereof. In other words, the Courts could 
intervene in this regard in the course of their participation in the development of the 
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common law and customary law as they have regard to the spirit, purport and objects 
of the new constitutional system. 179 
Unfortunately, Mahomed DP, as he then was, like the rest of the judges who concurred 
in the judgment of Kentridge AJ, did not comment on the constitutional provision which 
specifically protected fundamental rights and freedoms deriving from the common law, 
customary law or legislation, as long as they were not inconsistent with Chapter 3. 180 
It is my view that in a proper case a private litigant could argue that a right deriving 
from the common law or customary law or legislation, could not be relied upon by any 
person, private or public, if it was inconsistent with Chapter 3. 181 I further submit that no 
court of law could, in any event, allow any litigant, private or public, to rely upon a 
common law or customary law limitation of a Chapter 3 right unless such a limitation 
complied with the general limitation clause. 182 
Like Kentridge AJ, Ackermann J too came to the conclusion "that the framers of our 
Constitution did not intend that the Chapter 3 fundamental rights should, save where 
the formulation of a particular right expressly or by necessary implication otherwise" 
indicated, apply directly to legal relations between private persons. 183 In his view, it 
could never have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution "to constitute 
Chapter 3 as a super civil code, to which the private common law is directly subject."184 
(my emphasis) 
Curiously though, despite the clear provisions of Section 33(2) which, as stated above, 
specifically subjected the common law, customary law and legislation to the general 
limitation clause, Ackermann J did not seem to see any need to refer to Section 33(1) 
of the Constitution in this regard .185 
Kriegler J, in an interesting minority judgment, suggested that his colleagues erred -
and did so fundamentally - when they concluded that the individual's rights that were 
guaranteed in Chapter 3 were directly enforceable only against the state. 186 For him, it 
was common cause that Chapter 3 did not operate only as against the state but also 
"horizontally" as between individuals where legal relationships were involved. 187 As will 
become clearer below, Madala J too took the same position; 188 while acknowledging 
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that the Constitution had vertical operation and dealt with the relationship between the 
state and the individual, he did not subscribe to the view that its operation was limited 
to verticality only.189 
While Kriegler J referred to the majority judgment presented by Kentridge AJ as being 
reflective of the more conservative view, 190 Madala J blamed Kentridge AJ for dealing 
with the verticality-horizontality dichotomy on too narrow a basis. 191 Their two 
judgments, the gist of which I would personally prefer, unfortunately do not constitute 
the law as the majority ruled differently on this question. 
Kriegler J192 rightly pointed out that the Constitution held no hidden message of so-
called verticality; it nowhere provided that Chapter 3 governed only the vertical 
relationship between the state and the individual. On the contrary, he declared, Section 
4(1 ), in terms of which the whole Constitution was the supreme law of the Republic, 
made the Constitution as a whole applicable to all law and to all legal relationships. 
According to him, in order to address the inequities of South Africa's past, the framers 
of the Constitution had "unequivocally proclaimed much more sweeping aims than 
those identified by the judge a quo"193 and apparently accepted in the more 
conservative judgment of Kentridge AJ in which the majority of the Court concurred. 
The manifest intention of the makers of the Constitution was, as Section 4(2) showed, 
"to expand its scope to the widest limit their language could express."194 They had even 
expressly extended the provisions of Chapter 3 to juristic persons and locus standi to 
representative actors, group, class and even public interest claimants, their clear 
intention throughout being "to stretch the purview of Chapter 3 to its outermost 
boundaries". 195 
For Kriegler J196 and Madala J,197 the provisions of Section 33(2)-(4) of the Constitution 
were critical as far as the question of the application of Chapter 3 was concerned. In 
particular, Kriegler J rightly pointed out that Section 33(4) did not support a vertical 
reading of Chapter 3; 198 it merely proclaimed that nothing in the Chapter could preclude 
the adoption of measures, whether legislative or executive, intended to prevent and 
combat privatised unfair discrimination. 199 
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Madala J200 said that the Constitution allowed both for the direct application of a 
relevant Chapter 3 right and the interpretation, application and development of our law, 
including the common law and customary law, by having regard to the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Chater in terms of Section 35(3) of the Constitution. In other words, 
a person, either natural or juristic, would be entitled, under Section 22 of the 
Constitution, to approach a Court of law directly if any of his/her/its rights were 
affected or threatened. 
While acknowledging the importance of the provisions of Section 35(3) of the 
Constitution, Kriegler J held the view that they were manifestly intended to govern a 
residuary category not governed by the rest of Chapter 3.201 The purpose of Section 
35(3), he said, was to ensure that the Constitution permeated all that judges did as it 
was to permeate all that the legislature and the executive, at all levels of government, 
did.202 The section was to be used in all cases where there was no direct challenge 
based on one or more of the rights and freedoms entrenched in Chapter 3, he said.203 
All Courts, including the Constitutional Court, were constitutionally bound to follow its 
provisions. 204 
Kriegler J205 also disagreed with Kentridge AJ who said that the Courts did not acquire 
jurisdiction to invalidate and declare unconstitutional rules of common law inconsistent 
with Chapter 3.206 For him,207 the Constitutional Court, as "the court of final instance 
over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the 
provisions of' the Constitution,208 had jurisdiction to enquire into and adjudicate "any 
alleged violation or threatened violation of any fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 
3",209 and to indulge in "the determination of any other matters as may be entrusted to 
it by this Constitution or any other law."210 
The Constitutional Assembly Intervenes 
The verticality-horizontality dichotomy was eventually resolved by the Constitutional 
Assembly which provided in Section 8(2) of the (new) Constitution211 that: 
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[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic persons if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and of any 
duty imposed by the right. (my emphasis) 
The Constitutional Court rejected the argument that this introduction of horizontality, 
which would impose obligations upon persons other than organs of state, violated 
Constitutional Principle II as horizontality is not universally recognised. First and 
foremost, the Court held that nothing in Constitutional Principle 11 per se prevented the 
Constitutional Assembly from including in the new Bill of Rights provisions which are not 
universally accepted.212 
Secondly, the Court, rejected the notion that a horizontal application of the Bill of Rights 
would violate a basic tenet of our law, separation of powers, and thus allow the courts 
to encroach upon the sacred terrain of the legislature and "alter" legislation and the 
common law. Reaffirming that the courts always use the power of judicial review to 
"alter" legislation in ways they may consider desirable, the Court held that the argument 
failed to acknowledge that: 
the courts have always been the sole arm of government responsible for the 
development of the common law.213 
Lastly in this regard, the Court rejected the argument that horizontality would impose 
obligations upon individual persons who were otherwise entitled to be beneficiaries of 
"universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties". The Court held 
that the provisions of Constitutional Principle 11 would not be violated by a horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights as it was implicitly recognised that: 
even if only the state is bound, rights conferred upon individuals will justifiably be 
limited in order to recognise the rights of others in certain circumstances.214 
Thus, today, our Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic persons, albeit to a limited 
extent. It will only bind natural and juristic persons if applicable, after taking into account 
the nature of the right in question and any duty imposed by such right. Our Courts will 
be required to treat each case on its own merits and decide whether the right which 
allegedly was breached by private action should be given horizontal application. In a 
small way, this is a victory for the reasoning in the minority judgment of Kriegler J and 
Madala J in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Others, with which I associated 
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myself above; the new Bill of Rights has indeed ventured out and intervened in the 
sacred territory of our private law. 
Our Courts are allowed and constrained, in order to give effect to the rights in the Bill 
of Rights, to apply, and where necessary, develop our common law. In the process, the 
Courts may even develop the rules of our common law to limit some of the rights in the 
Bill, "provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1 )" of the (new) 
Constitution. However, it is not clear from Section 8(3) which comes first: The right or 
the common law when a right is being applied "horizontally". One interpretation is that 
you start with the common law. The provision does not say you first have to look at 
what a constitutionally guaranteed right should or does mean, and then "test" the 
common law against it. Hopefully, the Constitutional Court will soon provide guidance 
in this regard. 
RETROSPECTIVITY215 
The Constitutional Court has also had occasion to consider the question of 
retrospective operation of statutes, including the Constitution. The first case in which 
the Court had to deal with this question was S v Mhlungu and Others.216 The second 
one was Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another,217 while the third one was 
Key v Attorney-General, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division and Another.218 
However, the starting point, in my opinion, should be what our common law and 
statutory position was in 1994 when the (interim) Constitution came into effect. 
The Common Law Position 
In our common law there was a presumption that "statutes will not be held to take away 
exisUi1g rights retrospectively unless they so provide expressly or by necessary 
intendmen~."219 The common law position was spelt out by Innes CJ who said in Curtis 
v Johannesburg Municipality220 that: 
[i]n the absence of express provision to the contrary, statutes should be 
considered as affecting future matters only and more especially ... they should 
if possible be so interpreted as not to take away rights actually vested at the time 
of their promulgation. 
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In other words, the rule was that "the lawgiver is presumed to legislate only for the 
future",221 "and not for the past",222 and that "statutes should be interpreted, if possible, 
so as to respect vested rights".223 It was not to be presumed that interference with 
existing rights was intended by the legislature, unless the words used were clear and 
unambiguous.224 If the words were ambiguous, the Courts leaned towards the 
interpretation that favoured existing rights. 
Furthermore, if a right was acquired by virtue of some statute, it would not be taken 
away by the subsequent repeal of the statute under which it was acquired.225 As Botha 
JA stated in Bell v Voorsitter van die Rasklassifikasieraad,226 even where a statute 
was amended retrospectively while a suit was pending, the rights of the parties to the 
action, in the absence of a contrary intention, ought to be decided in accordance with 
the statutory provisions in force at the time of the institution of the action. 
This presumption applied to both statutory and common law rights. 
The Statutory Presumption against Retrospectivity 
Where a statute repeals an earlier statute, the Interpretation Act227 provides that 
"unless the contrary intention appears ... the repeal shall not ... affect any right, 
privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any law so 
repealed."228 James J (as he then was) in Browne v Incorporated Law Society of 
Natal229 set out three basic requirements which must be satisfied before this statutory 
presumption against retrospectivity could come into operation. 
The Law after the April 1994 General Elections 
The (interii01) Constitution did not have any apparent retrospective operation; it 
applied "to all law in force and all administrative decisions taken and acts performed 
during the period of' its operation.230 With regard to the judgments of the Constitutional 
Court on issues of constitutionality, it is worthy of note that the Constitution itself 
provided specifically that: 
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(u]nless the Constitutional Court in the interests of justice and good government 
orders otherwise, and save to the extent that it so orders, the declaration of 
invalidity of a law or a provision thereof -
(a) existing at the commencement of this Constitution, shall not invalidate 
anything done or permitted in terms thereof before the coming into effect of such 
declaration of invalidity. 
In S v Mhlungu and Others231 the Constitutional Court dealt, inter alia, with the 
implications of Section 241 (8) of the Constitution.232 The Court held that the purpose 
of Section 241 (8) was essentially to preserve the authority of pre-Constitution Courts 
to continue to adjudicate in cases then pending before our Courts.233 The constitutional 
guarantees that became available as from 27 April 1994 were extended to accused 
persons in pending cases.234 Accordingly, Mhlungu and the others were entitled to 
invoke their constitutional rights so as to preclude the use against them of the 
presumption contained in Section 217(1 )(b)(il) of the Criminal Procedure Act235 which 
the Court had earlier on236 held to be unconstitutional and hence invalid. 
Mahomed J was at great pains to show that the Constitution did not per se operate 
retrospectively.237 An as Kentridge AJ subsequently pointed out in Du Plessis and 
Others v De Klerk and Another,238 
[i]t was in that limited sense, if at all, that S v Mhlungu and Others ... held that Chapter 
3 had 'retrospective' operation. It most certainly did not decide that the Constitution 
operated retroactively in the meaning which I endeavoured to explain in my dissenting 
judgment in that case. 
Kentridge AJ then held that the Constitution did not operate retroactively in the sense 
that it enacted that as at a date prior to its commencement the law should be taken to 
be that which it was not.239 There was nothing in the Constitution suggesting that 
conduct unlawful before its commencement was now to be deemed to be lawful by 
virtue of Chapter 3 thereof.240 Furthermore, Kentridge AJ held that there was no warrant 
in the Constitution for depriving a person of property or an existing right which 
he/she/it lawfully held before its commencement by invoking against him/her/it a right 
which did not exist at the time when the right or property vested in them.241 
However, as the learned acting judge of the Constitutional Court pointed out, "[t]he 
consequences of that general principle are ... not necessarily invariable."242 The Court 
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curiously and without giving any examples, left "open the possibility that there may be 
cases where the enforcement of previously acquired rights would in the light of our 
present constitutional values be so grossly unjust and abhorrent that it could not be 
countenanced, whether as being contrary to public policy or on some other basis. "243 
(my emphasis) I am prepared to hazard a guess that this could be one area where the 
Courts could use the provisions of Section 35(3) of the Constitution244 as they 
interpret, develop and apply our statutes. the common law and customary law. 
Furthermore, the provisions of Section 33(2) and (3) of the Constitution could, in my 
view, come in handy in this regard. 
In Key v Attorney-General, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division and Another,245 
the Court dealt with a contention seeking to impugn a criminal case on the basis that 
a search, seizure and disclosure of documents in a manner which was inconsistent with 
the Constitution were unlawful. Kriegler J, in whose judgment all the other judges of 
the Court concurred, held that the commencement of the Constitution could not, by 
affording rights and freedoms which had not existed before such commencement, 
render unlawful actions that were lawful at the time they were taken.246 It was not open 
to any person, it was further held, to challenge the constitutionality of legislative 
provisions on the basis of actions taken prior to the commencement of the (interim) 
Constitution, which, had they been taken after its commencement, would have 
breached their fundamental rights. The relevant actions could not constitute a breach 
of any person's fundamental rights, as such rights had not yet come into existence at 
the time the search, seizure and disclosure took place.247 In particular, it was held that 
a disclosure of the information lawfully obtained before the Constitution came into 
force to the court or other persons for the purposes of the criminal proceedings could 
not be said to infringe the applicant's right to privacy under the Constitution.248 
Of particular note, the learned Judge then continued and held that there was nothing 
inherently ~mfair in receiving in evidence material which was properly garnered in the 
course of a lawful search and seizure. There was no warrant in justice for retroactively 
casting a blanket of illegality over what was properly unearthed according to the law as 
it stood at the time. 249 
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What all these cases amply demonstrate is that our common law in this regard has not 
changed in any fundamental way since the advent of the Constitution. As Kriegler J 
indeed concluded, 
EQUALITY 
... save possibly in exceptional circumstances involving gross injustice abhorrent 
to our present constitutional values, the courts apply the Jaw as it was before the 
Constitution came into force.250 (my emphasis) 
The (interim) Constitution251 provided for "the right to equality before the law and to 
equal protection of the law." Furthermore, provision was made for the right not to be 
unfairly discriminated against directly or indirectly.252 Our Courts, including the 
Constitutional Court, had to grapple with the meaning of these rights in a few cases. As 
their judgments amply demonstrate, our Courts at the very outset attached a great deal 
of importance to these rights. 
This was because in the new constitutional order, in view of our apartheid-based past, 
equality was given pride of place.253 As the Constitutional Court pointed out in many of 
its earlier judgments,254 the (interim) Constitution was an emphatic renunciation of our 
past in which inequality was systematically entrenched. 
Section 8(1) of the (Interim) Constitution 
Kroon J and Froneman J in Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another255 
dealt with the right to equality in relation to the right of access to information.256 In this 
regard, the judges, whose view was that the two sections ought to be read together,257 
said that: 
the right to disclosure in other jurisdictions has not always been based on a 
separate constitutional right of access to information, but on ... the basis that a 
fair trial envisages an "equality of arms" and that therefore all parties must have 
the same access to the records and other documents in the case ... 258 
In East Zulu Motors (Pty) Ltd v Empangeni/Ngwelezane Transitional Local Council 
and Others,259 the applicant, an owner of a business situated in the jurisdiction of the 
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Empangeni/Ngwelezane Transitional Local Council, had opposed an application by one 
of the respondents, the owner of a neighbouring property, for the rezoning of such a 
property. The rezoning had proceeded despite the objection. Applicant, as an aggrieved 
objector, had no right of appeal to the fourth respondent, the Town and Regional 
Planning Commission for KwaZulu-Natal, in terms of the provisions of the Town 
Planning Ordinance 27of1949 (Natal). The same provisions, however, in the case of 
an exempted local authority allowed a right of appeal to the fourth respondent to an 
unsuccessful applicant who felt aggrieved by a decision of the local authority not to 
proceed with a proposed rezoning. 
This raised the question whether such unequal treatment infringed the pr0visions of 
Section 8(1) of the (interim) Constitution. The Court observed that the equality clause: 
does not forbid classification or distinction which rests on a reasonable basis, ie 
where the distinction is founded on an intelligible differentia which has a rational 
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statutes.260 
The Court held that the distinction in casu did not have a reasonable basis and was not 
founded on such differentia. 261 It further held that, to the extent that the relevant 
provisions did not accord a right of appeal to an objector in the circumstances of the 
applicant, such provisions were indeed inconsistent with the equality clause. 262 
In S v Ntuli,263 the Constitutional Court held that the provisions of Section 309(4 )(a)264 
read with Section 305 of the Criminal Procedure Act violated, inter alia, the provisions 
of the (interim) Constitution which guaranteed everyone equality before the law.265 The 
relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act impugned in casu were found not 
to be reasonable and justifiable as required in the general limitation clause of the 
Constitution and could, therefore, not be allowed to stand.266 
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Section 8(2) of the (Interim) Constitution 
An interesting case dealing with the prohibition of unfair discrimination as then 
encapsulated in Section 8(2) of the (interim) Constitution was that of Motala and 
Another v University of Natal.267 In that case, the applicants, the parents of one 
Fathima, an exceptionally gifted minor, had brought an urgent application against the 
respondent arising from the latter's refusal of Fathima's application for admission to the 
respondent's faculty of medicine. Fathima was apparently a casualty of an "affirmative 
action" programme then operated by the University of Natal, which was, for a number 
of years faced with a dilemma about the selection of students for first year medicine. 
The respondent's "affirmative action" programme was structured in such a manner that 
African students, then victims of Bantu education with poor Matric results, could also 
be accommodated. In order to compensate for the defect of the education then 
available to African matriculants, African applicants were, in other words, assessed on 
a different basis to Indian applicants. 
The question which arose was whether treating members of the latter community 
differently when they themselves had suffered substantial disadvantages as a result of 
discrimination prior to April 1994 constituted unfair discrimination as envisaged in, and 
proscribed under, Section 8(2) of the (interim) Constitution. Another question was 
whether the "affirmative action" programme infringed the right to "equal access to 
educational institutions" then entrenched in Section 32(a) of the (interim) Constitution. 
With regard to both questions, Hurt J concluded that: 
[w]hile there is no doubt whatsoever that the Indian group was decidedly 
disadvantaged by the apartheid system, the evidence before me establishes 
clearly that the degree of disadvantage to which African pupils were subjected 
under the "four tier" system of education was significantly greater than that 
suffered by their Indian counterparts. I do not consider that a selection system 
which compensates for this discrepancy runs counter to the provisions of 
sections 8(1) and 8(2). As to the submissions based on section 32(a), as I read 
that section, the expression "educational institutions" is to be read in the context 
of the reference in this subsection to "educational institutions" and is to be taken 
to include a reference to "institutions of higher learning" (the expression used in 
section 14(1 )), then it seems to me that the right in section 32(a) would have to 
be limited by the provisions of section 8(3) in circumstances such as those faced 
by the respondent.268 (my emphasis) 
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In other words, for Hurt J, formal equalitywhich "presupposes that all persons are equal 
bearers of rights with a just social order''269 and which "is blind to entrenched, structural 
inequality"270 is anathema. Hence the learned Judge could not ignore "actual social and 
economic disparities between groups and individuals"271 and pretend that there was 
equality between products of Bantu education and pupils from the Indian community, 
though both groups had undoubtedly been victims of apartheid. The learned Judge 
visibly preferred substantive equality which "requires us to examine the actual social 
and economic conditions of groups and individuals in order to determine whether the 
Constitution's commitment to equality is being upheld. "272 
So, for judges like Hurt J, it would not be enough that a person is either black or female 
or both; an inquiry would have to conducted into the personal circumstances of the 
person in order to determine whether, for example, they should benefit from any of the 
"affirmative action" measures or programmes then envisaged in Section 8(3)(a) of the 
(interim) Constitution. 273 
Another interesting case was that of Hugo v State President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another.274 In that case, the applicant, a widower and the father of 
a son then aged eight years, was a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment for 
robbery. In terms of the Presidential Act, 17 of 1994, the President of the Republic 
had, in his magnanimity, provided for certain categories of prisoners to be granted a 
special remission of the remainder of their sentences. One such category, as it turned 
out, was that of "all mothers in prison on 10 May 1994, with minor children under the 
age of 12 years", (my emphasis) who had not been convicted of a number of offences, 
including robbery with aggravating circumstances. 
T11e gravamen of the applicant's complaint was that he, as a father of a child under the 
age of i 2 years, was unfairly discriminated against in violation of the provisions of 
' Section 8(2) of the (interim) Constitution. Magid J held that, but for the Presidential Act 
which made "an adverse distinction" between similarly situated mothers and fathers of 
\ 
children under the age of twelve years, the applicant would have benefitted from the 
remission of sentence. The Presidential Act clearly discriminated against the applicant 
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and, more so, against his son.275 Such prima facie discrimination was affected by the 
Section 8(4) presumption, the Learned Judge held.276 The Learned Judge was not 
persuaded that the respondents had discharged the onus which, in terms of Section 
8(4) of the (interim) Constitution, rested upon them.277 Accordingly, the Court held that 
the Presidential Act was in breach of Section 8 of the (interim) Constitution and 
ordered that it be rectified within six months from the date of its Order. 278 
A similar position was taken by the Constitutional Court in Fraser v Children's Court, 
Pretoria North and Others.279 In that case the applicant, the natural father of a child 
born out of wedlock, challenged the validity of the provisions of Section 18( 4 )( d) of the 
Child Care Act280 in so far as they dispensed with the father's consent for the adoption 
of such a child. The applicant's submission was that the impugned provisions violated 
both Sections 8(1) and 8(2) of the (interim) Constitution. 
Mahomed DP (as he then was) accepted that Section 18(4)(d) of the Act offended the 
equality clause as it impermissibly discriminated between the rights of a father in 
certain unions, such as Black customary unions, and those in other unions, such as 
unions solemnised in terms of the tenets of the Islamic faith. 281 The Learned Judge 
further said that the impugned provisions could also be attacked on the basis that they 
discriminated unfairly against the fathers of certain children on the basis of their gender 
or their marital status. 282 
However, Mahomed DP (as he then was) was averse to a blanket rule which would 
either automatically give to both parents of a child a right to veto adoption or arbitrarily 
deny such a right to all fathers of children born out of wedlock. 283 After looking at how 
an issue of this nature has been dealt with in other jurisdictions, the Learned Judge, 
acting in terms of the proviso to Section 98(5) of the (interim) Constitution, held that 
the question should be referred to Parliament which would formulate what it considered 
to be an appropriate statutory response to the matter.284 Parliament was given a period 
of two years within which to cure the defect in Section 18(4)(d) of the Act; pending that, 
the provisions of Section 18(4)(d) should remain in force. 285 This, needless to say, was 
a quintessential pyrrhic victory for the applicant! 
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In Brink v Kitshoff N0,286 the Constitutional Court dealt for the first time with the 
provisions of Section 8(2) of the (interim) Constitution. In that case the Court was 
called upon to deal with the constitutionality of the provisions of Section 44( 1) and (2) 
of the Insurance Act.287 
For O'Regan J,288 when dealing with the concept of equality, our history and especially 
the plight of blacks under apartheid, was of particular relevance. 289 However, the 
learned Judge pointed out that though race was the most visible and vicious basis of 
discrimination in our history, "other systematic motifs of discrimination were and are 
inscribed on our social fabric."290 She observed that though in our society gender 
discrimination had not been as visible or as widely condemned, it had "nevertheless 
resulted in deep patterns of disadvantage."291 
O'Regan J had no difficulty to find that the provisions of Section 44(1) and (2) of the 
Insurance Act violated Section 8(2), and were not saved by Section 8(3), of the 
(interim) Constitution.292 She also did not hesitate to conclude that, in the light of the 
clear purposes of the Act, the discrimination occasioned by those provisions could not 
be said to be reasonable and justifiable as required in terms of the general limitation 
clause.293 
Some of the cases dealt with above seem to make much of the difference between 
formal and substantive equality. The Constitutional Court itself, per Goldstone J, held 
in The President of the Republic and Another v Hugo,294 that: 
[w]e need ... to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that 
although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis 
of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting 
upon identical treatment in all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each 
case ... will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine whether 
its overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not. 
A classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a 
different context. (my emphasis) 
At paragraph 43 the learned Judge then went on to proffer the view that: 
[t]o determine whether that impact was unfair it is necessary to look not only at 
the group that has been disadvantaged but at the nature of the power in terms 
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of which the discrimination was effected and, also at the nature of the interests 
which have been affected by the discrimination. 
While this, in a sense, may be right, I personally prefer a combination of the two. The 
perspective which I prefer is the one that will allow our Courts, in certain instances, to 
strike down unfair discrimination even before conducting the enquiry required of us by 
substantive equality. After all, both forms of equality are envisaged in our new 
constitutional order; discrimination on the basis of race, gender or sexual preference, 
for instance, is per se frowned upon.295 In addition, where action is required to promote 
the achievement of equality and to redress the imbalances of the past which have 
engendered untold disabilities afflicting the majority of our people, the new order allows 
for appropriate measures to be taken. 296 
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER THREE 
1 .. As Sections 68-74 of the Constitution showed, a new constitutional text was to be drafted and 
adopted as envisaged in it by the National Assembly and the Senate sitting jointly for this purpose as the 
Constitutional Assembly. Chaskalson Palso pointed out in S v Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 
391 (CC) at 402, paragraph 7, that the Constitution "is a transitional constitution but which itself 
establishes a new order in South Africa; an order in which human rights and democracy are entrenched 
... "(my emphasis) 
2 .. Act No. 200 of 1993, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution. 
3 .. See Azhar Cachalia, Halton Cheadle, Dennis Davis, Nicholas Haysom, Penuel! Maduna and Gilbert 
Marcus, Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1994), at 4. 
According to Dion Sasson and Henning Viljoen, South African Constitutional Law (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape 
Town, 1988), at 219, "Constitutionalism ... means that government authority is bound by the law and is 
not arbitrary." BO Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (C Hurst & Co, London, 1981 ), 
at 10 identified the core and the substantive element of constitutionalism as "the limitation of government 
by a constitutional guarantee of individual civil liberties enforceable by an independent tribunal." For a 
detailed exegesis on the doctrine of constitutionalism, see also Laurence Boulle, Bede Harris and Cora 
Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1989), at 20-55. 
4 .. Under the previous constitutional systems, South Africa did not have a bill of rights. Thus, the Supreme 
Court's competency to pronounce upon the validity of Acts of Parliament was confined to "manner and 
form" issues, ie whether procedural requirements stipulated in the previous constitutions had been 
satisfied in passing an Act. See in this regard Section 2 of the South Africa Act Amendment Act, 9 of 
1956, and Section 59(2) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 32 of 1961, as well as 
Section 34(3), read with Section 34(2) of the last apartheid-based Republic of South Africa Constitution 
Act, 110 of 1983. Furthermore, as Sasson and Viljoen, South African Constitutional Law, supra at 229 
pointed out, because of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, the rights of the subject could be 
violated at any time by means of legislation. 
5 .. Section 4(2) of the Constitution. 
6 .. As Shadrack BO Gutta, 'Case Notes' in (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 
at 48 pointed out, "[w)here constitutional supremacy reigns, all three organs ... of government, the 
legislature, the judiciary and the executive, have limited power and are subordinated to the Constitution, 
with the judiciary having the supervisory or monitoring role." 
7 .. The introduction of which, to paraphrase Johan Kruger and Brian Currin (eds), Interpreting a Bill of 
Rights (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1994) at vii, amounted to a giant quantum leap, a re-ordering of the 
legal system. 
8 .. The limitation clause, which prescribed that the rights entrenched in the Constitution could, without 
negating the essential content of the right in question, be limited by law of general application which was 
reasonable, justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and, in respect 
of certain rights, also necessary. 
9 .. 'Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role of Constitutional Interpretation', in Dawid van Wyk, John 
Dugard, Bertus de Villiers and Dennis Davis (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South 
African Legal Order (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1994), at 1. 
10 .. Sachs J in S v Mhlungu and Others, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at 913, paragraph 111, described the 
Constitution as a momentous document, intensely value-laden. Langa J, in S v Makwanyane and 
Others, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 480D, paragraph 222, said that: "[i]mplicit in the provisions and tone of 
the Constitution are values of a more mature society, which relies on moral persuasion rather than force, 
on example rather than coercion." On an earlier occasion, Henk Botha 'The Values and Principles 
Underlying the 1993 Constitution' in ( 1994) 9 SAPL 233 had stated that the Constitution was a repository 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 189 June 1997 
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11 .. Section 35(1) of the Constitution. 
12 .. 1994 (3) SA 625 (E) or 1994 (1) BCLR 75 (E). 
13 .. At 633H (SA) and at 80 (BCLR). 
University of South Africa 
14 .. In this chapter the word "jurisprudence" is used in the same way as it was used by RWM Dias in 
Jurisprudence (4th ed, Butterworths, London, 1976), at 17, namely to deal "with thought about law rather 
than with knowledge of what the law is in various branches." 
15 .. As stated elsewhere, Section 98(2) of the Constitution provided that "[t]he Constitutional Court shall 
have jurisdiction in the Republic as the court of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, 
protection and enforcement of' its provisions. 
16 .. 1984 (1) SA 196 (B) at 200C. 
17 .. Such as happened, for example, in S v Marwane, 1982 (3) SA 717 (A), a Bophuthatswana human 
rights case in which the provisions of the South African Terrorism Act, 83of1967, were dealt with. 
18 . .'Rainbow Jurisprudence' in (1996) 12 SAJHR, 1. 
19 .. Ibidem. 
20 .. Davis et al, 'Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role of Constitutional Interpretation', op cit 1. 
21 .. Op cit 634C (SA) and at 80 (BCLR). 
22 .. Constitutionalism in Emergent States, op cit 10. 
23 .. Per Langa Jin S v Williams and Others, 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at 639F, paragraph 22. 
24 .. 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) at 1403H-I, paragraph 46. 
25 .. In S v Williams and Others, supra at 650D, paragraph 59. 
26 .. Ibidem at 648C-D, paragraph 50. 
27 .. For, as Froneman J pointed out in Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another, supra at 
6358-C (SA) or at 81 (BCLR), the previous constitutional system was the fundamental "mischief' to be 
remedied by the new Constitution. 
28 .. In Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa, op cit 14031-1404A, paragraph 46. 
However, the past cannot be forgotten or totally ignored in constitutional adjudication. See AJ van der 
Walt, 'Tradition on Trial: A Critical Analysis of the Civil-law Tradition in South African Property Law', in 
(1995) 11 SAJHR 169 at 192, where the author said that "the Constitution must be interpreted in terms 
of values which take the past into account, but in doing so it looks towards the future, towards 
reconstruction and reconciliation in an 'open and democratic society based upon freedom and equality'." 
29 .. Cockrell, 'Rainbow Jurisprudence', op cit 3 . At 10 the author pointed out that this was "no mere 
cosmetic change, but a paradigm shift with profound implications." He emphasised that the Constitutional 
Court's obsession in the first year of its existence with the role of "values" was not "some pathological 
manifestation of a curial neurosis, but rather ... the verbalization of a shift towards the substantive vision 
of law." (my emphasis) 
30 .. This could be gleaned from the provisions of Section 35(1) of the Constitution. The Courts would 
ordinarily look at such substantive constitutionally entrenched rights only when a law was being interpreted 
and its constitutionality was at issue. See CJ Botha, Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for 
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Students (2nd ed, Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1996) at 153. 
31 .. 1992 (1) SA 343 (A). 
32 .. Ibidem at 3778. 
33 .. 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
34 .. Ibidem at 652D, paragraph 16. 
35 .. Op cit8. 
36 .. Ibidem. 
37 .. Ibidem at 10. 
38 .. See the quotation from Isaiah Berlin's Four Essays on Liberty, (1969) 11, in the judgment of 
Ackermann J in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others and Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others, 
1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 32, paragraph 53. 
39 .. 'Rainbow Jurisprudence', op cit 37. 
40 .. Op cit. In that case, the Constitutional Court, against popular sentiment, declared invalid the 
provisions of Section 277(1 )(a), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, which 
authorised capital punishment. 
41 .. With the possible exception of Mahomed DP. 
42 .. It is noteworthy that all our Constitutional Court judges were nurtured in the hegemonic tradition in 
South Africa which advocated an unduly narrow, mechanical or phonographic approach to the interpretive 
function and which avidly denied a creative role in judicial law-making. Kruger and Currin, Interpreting 
a Bill of Rights, op cit vii, in fact spoke of the damage which had been caused to human rights due to the 
approach to interpretation which had hitherto been followed by most southern African courts. 
43 .. 'Rainbow Jurisprudence', op cit 10. At 3 the author said that" ... judges who were accustomed to 
working with formal reasons are now required to engage with substantive reasons in the form of moral and 
political values. We would expect the transition to a substantive vision of law to be traumatic, and ... the 
judgments of the Constitutional Court in 1995 exhibit many of the signs of such trauma." (my emphasis) 
44 .. Ibidem at 11. 
45 .. In The South African Legal System and Its Background (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1973), at 13. 
46 .. See also Robert L Calhoun, 'Democracy and Natural Law' in (1960) 5 Natural Law Forum, (Notre 
Dame Law School) at 31. 
47 .. Roscoe Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (Cambridge, 1930) at 133. 
48 .. Which stated in Group and Human Rights, Working Paper 25, Project 38 (1989) 2 that "human 
rights are the modern application of natural rights". 
49 .. Cockrell, 'Rainbow Jurisprudence', op cit 27. 
50 .. 1992 (4) SA 540 (BGD). 
51.. At 563C-D. 
52 .. In First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Bophuthatswana Consumer Affairs Council, 
1995 (2) SA 853 (BGD). 
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53 .. At 863F-G. 
54 .. As expressed in S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit 520E-F, paragraph 389. 
55 .. Ibidem at 442C, paragraph 117. 
56 .. Op cit 1405A-B, paragraph 46. 
57 .. In S v Williams and Others, op cit 650D, paragraph 59. 
58 .. See Johan Kruger, Towards a New Interpretive Theory' in Kruger and Currin, Interpreting a Bill of 
Rights, op cit 103 at 125. 
59 .. Op cit 913, paragraph 111. 
60 .. For which phrase see Sachs J in Coetzee v Government of te Republic of South Africa: Matiso 
v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, op cit 1404C, paragraph 46. 
61 .. Section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
62 .. Op cit 511F, paragraph 349. 
63 .. Supra at 1404C-1405A, paragraph 46. 
64 .. Op cit476, paragraph 207. 
65 .. Despite the injunction of Ronald Dworkin who said in 'My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Ben 
Michaels): Please Don't Talk about Objcetivity Anymore', in WJT Mitchell (ed} The Politics of 
lntepretation (1983) 287 at 298: "I have no interest in trying to compose a general defense of the 
objectivity of my interpretive or legal or moral opinions. In fact, I think that the whole issue of objectivity, 
which so dominates contemporary theory in these areas, is a kind of fake. We should stick to our knitting. 
We should account to ourselves for our own convictions as best we can, standing ready to abandon those 
that do not survive reflective inspection." 
66 .. In S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit462D, paragraph 177. 
67 .. See, for example, Mahomed AJA (as he then was) in Ex parte Attorney-General Namibia; In re 
Corporal Punishment by Organs of State, 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmS) at 861 and Langa J in S v Williams 
and Others, op cit 639F, paragraph 22. In S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit 492H, paragraph 278, 
Mahomed J talks of "a value judgment which requires objectively to be formulated ... "while Mokgoro J, 
ibidem at 499E, paragraph 304, piously proclaims that: "By articulating rather than suppressing values 
which underlie our decisions, we are not being subjective. On the contrary, we set out in a transparent and 
objective way the foundations of our interpretive choice and make them available for criticism." 
68 .. Lourens M Du Plessis, 'The Interpretation of Bills of Rights in South Africa: Taking Stock' in Kruger 
and Currin (eds) Interpreting a Bill of Rights, op cit, 1 at 20. At 21 the author said that: "The judiciary 
is inevitably confronted with political realities. The best way to deal with these realities is to face up to them 
and then determine the confines of judicial involvement in them ... "(my emphasis) 
69 .. S v Makwanyane and Another, supra at 489C-D, paragraph 266. 
70 .. It was undoubtedly with this view in mind that Chaskalson Pin Ferreira v Levin, op cit 106, paragraph 
183, pointed out that: "In a democratic society the role of the legislature as a body reflecting the dominant 
opinion should be acknowledged. It is important that we bear in mind that there are functions that are 
properly the concern of the courts and others that are properly the concern of the legislature. At times 
these functions may overlap. But the terrains are in the main separate, and should be kept separate." (my 
emphasis) 
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71 .. Kentridge AJ in S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit 473D-E, paragraph 200, grudgingly 
acknowledged this and said that:" ... public opinion, even if expressed in Acts of Parliament, cannot be 
decisive. If we were simply to defer to public opinion we would be abdicating from our constitutional 
function. Yet, were public opinion on the question clear, it could not be entirely ignored. The accepted 
mores of one's own society must have some relevance to the assessment whether a punishment is 
impermissibly cruel and inhuman." (my emphasis) 
72 .. Chaskalson P, being not only aware of this relationship but also being sensitive to the tension that 
may exist between the two organs of state where matters of policy are concerned, said in S v 
Makwanyane and Another, op cit 437G-438A, paragraph 107, that: 'Where choices have to be made 
between differing reasonable policy options, the courts will allow the government the deference due to 
legislators." (my emphasis) 
73 .. Botha, Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students, op cit 153 quite rightly in my opinion 
said that: "Every court will in effect have to become involved to some degree in constitutional 
interpretation. Even the decision by a magistrate's court to refer a so-called constitutional issue to the 
Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court involves a degree of constitutional intepretation." 
74 .. 'The Interpretation of Bills of Rights in South Africa: Taking Stock', in Kruger and Currin (eds}, 
Interpreting a Bill of Rights, op cit 5-6. See also Lord Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs 
(Bermuda) and Anotherv Collins MacDonald Fisher and Another, 1980 AC 319 (PC) at 328-329. 
75 .. In Hunter et al v Southern Inc, (1985) 11 DLR (4th) 641 at 649 the Canadian Supreme Court indeed 
said that: "[t]he task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute." 
76 .. Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students, op cit 153. 
77 .. In Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution, op cit 9. 
78 .. As Froneman J explained in Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, 1994 (4) SA 
592 (SE) at 592, 'The interpretive notion of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature does not apply in 
a system of judicial review based on the supremacy of the Constitution, for the simple reason that the 
Constitution is sovereign and not the Legislature. This means that both the purpose and method of 
statutory interpretation should be different from what it was before the commencement of the Constitution 
on 27 April 1994." (my emphasis) 
79 .. A concept which originated in, and was inextricably bound up with, the principle of the sovereignty 
and supremacy of Parliament. 
80 .. Botha, Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students, op cit 43. 
81.. Sachs Jin S v Mhlungu and Others, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at 917, paragraph 124, paraphrasing 
Cross. 
82 .. Section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
83 .. Op cit 652H, paragraph 17. 
84 .. Ibidem. 
85 .. And not the intention of the legislature any longer. 
86 .. As Lord Wilberforce pointed out in the Privy Council decision in Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda) 
v Fisher, [1979] 3 All ER 21 or [1980] AC 319 at 329E-F, "[a] constitution is a legal instrument giving rise, 
among other things, to individual rights capable of enforcement in a court of law. Respect must be given 
to the language which has been used and to the traditions and usages which have given meaning to that 
language." (my emphasis) 
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87 .. Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and Another, 1994 (1) SA 
407 {NmS) at 418F. See also Du Plessis, 'The Interpretation of Bills of Rights in South Africa', op cit 5-6. 
88 .. Lord Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda) v Fisher, op cit 328. See also Du Plessis, 
'The Interpretation of Bills of Rights in South Africa', op cit 5-6. 
89 .. Op cit 652H-653A, paragraphs 17 and 18. With due respect, the learned acting judge was exhibiting 
a commitment to the literal approach to constitutional interpretation such as was evident in the judgment 
of Miller JA in S v Marwane, 1982 {3) SA 717 {A) at 7 49D-F, and that of Galgut AJA in Government of 
the Republic of Bophuthatswana v Segale, 1990 ( 1) SA 434 {BA) at 448F. For further examples of this 
hidebound approach to constitutional interpretation, see Cabinet of the Transitional Government for 
the Territory of South West Africa v Eins, 1988 (3) SA 369 (A); and Cabinet for the Territory of South 
West Africa v Chikane and Another, 1989 (1) SA 349 {A). 
90 .. 1995 (3) SA 867 {CC) at 874, paragraph 9. 
91 .. Attorney-General v Moagi, 1982 (2) Botswana LR 124 at 184. This is important to bear in mind 
because, as Sachs J observed in S v Mhlungu and Others, supra at 917, paragraph 125, "[aJ purposive 
and mischief-orientated reading as against a purely literal one always involves a degree of strain on the 
language." 
92 .. Op cit 749D-E. This position was legitimately criticised by Du Plessis in 'The Interpretation of Bills of 
Rights in South Africa' op cit 6 as "a restatement of the South African judiciary's profoundly defective 
literalist-cum-intentiona/ist approach to statutory interpretation". 
93 .. Ibidem at 19. 
94 .. See, for example, Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana, 1992 (4) SA 540 {B) at 567H; and 
Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal, 1994 (6) BCLR 85 (T) at 1 OOH. 
95 .. See, for example, Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal, op cit 95F-G. 
96 .. (1985) DLR (4th) 321 at 395-396. 
97 .. Which Botha in Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students, op cit 159 described as 
"an exercise in the balancing of various societal interests and values." 
98 .. Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana, supra at 566G. 
99 .. Statutory lnterpretaion: An Introduction for Students, supra at 27. 
100 .. See Chaskalson Pin S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit403, paragraph 10. 
101 .. Per Schreiner JA in Jaga v Donges NO and Another, 1950 (4) SA 653 (AD) at 662G-H. 
102 .. It is also noteworthy that even in England, as the judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper 
(Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and Related Appeals, [1993] AC 593 (HL (E)) at 634D-E shows, the Courts 
have recently accepted this approach to interpretation of statutes, though the United Kingdom still has to 
abandon the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as the grundnorm of its constitutional system. 
103 .. Op cit 405, paragraph 15. 
104 .. Ibidem at 407, paragraph 19, the Learned President of the Constitutional Court actually said that: 
"[b]ackground evidence may ... be useful to show why particular provisions were or were not included in 
the Constitution. It is neither necessary nor desirable at this stage in the development of our constitutional 
law to express any opinion on whether it might also be relevant for other purposes, nor to attempt to lay 
down general principles governing the admissibility of such evidence. It is sufficient to say that where the 
background material is clear, is not in dispute, and is relevant to showing why particular provisions were 
or were not included in the Constitution, it can be taken into account by a Court in interpreting the 
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Constitution." 
105 .. 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE} at 597G-H. 
106 .. See, in general, the judgment of McLaren J in Potgieter en ·n Ander v Kilian, 1995 (11) BCLR 
1498 (N). 
107 .. In S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit, both Chaskalson P (at 432C, paragraph 89) and Didcott 
J (at 468F-G, paragraph 188) quoted with approval the view of Justice Jackson in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943) at 638, which is paraphrased herein, in this regard. 
108 .. In S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit431C-E, paragraph 88. See also Langa Jin S v Williams 
and Others, op cit 6448, paragraph 36. 
109 .. Section 33( 1 ) of the Constitution. 
110 .. In S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit 436F-G, paragraph 104. 
111 .. Ibidem at 437G-438A, paragraph 107. See also Chaskalson P in Executive Council of the 
Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republlic of South Africa and Others, 
1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC} at 1331J, paragraph 99. See further Sachs Jin Coetzee v Government of 
the Republic of South Africa, op cit 1421F-G, paragraph 76. 
112 .. In S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit 4730-E, paragraph 200. 
113 .. Ibidem at 498C-D, paragraph 300. 
114 .. Ibidem at 498H-I, paragraph 302. 
115 .. Ibidem at 4811, paragraph 227. It is noted that the value of ubuntu was specifically mentioned in the 
post-amble to the Constitution as a value to be pursued in the new constitutional order instead of 
retaliation, vengeance and victimisation. See the remarks of RB Mqeke, 'Customary Law and Human 
Rights', in (1996} 113 The South African Law Journal (SALJ) at 364 on this. 
116 .. Ibidem at 514C, paragraph 361. 
117 .. Ibidem at 4878, paragraph 258. 
118 .. See Constititutional Principle XIII, paragraph 1 in Schedule 4 to the Constitution. 
119 .. Per Sachs Jin S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit 514H, paragraph 365. 
120 .. Per Mokgoro J, ibidem at SOOD, paragraph 306. 
121.. In 'Rainbow Jurisprudence', op cit 25. 
122 .. In S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit 486G, paragraph 255. 
123 .. Ibidem at 518, paragraph 383. 
124 .. On this question, see in general 0 Kahn-Freund 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparable Law', (1974) 
37 Modern Law Review, 1. 
125 .. Op cit. 
126 .. At 6420-E, paragraph 31. 
127 .. In S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit. 
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128 .. Ibidem at 414E-415F, paragraphs 37-39. 
129 .. Cockrell, 'Rainbow Jurisprudence', op cit 26. 
130 .. Per Froneman Jin Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order, op cit 633F-G. See also S v Botha, 
1994 (4) SA 799 (W) at 820A-B; and Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal, 1995 (1) 608 (T) at 642 
H-1. 
131 .. That is to say whether the Chapter was intended only as a protection against the legislative and 
executive powers of the state. 
132 .. That is to say whether the Chapter 3 rights could also be extended to the relationships between 
individuals and could, therefore, be invoked in private law disputes. 
133 .. 1994 (4) BCLR 1 (W) or 1995 (1) SA 251 (W). 
134 .. At SA 2571-J. 
135 .. 1994 (6) BCLR 124 (T) or 1995 (2) SA 40 (T). 
136 .. At SA 49G-H the learned judge said that he could not "imagine that the drafters of the Constitution 
intended the whole body of our private law to become unsettled ... There was no need for constitutional 
invasion of the private law. Parliament is empowered to alter the existing law wherever the shoe pinches." 
See also Mclaren J in Potgieter en 'n Ander v Kilian, 1995 (11) BCLR 1498 (N). 
137 .. 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D). Friedman Jin Baloro and Others v University of Boputhatswana and 
Others, 1995 (8) BCLR 1018 (B) at 1054H-I, came to the conclusion that the fundamental rights 
contained in Chapter 3 were, within certain limits, to be applied horizontally. 
138 .. Which, as the learned judge said at 382F-H, were the only entrenched rights in issue before him. 
139 .. Ibidem. 
140 .. Section 7(1), read with Section 233(1)(ix) of the Constitution. It is noteworthy that, unlike in Article 
1 (3) of the German Basic Law, reference to the judiciary was conspicuously absent in Section 7(1 ). 
According to Kentridge AJ in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) 
at 683F-G, paragraph 47, one of the effects of this was "to exclude the equation of a judgment of a court 
with state action and thus prevent the importation of the American doctrine developed in Shelley v 
Kraemer ... " 
It needs to be noted, however, that, in terms of Section 4(2), the Constitution, of which Chapter 3 was 
in my opinion the most important component, bound "all legislative, executive and judicial organs of state 
at all levels of government." 
141 .. The Genesis of the Provisions Concerned with the Application and Interpretation of the Chapter on 
Fundamental Rights in South Africa's Transitional Constitution', in (1994) 4 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg, at 710. 
142 .. Ibidem at 712. 
143 .. Section 7(2) of the Constitution. 
144 .. Section 33(2) of the Constitution. 
145 .. Section 33( 1) of the Constitution. 
146 .. Section 35(1) of the Constitution. 
14 7 .. Section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 196 June 1997 
Uni·ferslty of South Africa 
148 .. Section 33(4) of the Constitution. 
149 .. Op cit 1056G. 
150 .. Ibidem. 
151 .. Section 33(3) of the Constitution. 
152 .. As was pointed out in Cachalia et al, Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution, op cit 20, 
Section 33(2) of the Constitution specifically subjected the common law, customary law and legislation 
to the rights contained in Chapter 3 and rendered any common law or customary law or legislative 
limitation of a Chapter 3 right unconstitutional unless it conformed to the requirements of the general 
limitation clause, namely Section 33(1 ). 
153 .. In terms of Section 102(2) of the Constitution, alternatively in terms of Section 102(8) thereof. 
154 .. 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC). 
155 .. The learned acting judge of the Constitutional Court pointed out at 684, paragraph 4 7, that "law'' as 
used in Section 7(2) was not "reg" in Afrikaans but "wef', which he said unambiguously connoted a statute. 
This, he said, affected only the relationship between the individual and the legislative organ and not 
between opposing private litigants. At 699, paragraph 77, Mahomed DP stated that, while having no doubt 
that the phrase "all law'' used in that sub-section included the common law, he agreed with Kentridge that 
this related to the persons referred to in Section 7(1) of the Constitution. According to Mahomed DP 
(ibidem), the provisions of Section 4 of the Constitution could not be used to extend the application of 
Section 7(1) to bodies or persons not otherwise envisaged in terms of the latter section to be bound by 
Chapter 3. 
However, Kriegler J, ibidem at 718-719, paragraphs 129 and 130, declared that "all law in force ... " meant 
all law, and that Chapter 3 governed all law. Madala J, ibidem at 730, paragraph 159, also declared that 
"all law'' included statutes, the common law and customary law. And Sachs J, ibidem at 736, paragraph 
177, said that there was no sector where law dwelt, that was not reached by the principles and values of 
the Constitution, unless the Constitution itself specifically protected it from legal intervention. 
156 .. Ibidem at 684-685, paragraph 49. 
157 .. Ibidem at 688, paragraph 57. 
158 .. Ibidem at 684-685, pagraph 49. 
159 .. Ibidem. In this regard, the learned acting judge cited the Court's decision in Shabalala and Others 
v The Attorney-General of the Transvaal and Another, 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC); 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 
(CC) as an example. 
160 .. Section 98(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
161 .. The only source of the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction! 
162 .. At 686, paragraph 52. However, Kriegler J, ibidem at 718-719, paragraphs 129 and 130, and Sachs 
J ibidem at 736, paragraph 177, held the view that there was no sector of our law that was not reached 
by the values and principles of the Constitution. 
163 .. Ibidem at 691, paragraph 60. Note, however, that at 693, paragraph 63, Kentridge AJ pointed out 
that, though the application and development of the common law did not fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court under Section 98 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, as the court of final 
instance over all matters pertaining to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the provisions of 
the Constitution, had control over the development of the common law and customary law and 
jurisdiction to determine what the "spirit, purport and objects" of Chapter 3, which the courts had to have 
regard to, were. 
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164 .. (1992) 8 C.R.R. (2d) 173. 
165 .. Ibidem at 185 and 189. See also Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, (1995) 126 D.L.R. (4th) 
129 at 156, where the Court emphasised that "the common law must be interpreted in a manner which 
is consistent with Charter principles. This obligation is simply a manifestation of the inherent jurisdiction 
of the courts to modify or extend the common law in order to comply with prevailing social conditions and 
values." 
166 .. Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another, supra at 692-693, paragraph 62. 
167 .. Ibidem. 
168 .. Ibidem. 
169 .. Chaskalson P, Mahomed DP, Ackermann J, Langa J, Mokgoro J, O'Regan J and Sachs J concurred 
in the judgment of Kentridge AJ. 
170 .. Ibidem at 698, paragraph 75. 
171.. Ibidem at 698-699, paragraph 76. 
172 .. Ibidem. However, as Mahomed DP's own judgment in S v Mhlungu and Others, op cit, amply 
demonstrates, this is precisely the case when clear language used in a statute may otherwise yield an 
absurd and obviously unintended result; for the right reasons, judges indeed use "astute judicial 
craftsmanship and nimble argumentation." 
173 .. Ibidem at 699-700, paragraph 78. 
174 .. Supra. 
175 .. Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another, op cit 703, paragraph 88. 
176 .. Ibidem at 702, paragraph 85. 
177 .. Ibidem. 
178 .. Ibidem at 702-703, paragraph 86. 
179 .. Ibidem. See also Ackermann J, ibidem at 711, paragraph 110. 
180 .. Section 33(3) of the Constitution. 
181 .. That is the suggestion we sought to make with Cachalia et al, Fundamental Rights in the New 
Constitution, op cit 20. 
182 .. Ibidem for our reference to Section 33(2) of the Constitution. 
183 .. Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another, supra at 709, paragraph 106. 
184 .. Ibidem at 711 , paragraph 111 . 
185 .. Ibidem at 711-712, paragraph 112. 
186 .. Ibidem at 714, paragraph 118. 
187 .. Ibidem at 715, paragraph 119. 
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188 .. Ibidem at 730-731, paragraph 159, where the Learned Judge of the Constitutional Court declared 
that, in his view, the provisions of Chapter 3 had not gone as far as subjecting the State to its rigours only, 
but had in fact "ventured out and colonised the common law." 
189 .. Ibidem at 727, paragraph 154. 
190 .. Ibidem at 715, paragraph 121. 
191 .. Ibidem at 727, paragraph 153. 
192 .. Ibidem at 718, paragraph 128. 
193 .. Ibidem at 717, paragraph 125. 
194 .. Ibidem at 718-719, paragraph 130. 
195 .. Ibidem at 719, paragraphs 131and132. 
196 .. Ibidem at 719-720, paragraphs 133 and 134. 
197 .. Ibidem at 730-731, paragraph 159. 
198 .. Ibidem at 719-720, paragraph 134. 
199 .. Ibidem. 
200 .. Ibidem at 731, paragraph 160. 
201 .. Ibidem at 722, paragraph 140. 
202 .. Ibidem, paragraph 141. 
203 .. Ibidem at 722-723, paragraph 142. 
204 .. Ibidem at 722, paragraph 141. At 723, paragraph 143, the learned judge of the Constitutional Court 
disagreed with Kentridge AJ who seemed to suggest in his judgment, ibidem at 693, paragraph 63, that 
the "indirect" application of Section 35(3) was limited to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, with our 
Constitutional Court having some overriding review power akin to that of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. 
205 .. Ibidem at 723, paragraph 143. 
206 .. Ibidem at 691, paragraph 60. 
207 .. Ibidem at 723, paragraph 143. 
208 .. Section 98(2) of the Constitution. 
209 .. Section 98(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
210 .. Section 98(2)(g) of the Constitution. 
211. It is noteworthy that Section 8(1) of the (new) Constitution leaves very little, if any, room for 
ambiguity; unlike the (interim) Constitution, the 1996 Bill of Rights expressly "applies to all law and binds 
the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state." (my italics) 
212 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 
1253 (CC) at 1280, paragraph 53. 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 199 June 1997 
University '>f South Africa 
213 .. Ibidem, at 1280-1281, paragraph 53. 
214 .. Ibidem, at 1281, paragraph 56. 
215 .. In this regard, a distinction is made between a retrospective statute and an ex post facto one. 
According to Chase Jin (the American case of) Calder v Bull, (1798) 3 Dallas (U.S.) 386 at 391, "[e]very 
ex post facto law ... must necessarily be retrospective, but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto 
law. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeablv to existing laws is retrospective, and 
is generalfy unjust and may be oppressive; it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect 
effect ... " (my emphasis) See also R v Margolis & Others, 1936 TPD 143 at 144; and Shewan Tomes 
and Co Ltd v Commissioner of Customs and Excise, 1955 (4) SA 305 (A) at 311. 
216 .. 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) or 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC). 
217 .. Op cit. 
218 .. 1996 (6) BCLR 788 (CC). 
219 .. Per Fieldsend CJ in Pretorius v Minister of Defence, 1981 (1) SA 1174 (ZAD) at 1177-1178. 
220 .. 1906 TS 308 at 311. 
221 .. Per Innes JA in Mahomed NO v Union Government, 1911AD1 at 8. 
222 .. Per Wessels JA in Katzenellenbogen Ltd v Mullin, 1977 (4) SA 855 (A) at 884A. 
223 .. Per Bowen LJ in Hough v Windus, (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 224, at 237. 
224 .. To paraphrase Lord Ashbourne in Smith v Callander, [1901] A.C. 297 at 305, it was competent for 
Parltament, in its wisdom, to make the provisions of an Act retrospective, provided that that appeared very 
clearly in the terms of the Act or by necessary implication. 
225 .. SGG Edgar, Craies on Statute Law (7th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1971 ), at 415. 
226 .. 1968 (2) SA 678 (A), at 684. 
227 .. Act No. 33 of 1957. 
228 .. Section 12(2)(c) of the Interpretation Act. 
229 .. 1968 (3) SA 535 (N) at 537, where the learned Judge said: " ... if the applicant seeks to rely upon the 
provisions of the Interpretation Act, he must establish: 
(a) that sec. 3 of Act 26 of 1965 in fact repealed the provisions of the law as it previously existed, 
(b) that Act 26 of 1965 was not intended to take away such rights as may have been in existence at the 
date upon which it was brought into operation, and, 
(c) that he had, as that date, a right or privilege which he had acquired or which had accrued to him under 
the repealed law." 
230 .. Section 7(2) of the Constitution. 
231 .. Op cit. 
232 .. The Court's judgment in Mhlungu is dealt with more fully in a later chapter in this thesis. 
233 .. See Mahomed J (as he then was), in 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at 879, paragraph 24 and at 883, 
paragraph 30. 
Penuell M. Maduna • LLD Thesis 200 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
234 .. Mahomed J, ibidem at 889, paragraph 46. See also Kriegler J, ibidem at 906, paragraph 91 and at 
909, paragraph 98. 
235 .. Act No. 51 of 1977. 
236 .. In S v Zuma and Others, 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC); 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC), which is discussed more 
fully in Chapter 6 in this thesis. 
237 .. In S v Mhlungu and Others, supra at 887-888, paragraphs 39 and 41. See also Sachs J, ibidem 
at 918, paragraph 132, and at 921, paragraph 144. 
238 .. 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at 669, paragraph 13. 
239 .. Ibidem at 672, paragraph 20. 
240 .. Ibidem at 669, paragraph 14. 
241 .. Ibidem at 672, paragraph 19. 
242 .. Ibidem, paragraph 20. 
243 .. Ibidem. 
244 .. Section 39(2) of the (new) Constitution. 
245 .. Op cit. 
246 .. Ibidem at 792-793, paragraphs 6 and 7. The Constitutional Court thus reaffirmed the provisions of 
Section 12(2)(d) of the Interpretation Act, 1957, which stated that ''where a law repeals any other law, 
then unless the contrary intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment 
incurred in respect of any offence committed against any law so repealed ... and any ... legal proceeding 
... may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be 
imposed, as if the repealing law had not been passed". 
247 .. Ibidem at 792, paragraph 6. 
248 .. Ibidem at 796, paragraph 15. 
249 .. Ibidem at 792-793, paragraph 7. 
250 .. Ibidem at 791, paragraph 4. See also O'Regan J in Tsotetsi v Mutual and Federal Insurance 
Company Ltd, 1996 (11) BCLR 1439 (CC) at 1442-1444, paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
251 .. Section 8(1 ). Section 9(1) of the (new) Constitution is slightly different and provides that: 
"[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law." (my 
emphasis) In my humble view, if the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Bliss v Attorney-General of 
Canada, (1979) 92 DLR (3rd) 417 is anything to go by, the addition of the phrase "equal benefit of the law'' 
is likely to have limited impact (if any) since the concept of equality before the law and equal protection 
of the law encompasses equal benefit of the law in any event. 
252 .. Section 8(2) of the (interim) Constitution. See Section 9(3), (4) and (5) of the (new) Constitution. 
253 .. See the preamble to, as well as the provisions of Section 33(1 )(a)(ir) of, the (interim) Constitution. 
254 .. Such as S v Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paragraphs 218, 262 and 322; 
Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General, Transvaal and Another, 1995 (12) BCLR 1593, at 
paragraph 26. 
255 .. 1994 (1) BCLR 75 (E). 
Penuell M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 201 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
256 .. As was then contained in Section 23 of the (interim) Constitution. 
257 .. Qozeleni, op cit88H. 
258 .. Ibidem, paragraph 1-J. 
259 .. 1996 (11) BCLR 1545 (N). 
260 .. Per Thirion J, at 1555J-1556A. See also the decision of Waddington Jin Larbi-Odam and Others 
v Member of the Executive Council for Education and Another, 1996 (12) BCLR 1612 (B), where it 
was found that a regulation reserving public service jobs such as teaching posts for South African citizens 
was not ultra vires and did not constitute unfair discrimination against aliens who sought to compete for 
such jobs. 
261 .. Ibidem, at 1556J. See also the decision of Van Dijkhorst J in Walker v Stadsraad van Pretoria, 
1997 (3) BCLR 416 (T), where the differentiation between areas in respect of levying and collection of 
service charges by a local authority was described as unfairly discriminatory against residents of former 
whites-only areas and therefore as being unconstitutional and contra bonos mores. 
262 .. Ibidem, at 1557 A. See also the Order of the Court in this regard. 
263 .. 1996 (1) BCLR 141 (CC). 
264 .. In terms of which those unrepresented convicts seeking to appeal against decisions of lower courts 
could not prosecute their appeals or reviews in person unless they had judges' certificates confirming that 
there were reasonable grounds for their appeals or reviews. 
265 .. See Didcott J (in whose judgment the rest of the members of the Court concurred} at 150, 
paragraphs 18 and 19, and at 152, paragraph 25. 
266 .. Ibidem, at 153, paragraph 30. 
267 .. Op cit. Note that at 382G-H Hurt J held, as already stated above, that the equality clause was 
"enforceable not only against the State or its organs ... but also against individuals, natural or juristic, who 
may be disposed to threaten them or interfere with the exercise of them." (my emphasis) 
268 .. Ibidem, at 383C-E. 
269 .. Catherine Albertyn and Janet Kentridge, 'Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim Constitution', 
in (1994) 10 SAJHR 149 at 152. 
270 .. Ibidem. 
271.. Ibidem. 
272 .. Ibidem. 
273 .. See Section 9(2) of the (new) Constitution. 
27 4 .. 1996 (6) BCLR 876 (D), which must be contrasted with the decision of Van Schalkwyk J in Kruger 
v Minister of Correctional Services, 1995 (2) SA 803 (T). 
275 .. At 884H-885A. 
276 .. At 8858. 
277 .. At 885J. 
Penuell M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 202 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
278 .. At 886. It is noted that when this matter came before the Constitutional Court on appeal, Goldstone 
J, with the concurrence of the majority of the judges of the Constitutional Court, held in The President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo (an unreported case cited as Case CCT 11/96 given 
on 18 April 1997), at paragraph 53 that the provisions of the Presidential Act were not inconsistent with 
the (interim) Constitution. In paragraph 47 the learned Judge held that, while the Presidential Act had 
indeed denied fathers in the circumstances of the Respondent an opportunity it afforded women, the 
impact it had upon the fathers was not unfair. The Court held at paragraph 52 that the President had 
exercised his discretion fairly and in a manner that was consistent with the (interim) Constitution. 
279 .. 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC). 
280 .. Act No. 7 4 of 1983. 
281 .. Fraser, supra at 163, paragraph 23 and at 162, paragraph 21. 
282 .. Ibidem at 163, paragraph 24. 
283 .. Ibidem at 164-165, paragraphs 27 and 28. 
284 .. Ibidem at 171, paragraph 43. 
285 .. Ibidem at 174, paragraph 52. 
286 .. 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC). 
287 .. Act No. 27 of 1943. The relevant provisions of the Act were impugned because they treated married 
women and married men differently and unfairly discriminated against married women. 
288 .. In whose judgment the rest of the members of the Court concurred. 
289 .. Brink, op cit 768H, paragraph 40 
290 .. Ibidem at 769A, paragraph 41. 
291 .. Ibidem, paragraph 44. 
292 .. Ibidem. 
293 .. Ibidem at 771 D-F, paragraph 50. 
294. Op cit, paragraph 41. 
295 .. See Section 9(3) and (4) of the (new) Constitution, the provisions of which allow for both vertical 
and horizontal application of the equality clause. 
296 .. Ibidem, Section 9(2). 
Penuell M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 203 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
lNCRIMINATION AND OUR COMPANY LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
U nder the South African Companies Act, 1 in the winding-up of a company unable to pay its debts,2 the Master of the Supreme Court or a provincial or local 
division of the Supreme Court may, at any time after a winding-up order has been 
made, summon before him/her/it, and examine on oath or affirmation, any director or 
officer of the company or person known or suspected to have in his or her possession 
any property of the company or believed to be indebted to the company, or any person 
whom the Master or the Court deems capable of giving information concerning the 
trade, dealings, affairs or property of the company.3 If the person who has been duly 
summoned fails to attend the enquiry, the Master or the Court may cause him or her to 
be apprehended and brought before him/her/it for examination.4 Unless the Master or 
the Court directs otherwise, the examination or enquiry is private and confidential;5 this, 
needless to say, denies all persons access to the examination or enquiry and related 
matters. 
The Master or the Court, as the case may be, may refer the whole or any part of such 
an examination or enquiry to a commissioner6 who has the same powers of summoning 
and examining witnesses and of requiring the production of documents.7 The 
commissioner may or may not be within the jurisdiction of the Court which has issued 
the winding-up order.8 
For the purpose of a Section 417 examination and any other enquiry under the Act in 
connection with the winding-up of any company, every magistrate and every other 
person appointed by the Master or the Court is a commissioner.9 Ordinarily, if the 
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person appointed as a commissioner for this purpose is not a magistrate, the appointee 
is an officer connected with the administration of the Act or a senior counsel. 10 If the 
commissioner is a magistrate, he or she also has the powers of punishing defaulting or 
recalcitrant witnesses, or causing defaulting witnesses to be apprehended, and of 
determining questions relating to any lien with regard to documents as the Court. 11 
The person summoned under Section 41712 may be examined either orally or on written 
interrogatories and the Master or the Court may reduce the answers he or she gives to 
writing and require him or her to sign them. 13 Furthermore, such a person may be 
required to produce any books or papers in his or her custody or under his or her 
control relating to the company. 14 If such a person fails, without sufficient cause, to 
answer fully and satisfactorily any question put to him or her, he or she is guilty of an 
offence 15 and shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding R2000 or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or to both such fine and 
imprisonment. 16 
There does not seem to be any limitation upon the matters which the Section 417 
examination or enquiry may cover, provided that they concern or relate to the trade or 
dealings or affairs or property of the company. Furthermore, the examination may be 
directed solely at the general credibility of an examinee where the establishment of 
such a person's veracity is necessary in order to decide whether to embark upon a trial 
to obtain what is due to the company being wound up.17 
It is implied in the Act18 that other persons too may apply for an examination or enquiry 
under Section 417, provided that they bear all "the costs and expenses incidental" 
thereto, unless the Master or the Court directs that they or any portion thereof be paid 
out of the assets of the company. Thus, a creditor or a liquidator or a judicial manager 
of the company who is ready to personally bear all the costs and expenses of the 
examination may apply for a Section 417 examination. This seems to be an effective 
deterrent to those persons who may otherwise seek to use the Section 417 procedure 
for purposes other than the achievement of a beneficial winding-up or judicial 
management. The power of the Master or the Court to order that the costs and 
expenses incidental to the examination be paid from the assets of the company 
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certainly assists those persons who act bona fide and reasonably, irrespective of the 
outcome of the examination. 
Lastly, as the provisions of Section 417 of the Act relate specifically to the winding-up 
of a company which is unable to pay its debts, it would appear that this procedure 
applies only in cases of compulsory winding-up. 19 Moreover, it is noteworthy that 
Section 417 applies to judicial management cases as well20 and can be invoked in 
South Africa even by a foreign liquidator who has obtained recognition as such by a 
South African Court. 21 
The next question to be considered is whether this (potentially oppressive) procedure22 
is necessary in our corporate law, bearing in mind the emergence of a human rights-
oriented legal system in our society. 
THE PURPOSE OF THE PROCEDURE 
The basic objective of this procedure is to assist liquidators of companies to discharge 
their statutory duties so that, as Van Winsen J23 observed, "they may determine the 
most advantageous course to adopt in regard to the liquidation of the company." 
Company liquidators are, in terms of the Act, required to, inter a/ia, recover and reduce 
into possession all the movable and immovable assets and property of the company,24 
give to the Master such information and assistance as may be required for enabling him 
or her to perform his or her duties under the Act,25 examine the affairs and transactions 
of the company before its winding-up in order to ascertain whether any contravention 
of the Act has taken place and whether any director has to be disqualified from office 
as such,26 and, where the company has failed, to report to the general meeting of its 
creditors and contributories the causes of its failure. 27 
In short, the procedure helps the liquidator28 to achieve his or her primary objective, 
"namely the ascertainment of the assets and liabilities of the company, the recovery of 
the one and the payment of the other, according to law and in a way which will best 
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serve the interests of the company's creditors."29 From this point of view, the procedure 
is reasonable and justifiable. 30 
THE NATURE OF THE EXAMINATION 
Bearing in mind that the mechanism established under Sections 417 and 418 of the Act 
is triggered pursuant to a winding-up order31 made in respect of a company unable to 
pay its debts, it is important to characterise the proceedings conducted thereunder. 
The Master, the Court32 or, as the case may be, a commissioner appointed in terms of 
Section 418(1)(a) of the Act does not function as a court of law when conducting an 
examination or enquiry under Sections 417 and 418 of the Act. The proceedings are 
not judicial proceedings; they are not even quasi-judicial, for they decide or determine 
nothing; they do not even decide whether or not there is a prima facie case. Their 
purpose is only to investigate and report. Thus, the proceedings are merely 
administrative. 
However, the importance of the examination is not thereby diminished. Serious 
consequences, including an adverse impact on the rights and interests of an examinee 
and criminal prosecution, may flow from a report of such an examination. For this 
reason, the Master, the Court or a commissioner must act fairly and display a great 
measure of natural justice in the conduct of the proceedings. 33 In principle, the 
examinee has become entitled to all the rights to all the constitutional rights relating to 
administrative action which were ushered in by the (interim) Constitution.34 
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Prior to the intervention of the Constitutional Court,35 a person duly summoned under 
the Act could be required to answer any question put to him or her at the examination, 
notwithstanding that the answer might tend to incriminate him or her, and any answer 
given to any such question could thereafter be used in evidence against him or her.36 
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This was despite the fact that, under our common law, it was an established principle 
that no one could be compelled to give evidence incriminating himself or herself. He or 
she could not be forced to do that either before the trial, or during the trial. 37 Despite 
numerous statutory interventions which subverted this right, especially during the 
apartheid era, the old maxim nemo prose prodere tenetur,38 which neatly encapsulates 
this principle, was always an important part of the development of our jurisprudence. 
The statutory interventions affecting this right were possible in the past constitutional 
dispensation which was predicated upon unbridled parliamentary sovereignty and in 
which there was no Bill of Rights protecting fundamental rights. Under the (interim) 
Constitution, every person arrested for the alleged commission of an offence acquired 
the constitutional rights, inter alia, "promptly to be informed ... that he or she has the 
right to remain silent and to be warned of the consequences of making any 
statement",39 "not to be compelled to make a confession or admission which could be 
used in evidence against him or her'',40 and "not to be a compellable witness against 
himself or herself'.41 It was thus not surprising at all when the validity of the provisions 
of Section 417(2)(b) of the Companies Act was the subject of challenge before the 
Constitutional Court in the cases discussed hereunder.42 
FERREIRA V LEVIN NO AND OTHERS AND 
VRYEHOEK AND OTHERS V POWELL NO AND 
0THERs43 
In this case, the applicants summoned for examination under Section 417(1) of the 
Companies Act had unsuccessfully sought a temporary interdict in the Court a quo 
prohibiting their further examination pending a determination of the constitutionality of 
the provisions of Section 417(2)(b) of the Act. Basing their attack oddly enough not on 
Section 25(2)(b) and (c) but on the provisions of Section 25(3) of the (interim) 
Constitution, the applicants contended that the right against self-incrimination was not 
limited to the cases of arrested, detained or accused persons; it could be extended 
under the (interim) Constitution, they contended, to extra-curial proceedings, including 
proceedings at an examination or enquiry envisaged in Section 417 of the Act. 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULES 
The gist of the complaint of the applicants was that, in terms of Section 417(2)(b) of the 
Companies Act, they were required to answer questions at the Section 417 
examination, the answers to which might incriminate them, and which might thereafter 
be used in evidence against them. This, they contended, would be in violation of their 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. As will appear more fully later, the applicants in this 
case were not attacking the provisions of Sections 417 and 418 in their entirety. 
The Question of Invalidity 
An important question the Court had to settle first and foremost was whether or not the 
question of invalidity of a statute or a provision thereof was determined by an objective 
or subjective enquiry. According to Ackermann J, the answer to this question was that 
the enquiry is an objective one.44 In other words, the fact that a statutory provision was 
inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution and, therefore, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, invalid and of no force and effect,45 would not depend on the subjective 
positions in which the parties to a dispute found themselves. As Ackermann J pointed 
out, 
(t]he Constitutional Court, or any other competent Court for that matter, ought not 
to restrict its enquiry to the position of one of the parties to a dispute in order to 
determine the validity of a law ... laws are objectively valid or invalid depending 
on whether they are or are not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact that 
a dispute concerning inconsistency may only be decided years afterwards, does 
not affect the objective nature of the invalidity. The issue of whether a law is 
invalid or not does not in theory therefore depend on whether, at the moment 
when the issue is being considered, a particular person's rights are threatened 
or infringed by the offending law or not.46 
While Ackermann J acknowledged that it was one of the Constitutional Court's functions 
to determine and pronounce upon the validity of laws, including Acts of Parliament,47 
he was not, however, prepared to declare whether the Court could mero motu tackle 
elements of unconstitutionality in legislation. He merely quoted a German authority48 
who reasoned that "[a]n unconstitutional law is from its inception (ex tune) and without 
need for any further constitutive act (ipso iure) inoperative ... " 
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This, needless to say, would not help a person who is suddenly confronted with an 
obviously unconstitutional law, the invalidity of which has not yet been declared; neither 
does it help an administrator who has a gut feel that he or she is administering an 
otherwise invalid law. In practice, the law remains on the statute book and is 
implemented till its invalidity is appropriately declared; the administration has no choice 
but to implement all the laws given to it by the legislatures till their invalidity has been 
declared. In the meantime, the implementation of such a law could have grave 
consequences. It would thus be helpful if in our new legal system the executive and the 
administration were allowed the power to approach a competent Court with a question 
of law concerning the validity of legislation it is administering. 
Locus Standi 
The next important question was whether or not the applicants had locus standi to bring 
the matter before the Court. In other words, could the applicants, as examinees under 
Section 417 of the Act, and not as accused persons,49 be permitted to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the Court under the (interim) Constitution50 to solve their legal problem? 
Ackermann J51 was prepared to acknowledge that a person faced with the dilemma to 
choose between refusing to answer incriminating questions under Section 417 of the 
Act and getting punished for such refusal, and answering incriminating questions and 
risk the use of the answers in a subsequent criminal trial might have had a sufficient 
interest of his or her own which could entitle him or her to apply to a competent Court 
of law for appropriate relief. However, after a lengthy analysis of the provisions of 
Section 7(4)(a) and (b) of the Constitution, the learned judge came to the conclusion 
that the applicants did not have locus standi to approach the Court as they were not 
accused persons as envisaged in Section 25(3) of the (interim) Constitution.52 Of 
particular note was his statement that as the Section 417 examinees were not accused 
persons, it was a matter of pure speculation whether they would ever become accused 
persons in a criminal prosecution.53 Even when they became accused persons, they 
could use the shield of the privilege against self-incrimination only if and when an 
attempt to use the evidence gathered in terms of Section 417(2)(b) of the Act was 
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made, and not immediately they were charged with the commission of an offence 
relating to their involvement with the company.54 
Chaskalson P, forthe majority, held a different view. The President of the Court was of 
the opinion that the Court had to adopt a broad approach to the issue of standing in 
constitutional cases.55 Such an approach, he held, would be consistent with the 
mandate of the Court to uphold the (interim) Constitution and would serve to ensure 
that constitutional rights enjoyed the full measure of protection to which they were 
entitled.56 
After an analysis of Canadian jurisprudence on this issue, Chaskalson P held that 
Section 7(4) of the (interim) Constitution did not deny the applicants the right to 
approach the Court. 57 The applicants were direct victims of an unconstitutional provision 
which affected their common law rights. Non-compliance with such a provision had 
possible criminal consequences for them and, therefore, they had sufficient standing 
to secure a declaration from the Constitutional Court as to the constitutionality of 
Section 417(2)(b) of the Companies Act.58 The applicants could rely on the jurisdiction 
vested in the courts by Section 98(2)(a) and Section 101 (3(a) of the (interim) 
Constitution to deal with "any alleged violation or threatened violation of any 
fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 3" and on the general jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court to interpret, protect and enforce the (interim) Constitution. 59 
Chaskalson P further pointed out that what Section 7(4)(b)(i) of the Constitution 
required was that the person concerned should make the challenge of a law in his or 
her own interest. It was for the Court to decide what was a sufficient interest.60 
The Court's Ruling 
The majority of the Constitutional Court held that the provisions of Section 417(2)(b) of 
the Companies Act were inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution and agreed to 
the order proposed by Ackermann J.61 According to Chaskalson P, Section 417(2)(b) 
infringed the rule against self-incrimination which "is inextricably linked to the right of 
an accused person to a fair trial. "62 
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For this purpose, it is interesting to note that Chaskalson P was prepared to use the 
Constitutional Court's "general jurisdiction to enquire into and declare an Act of 
Parliament or any provision thereof to be invalid",63 even though the provisions of 
Section 25(3) of the (interim) Constitution specifically related to accused persons, and 
not to persons envisaged in Section 417 ( 1) of the Act. 64 The learned President of the 
Court was even prepared to make the following statement: 
{t]he right to challenge the constitutionality of a statute which affects you directly 
cannot be made dependent on the finding of some other constitutional right on 
which to base the challenge. What if there is no such right?65 
This, in my view, was a correct approach to the Court's work. The Court should be able 
to use its general jurisdiction to defend and expand human rights, even if the offending 
provision does not violate any specific right guaranteed in a constitution.66 
Though there is an off chance that a person summoned to appear at a Section 417 
enquiry or examination may subsequently be charged with an offence under the law, 
it is equally true that "the procedure provided in sections 417 and 418 of the Companies 
Act is not primarily concerned with the prosecution of offenders."67 Be that as it may, 
Chaskalson P was right in observing that it would be highly technical to suggest that a 
person summoned in terms of Section 417(1) of the Companies Act to appear at a 
Section 417 examination, who genuinely feared prosecution if he or she was called 
upon to answer questions in violation of the rule against self-incrimination, should not 
be able to approach the Court to have the relevant provision declared invalid merely 
because he or she had not yet been charged.68 Due to the fact that the impugned 
provisions of the Companies Act had a direct bearing on the applicants' common law 
rights, and non-compliance with which had possible criminal consequences, the learned 
President of the Court was of the view that they had sufficient locus standi to secure a 
declaration from the Court as to the constitutionality of Section 417(2)(b).69 
The Court's Order 
As stated above, the Court agreed to the order proposed by Ackermann J. Pursuant to 
Section 98(5) of the Constitution, the Court thus declared the provisions of Section 
417(2)(b) of the Companies Act, with immediate effect, invalid to the extent only of the 
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phrase:" ... and any answer to any such question may thereafter be used in evidence 
against him."70 
Of particular note is the fact that the Court's order was specifically made retrospective. 
The Court declared that as from the date of its order, 71 no incriminating answer given 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 417(2)(b) of the Act on or after 27 April 199472 
shall be used in evidence in criminal proceedings against the person who gave it, 73 
unless the proceedings in which such a person stands trial are based on a charge 
relating to the administering or taking of an oath or the administering or making of an 
affirmation or the giving of false evidence or the making of a false statement in 
connection with the Section 417 questions and answers or to a failure to answer lawful 
questions fully and satisfactorily.74 
BERNSTEIN AND OTHERS V BESTER NO AND 
OTHERS 
In Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others,75 the Constitutional Court had 
another occasion to revisit the issue of the constitutionality of the provisions of Sections 
417 and 418 of the Companies Act. The attack in this case went broader than in 
Ferreira v Levin 76 and sought the striking down of Sections 417 and 418 of the 
Companies Act in their entirety. 
The essence of the dispute between the parties was whether the (interim) Constitution 
precluded the respondents from continuing with the examination of the applicants under 
Sections 417 and 418 of the Act. The Constitutional Court was called upon to determine 
whether the two sections were inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution and, 
consequently, invalid and of no force and effect. 
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THE GROUNDS OF THE ATTACK 
The applicants impugned the provisions of the two sections on four grounds which are 
canvassed in brief hereunder. The order in which these grounds were identified by the 
Court will be varied slightly in order to deal with the provisions of Section 417(2)(b) of 
the Act first. 
1) Section 417(2)(b) of the Act 
The question of the validity of Section 417(2)(b) of the Act arose in this case as well. 
In this regard, the Court merely reaffirmed its order in Ferreira v Levin. 77 
2)(a) Violation of Section 11 (1) of the Constitution 
The applicants contended that the provisions of Sections 417 and 418 violated Section 
11 (1) of the (interim) Constitution which provided that: "[e]very person shall have the 
right to freedom and security of the person, which shall include the right not to be 
detained without trial." The applicability of this section of the Constitution had already 
been dealt with in Ferreira v Levin78 and the Court would not deviate from its ruling in 
this regard. 
Ackermann J,79 for the majority, concluded that, though the statutory compulsion80 to 
obey a subpoena might infringe Section 11 (1) of the (interim) Constitution, it was a 
limitation manifestly justified under the general limitation clause.81 
2)(b) Violation of Section 13 of the Constitution 
Firstly, the applicants contended that the statutory compulsion82 of a witness to disclose 
his or her confidential books and documents and information clearly violated Section 
13 of the (interim) Constitution.83 For Ackermann J, the nature of privacy implied in the 
right to privacy "relates only to the most personal aspects of a person's existence, and 
not to every aspect within his/her personal knowledge and experience."84 
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The learned Judge held that engaging in the activities of a company which conducts its 
business on the basis of limited liability and operates through the mobilization of funds 
belonging to members of the community, is not a private matter. An examinee can thus 
not hide behind the right to privacy and refuse to answer questions and divulge 
information.as He further held that Section 418(5)(b)(iii)(aa) of the Acta6 constituted a 
limitation on the right to privacy which was justified under the general limitation clause. a7 
Secondly, the applicants contended that the statutory compulsionaa to produce books 
and documents constituted a seizure of private possessions and thus violated the right 
not to be subjected to the seizure of private possessions guaranteed in Section 13 of 
the (interim) Constitution. Ackermann Jag thought that this argument too should be 
disposed of in the same manner as the previous one based on the general right to 
personal freedom. 
The learned Judge of the Constitutional Court, whilst recognising that the relevant right 
was subject to the general limitation clause, held that the statutory compulsion must be 
read down to prevent a compulsion to produce books or papers which would violate the 
Section 13 constitutional right not to be subjected to a seizure of personal 
possessions.go He considered that it was possible, in a proper case, for a person to 
refuse to produce his or her personal books and documents on the basis of the Section 
13 right; such refusal would constitute 'sufficient cause' as envisaged in Section 
418(5)(b)(iii)(bb) of the Act, unless it failed the Section 33(1) constitutional test.g1 
The learned Judge again observed that there was a distinction between private 
possessions and books and papers relating to a company. He found it difficult to see 
how documents which were truly relevant to .the matters legitimately being examined 
could be said to be private documents.g2 If it turns out that even what may be regarded 
as private possessions relate to the company, and therefore relevant to the enquiry, the 
Master or the Court should be permitted to compel the production thereof under 
Sections 417 and 418 of the Act; such compulsion would be justifiable under the 
general limitation clause.g3 
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In both instances Ackermann J held that it was, in his opinion, the task of the Supreme 
Court to develop the concept, the contents and the limits of the right to privacy and the 
right not to be subjected to the seizure of private possessions. This was an indication 
of the fact that the development of our common law is left to "ordinary" Courts. 
3) Violation of Section 24 of the Constitution 
It was the submission of the applicants that the whole mechanism set up under 
Sections 417 and 418 of the Act violated Section 24 of the (interim) Constitution in that 
it permitted an enquiry in violation of paragraphs (b)94 and (c)95 of Section 24. As 
Ackermann J regarded the examination or enquiry under Sections 417 and 418 as "an 
integral part of the liquidation process pursuant to a court order",96 he syllogically found 
it difficult to fit the examination into the mould of administrative action.97 
The learned Judge refrained from characterising the Section 417 or 418 proceedings. 
However, even assuming that the proceedings indeed constituted administrative action, 
he did not see how the provisions of Section 24(b) and (c) of the (interim) Constitution 
could help the applicants as there was nothing in any of the provisions of Section 41798 
or 418 which was inconsistent with Section 24 of the (interim) Constitution. If they 
were not accorded fairness by the commissioner, they could have approached the 
ordinary courts for an appropriate remedy,99 without impugning the mechanism of 
Sections 417 and 418. 
4) Violation of Section 8 of the Constitution 
Lastly, the applicants submitted that the Section 417 mechanism, especially the 
provisions of Section 417(2)(b) of the Act, 100 violated the (interim) Constitution in that 
it treated examinees and liquidators or creditors unequally by giving the latter an unfair 
advantage over them. In other words, they submitted that the liquidator and creditors 
could get a complete preview of their opponent's case and obtain discovery of 
documents from them, thus being afforded an overwhelming advantage in subsequent 
civil litigation. 
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The Court had to determine whether the statutory mechanism set up under Sections 
417 and 418 denied anyone the right to equality before the law as guaranteed in 
Section 8(1) of the (interim) Constitution. Ackermann J said he failed to see how this 
could be so, regard being had to the purpose of the proceedings under Sections 417 
and 418 of the Act. 101 The learned judge held that Sections 417 and 418 did not deny 
the applicants the right to equality before the law or the right to equal protection under 
the law or the right not to be unfairly discriminated against; thus, they were not 
inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution. 102 
The Court's Order 
The Constitutional Court103 ordered that, save to the extent the provisions of Section 
417(2)(b) of the Act were declared to be invalid in Ferreira v Levin, 104 the provisions 
of Sections 417 and 418 were declared not to be inconsistent with the (interim) 
Constitution. Thus, other than that, answers which tend to incriminate an examinee 
may not be used against him or her in any subsequent criminal proceedings (other than 
those special cases exempted in terms of the Court's order in Ferreira v Levin), the 
mechanism of Sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act remains intact. 
However, as Ackermann J105 pointed out, the order in Ferreira v Levin left the question 
regarding the constitutionality of the use in civil proceedings of answers given under 
Section 417(2)(b) of the Act open. The learned Judge, after scrutinising available 
comparative material from other jurisdictions, concluded that: 
[t]here is ... no indication that the use of compelled testimony in civil proceedings 
is prohibited or held to be unconstitutional in other open and democratic societies 
based on freedom and equality. 106 
Thus, the Court's order in Ferreira v Levin was confined to the use of compelled self-
incriminating testimony given at the Section 417 enquiry in subsequent criminal 
proceedings against the examinee. 
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JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The provisions of Sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act are intact, save for that 
portion covered in the Ferreira v Levin order. A few interesting jurisprudential 
consequences flow from the Court's refusal to tamper with them beyond the extent of 
the Ferreira v Levin order. 
Firstly, the two judgments of the Constitutional Court did not affect the power of the 
Master or the Court107 or, as the case may be, a commissioner, 108 to summon and 
examine witnesses concerning the trade, dealings, affairs or property of a company 
being wound-up. The Master or the Court, 109 or a commissioner who is a magistrate, 110 
may cause a witness who fails, without lawful excuse, to attend the examination to be 
apprehended and brought before them for examination. 
Secondly, an examinee may be required to answer any and all questions put to him or 
her at the Section 417 enquiry, notwithstanding that the answer might tend to 
incriminate him or her. 111 He or she cannot refuse to answer questions on the basis that 
the answers may incriminate him or her112 or, as the case may be, be used in a 
subsequent civil action against him or her. 113 Failure on the part of an examinee, without 
sufficient cause, to answer fully and satisfactorily any question lawfully put to him or her 
in the enquiry is a punishable offence. 114 
In addition, the two judgments preserved the statutoy compulsion, through a subpoena 
duces tecum, 115 to produce or reveal relevant information, books and documents. Thus, 
an examinee cannot hide behind the shield of the right to privacy and refuse, without 
sufficient cause, to disclose at the enquiry information concerning the affairs of the 
company. 116 
However, like in the United States,117 for example, while the witness may not refuse to 
comply with an order to give testimony on the basis of the privilege against self-
incrimination, the testimony or other information compelled under the order to testify 
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may not be used against him or her in a subsequent criminal case, save to the extent 
of the Ferreira v Levin order. It can be used only in civil proceedings as the privilege 
against self-incrimination does not extend to such proceedings. 
Lastly, while there is no limitation upon the matters about which a Section 417 
examination may be held, provided that they are matters concerning the trade, 
dealings, affairs or property of the company, the Constitutional Court has acknowledged 
and reaffirmed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to deal with any problems relating 
to the conduct of such an examination. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court may 
intervene and refuse the invocation of the procedure if the circumstances of an existing 
or a proposed litigation persuade it that the applicant is not legitimately seeking 
information qua liquidator or judicial manager but an unfair advantage qua litigant or 
potential litigant.118 The Supreme Court, in other words, has a discretion but, as Sir 
Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C pointed out in Cloverbay Ltd (joint administrators) v 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA,119 
in exercising the discretion the court has to balance the requirements of the 
liquidator against any possible oppression to the person to be examined. Such 
balancing depends on the relationship between the importance to the liquidator 
of obtaining the information on the one hand and the degree of oppression to the 
person sought to be examined on the other. 120 
In my opinion, the Constitutional Court in Bersntein did nothing to reinforce confidence 
in our system of administrative justice as was then encapsulated in the provisions of 
Section 24 of the (interim) Constitution. In fact, it used doubtful classifications to avoid 
the issue. 
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ENDNOTES-CHAPTERFOUR 
1 .. Act No. 61 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 
2 .. A company is deemed to be unable to pay its debts if: (a) it fails for three weeks after demand left at 
its registered office to pay or to secure a debt of not less than R100; or (b) if the sheriff or messenger of 
the court has filed a nu/la bona return in respect of a judgment against the company; or (c) if it is proved 
to the satisfaction of the court that, taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities, it is unable 
to pay its debts. 
3 .. Section 417(1) and (2)(a) of the Act. Any other person applying for such an examination or enquiry is 
required to bear the costs and expenses incidental thereto, unless the Master or the Court directs 
otherwise. See Section 417 (6) of the Act. 
4 .. Section 417(4) of the Act. 
5 .. Section 417(7) of the Act. 
6 .. In terms of Section 418(1 )(b) of the Act. 
7 .. Section 418(2) of the Act. 
8 .. Section 418( 1 )(b) of the Act. 
9 .. Section 418(1)(a) of the Act. 
10 .. See Lipkie v Bloemfontein Auctioneers & Agencies (Pty) Ltd, 1960 (4) SA 672 (0) at 673. See 
also Anderson v Dickson NO (lntermenua (Pty) Ltd intervening), 1985 (1) SA 93 (N) at 111. 
11 .. Section 418(2) of the Act. It is noteworthy that the powers of the Court to punish recalcitrant witnesses 
are those available to it in the case of contempt in facie curiae only. See Van der Berg v Schutte, 1990 
(1) SA 500 (C) at 509-511. 
Regarding what happens to a person who, without sufficient cause, fails to attend at the time and place 
specified in the summons issued by a commissioner who is not a magistrate, see Section 418(5)(a) of the 
Act. 
12 .. Or under Section 418 of the Act. For our purposes, we shall refer to the examination or enquiry as 
the Section 417 examination or enquiry. 
13 .. Section 417(2)(a) of the Act. Note, however, that the examinee is entitled to an opportunity to read 
the transcript before signing it, to make corrections in the margin and to sign subject to such corrections. 
See.Re Milton Hindle Ltd, [1963) 3 All ER 161 (Ch). 
Note further that, in terms of Section 417(1A), such examinee may be legally represented at the 
examination or enquiry. 
14 .. Section 417(3) of the Act. 
15 .. Section 418(5)(b)(iii) of the Act. 
16 .. Ibidem, Section 441 (1 )(f). 
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17 .. See Pretorius and Others v Marais and Others, 1981 (1) SA 1051 (A) at 1063H-1064A. 
18 .. Section 417(6). 
19 .. Though, arguably, a Court acting under Section 388 of the Act may extend the application of the 
provisions of Section 417 to cases of voluntary winding-up. 
20 .. In terms of Section 439(2) of the Act. 
21 .. See Moolman v Builders and Developers {Pty) Ltd: Jooste lntevening, 1990 ( 1) SA 954 (A) at 
959-961. 
22 .. Which a British judge, Bowen LJ, commenting more than a century ago on Section 115 of the (British) 
Companies Act, 1862, referred to in the following terms in In re North Australian Territory Company, 
(1890} 45 Ch 87 at 93: "It is an extraordinary power; it is ·a power of an inquisitorial kind which enables 
the Court to direct to be examined - not merely before itself, but before the examiner appointed by the 
Court - some third person who is no party to a litigation. That is an inquisitorial power, which may work 
with great severity against third persons, and it seems to me to be obvious that such a section ought to 
be used with the greatest care, so as not unnecessarily to put in motion the machinery of justice where 
it is not wanted, or to put it in motion at a stage when it is not clear that it is wanted, and certainly not to 
put it in motion if unnecessary mischief is going to be done or hardship inflicted upon the third person who 
is called upon to appear and give information." 
23 .. In Western Bank Ltd v Thorne NO and Others NNO, 1973 (3) SA 661 (C) at 666F. 
24 .. Section 391 of the Act. 
25 .. Ibidem, Section 392. 
26 .. Ibidem, Section 400(1 ). 
27 .. Ibidem, Section 402(b). 
28 .. Who, as Megarry J pointed out in Re Rolls Razor Ltd (2), [1969) 3 All ER 1386 at 1396-1397, is 
necessarily placed in difficulty, usually coming as he or she does "as a stranger to the affairs of the 
company which has sunk to its financial doom. In that process, it may well be that some of those 
concerned in the management of the company, and others as well, have been guilty of some misconduct 
or impropriety which is of relevance to the liquidation. Even those who are wholly innocent of any wrong-
doing may have motives for concealing what was done. In any case, there are almost certain to be many 
transactions which are difficult to discover or to understand merely from the books and papers of the 
company. Accordingly, the legislature has provided this extraordinary process so as to enable the requisite 
information to be obtained ... There is here an extraordinary and secret mode of obtaining information 
necessary for the proper conduct of the winding-up." See Van de Berg v Schulte, 1990 (1) SA 500 (C) 
at 506-507; and Hefer JA in Moolman v Builders and Developers (Pty) Ltd (In Provisional 
Liquidation): Jooste Intervening, 1990 (1) SA 954 (A) at 960G-I. 
29 .. Merchant Shippers SA (Pty) Ltd v Millman NO and Others, 1986 (1) SA 413 (C) at 4170-E. 
30 .. See Hurt Jin Lynn NO and Another v Kreuger and Others, 1995 (2) BCLR 167 (N) at 1700-F. 
31 .. Section 417(1) provides that the summoning of an affected person, and a priori, the examination may 
be done "at any time after a winding-up order has been made". 
32 .. Acting in terms of Section 417 (2 )(a) of the Act. 
33 .. See Lord Denning in Re Pergamon Press Ltd, [1971) Ch 388 (CA) at 3990-H, and Sachs LJ, ibidem 
at 402G-403A. 
34 .. See Jones Jin Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, Port Elizabeth, 1995 (2) SA 433 (SE) at 4431. 
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35 .. A subject which is discussed more fully later in this chapter. 
36 .. Section 417(2)(b) of the Act. It is noted the provisions of this section were not unprecedented or 
confined to the Republic; Section 597(12) of the Australian Corporations Amendment Act, 1990, which 
provides that: "A person is not excused from answering a question put to the person at an examination 
... on the ground that the answer might tend to incriminate the person or make the person liable to a 
penalty", is a good example of this. 
37 .. Per Innes CJ in R v Camane, 1925 AD 570 at 575. 
38 .. That is to say, one should not be compelled to produce evidence against oneself. 
39 .. Section 25(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
40 .. Section 25(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
41 .. Ibidem, Section 25(3)(d). 
42 .. It is noted in passing, however, that in the United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal held per Dillon LJ in 
Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell, [1992] 2 All ER 856 (CA) at 876 that a director 
was not entitled to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to answer questions under 
Sections 235 and 236 of the Insolvency Act, 1986 as it was a requirement of public policy that the law 
should be able to deal adequately with dishonesty or malpractice on the part of bankrupts or company 
directors. See also Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Re Arrows Ltd (No 4) Hamilton v Naviede, [1994] 3 All 
ER 814 (HL) at 821-822. 
43 .. 1996(1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
44 .. Ferreira v Levin NO and Others, at 20, paragraph 26. 
45 .. In terms of Section 4(1) of the Constitution. 
46 .. Ferreira v Levin NO and Others, at 21, paragraphs 26 and 27. This seems to fly in the face of the 
"cases and controversies" approach the Court seems to be in favour of, however. I cannot imagine the 
Court allowing anyone at any time being competent to challenge any legal provision for unconstitutionality 
though. 
47 .. Ibidem, paragraph 27. 
48 .. Ibidem, at 22, paragraph 29. 
49 .. That is prior to the stage when the incriminating answers given under Section 417(2)(b) of the Act 
could be made use of. 
50 .. Section 7(4)(b). 
51 .. Ferreira v Levin NO and Others, at 23-24, paragraph 33. 
52 .. Ibidem at 24-26, paragraphs 34-41. 
53 .. Ibidem at 26, paragraph 41. 
54 .. Ibidem. See also Kriegler J, ibidem at 110-111, paragraph 199, and at 112-113, paragraphs 205-206, 
for a discussion of the concept of ripeness of an action or case. 
55 .. Ibidem at 98, paragraph 165. 
56 .. Ibidem. 
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61 .. See Chaska Ison P at 95, paragraph 158. Note that the majority of the Court, represented by the 
learned President of the Court, otherwise disagreed with Ackermann J on the question of locus standi and 
on his interpretation of Section 11 (1) of the Constitution. 
62 .. Ibidem, paragraph 159. 
63 .. Ibidem at 96, paragraph 161. 
64 .. In this regard, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of Kriegler J, ibidem at 112, paragraphs 203 and 
204, where the learned Judge of the Constitutional Court said, inter a/ia, that the Constitution did not 
make any provision for "a general - or independent - right against self-incrimination." He further said that, 
on the clear wording and self-evident context of the relevant constitutional provisions, it was clear that 
such provisions related to the proceedings during a criminal trial, and to nothing else. He then concluded: 
"To my mind it is not possible to read those provisions as embodying the general privilege against self-
incrimination. Nor can I read them as referring to any process so far removed from, and antecedent to, 
a trial as an enquiry under section 417 of the Companies Act." 
65 .. At 97, paragraph 163. 
66 .. At 99, paragraph 167, where the learned President of the Constitutional Court, after once again 
alluding to the general jurisdiction of the Court to interpret, protect and enforce the provisions of the 
Constitution, pointed out that the constitutionality of a law could be challenged on the basis that it was 
inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution other than those then contained in Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution. As far as he saw it, nothing in Section 7(4) or in any other provision of the Constitution 
denied the applicants the right that a litigant had to seek a declaration of rights in respect of the validity 
of a law which directly affected his or her interests adversely. 
67 .. Per Hurt Jin Lynn NO and Another v Kreuger and Others, supra at 1700. 
68 .. Ferreira v Levin and Others, at 97, paragraph 163. 
69 .. Ibidem at 98, paragraph 166. 
70 .. Ibidem at 94, paragraph 157. 
71.. 6 December 1995. 
72 .. The date when the Constitution came into effect. 
73 .. At 95, paragraph 157. 
74 .. Ibidem at 94-95, paragraph 157. 
75 .. 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC). This case, it will be recalled, related to the collapse of Tollgate Holdings 
Ltd, a public investment company that was listed on both the Johannesburg and London Stock 
Exchanges. 
76 .. Supra. 
77 .. At 94-95, paragraph 157. 
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79 .. paragraph 55. 
80 .. Contained in the mechanism of Sections 417 and 418. 
81 .. Section 33(1) of the Constitution. 
82 .. Contained in Sections 417(3) and 418(2) of the Act. 
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83 .. Which provided that: "[e]very person shall have the right to his or her personal privacy, which shall 
include the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private 
possessions or the violation of private communications." 
84 .. Bernstein v Bester at 490, paragraph 79. 
85 .. Ibidem at 491-492, paragraph 85. 
86 .. The statutory compulsion to answer fully and satisfactorily any question lawfully put to an examinee. 
87 .. Ibidem. 
88 .. Section 417(3) read with Section 418(5)(b)(iii)(bb) of the Act. 
89 .. At 492-493, paragraph 88. 
90 .. Ibidem. 
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93 .. Ibidem at 493, paragraph 90 and at 494, paragraph 92. Note that the US Supreme Court came to the 
same conclusion in Hale v Henkel, 201 US 43 (1906) at 73 and at 74-75, namely that examinees cannot 
invoke the protection which the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution affords against searches and 
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95 .. Which guaranteed to every person the right to be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative 
action which affected any of his or her rights or interests unless the reasons for such action had been 
made public. 
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paragraph 157. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TIIBRIGHTTOAFAIR TRIALAND 
TIIB COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL MATTERS 
INTRODUCTION 
After the adoption of the (interim) Constitution, our Courts had an opportunity to grapple with the constitutional validity of some of the provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Act1 and the principles of our law of evidence, which deal with the collection 
of evidence in criminal cases or with the admissibility of evidence collected in violation 
of the (interim) Constitution. Most of these cases turned on the right to a fair trial as 
encapsulated in the provisions of Section 25(3) of the (interim) Constitution. It is 
noteworthy that, according to Kentridge AJ, the right to a fair trial thus conferred by the 
(interim) Constitution was broader than the list of specific rights set out in paragraphs 
(a) to U) of that subsection. 2 As such, the right to a fair trial "embraces a concept of 
substantive fairness which is not to be equated with what might have passed muster 
in our criminal courts before the Constitution came into force."3 
Others turned on the right or privilege against self-incrimination, an old principle of our 
common law4 which finds expression in the maxim nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere.5 
This principle was given constitutional status when the (interim) Constitution became 
law.6 
Yet others turned on the right of every person to his or her personal privacy, which 
included "the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, 
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the seizure of private possessions or the violation of private communications."7 
Invariably in such cases it was always argued that the evidence obtained in the course, 
or as a result, of illegal searches should be excluded on the basis of their ostensible 
violation of the right to privacy. 
Unfortunately, all these cases, with the exception of the two that were handled by the 
Constitutional Court, were all confined to the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts that 
decided them; none of them was a Constitutional Court or an Appellate Division 
decision on the matters they raised. On the basis of the stare decisis principle, they 
would thus be binding only in those areas or provinces. 
The cases that were dealt with only by the High Court at the time of writing are included 
in this chapter to illustrate that the issues that were raised in them are very much alive. 
Unfortunately, due to the Constitutional Court's "cases and controversies" approach, 
which would prevent it from dealing with such issues mero motu, they may only come 
to its attention in cases that are appropriately brought before it. 
SECTION 37 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ACT 
The provisions of Section 37 of the Act allow police officers to ascertain the bodily 
features, including marks and prints of any person falling within any of the categories 
referred to in subsection (1) thereof, with or without the affected person's consent, and 
by force if necessary. By legalising acts which might otherwise give rise to criminal or 
delictual liability, these provisions make serious inroads upon the bodily integrity of the 
individual accused of the commission of a crime. However, these inroads should be 
excusable if seen in the light of the fact that the ascertainment of the bodily features 
and 'prints' of an accused person often forms an essential component of the 
investigation of crime, a prerequisite for the effective administration of any criminal 
justice system and the proper adjudication of a criminal trial. 
In S v Maphumulo and Another,8 for example, the investigating officer desired to take 
the fingerprints of the accused for evidential purposes. Instead of doing so by force in 
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terms of Section 37(1 ), the prosecuting authority sought an order under Section 37(3) 
of the Act compelling the accused to submit to the taking of their fingerprints. The 
apparent reason was the fear that if the provisions of Section 37(1) of the Act were 
relied upon, the privilege against self-incrimination as encapsulated and enshrined in 
Section 25(2)(c) of the (interim) Constitution might be violated. 
Though counsel in the matter referred pertinently to the right of every person not to be 
compelled to be a witness against himself or herself,9 Combrink J considered the 
provisions of Section 25(2)(c) of the (interim) Constitution to be more apposite to the 
issue. 10 The Court had to determine whether the taking of an accused's fingerprints 
constituted a violation of Section 25(2)(c). The learned Judge, for this purpose, made 
a clear distinction between an accused person's bodily features, such as a facial scar, 
a crooked nose, an artificial leg, footprints, palm prints and fingerprints, on the one 
hand, and his or her statements or communications, on the other. 11 For the learned 
Judge, the question was settled by Watermeyer JA in Ex parte Minister of Justice in 
re: R v Matemba.12 He thus ruled that "the police are ... entitled in terms of the power 
conferred upon them by the provisions of section 37(1 ), to take the accused's 
fingerprints forcibly if necessary. In doing so, however, the police are enjoined to 
exercise discretion and care, and to have due regard to the dignity of the accused."13 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISIONS: SECTION 
220FTHEACT 
In S v Motlousi, 14 the State sought to tender the evidence of the finding and seizure 
by the police of bloodstained banknotes which were found in the course of a search 15 
of the room occupied by the accused person. The Court found on the facts that the 
police could not have acted bona fide in this case. 
Similarly in S v Mayekiso en Andere, 16 the State sought to tender the evidence of the 
findings of certain items which were seized during a search 17 of a bag found at the 
residence of the first accused. It appeared that when the search was conducted, the 
police had no reason to believe that the deceased had been killed at the residence or 
that the third accused, the owner of the bag, had been involved in the killing. In other 
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words, the police had no reason to believe that the requirements of the Criminal 
Procedure Act18 relating to searches and seizures were satisfied and that a search 
warrant would have been issued. It therefore followed that the police would not have 
been entitled to act under Section 22 of the Act. The Court found on the facts that the 
search of the bag constituted an infringement of the owner's fundamental right. 
In both Motlousi and Mayekiso Farlam J and Van Reenen J respectively rejected the 
Canadian 19 and United States20 approaches and, instead, followed the Irish approach 
adopted by Kingsmill Moore Jin the People (Attorney-General) v O'Brien21 decision. 
In a nutshell, the approach adopted in O'Brien was that where evidence is obtained as 
a result of illegal action it is a matter for the trial judge to decide, in his or her discretion, 
whether to admit or reject it. In exercising that discretion, Courts have to make a choice 
between two desirable ends which may be incompatible.22 The O'Brien approach would 
thus, in some instances, justify the admission of evidence despite the fact that it was 
illegally obtained in breach of the constitutional rights of the accused. 
Applying the O'Brien approach in Motlousi23 and Mayekiso,24 Farlam J and Van 
Reenen J respectively declared the tendered evidence inadmissible in casu. In my view, 
the O'Brien approach seems to be fully in accordance with our law and I would be 
surprised if the Constitutional Court, which, unfortunately did not address this issue, 
came to a different conclusion. 25 
SECTION 112(1)(8) OF THE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE ACT 
In S v Maseko,26 the Witwatersand Local Division of the Supreme Court dealt with the 
validity of the provisions of Section 112(1 )(b) of the Act27 in relation to the right to 
remain silent during plea proceedings.28 On an earlier occasion, though under the 
previous constitutional order the issue was not clear, the Appellate Division had held 
that an accused had a right to remain silent when questioned by a magistrate in terms 
of this section.29 
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In Maseko, Borchers J accepted that the accused, a youth then aged about 18 years, 
who had appeared before a court without any legal assistance, did not know that he 
had a right to remain silent during the plea proceedings. 30 The learned Judge also 
accepted that the accused had not been informed that he had such a right and had thus 
proceeded to make incriminating statements against himself.31 The learned Judge 
opined that the common law position that the accused questioned under Section 
112(1 )(b) of the Act had no right to be warned of his or her right to remain silent32 was 
no longer truly reflective of our legal position in the light of the (interim) Constitution.33 
To give content to the accused's right not to incriminate himself or herself during plea 
proceedings, Borchers J held34 that if an accused person incriminates himself or herself 
in ignorance of his or her right to remain silent, "a fundamental right expressly granted 
... by the Constitution has been violated."35 Holding that statements made under Section 
119 of the Act by such an accused person should not be used as evidence against him 
or her, the learned Judge nonetheless refused to refer the matter to the Constitutional 
Court under Section 102(1) of the (interim) Constitution for its decision.36 In his view, 
the provisions of Section 112( 1 )(b) were not in conflict with the (interim) Constitution 
merely because they did not expressly make provision for the right to remain silent 
during plea proceedings.37 
POINTINGS OUT AS EVIDENCE: SECTION 
218(2) OF THE ACT 
In our common law, the pointing out38 by an accused person of a certain fact, the 
existence or discovery of which was in itself highly relevant to the crime under 
investigation and which, therefore, tended to establish a link between the knowledge 
on the part of the accused person of that fact and the commission of the crime, 
amounted to an admission by conduct on the part of the accused person.39 In 1991, the 
Appellate Division held in its landmark decision in S v Sheehama40 that paintings out 
were, in appropriate circumstances, to be viewed as admissions by conduct and that 
their admissibility was, accordingly, to be governed by the provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Act relating to the admissibility of admissions and confessions. In other 
words, the admissibility of a pointing out, as an extra-curial admission by the accused, 
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is governed by the common law rule that it must have been made freely and voluntarily, 
which is now embodied in the provisions of Sections 217, 218 and 219A of the Act. 
The issue is, however, also governed by Section 218(2) of the Act, which provides that 
evidence of a pointing out is admissible, notwithstanding the fact that it forms part of an 
inadmissible confession or statement. In other words, this section seemingly renders 
the fact that a pointing out forms part of an inadmissible confession irrelevant.41 
The Court, in S v Melani and Others,42 dealt with, inter a/ia, the issue of the 
admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of a pointing out. Professing to be guided 
by the tenor and spirit of the decision of the Constitutional Court in S v Zuma and 
Others,43 which the Court admitted did not directly grapple with "[t]he question of 
whether evidence obtained in breach of the provisions of section 25 of the Constitution 
is admissible in a criminal trial",44 Froneman J dealt with the constitutional questions 
begged by the issue of the admissibility of paintings out in the post-1994 situation. 
The learned Judge's starting point was the right to consult with a legal practititoner 
during the pre-trial procedure, as well as the right to be informed about this right, all of 
which were then contained in Section 25(1 )(c) of the (interim) Constitution.45 The 
Learned Judge concluded on the facts of the case that this right had been infringed.46 
Froneman J further looked at the rights then guaranteed in Sections 25(2)(a), 25(2)(c), 
25(3)(c) and 25(3)(d) of the (interim) Constitution. The learned Judge concluded that 
the provisions of the (interim) Constitution had provided a further basis for the 
exclusion of the evidence obtained in breach of the rights guaranteed to an accused 
person.47 This, he opined, would "help ensure the fairness and integrity of the criminal 
process at least from arrest up to and including the trial."48 On the basis of this, he held 
that the alleged evidence of pointing out by two of the accused persons in casu was 
inadmissible and should therefore be disregarded.49 
However, the learned Judge was worried about "an absolute exclusionary rule"; he 
preferred that the Courts should have a discretion "to allow the evidence despite it 
being obtained in an unconstitutional manner'', though the position was not clear in our 
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law. He derived solace from the fact that, at least in New Zealand, the Courts did have 
this discretion. 50 
As the learned Judge quite correctly pointed out, however, the issue of whether our 
judges have such a discretion would have to be settled once and for all time by the 
Constitutional Court;51 in the meantime, the old common law position pertains nationally, 
except in the area of the territorial jurisdiction of the Court that decided Melani. In 
Gauteng the judges are divided on the issue; Strydom J's decision in Malefo52 was not 
supported by Claassen J.53 In effect Claassen J disagreed with Froneman J too on the 
approach the latter adopted in his decision in Melani.54 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
In the same period, the Constitutional Court had occasion to deal with the 
constitutionality of two of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act. These were 
Sections 205 and 22. 
SECTION 205 OF THE ACT 
Section 205 provides an evidence-gathering mechanism whereby a person who is likely 
to give material or relevant information as to any alleged offence but who will not furnish 
such information in the ordinary course may be required or subpoenaed by a judicial 
officer to appear before him or her for examination by a prosecuting authority. Where 
such a person gives the requisite information before the stated date, the obligation to 
so appear lapses. 
However, should such a person fail or refuse, without a just cause, to appear before the 
judicial officer and give the requisite information, provision is made in the Act for the 
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.55 But, 
since 1993, before such a sentence can be imposed, the judicial officer must also be 
"of the opinion that the furnishing of such information is necessary for the administration 
of justice or the maintenance of law and order."56 The sentence imposed under Section 
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189(1) for the purposes of the Section 205(1) enquiry is "subject to appeal in the same 
manner as a sentence imposed in any criminal case".57 
It is important to note that an enquiry under Section 189 does not create an offence.58 
The recalcitrant examinee does not, therefore, go to prison for a criminal offence;59 if, 
at a later stage, he or she becomes willing to testify and does comply with the 
provisions of Section 205(1) of the Act, this would entitle him or her to immediate 
release.60 
The Act61 further makes provision for the discharge of such a person from prosecution 
where he or she has answered all relevant questions frankly and honestly. It also 
precludes the use of such evidence at a later trial of such a person if he or she does not 
qualify for a discharge from prosecution,62 unless he or she is prosecuted for perjury 
arising from the giving of evidence under Sedion 205.63 
In Nel v Le Roux NO and Others,64 the Constitutional Court was, pursuant to a Section 
103(4) referral, called upon to deal with the issue of the constitutionality of the 
provisions of Section 205 which were attacked on the basis that they were inconsistent 
with the (interim) Constitution. Its unanimous judgment was delivered by Ackermann 
J. 
Ackermann J scoured the bases of the constitutional attack on the provisions of Section 
205. The learned Judge held, for example that the recalcitrant examinee could not be 
sentenced under Section 189 if he or she furnished "a just excuse" or "sufficient cause", 
the two expressions which he said do not differ materially from each other.65 It was the 
duty of the judicial officer before whom the recalcitrant examinee appears, to determine, 
bearing in mind the spirit, purport and objects of the fundamental rights guranteed in the 
(interim) Constitution, whether the examinee has a just excuse or sufficient cause to 
refuse to testify, the learned Judge held.66 
The learned Judge further held that the provisions of Section 205 were not trumped by 
the general limitation clause. He held in particular that: 
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[w]e are not alone in adopting a procedure such as that embodied in section 205. 
Other open and democratic societies based on freedom and equality do the 
same.67 
As the Section 205 examinee is not an accused person, it would be a misnomer to talk 
of "a fair trial" in this regard. Ackermann J held that: 
[t]he imprisonment provisions in section 189 constitute nothing more than 
process in aid of the essential objective of compelling witnesses who have a 
legal duty to testify to do so; it does not constitute a criminal trial, nor make an 
accused of the examinee. This disposes of the attack directly based on the ... fair 
trial right.68 
The Court, after a meticulous examination of all the issues raised in the case, 
concluded and declared that the provisions of Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act were not inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution.69 
SECTIONS 6 AND 7 OF THE INVEST/GA TION OF SERIOUS ECONOMIC 
OFFENCES ACT 
In Key v Attorney-General, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division and Another,70 
the applicant was indicted on a number of charges arising from the collapse of the 
Tollgate group of companies. Representatives of the Office for Serious Economic 
Offences, acting on the strength of an order issued in terms of Section 6(1) of the 
Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act,71 searched his residence and 
offices and certain seized documents. Such documents were made available to 
investigative accountants under Section 7 of the Act, on whose report, the applicant 
contended, the criminal case against him was built. 
The Constitutional Court was called upon to determine, inter alia, whether the 
provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences 
Act were inconsistent with the right to privacy which was then enshrined in Section 13 
of the (interim) Constitution. However, the first question the Court had to decide was 
whether it was open to the applicant to challenge the validity of those provisions of the 
Act in respect of conduct that had occurred before the commencement of the (interim) 
Constitution. The Court unanimously agreed to follow its earlier decision in Du 
Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another,72 in which it had held that the (interim) 
Constitution did not operate retrospectively. 73 
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Rejecting the applicant's contention, Kriegler J observed that as virtually all the events 
complained of had taken place prior to the commencement of the (interim) 
Constitution, none of them could be said to have constituted a breach of any of the 
applicant's rights guaranteed in the (interim) Constitution. As the learned Judge 
pointed out, "[s]uch rights had not yet come into existence when the events took place. 
Nor did - nor could - the subsequent advent of the Constitution, by affording rights and 
freedoms which had not existed before, render unlawful actions that were lawful at the 
time at which they were taken."74 In particular, the learned Judge held that there was 
"nothing inherently unfair in receiving in evidence material which was properly garnered 
in the course of a lawful search and seizure. And there is no warrant in justice for 
retroactively casting a blanket of illegality over what was properly unearthed according 
to the law as it stood at the time."75 (my italics) 
In the result, Kriegler J made no order as to the constitutionality of the provisions of 
Sections 6 and 7 of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act and, 
instead, held that the evidence procured pursuant to those sections which was obtained 
before the commencement of the (interim) Constitution was not rendered inadmissible 
in the criminal proceedings against the applicant by virtue of the constitutional changes 
that took place on 27 April 1994.76 
THE O'BRIEN APPROACH 
It is noteworthy, however, that without any reference to the Irish decision in People (A· 
G) v O'Brien,77 which was quoted with approval by Farlam Jin Motlousi78 and by Van 
Reenen J in Mayekiso,79 Kriegler J, with reference to the admissibility of evidence 
obtained in violation of an accused person's fundamental right to a fair trial, made this 
remark: 
[t]he question whether the admission of such evidence would in any way infringe 
the applicant's right to a fair trial is a matter to be decided by the trial judge on 
the facts and circumstances established at the trial.80 (my italics) 
This was precisely the approach taken by Kingsmill Moore J in O'Brien. It is for the trial 
judge to decide, in his or discretion, whether or not to admit the evidence, regard being 
had to the spirit, the purport and objects of our new constitutional order! Thus, the 
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Constitutional Court has, arguably, rejected the Canadian and American approaches 
in this regard.81 
The issue has to be looked at in the context of the fairness of the trial.82 And, as Kriegler 
J put it, 
[u]ltimately ... fairness is an issue which has to be decided upon the facts of each 
case, and the trial judge is the person best placed to take that decision. At times 
fairness might require that evidence unconstitutionally obtained be excluded. But 
there will also be times when fairness will require that evidence, albeit obtained 
unconstitutionally, nevertheless be admitted.83 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND 
STATUTORY PRESU.MPTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
U nder the (interim) Constitution 1 every person was, as stated earlier on, granted the right to a fair trial.2 This is a standard clause found in numerous international 
human rights instruments and in constitutions of many countries with bills of rights. 
However, as was stated in an earlier chapter, 3 prior to 27 April 1994, this right was not 
constitutionally guaranteed as there was no bill of rights in our country then. It could be 
overridden by any Act of Parliament as the will of a transient majority in that institution 
was the law. 
Thus, South African statutory law is replete with statutory presumptions, some of which 
may tamper with the right to a fair trial. Depending on the context and the general policy 
of the Acts in which these are found, some of them use certain forms of words to 
impose an onus of proof while others merely place a duty to adduce contrary evidence 
upon the parties against whom they operate. 
The phrase "shall be prima facie evidence or proof' is used in many of our statutes. 
According to LH Hoffmann and OT Zeffertt, "[t)he normal meaning of such provisions 
is that in the absence of some evidence to the contrary, the fact in issue either may or 
must be taken to be proved."4 The onus is not affected; the onus remains upon the party 
required to prove a fact. If the accused leads sufficient evidence to raise a doubt, he or 
she is entitled to an acquittal.5 
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In other statutes the phrase "in the absence of evidence to the contrary" is used. ''These 
words", according to Hoffmann and Zeffertt, "also have the effect of placing a duty to 
adduce evidence upon the party against whom they operate.'16 
In statutes such as the General Law Amendment Act,7 and Stock Theft Act,8 which 
deal with the possession of stock, produce or other goods which are reasonably 
suspected of having been stolen, the phrase "give a satisfactory account of such 
possession" is utilised. According Hoffmann and Zeffertt,9 the phrase imposes no onus 
upon the accused and he or she merely has a duty to adduce evidence showing that 
his or her explanation may reasonably be true and satisfactory. 
Yet in others the phrase "unless the contrary is proved' is utilised.10 This phrase, as can 
be gleaned from Ex parte Minister of Justice: in re R v Jacobson and Levy, 11 unlike 
the other two above, clearly imposes an onus upon the opposing party. One of the 
presumptions in which this phrase was used was to be found in Section 217(1 )(b)(ii) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 12 the provisions of which the Constitutional Court was 
called upon to deal with in S v Zuma and Others 13 and S v Mhlungu and Others. 14 
Subsequently, in S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso, 15 the Constitutional Court also had 
occasion to deal with the provisions of Section 21 (1 )(a)(t) of the Drugs and Drug 
Trafficking Act, 16 where a similar phrase was used. However, as will be pointed out 
later, the Court in this case, most unfortunately, confined its declaration of invalidity to 
the provisions of Section 21 (1 )(a)(t) of the Act. 
Then in February 1996 the Constitutional Court gave its judgment in S v Mbatha; S v 
Prinsloo, 17 a case in which the Court dealt with the constitutionality of the presumption 
in Section 40(1) of Arms and Ammunition Act. 18 The contention of the applicants was 
that the said presumption violated the "fair trial" provisions of the (interim) Constitution, 
in particular the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to be presumed 
innocent. 
Lastly, in Scagell and Others v Attorney-General of the Western Cape Others, 19 the 
Constitutional Court dealt with the constitutionality of, inter a/ia, the similarly worded 
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Section 6(4) of the Gambling Act.20 It also dealt with the constitutionality of the slightly 
differently worded provisions of Section 6(3) of that Act. 21 
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The presumption of innocence22 is an integral component of our legal system.23 As a 
basic tenet of the South African system of criminal justice, it finds expression in the rule 
that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person is placed firmly on the 
prosecution,24 "unless the legislature directs otherwise."25 The accused is presumed to 
be innocent and the prosecution should ordinarily bear the onus on all issues,26 the only 
common law exception to this principle being that where the accused raises a defence 
of insanity, he or she bears the onus to prove such insanity.27 
The presumption of innocence28 was reaffirmed by our (interim) Constitution which 
stated that every person charged with the alleged commission of an offence shall have 
the right to a fair trial which includes the right "to be presumed innocent".29 Due to this, 
as Cachalia et al quite correctly suggested, the "numerous statutory provisions that 
place some form of onus upon an accused person . . . will now be subject to 
constitutional review."30 Statutory presumptions, needless to say, would in appropriate 
"cases and controversies", give our Courts ample opportunity to intervene on the basis 
of the presumption of innocence. 
The right to be presumed innocent till found guilty by a court of law is a very important 
component of democracy and is guarded jealously in all democratic societies. In the 
United States, for example, the presumption of innocence, although not specifically 
articulated in the Constitution, is accepted as a basic component of a fair trial under 
their system of criminal justice. 31 Moreover, as Roberts J pointed out, due process 
clauses, 32 limit the power of Congress or state legislatures to make the proof of one fact 
or group of facts evidence of the ultimate fact upon which guilt is predicated.33 
The Canadian Constitution, like ours, provides that: 
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[a]ny person charged with an offence has the right ... to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal ... 34 
In a very important Canadian case in this regard, Dickson CJC said that the 
presumption of innocence, "a hallowed principle lying at the very heart of criminal law", 
protects the fundamental liberty and human dignity of all persons accused by the State 
of criminal conduct. It ensures that the State proves all the necessary elements of an 
offence beyond all reasonable doubt, failing which a person accused of the commission 
of an offence is innocent. ''This is essential in a society committed to fairness and social 
justice. "35 
Linked to the right to be presumed innocent are rights such as the right to remain silent 
after arrest,36 the right not to be compelled to make a confession or admission which 
can be used in evidence against him or her,37 and the right not to be a compellable 
witness against oneself.38 These rights are part and parcel of the criminal justice 




OF THE CRIMINAL 
It needs to be pointed out that it is an old requirement of our common law that extra-
judicial statements made by accused persons, whether incriminating or exculpatory,41 
can be given in evidence by the state only if the prosecution can prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that they were made freely and voluntarily.42 Section 217(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act is the general provision which deals with the admissibility of 
confessions made by accused persons. It provides that: 
[e]vidence of any confession made by any person in relation to the commission 
of any offence shall, if such confession is proved to have been freely and 
voluntarily made by such person in his sound and sober senses and without 
having been unduly influenced thereto, be admissible in evidence against such 
person at criminal proceedings relating to such an offence. 
Thus, under this sub-section, if the prosecution wishes to put a confession43 in 
evidence, it is normally required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
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confession was made by the accused freely and voluntarily, in his or her sound and 
sober senses, and without any undue influence.44 At the very least, this means that for 
a confession to be admissible, proof is required that it was not induced by violence, or 
by threats or promises made by a person in authority.45 
However, the sub-section is followed by a proviso which excludes all confessions made 
to peace officers other than magistrates and justices of the peace.46 This proviso is to 
the effect that a confession made to a peace officer other than a magistrate or justice 
of the peace will not be admissible in evidence unless it is confirmed and reduced to 
writing in the presence of a magistrate or justice who should, of course, be satisfied, 
and record that he or she is satisfied, that the confession was indeed made freely and 
voluntarily and without any undue influence. 
Furthermore, under Section 217(1)(b)(t), upon its mere production at the proceedings, 
a confession made to a magistrate and reduced to writing by him or her, or which is 
confirmed and reduced to writing in the presence of a magistrate is admissible against 
the accused if it appears from the document containing it that it was made by a person 
whose name corresponds to that of the accused. In the case of a confession made to 
a magistrate or confirmed and recorded in the presence of a magistrate through an 
interpreter, if a certificate by the interpreter appears on such document declaring that 
he or she interpreted truly and correctly and to the best of his or her ability with regard 
to both the contents of the confession and any question put to the accused by the 
magistrate, the confession is similarly admissible.47 Once these basic facts are proved, 
"this then triggers off the presumption in regard to the accused's state of mind. 
Thereafter an onus is cast on the accused to prove the contrary."48 
Section 217(1 )(b)(it) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which was under attack in the 
Shangase,49 Zuma and Mhlungu cases, provided that where a confession was made 
to a magistrate and reduced to writing by him or her, or was confirmed and reduced to 
writing in the presence of a magistrate,50 upon its mere production at the proceedings, 
it would be presumed, unless the contrary was proved, to have been freely and 
voluntarily made by the accused in his or her sober senses and without any undue 
influence, if it appeared from the document in which it was contained that it had not 
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been made improperly. In other words, this "reverse onus clause"51 placed on an 
accused the burden52 of proving that the confession recorded by or confirmed and 
recorded in the presence of a magistrate was tainted, that is, that it was not freely and 
voluntarily made by him or her, in his or her sound and sober senses, and without his 
or her having been unduly influenced to make it. For this purpose, a voir dire,53 in which 
the prosecution and the defence would lead evidence about the circumstances in which 
the confession was made or obtained, was held. Failure to hold a voir dire when an 
accused disputed the admissiblity of a confession would constitute a material 
irregularity.54 
This reverse onus was required to be discharged on a balance of probabilities55 and not 
by merely raising a doubt. As this was a rebuttable presumption, the state was allowed 
to lead evidence in rebuttal to the evidence led by the accused. 56 If at the end of the trial 
within a trial the probabilities were evenly balanced, or, to put it simply, if the accused 
had failed to discharge the reverse onus,57 the presumption would prevail.58 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT INTERVENES 
In both S v Zuma and Others59 and S v Mhlungu and Others60 the Constitutional 
Court had occasion to grapple with the validity of the provisions of Section 217(1 )(b)(it) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act. In the former case the question of validity was the sole 
question for decision while in the latter one the other question related to the applicability 
or otherwise of a declaration of constitutional invalidity of the said provisions to criminal 
trials commenced on or before 27 April 1994.61 
In Zuma the accused were indicted on two counts of murder and one of robbery. Two 
of the accused had made statements to a magistrate which the state sought to rely on 
as confessions on the basis of the provisions of Section 217(1 )(b)(it) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. As the affected accused alleged that the statements had been induced 
by assaults and fear of further assaults, the defence contested their admissibility and 
a trial-within-a-trial was subsequently held. 
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It is noteworthy that while the court a quo was not entirely satisfied that the statements 
had not been made freely and voluntarily and without any undue influence,62 the 
accused themselves had failed to discharge the onus imposed upon them by the 
provisions of Section 217(1 )(b)(it) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Hugo J expressed 
doubt over the constitutional validity of Section 217 ( 1 )(b )(i1). 63 However, though the state 
and the defence had consented to the issue of the constitutional validity of these 
provisions to be decided by the trial judge,64 the court a quo nonetheless refrained from 
giving a decision on the issue, referred the matter to the Constitutional Court and 
adjourned the trial sine die.65 This helped in creating legal certainty as far as the validity 
of the provisions of Section 217(1 )(b)(it) was concerned, something which the doctrine 
of stare decisis would obviously have prevented if Hugo J had decided the issue at his 
level in the judicial hierarchy. 
Similarly, in Mhlungu the accused were charged with, inter alia, murder, to which they 
had pleaded not guilty. The state sought to rely on confessions made by the accused, 
contending that, in respect of two of the confessions, the requirements of Section 
217(1 )(b)(it) had prima facie been satisfied. 
The gist of the defences' attack on the provisions of Section 217(1 )(b)(it) in both cases 
was that they violated certain basic rights guaranteed to all persons charged with the 
alleged commission of an offence and were, therefore, in conflict with the Constitution. 
In Mhlungu, however, there were two additional questions, namely: 
(1) whether the proceedings could be said to have been 'pending' immediately 
prior to the commencement of the Constitution; and 
(2) if so, whether, in the light of the provisions of Section 241 (8) of the 
Constitution, the provisions of the Constitution were applicable to the trial. 
These questions will be dealt with separately below. By way of conclusion, the 
implications of the ruling on the question of the validity of the Section 217(1 )(b)(it) 
presumption will be dealt with. 
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THE VALIDITY OF SECTION 217(1)(8)(11) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ACT 
As pointed out above, Levinsohn J had earlier on dealt with the constitutionality of the 
provisions of Section 217(1 )(b)(il) of the Criminal Procedure Act.66 The learned judge 
had found that the said provisions fell foul of the Constitution and held that the onus 
of proving the voluntariness of confessions thus rested with the state.67 However, 
despite the Shangase judgment,68 in S v Zuma and Others,69 as Hugo J felt that the 
site of the onus would be decisive in so far as the admissibility of the confessions made 
by Accused 1 and 2 was concerned, the matter was referred to the Constitutional 
Court.70 
In Zuma this question was canvassed at great length by Kentridge AJ. 71 For this 
purpose the learned acting judge of the Constitutional Court traversed the jurisprudence 
of countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Canada, 
where the courts had had occasion to look into the validity of similar legal provisions. 
He also considered decisions of the Privy Council and of the European Court of Human 
Rights. 72 
In all these jurisdictions, where reverse onus provisions are not uncommon,73 courts 
have grappled with the problem of reconciling such provisions with the need to preserve 
the presumption of innocence. The courts of the United States, including the Supreme 
Court,74 have tried over a long period to enunciate a governing principle in this regard.75 
In numerous judgments Canadian courts too have grappled with this conundrum. Of 
particular importance was the judgment of Dickson CJC, who said in R v Oakes76 that: 
[i]n general one must, I think, conclude that a provision which requires an 
accused to disprove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a presumed 
fact, which is an important element of the offence in question, violates the 
presumption of innocence ... If an accused bears the burden of disproving on a 
balance of probabilities an essential element of an offence, it would be possible 
for a conviction to occur despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. This would 
arise if the accused adduced sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as 
to his or her innocence but did not convince the jury on a balance of probabilities 
that the presumed fact was untrue.77 (my italics) 
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Two years later Dickson CJC stated this position much more forcefully in R v Whyte78 
which dealt with a presumption contained in a statute creating the offence of having 
care or control of a motor vehicle while one's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. 
Under the relevant statute, proof that an accused occupied the driver's seat was 
sufficient as the accused was presumed to have the care and control of the motor 
vehicle unless he or she established on a preponderance of probabilities that he or she 
did not enter the vehicle for the purpose of setting it in motion. For the learned Chief 
Justice, it was irrelevant that the presumption did not relate to an 'essential element' of 
the offence; in this regard he said: 
[t]he exact characterization of a factor as an essential element, a collateral factor, 
an excuse, or a defence should not affect the analysis of the presumption of 
innocence. It is the final effect of a provision on the verdict that is decisive. If an 
accused is required to prove some fact on the balance of probabilities to avoid 
conviction, the provision violates the presumption of innocence because it 
permits a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact 
as to the guilt of the accused.79 (my italics) 
After considering a few important cases from these jurisdictions, the Constitutional 
Court came to the right conclusion that, by shifting the burden of proof onto the 
accused,80 the provisions of Section 217(1 )(b)(il) of the Criminal Procedure Act indeed 
violated the Constitution.81 It thus ruled82 that the said provisions were invalid and 
declared that its decision would invalidate the application of Section 217(1 (b)(it) in any 
criminal trial which commenced on or after 27 April 1994, in which the verdict had not 
yet been given.83 
Though Kentridge AJ listened to the state's argument that the Section 217(1 )(b)(it) 
presumption "did not relate to any element of the offence charged, but merely to the 
voluntary character of the confession",84 the learned acting judge, following the 
reasoning in the Canadian judgment in R v Whyte, remarked that it would be possible 
in some cases for a conviction to be based solely on a confession admitted under of 
Section 217(1 )(b){i1), "notwithstanding the Court's reasonable doubt that it was freely 
and voluntarily made. The practical effect of the presumption is that the accused may 
be required to prove a fact on the balance of probabilities in order to avoid conviction."85 
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Regarding the state's further argument that the court could in appropriate cases reject 
admissible but unfairly prejudicial evidence, he ruled that the presumption of innocence 
could not depend on the exercise of a judicial discretion, the authority for the existence 
of which was still in dispute.86 After carefully considering the state's argument that, in 
the alternative, the Section 217(1 (b}(it) presumption could be salvaged by the limitation 
clause,87 he concluded that it did not meet the criteria laid down in the limitation clause, 
and should, therefore, be declared invalid.88 
THE (INTERIM) CONSTITUTION AND MATTERS 'PENDING' BEFORE 27 APRIL 
1994 
Before the intervention of the Constitutional Court, this question was a subject of heated 
debate in various courts. 89 At the heart of it all was a proper meaning to be ascribed to 
the controversial provisions of Section 241 (8) of the (interim) Constitution, which were 
to the effect that: 
(a]ll proceedings which immediately before the commencement of this 
Constitution were pending before any court of law, including any tribunal or 
reviewing authority established by or under law, exercising jurisdiction in 
accordance with the law then in force, shall be dealt with as if this Constitution 
had not been passed: Provided that if Cin appeal in such proceedings is noted or 
review proceedings with regard thereto are instituted after such commencement 
such proceedings shall be brought before the Court having jurisdiction under this 
Constitution. (my italics) 
On this question the judges of the Constitutional Court themselves were divided in S v 
Mhlungu and Others.90 On the one hand, Kentridge AJ, for the minority of the judges,91 
on the basis that the Court was "not entitled to depart from the clear language of the 
section,"92 concluded that Section 241 (8) excluded the application of the substantive 
provisions of the Constitution in cases that were pending when the Constitution 
became law.93 Thus, for them, the Constitutional Court's ruling in S v Zuma and Others 
"must remain limited to ... proceedings which began on or after 27 April 1994, ie which 
were not pending on that date. We cannot override Section 241(8)."94 
On the other hand, Mahomed J (as he then was), for the majority,95 supported by 
Kriegler J and Sachs J,96 ruled that, properly construed, the provisions of Section 241 (8) 
of the Constitution, the basic object of which the learned judge said was merely "to 
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preserve the authority of Courts dealing with pending matters to continue to discharge 
their functions as such Courts",97 did not preclude the enjoyment of the benefits of the 
Constitution, especially Chapter 3 thereof, by persons whose cases were pending 
before 27 April 1994 when the Constitution became operative. Agreeing with 
Mahomed J, Kriegler J pithily stated that he shared with Mahomed J and Sachs J 
a profound disbelief that the framers of the Constitution could conceivably have 
purported to give, with one hand, the fundamental rights and freedoms to all, 
only, surreptitiously with the other, to withhold its benefits from many thousands 
of persons whose criminal cases must have been pending on 27 April 1994. 
On this basis, the majority of the judges concluded that the accused "were entitled to 
invoke the protection of the Constitution in the attack on s 217(1(b)(ii) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act ... "98 They thus extended the benefits of the Constitutional Court's 
decision in S v Zuma and Others99 to all cases, irrespective of whether they 
"commenced before, on or after 27 April 1994 ... in which the final verdict was or may 
be given after 27 April 1994."100 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE Two DECISIONS 
The presumption contained in the provisions of Section 217(1 )(b)(il) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act has, since the advent of the (interim) Constitution, ceased being part 
of our law. 101 Thus, in all cases where the state seeks to rely on a confession, 
irrespective of when they commenced, it will now have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that such a confession was made by the accused freely and voluntarily and 
without any undue influence. Our courts, like courts in all civilised societies, are once 
again in a position to insist that "before extra-judicial statements can be admitted in 
evidence the prosecution must ... prove beyond reasonable doubt that the statement 
was not obtained in a manner which should be reprobated and was therefore in the 
truest sense voluntary."102 
However, though the Section 217(1 )(b)(il) presumption is now gone, confessions made 
to peace officers other than magistrates are still inadmissible in evidence in terms of the 
remainder of the proviso to Section 217(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, unless they 
are confirmed and reduced to writing in the presence of a magistrate or justice. 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 251 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
Moreover, the provisions of Section 217(1 )(b)(1), which, in my opinion, would make 
sense only if linked to the now invalid Section 217(1 (b)(it), are still intact, so that a 
confession made to a magistrate and reduced to writing by him or her or which has 
been made and reduced to writing in his or her presence is admissible in evidence upon 
its mere production if it meets the requirements of this sub-paragraph. 
If this unnecessary encumbrance and pretence 103 too could be removed, our system of 
criminal justice shall have fully reverted to the common law position as reflected in 
Section 217(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, where the only enquiry is whether or 
not the confession was made by the accused freely and voluntarily, in his or her sound 
and sober senses, without any undue influence, and not also to whom it was made. In 
other words, it is my contention that the whole proviso to Section 217(1) is unnecessary. 
It is obvious that in this respect as in many others, at the very least, an amendment to 
the Criminal Procedure Act is required. I join Langa Jin his hope that "it will not be 
long before a revised Criminal Procedure Act, consistent with the Constitution, is put in 
place."104 That may help address numerous shortcomings and obvious elements of 
unconstitutionality in the Act which otherwise will have to wait till proper "cases and 
controversies" are appropriately before the Constitutional Court. 
THE COURT AND STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL 
The Constitutional Court, it should further be observed, carefully pointed out that its 
decision in Zuma was not doing away with all statutory provisions which create 
presumptions in criminal cases. 105 Nor does it seek to invalidate every reverse onus 
provision in our law.106 The Court fully recognised "the social need for effective 
prosecution of crime", and that in certain instances some reasonable presumptions may 
indeed come in handy in this regard. 107 In other words, precisely because statutory 
presumptions are not intrinsically constitutionally invalid, the merits and demerits of 
each one of them will have to be evaluated. 
In Canada too, not all statutory presumptions, not even those found in reverse onus 
clauses, are per se invalid. In R v Appleby, 108 for example, the Canadian Supreme 
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Court held that the presumption of innocence did not preclude all reverse onus clauses; 
a clause of that nature would be valid if it had four characteristics, namely: 
(1) it must apply only after certain facts have been established by evidence led 
by the Crown; 
(2) there must be a "rational connection" between the facta probanda109 and the 
conclusions to be deemed under the reverse onus clause; 
(3) the proof required of the accused must be of facts which he or she could 
reasonably be expected to prove or disprove; 110 and 
( 4) the standard of proof required of the accused must be a balance of 
probabilities and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.111 
In R v Shelley112 the Canadian Supreme Court, using these characteristics, held that 
a reverse onus clause which failed to meet anyone of them would be invalid. An even 
more interesting decision in R v Oakes, 113 which is relevant to the discusion of Section 
21 (1 )(a)(t) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act114 which follows hereunder, was 
based on the same considertions. 
SECTION 21(1)(A}(1) OF THE DRUGS AND 
DRUG TRAFFICKING ACT 
Under the provisions of Section 21 (1 )(a)(t) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 
persons convicted of possession of more than 115 grams of dagga115 were presumed 
to be dealing in the drug, until the contrary was proved by them on a balance of 
probabilities. 
THE VALIDITY OF SECTION 21(1)(A)(l) OF THE DRUGS AND DRUG 
TRAFFICKING ACT 
The case of S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso, 116 in which the accused had been found 
guilty in magistrates' courts of posession of dagga in excess of 115 grams came before 
the Constitutional Court by way of reference from the Cape Provincial Division of the 
Supreme Court117 in terms of the (interim) Constitution.118 In both Bhulwana119 and 
Gwadiso the Cape Provincial Division held that the evidence would not have been 
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sufficient to convict the accused of dealing in dagga but for the presumption in Section 
21 (1 )(a)(t) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act. The Constitutional Court was thus 
called upon to determine the constitutionality of the presumption, upon which depended 
the correctness of the conviction of the accused. 
The plain effect of Section 21 (1 )(a)(t) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act, as 
Marais J correctly pointed out in S v Bhulwana, 120 was that once the accused was 
proved to have been in possession 121 of dagga in excess of 115 grams, he or she was 
presumed to have been dealing in the drug, 122 unless he or she established the contrary 
on a balance of probabilities. In other words, once the State had proved possession of 
the drug in excess of the statutory limit, the onus shifted to the accused. 123 However, 
for this presumption to come into operation, the State, according to the Appellate 
Division in S v Jacobs,124 was also required to prove that the accused knew that what 
he or she was in possession of was dagga. Moreover, as Trollip JA pointed out in S v 
Majola, 125 the presumption could not operate where the possession of dagga was not 
proved but presumed. 
Furthermore, this reverse onus presumption, according to a Natal judgment in S v 
Kubheka, 126 applied only in respect of prepared or dried dagga and not to a dagga plant 
or freshly cut, moist dagga. However, it is to be noted that watering a single dagga plant 
with the necessary intention was regarded as dealing in the drug. 127 
The Constitutional Court once again traversed our own, as well as foreign, case law for 
the meaning of the phrase "unless the contrary is proved", which was contained in the 
relevant provision. It concluded that Section 21 (1 )(a)(t) constituted a reverse onus 
provision which shifted the burden of proof onto the accused. The effect of this was that, 
even where the accused raised a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he or she was 
dealing in dagga, if he or she failed to show on a balance of probabilities that he or she 
was not dealing in the drug, he or she would be convicted of dealing in it. 128 
Because of the likelihood of a conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt 
as to the accused's guilt, the Court also dealt with the justifiability of the Section 
21 (1 )(a)(t) presumption under Section 33(1) of the (interim) Constitution. 129 It 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 254 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
concluded that the Section 21 (1 )(a)(t) presumption could not be justified in terms of 
Section 33(1) of the Constitution. Although the Court accepted the social need to 
suppress illicit drug trafficking as an urgent and a pressing one, it could not see how the 
presumption furthered such an objective. While the presumption constituted a palpable 
infringement of the right to be presumed innocent till proven guilty beyond reasonable 
doubt, it also could not see any logical connection between the proved possession of 
dagga and the presumed dealing therein. 130 
In sum, O'Regan J, in whose judgment the rest of the members of the Constitutional 
Court concurred, found that the presumption in Section 21 (1 )(a)(t) of the Drugs and 
Drug Trafficking Act was invalid because it infringed the right to a fair trial v1hich was 
guaranteed in the (interim) Constitution. In particular it concluded that the Section 
21(1)(a)(t) presumption violated the presumption of innocence and therefore offended 
Section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution. 131 It thus declared that the provisions of Section 
21 (1 )(a)(t) as well as the words "dagga or" in Section 21 (1 )(a) were invalid and of no 
force or effect. 132 In order to obviate a situation where the litigants who were otherwise 
successful, were not to obtain the relief they were entitled to, the Court then ruled in 
terms of Section 98(6)(a) of the (interim) Constitution that the order invalidating 
Section 21 (1 )(a}(t) presumption should also invalidate any application thereof "in any 
criminal trial in which the verdict of the trial court was entered after the Constitution 
came into force, and in which, as at the date of this judgment, either an appeal or 
review is pending or the time for the noting of an appeal has not yet expired."133 
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE BHULWANA JUDGMENT 
In the light of this judgment, the State now has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
an accused charged with dealing in dagga was actually dealing in the drug and was not 
merely in possession thereof. Otherwise the accused will be convicted of possession 
of the drug only. 
Of particular note, however, is the fact that the Bhulwana judgment was, as stated 
above, confined specifically to the provisions of Section 21 (1 )(a}(t) of the Drugs and 
Drug Trafficking Act; the Court, in other words, was, wittingly or unwittingly, concerned 
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with the application of the presumption in dagga cases as referred to in Section 21(1)(a) 
only. 134 As a result of this narrow approach, the Section 21(1)(a) reverse onus 
presumption in respect of dealing in drugs other than dagga was left intact.135 Therefore, 
a person found in possession of cocaine or mandrax, for example, would still be 
affected by the reverse onus presumption and denied his or her basic constitutional 
right to be presumed innocent as though the Bhulwana judgment of the Constitutional 
Court had not been pronounced. If he or she failed to rebut the presumption, he or she 
might be found guilty of dealing in drugs other than dagga even if he or she had raised 
a reasonable doubt, the mischief O'Regan J had apparently set out to address in 
Bhulwana. 136 
Though it accepted that in general to shift the onus to an accused would offend the right 
to be presumed innocent, 137 the Court was, for some strange reason, not prepared mero 
motu to extend the declaration of invalidity to other similarly worded presumptions in the 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act as it had earlier on done in S v Makwanyane and 
Another, 138 for example. If anything, its earlier decision 139 to tread rather cautiously in 
the area of statutory presumptions was reaffirmed in Bhulwana. However, one is left 
to wonder why, if the relevant reverse onus presumption was inconsistent with the 
Constitution in respect of dagga, it was not regarded as being similarly inconsistent 
with regard to other drugs and narcotics as well. 
Thus, unless Parliament intervened and passed appropriate legislation, the obviously 
offensive and unconstitutional reverse onus provisions in the Drugs and Drug 
Trafficking Act (and in other statutes) would obviously remain applicable140 till their 
validity was raised in concrete proceedings. Accused persons affected by them might 
be prejudiced for a very long time unless and until someone was prepared to contest 
their validity or some judge raised mero motu their validity and referred the question to 
the Constitutional Court for a decision. 141 
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 
DRUGS AND DRUG 21(1)(A)(111) OF THE 
TRAFFICKING ACT 
Gutto 142 ascribed this narrow incremental approach adopted by the Court when 
confronted with a challenge to strike down legislation to 'caution', which he said "is a 
recognised rule in the interpretation of laws relating to rights and freedoms". Precisely 
because of this 'caution', it was not surprising at all that, within a short space of time, 
the Constitutional Court had, Jo, once again, consider the validity of a similar reverse 
onus presumption contained in the provisions of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act. 
In S v Julies 143 the Court had to deal with the provisions of Section 21 (1 )(a){iil) of the 
Act, in terms of which, if an accused person had been proved in a prosecution to have 
been "found in possession of any undesirable dependence-producing substance, other 
than dagga", it was presumed, until the contrary was proved by the accused person, 
that he or she dealt in such substance. 
Needless to say, the Court, observing that the same reasoning it had previously 
adopted in S v Bhulwana;S v Gwadiso applied a fortiori to the presumption in 
question,144 came to a unanimous conclusion that the provisions of Section 21 (1 )(a)(iii) 
of the Act were in conflict with the (interim) Constitution and declared them to be 
invalid and of no force and effect. 145 The Julies case, in my humble submission, could 
have been avoided if the Court had utilised its power in terms of Section 98(2) of the 
(interim) Constitution and dealt once and for all with all similar presumptions in the Act 
in Bhulwana, and not piecemeal. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 40(1) 
OF THE ARMS AND AMMUNITION ACT 
As stated above, the question of the validity of the presumption contained in Section 
40(1) of the Arms and Ammunition Act was dealt with by the Constitutional Court in 
S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo, 146 in which the applicants had faced charges for illegal 
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possession of arms and ammunition in contravention of Sections 32(1 )(a) and 32(1 )(e) 
of the Anns and Ammunition Act. Langa J, speaking on behalf of the Court, pointed 
out that as a legal presumption, it had similar features to the one discussed in the 
Bhulwana case above, the effect of which was to relieve the prosecution of the burden 
of proof with regard to an essential element of the offence. 147 On the basis of O'Regan 
J's ruling in Bhulwana, the learned judge of the Constitutional Court easily came to the 
conclusion that the Section 40(1) presumption indeed violated the right of an accused 
to be presumed innocent in terms of Section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution. 148 
The next question the learned judge considered was whether the presumption could, 
nevertheless, be salvaged by the general limitation clause. 149 After subjecting it and the 
contention of the State to the test developed by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane and 
Another, 150 Langa J came to the conclusion that the Section 40(1) presumption was not 
shown to be reasonable and justifiable as required by the Constitution. 151 Having found 
the presumption to have been inconsistent with the Constitution and unreasonable and 
unjstifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, the 
learned judge then declared that it was, with effect from the date of the Mbatha 
judgment, invalid and of no force or effect. 152 
THE LEGAL /MPLICA T/ONS OF THE MBA THA DECISION 
Due to the Constitional Court's well-reasoned decision in Mbatha, the prosecution now 
has to prove possession of arms and/or ammunition beyond reasonable doubt before 
a court can convict an accused person thereon. In this regard, the right of an accused 
person "to be presumed innocent and to remain silent ... and not to testify during trial"153 
has thus been accorded full respect. 
However, the Mbatha decision too did not deal with all the similarly worded 
presumptions in the Act, some of the provisions of which were being impugned; the 
Constitutional Court simply concerned itself with the question that arose in, and was 
referred to it by, the Court a quo, namely the constitutionality of Section 40(1) of the 
Arms and Ammunition Act. 
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The presumption that a person who was found in possession of an arm or ammunition 
at any particular time in violation of Section 37(1) of the Arms and Ammunition Act 
was a juvenile under the age of sixteen years, for instance, was left intact. Thus, until 
either a proper referral is made to the Constitutional Court in this regard, or Parliament 
intervenes and changes the law, such a person shall, upon proof of possession by him, 
or her, as the case may be, "be presumed then to have been under the age of sixteen 
years, until the contrary is proved."154 (my emphasis) 
The same applies to the reverse onus presumption affecting any accused person who 
it is alleged permitted or enabled a juvenile under the age of sixteen years to be in 
possession of an arm or ammunition. Despite the Mbatha decision, "such a person 
shall, upon proof of possession by the juvenile of such arm or ammunition, be presumed 
to have permitted or enabled the juvenile to be in possession of such arm or 
ammunition, until it is proved that he was unable to prevent the juvenile from obtaining 
possession of the arm or ammunition."155 
Lastly, Mbatha left the presumptions in Sections 40(2) and 40(3) of the Arms and 
Ammunition Act intact. I venture to suggest that all the problems Langa J quite rightly 
identified with regard to Section 40(1) of the Act would equally apply to the provisions 
of these sections as well, and for the same reasons, ought to have been declared 
invalid and of no force and effect. All these presumptions too could lead to the 
conviction of innocent persons who fail to disprove them on a balance of probabilities. 
THE VALIDITY OF SECTIONS 245 AND 332(5) 
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 
The Constitutional Court found occasion in 5 v Coetzee and Others 156 to grapple with 
the validity of Sections 245157 and 332(5)158 of the Criminal Procedure Act. As Langa 
J pointed out, the presumption in Section 245 fell into the class of "reverse 
onus"provisions that had already been dealt with previously by the Court. 159 The learned 
Judge had no problem finding that the provisions of Section 245 clearly infringed "the 
presumption of innocence ... entrenched in ... the Constitution."160 He also found that 
the provisions of Section 245 did not pass the test of the general limitation clause. 161 
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Similarly, the learned Judge did not find it difficult to come to the conclusion that Section 
332(5) offended against the right to be presumed innocent which was enshrined in the 
(interim) Constitution.162 The provisions of Section 332(5) could not be salvaged by the 
general limitation clause, the learned Judge further found. 163 
In the result, the Court declared both sections to be inconsistent with the (interim) 
Constitution, invalid and of no force or effect. 164 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THER!GHTTOAFAIR TRIALAND OUR 
APPEALS PROCEDURES 
INTRODUCTION 
In S v Ntuli1 and in S v Rens,2 the Constitutional Court had occasion to grapple with the right to a fair trial3 in relation to some aspects of our appeals procedures. As 
Didcott J noted in S v Ntuli,4 the processes involved in the two matters, which related 
to affording access, for the purposes of the order or relief sought, to a court higher than 
the court of first instance, had some features in common. 
In the first case, the issue was whether the provisions of Section 309(4)(a)5 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act,6 , were unconstitutional. Essentially this section provided that 
no person who had been convicted by a lower court of an offence, and was undergoing 
imprisonment for that offence or for any other offence, was entitled to prosecute in 
person any proceedings for appeal against the proceedings relating to such conviction 
unless a judge of the provincial or local division having jurisdiction had certified that 
there were reasonable grounds for appeal. 
With the provisions of this section, which limited the right of appeal of a prisoner without 
professional legal assistance, the legislature ostensibly wished to prevent prisoners 
from abusing the right to conduct their own appeals.7 As the purposes of review and 
appeal as well as the procedures which ought to be followed in regard to the one or the 
other differ, the prisoner-applicant seeking, and the judge issuing, a judge's certificate 
would have to indicate clearly whether appeal or review was being referred to.8 
Penuel! M. Maduna • LLD Thesis 270 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
The requisite judge's certificate, it must be noted, did not grant a prisoner leave to 
appeal; it merely granted him or her leave to prosecute in person an appeal already 
noted under Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, the refusal to grant 
such a certificate was not a refusal to allow an appeal to be prosecuted in the usual 
way.9 
In the second case, the question to be determined was whether the relevant provisions 
of the Criminal Procedure Act10 requiring a person convicted by a superior court of an 
offence to apply for leave to appeal against such conviction and sentence,11 and, in the 
course of such application, to satisfy the trial court on a balance of probabilities that 
there were reasonable prospects of success on appeal, were unconstitutional by reason 
of inconsistency with Section 25(3)(h) of the (interim) Constitution. 12 The relevant 
provisions of the Act were inherited from our past criminal justice systems, 13 and had 
been applied in many instances in the history of our legal system before the 
Constitutional Court's judgment in S v Rens. 14 
Applications for leave to appeal may be made orally at the end of the trial by the 
accused person or by his or her legal representative. Alternatively, the person affected 
may apply in writing for leave to appeal within a specified period. The procedure allows 
for condonation of late applications in appropriate instances. The test for reasonable 
prospects of success on appeal is lower than that applied to determine whether the 
appeal should succeed. 15 All that is required is that there should be a reasonable 
prospect of success on appeal. 16 The test of reasonable prospects of success on 
appeal applies to both questions of law and fact. 17 
In principle, leave to appeal is granted only after a sentence has been imposed. This 
principle helps prevent appeals from being handled piecemeal. 18 However, in very rare 
and special circumstances, such as was the case in S v Majola and S v Augustine, 19 
for example, a departure from this principle is allowed. 
According to Section 316(1 ), an accused person convicted of any offence before a 
superior court may apply for leave to appeal against his or her "conviction or against 
any sentence or order following thereon". An accused person convicted of any offence 
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before any such court on the basis of a plea of guilty may only note an appeal and apply 
for leave to appeal only against any sentence or order following thereon. However, as 
the Appellate Division decision in S v Mavhungu20 shows, the fact that a person 
pleaded guilty in a superior court to a charge of murder does not prevent him or her 
from appealing against a conviction which was based on such a plea. 
A judge granting leave to appeal is required not only to give reasons for his or her 
decision but also to indicate in respect of which aspects of the matter that is done.21 
The two cases are now to be discussed seriatim. 
SVNTULI 
SECTION 309(4)(A) 
In this case, the person concerned, Nicko Ntuli, who had not been legally represented 
at his trial, was convicted by a regional magistrate of rape, attempted murder and 
assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and sentenced to imprisonment for an 
effective aggregate period of thirteen years. Ntuli noted an appeal and sought to 
prosecute it personally as he apparently could not, at that stage,22 afford the costs of 
legal representation. Due to the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act,23 
however, he could not do so. Though Cloete J of the Witwatersrand Local Division, 
within the jurisdiction of which the matter fell, concluded that there were no prospects 
of success on appeal whatever, the matter was nonetheless mero motu referred24 to the 
Constitutional Court for its decision. 
The Constitutional Court itself, after a perusal of the record, instructed both sides to also 
address it on whether the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, which 
applied only to convicts who were not legally represented, 25 infringed the provisions of 
Section 8(1 )26 or (2)27 [or both] of the (interim) Constitution, and if so, whether the 
infringement was permissible under the (interim) Constitution.28 The Court 
acknowledged that the Section 309(4)(a) requirement of a judge's certificate obviously 
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operated, in each case affected by it, as a restriction on the full access to the Supreme 
Court which was enjoyed by those who were free to prosecute their similar appeals to 
finality and usable for the determination of the appeals themselves. 29 It further held that 
that requirement, which sounded rather vague and which frustrated the enjoyment of 
a basic right, namely access to a higher court than that of first instance, was 
incompatible with the provisions of Section 25(3)(h) of the (interim) Constitution.30 
Didcott J also held that it followed, in his opinion, that the requirement was also 
inconsistent with the equality clause, particularly Section 8(1) of the (interim) 
Constitution.31 Though accepting it as trite that "differentiation does not amount per se 
to unequal treatment in the constitutional sense",32 the learned judge of the 
Constitutional Court held that the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 
violated both Sections 25(3)(h) and 8(1) of the (interim) Constitution,33 as they unfairly 
discriminated against particularly those who laboured under the greatest disadvantage 
in managing their appeals without that extra handicap, namely the Section 309(4)(a) 
requirement. 
The next question to be considered was whether the provisions of Section 309( 4 )(a) of 
the Act were, nonetheless, saved by the general limitation clause.34 Didcott J opined 
that the statutory provisions failed both the test of reasonableness and that of 
justifiablity in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.35 
Therefore, they could not be allowed to stand. 36 
The Court then had to grapple with the possibility of abuse of a total abolition of the 
requirement of the judges' certificates. After having considered the statistics presented 
to the Court in argument, Didcott J assumed that, for the time being at any rate, the total 
of appeals from magistrates' courts would be swollen substantially by allowing prisoners 
who until then needed certificates to appeal in future without them. The learned judge 
was of the opinion that Parliament needed time to address the issue and concluded that 
it was in the interests of justice and good government for the Court to provide the 
opportunity for it to do so. 37 
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In the result, the provisions of Section 309(4)(a) were adjudged to be invalid on the 
score of their inconsistency with the (interim) Constitution.38 The Court,39 however, 
suspended the declaration of invalidity and ordered Parliament to remedy the defect 
by 30 April 1997;40 pending action by Parliament within the specified period, the 
provisions of Section 309(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act would thus remain valid. 
The matter was remitted to the Witwatersrand Local Division which was instructed to 
deal with it accordingly. 
SECTION305 
The most unfortunate thing is that the Constitutional Court did not extend this judgment 
to the provisions of Section 305 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, pending 
successful litigation on this point, though Section 305 would have the same 
discriminatory effect as the impugned Section 309(4)(a) of the Act, which were quite 
correctly adjudged to be constitutionally invalid, a person convicted by a lower court of 
an offence and undergoing imprisonment for that offence or any other offence, shall still 
not be entitled to prosecute in person any proceedings for the review of the proceedings 
relating to such conviction unless a judge of the provincial or local division having 
jurisdiction has certified that there are reasonable grounds for review. Once again, the 
Constitutional Court was not prepared to use its power as the court of final instance 
over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the 
provisions of the (interim) Constitution41 to intervene and curb the obvious injustice and 
unconstitutionality immanent within Section 305. 
SVRENS 
In this case, the applicant42 had been convicted in criminal proceedings before a 
provincial division of the Supreme Court sitting as a court of first instance. After 
conviction and sentence, the applicant had applied for leave to appeal. Though the 
court a quo had concluded that there were no reasonable prospects of success on 
appeal, it had nonetheless referred the question of whether the provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Act,43 in terms of which an apeal in the case of proceedings in a 
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superior court shall lie only as provided in Section 316 to 319 of the Act, and not as a 
matter of right, were unconstitutional by reason of their apparent inconsistency with the 
provisions of the (interim) Constitution.44 
The Criminal Procedure Act,45 as stated above, requires a person who has been 
convicted by a superior court to apply for leave to appeal against both conviction and 
sentence, if he or she wishes to appeal. If the trial court refuses leave to appeal, the 
Act46 makes provision for the convicted person to petition the Chief Justice. Apparently, 
the underlying purpose of these provisions, which were even given constitutional 
recognition,47 is to ensure that the work load of appellate courts is not made more 
cumbersome by requiring them to deal with appeals where there are no reasonable 
prospects of success. 
On the face of it, the provisions requiring leave to appeal48 seem to have been 
repugnant to and in conflict with the provisions of Section 25(3}(h) of the (interim) 
Constitution which, as stated above, guaranteed to every accused person the right to 
a fair trial, including the right "to have recourse by way of appeal or review to a higher 
court than the court of first instance". However, the provisions of Section 25(3)(h) seem 
to have been qualified by Section 102(11) of the (interim) Constitution.49 It would thus 
appear that appeals to the Appellate Division and the Constitutional Court were not 
automatic. To paraphrase Magid J, the right to appeal to the Appellate Division or the 
Constitutional Court was not an absolute right of appeal.50 
The Constitutional Court had to reconcile those two seemingly conflicting provisions of 
the (interim) Constitution. Madala J stated that, as a matter of principle, 
[i]t is not to be assumed that provisions in the same constitution are contradictory 
and the two provisions should, if possible, be construed in such a way as to 
harmonise with one another.51 
For the learned judge, the basic right protected by Section 25(3) was the fairness of the 
trial, a criterion with which Section 102(11) had to be consistent, whether interpreted 
narrowly or extensively.52 With particular reference to Section 25(3)(h), the learned 
judge concluded that what was required was that "provision be made either for an 
appeal in the conventional manner, or for a review in the sense of a re-assessment of 
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the issues by a court higher than that in which the accused was convicted. Such a 
construction would bring the provisions of section 25(3 )(h) and section 102( 11 ) into 
harmony with one another."53 
Madala J concurred with Magid J who concluded in S v Bhengu54 that Section 25(3)(h) 
of the (interim) Constitution had not created an absolute right of appeal.55 The learned 
judge considered the provisions of Sections 316-319 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
not to be unfair, though no provision for oral argument or a full re-hearing of the matter 
was made.56 
The learned judge further reaffirmed (ex abundanti cautela) that "[t]he full bench is 
clearly a higher tribunal than a court composed of a judge sitting alone with or without 
assessors.''57 Thus, an appeal to a court higher than that of first instance may also mean 
an appeal to the full bench. Only the Appellate Division is entitled to grant leave to 
appeal against a decision or order of a full court acting as a court of appeal. 
Though in the heads of argument the applicant had not mentioned the applicability of 
the equality clause to his matter, Madala J canvassed that issue after it had been 
presented in argument. The learned judge's conclusion was that the equality clause 
would not help the applicant in his matter. Of particular note was the learned judge's 
statement that: 
[t]he principle that there be equality before the law and equal protection of the 
law does not require identical procedures to be followed in respect of appeals 
from or to different tiers of courts. As long as all persons appealing from or to a 
particular court are subject to the same procedures the requirement of equality 
is met ... it is quite rational that different procedures be followed in the different 
courts given the different circumstances.58 
The Court59 thus found that the provisions of Section 316 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act were not inconsistent with Section 8 or 25(3)(h) of the (interim) Constitution.60 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND THE 
RIGHT TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
T he right of access to one's legal adviser1 and the right to professional legal assistance2 are inextricably bound up with the right to a fair tria/,3 a principle which 
even in the heyday of apartheid was accorded respect by our judiciary.4 As NC Steytler 
pointed out, 
[o]ne of the fundamental principles of a fair trial is that the accused should be 
afforded the opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes which 
may affect his interests. To assist him in such participation he is entitled to be 
represented by a lawyer, whose duty it will be to ensure that the opportunity to 
participate is afforded and utilized fully. In undefended cases, on the other hand, 
the accused bears that responsibility.5 
The nature of our accusatorial trial system6 makes legal representation in our criminal 
trials extremely desirable, irrespective of the station in life an accused person occupies. 
In this regard, the remarks of Sutherland J in Powell v Alabama7 are apposite. The 
learned judge of the US Supreme Court said that: 
[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the 
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without 
the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted 
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his 
defence, even though he may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand 
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he 
may not be guilty, he faces the danger of conviction, because he does not know 
how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much 
more true is it of the ignorant and the illiterate or those of feeble intellect.8 
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Prior to the adoption of the (interim) Constitution, however, the accused in criminal 
proceedings did not have a right to be assisted in their defence at the instance of the 
fiscus. The government in fact once saw providing legal aid to the indigent accused as 
subsidizing crime. 9 Though the right to professional legal assistance was recognised in 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 10 all it entailed was that an accused person may not be 
deprived of the opportunity to engage the services of a lawyer, if he or she could afford 
the cost of his or her (ie the lawyer's) services. 11 Where an accused could not afford the 
services of a lawyer, he or she had no right to demand that a lawyer should be 
appointed on his or her behalf. 12 
Under our law the right of access to a legal adviser is available to the person who can 
afford the cost of legal services from the time of his or her arrest. 13 This right exists 
whether or not he or she has been formally charged with the commission of an offence; 
it can thus be exercised even where such a person has been detained as a suspect. 14 
Refusal on the part of the authorities to allow a person who has been arrested an 
opportunity to contact and be assisted by his or her legal adviser is not only contrary to 
the Criminal Procedure Act, but may also constitute an abuse of power.15 
However, this fundamental due-process right, needless to say, was available only to the 
affluent who could afford the cost of legal services, and not to the indigent. 16 It was, as 
Didcott J remarked, "a right to representation which no pauper can hope to exercise."17 
To paraphrase Steytler,18 the majority of accused persons in South Africa, who are 
indigent, illiterate or under-educated, inexperienced and unfamiliar with the official 
languages used in our Courts, would not be able to participate effectively in court 
proceedings without professional legal assistance. They, the wretched of the earth, 
would routinely confront the criminal justice system, in a foreign and hostile territory, 
completely unassisted. And yet the mighty State would be utilising the financial 
resources at its disposal to hire as prosecutors persons trained in law. 19 
Needless to say, the majority of the indigent accused persons, to whom the criminal 
justice system was, and still is, inaccessible, were, and still are, blacks. The grave 
injustice done to such persons is there for all and sundry to see: "Many are illiterate or 
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barely literate. Few speak or understand either official language, or cope well enough 
to hold their own in a tongue that remains foreign to them. What is said in our 
courtrooms to each of the rest, what he in turn says there, must therefore be 
interpreted, word for word. But he is still not orientated. For much of our jurisprudence 
is alien to the culture and traditions of the society from which he springs. So are some 
of our procedures. Entangled in the workings of a legal machinery that bewilders him, 
he has the most to gain from a lawyer's help and the most to lose from the lack of it. Yet 
the barrier of poverty stands highest in his very case."20 (my emphasis) 
Our Courts intervened and, as a mere rule of practice,21 ensured that, at the very least, 
indigent accused persons in capital cases in the Supreme Court22 had the services of 
pro Deo counsel23 who were independent members of the bar and not in any way 
connected to the police and the prosecution.24 In most cases pro Deo counsel were 
junior members of the bar who were usually not assisted by instructing attorneys. 25 
Moreover, our Courts had no power to compel members of the bar to appear as pro 
Deo counsel in any matter;26 they could not properly issue a mandamus ordering the 
State to pay for professional legal assistance rendered to an accused person.27 
The provision of legal aid was for the first time given statutory footing with the 
enactment of the Legal Aid Act. 28 However, besides the attitude of the State,29 there 
was always the problem of affordability.30 Thus, the Legal Aid Board issued a stringent 
Legal Aid Guide which, inter a/ia, excluded indigent accused persons who, according 
to legal aid officers, led a criminal life or were unemployed for no good reason, or who 
were involved in cases where pro Deo counsel was provided. The Legal Aid Guide 
also excluded accused pesons in respect of offences for which an admission of guilt 
had been determined, or which could be compounded, or where the commission of the 
offence was admitted, or where the defence was so simple that it could be handled by 
the accused person himself or herself. Unless the director of legal aid granted 
permission due to exceptional circumstances, traffic offences and all offences 
connected with the use of a motor vehicle were also excluded. 31 
In other words, from the very outset, our legal aid scheme was never intended to be the 
kind of legal aid envisaged in US Court decisions such as Gideon v Wainwright32 and 
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Argersinger v Hamlin,33 for instance. However, as will be shown below, some of our 
brave and human rights-oriented judges tried, in very difficult and trying circumstances 
prior to the adoption of the (interim) Constitution, to ameliorate the position of the 
indigent accused. Some of them certainly might have thought that some space for 
innovation and judicial creativity had become open to them when the preamble to the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 198334 solemnly declared "one of our 
national goals" to be "the equality of all under the law".35 
THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL 
As observed above, our Courts have for a very long time recognised the importance of 
assistance by counsel in criminal proceedings, wherever possible and necessary, to 
ensure that every accused person has a fair trial. In S v Baloyi,36 for example, Margo 
J acknowledged that: 
[t]here are cases where, because of the gravity of the charge or the complexity 
of the matter, the accused ought in the interests of justice to be represented, 
even though he cannot afford it. In such cases, if a pro deo defence is not 
provided, it would be the duty of the Court to refer the matter to one of the legal 
aid bodies or to i~voke the assistance of one or other of the professional bodies 
to appoint a legal adviser to act without remuneration.37 
However, prior to the decision of Goldstone in S v Radebe; S v Mbonani,38 though 
some magistrates did advise the accused that they had a right to seek the assistance 
of legal counsel, the practice was far from universal. In other words, there was no firm 
rule along those lines. Goldstone J, a human rights standard-bearer of international 
repute, remarked that: 
[i]f there is a duty upon judicial officers to inform unrepresented accused of their 
legal rights, then I can conceive of no reason why the right to legal 
representation should not be one of them ... depending upon the complexity of 
the charge or of the legal rules relating thereto and the seriousness thereof, an 
accused should not only be told of this right but he should be encouraged to 
exercise it. He should also be informed in appropriate cases that he is entitled 
to apply to the Legal Aid Board for assistance. A failure on the part of a judicial 
officer to do this, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, may 
result in an unfair trial in which there may well be a complete failure of justice. I 
should make it clear that I am not suggesting that the absence of legal 
representation per se, or the absence of the suggested advice to an accused 
person per se, will necessarily result in ... an unfair trial and the failure of justice. 
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Each case will depend on its own facts and peculiar circumstances.39 (my 
emphasis) 
In S v Khanyile and Another,40 Didcott J agreed fully with Goldstone J. However, the 
learned judge of the Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court (as he then was) 
expressed displeasure that Goldstone J's judgment had not gone far enough in that it 
postulated an "accused person managing to obtain representation once he is advised 
that he may and should have it. "41 
Didcott J suggested that the time had come for our Courts to acknowledge that 
"relatively few of those charged in this country with crimes can afford to pay for the hire 
of a lawyer ... ", and for the spotlight to shift "from the right to a representation that is 
obtainable" to "a right to be provided with representation once it is wanted but otherwise 
out of reach."42 Putting it pithily and bluntly, he said: 
[a]nd the question arising is whether the time has not come at last for our Courts, 
which have long recognised and upheld the first right, to proclaim the second as 
a corollary, in some situations at Jeast. 43 (my emphasis) 
However, Didcott J acknowledged that there were two basic constraints afflicting our 
criminal justice system, namely inadequate funding of legal aid44 and the paucity of 
persons trained and experienced in the practice of law.45 For him these constraints 
entailed that as a jurisdiction we would "[f]or the time being ... have to manage as best 
we can with a dimmer light";46 he recognised, he declared,47 that we could not as yet 
attain the heights US jurisprudence had reached when the Gideon v Wainwright48 
case was decided. 
Heath J and Liebenberg AJ too, in Nakani v Attorney-General and Another,49 agreed 
with Goldstone J that an accused person should be told of his or her right to legal 
representation. However, the two learned judges disagreed with the decision of Didcott 
J in Khanyile that an indigent accused person was entitled to defence at State expense 
in certain circumstances. In S v Mabaso and Another,50 Hoexter JA too expressed his 
entire agreement with Goldstone J that an accused person had a right to be informed 
of his or her right to legal representation. 
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Subsequently, in S v Davids; S v Dladla,51 Didcott J52 declared53 that his decision in S 
v Khanyile and Another54 "was not the fashioning of a brand new right, but the 
elaboration and development of one well embedded in our law, the right to a fair trial or, 
to narrow that down to the component of it which interests us now, the right to be 
represented on trial." (my emphasis) As David McQuoid-Mason also pointed out,55 the 
decision in S v Khanyile and Another was "still decades behind notions of a fair trial 
in Anglo-American and Continental jurisdictions". It was "but a small step towards 
achieving 'equality of all under the law' ... in our criminal justice system and should not 
be seen as a giant leap by the Courts." 
According to Didcott J, mistrials declared on the grounds of no representation, as 
opposed to denials thereof, were to be restricted to cases of extreme hardship. These 
would be cases "where the lack of help had rendered the trials in all the circumstances 
'palpably and grossly unfair'."56 Nienaber J, in a dissenting judgment, rejected this 
notion,57 suggesting instead that, "whatever the position may be in countries other than 
our own, no rule of law, practice or procedure is transgressed should a court decide to 
proceed with a trial notwithstanding the absence of legal representation for the 
accused."58 As though this was not enough, the learned judge then crudely, cynically 
and insensitively added that "[t]hat this is so is, no doubt, a sad commentary on our 
inability to provide adequate and comprehensive legal aid to all in need of it ... But in 
the meantime the trial ... must proceed, affording proof of yet another of the inequities 
of poverty."59 
Bristowe J, while agreeing with Didcott J, said that the extension of the right as 
envisaged in S v Khanyile and Another should be applied conservatively.60 The 
learned judge described the decision in Khanyile as an extension of the right because 
before Khanyile no one had "ever insisted that an accused appearing in the 
magistrate's court must be represented upon pain of his conviction being set aside."61 
Lastly, Didcott J then said that "[i]t would no doubt have been better all round had the 
Appellate Division rather than a subordinate one responded to our social needs and the 
beckoning of modern jurisprudence by developing the right to representation in this part 
of the world. Apart from other benefits, the course it charted would have had to be 
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followed then throughout the land."62 As luck would have it, the opportunity for the 
Appellate Division to do so arose in S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana.63 
THE APPELLATE DIVISION INTERVENES 
In S v Rudman; S v Mthwana,64 the Appellate Division had to decide a question of 
procedure, namely whether an indigent accused person, who could not pay for his or 
her own defence, was entitled to be provided at his or her trial with legal representation, 
if necessary at the expence of the State. As Nicholas AJA pointed out, "[n]o such rule 
had ever been recognised in South Africa until it was proclaimed by Didcott J, with 
Friedman J concurring" in S v Khanyile and Another.65 Indeed, before the Khanyile 
decision, it had been suggested that "a criminal trial conducted without such 
representation was irregular or illegal. "66 
The learned acting judge of appeal did personally seem to be averse to Didcott J's 
decision in Khanyile; he in effect said that the maxim judicis est ius dicere sed non 
dare67 was not an obstacle to the adoption of the Khanyile rule.68 He further said that 
he did not think that the Appellate Division "would be precluded by the present state of 
the law on the point from adopting the Khanyile rule."69 The learned acting judge of 
appeal seems indeed to have been bowled over by the premise on which the Khanyile 
decision was based, the trenchant and persuasive appeal of which he found to be 
irresistible.70 
He then said that in order to decide whether or not to adopt the Khanyile rule, a 
question of principle and the question of feasibility would have to be considered. 71 On 
the first, being excessively careful not to adopt a rule that "would be coercive, if not with 
intention, then at any rate in effect", and being aware that "the Supreme Court has no 
power to issue a mandamus on the Government to provide legal aid", Nicholas AJA 
declared that the Court "should not adopt a rule the tendency of which would be to 
oblige the Government to do so."72 He also concluded that the implementation of the 
Khanyile rule would not be feasible in the Republic at the present time.73 
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THE POST-APRIL 271994 SITUATION 
The Constitution provided that every accused person "shall have the right to a fair trial, 
which shall include the right ... to be represented by a legal practitioner of his or her 
choice or, where substantial injustice would otherwise result, to be provided with legal 
representation at state expense, and to be informed of these rights."74 (my emphasis) 
Thus, the decision in S v Khumalo en Andere,75 namely that there is no legaJ 
requirement that a person must at the time of his or her arrest be informed that he or 
she is entitled to legal representation, is no longer part of our law. 
The common law position propounded by Goldstone Jin S v Radebe; S v Mbonani76 
has thus been given constitutional status. Accused persons are now to be informed at 
the beginning of their cases, as the constitutional system now requires them 
peremptorily to be, of their right to acquire the services of lawyers either on their own, 
if they can afford to, or, where they cannot, if substantial injustice may otherwise result, 
at the expense of the State. 
In S v Lombard en ·n Ander77 and in S v Vermaas,78 both of which were concerned 
with charges of a commercial nature which had developed into trials of considerable 
dimensions, the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court stopped the 
proceedings and referred questions relating, inter alia, to whether or not the accused 
could not benefit from the provisions of Section 25(3)(e) of the Constitution and have 
legal representatives appointed for their defence at the expense of the State. Du 
Plessis79 further wanted the Court to rule on whether, by virtue of that section, he had 
a right to be assisted and defenced by a lawyer of his own choice at the expense of the 
State. 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ENTERS THE 
FRAY 
In S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis,80 the Constitutional Court was called upon to decide 
whether Vermaas and Du Plessis were, or either of them was, entitled, on the strength 
of Section 25(3)(e) of the Constitution, to obtain legal representation at the cost of the 
State. Didcott J81 refused to venture an opinion on this question as the Court was ill-
equipped for the factual findings and assessments which the enquiry entailed.82 
According to the learned judge of the Constitutional Court, a decision on this question 
is pre-eminently one for the judge trying the case, a judge much better placed ... 
by and large to appraise, usually in advance, its ramifications and their 
complexity or simplicity, the accused person's aptitude or ineptitude to fend for 
himself or herself in a matter of those dimensions, how grave the consequences 
of a conviction may look, and any other factor that needs to be evaluated in the 
determination of the likelihood or unlikelihood that, if the trial were to proceed 
without a lawyer for the defence, the result would be "substantial injustice".83 
The question was, therefore, remitted to the Courts a quo.84 Both the trial judges would 
have to consider the question more fully and dispose of the cases one way or the other. 
The next question the Court had to grapple with was whether or not an indigent 
accused person, in whose interest the State supplied the services of a lawyer, could, 
once again on the strength of the provisions of Section 25(3)(e) of the Constitution, 
choose a lawyer for his or her defence. Didcott J agreed with Hartzenberg J that "no 
such right was derived from section 25(3)(e) when the State supplied the lawyer's 
services. "85 The right to choose a lawyer was reserved for those who could afford the 
lawyers' fees, in other words. Didcott J said that the effect of the disjunctive "or" which 
appeared in the section immediately before the reference to the prospect of "substantial 
injustice" was to differentiate clearly between two situations, the first being where the 
accused person could make his or her own arrangements for legal representations and 
the second being where the assistance of the State became imperative if substantial 
injustice was to be averted. The right to choose a lawyer belonged to the former 
category and not to the latter one. 86 
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JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Ultimately, Didcott J reluctantly conceded. that his long cherished ideal of a situation in 
South Africa where the fiscus would be willing and able to provide free legal assistance 
and representation in all cases involving the indigent where substantial injustice would 
otherwise result, would flounder on the rocks of affordability. He declared that "the 
Constitution does not envisage, and it will surely not brook, an undue delay in the 
fulfilment of any promise made by it about a fundamental right. One can safely assume 
that, in spite of section 25(3)(e), the situation still prevails where during every month 
countless thousands of South Africans are criminally tried without legal representation 
because they are too poor to pay for it. They are presumably informed ... of their right 
to obtain that free of charge in the circumstances it defines. Imparting such information 
becomes an empty gesture and makes a mockery of the Constitution, however, if it is 
not backed by mechanisms that are adequate for the enforcement of the right."87 (my 
emphasis) However, all is not lost; the basic principle that, where substantial injustice 
would otherwise result, the State has an obligation to provide legal aid to those accused 
persons who sorely need it, has been constitutionally established. It is now left to our 
Courts to determine what, in each case that comes before them, is in the interest of 
justice. 
Our Courts have already started using the space created by the advent of the new 
constitutional system and by Didcott J's interpretation of the fundamental right to legal 
representation. In Msila v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others,88 
for example, Ludorf J ordered that the applicant be provided with professional legal 
assistance to argue an application for legal aid as well as in his then pending trial. 89 
Subsequently, in Legal Aid Board v Msila and Others,9° Kroon J, with the other 
members of the Court concurring, held that, while accepting that the Legal Aid Board 
was entitled to prescribe a means test due to its financial constraints, "the means test 
... should not have come into the picture at all. As far as the applicant's financial 
resources were concerned the only question to be decided was ... whether or not the 
applicant was factually in a position to pay for his own legal representation ."91 
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Judges such as Froneman J92 and Noorbhai J,93 for example, have even regarded the 
mere failure on the part of a court to inform an accused person of his or her right to legal 
representation as a fatal irregularity and, in appropriate cases, even ordered the release 
of the affected persons from prison as a result. An interesting example of this was the 
case of one Patrick Mgcina, who had been convicted on charges of 'highjacking' and 
attempted murder and sentenced to imprisonment. According to Mungo Soggott, 
Mgcina was released from prison after serving only fifteen months of his sentence 
"when the Johannesburg High Court found that the magistrate who convicted him had 
not informed him of his right to a lawyer at the state's expense ... the judgment has 
created a crucial precedent and could have a huge impact as magistrates will now be 
forced to give accused people who do not have lawyers careful explanation of their 
constitutional right to representation."94 
According to the editor of the Sunday Times,95 the release of Mgcina was "followed by 
rumbles from lobbyists who want the Constitution changed to curb the rights of the 
accused and convicts." The editor opined that the civil servants who dealt with the 
case, and not the Constitution, were to blame; if Mgcina had been given legal aid or 
told by the magistrate of his right to request it, his constitutional right to a fair trial would 
not have been violated and he would, therefore, not have been released so untimely. 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 290 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
ENDNOTES - CHAPTEREIGHT 
1 .. Which, in S v Alexander (1), 1965 (2) SA 796 (A) at 808C-D, and subsequently in Minister of Prisons 
v Cooper, 1978 (3) SA 512 (C) at 520A, was described as a fundamental common-law right. In Mandela 
v Minister of Prisons, 1983 ( 1) SA 938 (A) at 9570 this right was described as a corollary of the right of 
access to the Courts. 
2 .. About the recognition of which in our law and jurisprudence see generally S v Mabaso and Another, 
1990 (3) SA 185 (A) at 201F-H. 
3 .. A concept which, according to 8ristowe Jin S v Davids; S v Dladla, 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 2021-J, 
is a relative one. 
4 .. In S v Tyebela, 1989 (2) SA 22 (A) at 29G-H, Milne JA indeed declared that '[i}t is a fundamental 
principle of our law, and indeed of any civilised society, that an accused person is entitled to a fair trial.' 
5 .. In The Undefended Accused on Trial (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1988), at 63. 
6 .. In which, as Didcott J observed in S v Khanyile and Another, 1988 (3) SA 795 (N) at 799A-8, 'the 
judicial officer is no inquisitor conducting his own investigations but an adjudicator who by and large must 
leave the management of the trials he hears and the combat waged in them to the adversaries thus 
engaged.' It is noted that, in any event, as Didcott J himself pointed out, the trial judge would be no 
substitute for legal counsel. See ibidem at 7988-7998. 
7 .. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
8 .. Ibidem at 68-69. Part of this passage was quoted with approval by Goldstone J in S v Radebe; S v 
Mbonani, 1988 (1) SA 191 {T) at 195E-G. 
9 .. Articulating the attitude of government, PC Pelser, then Minister of Justice in the (apartheid} Republic, 
is on record as having said that: "If legal aid is to give rise to the State having to guarantee to the skolly 
element who loaf about, snatch handbags, steal purses and remove money from people's pockets, the 
additional security of being defended free of charge by legal practitioners provided by the authorities when 
they appear in court, I can say even at this stage that the writing is on the wall. I want to put it very clearly 
that I shall never be a party to subsidizing crime." (my emphasis) See House of Assembly Debates, vol. 
25, col. 1496 (26 February 1969). 
10 .. Act No. 51of1977, Sections 73(1) and (2) of which merely confirm the fundamental procedural right 
to legal representation. See Didcott J in S v Khanyile and Another, supra at 8098-C on the meaning of 
these provisions and their forerunners. 
It is noted that Section 73(3) of the Act provides for situations where some qualified form of assistance 
may be rendered by third parties who are not lawyers. 
11 .. This picture, needless to say, has not changed fundamentally since John Dugard said this in his 
seminal work on human rights in South Africa, namely Human Rights and the South African Legal 
Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978) at 255. 
12 .. See generally S v Chaane en Andere, 1978 (2) SA 891 (A). 
13 .. Section 73(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The importance of the right to counsel at the pre-trial 
stage was emphasised by the US Supreme Court in Escobedo v Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) at 487-
488; and in Miranda v Arizona, 384U.S. 436 (1966). 
14 .. See Ngqulunga v Minister of Law and Order, 1983 (2) SA 696 (N) at 6988-C. 
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15 .. See S v Du Preez, 1991 (2) SACR 372 (Ck). See also generally Novick v Minister of Law and 
Order and Another, 1993 (1) SACR 194 (W). 
16 .. Didcott Jin S v Khanyile and Another, supra at 810C-D, said that "[e}very person accused of a 
crime and able to get a lawyer has the right to be defended by one. That he should be allowed to exercise 
the right is vital to the fairness of the proceedings ... A denial of the right ... makes the trial per se unfair. 
And any conviction that ensues will inevitably be upset. All this is by now, and has long been, axiomatic 
here." (my emphasis) 
17 .. Ibidem at 811G-H. 
18 .. The Undefended Accused on Trial, supra at 14. See also Didcott Jin S v Khanyile and Another, 
supra at 800F-G. 
19 .. Ibidem. See also Didcott J, ibidem at 811H-J. 
20 .. Per Didcott J, ibidem at 8121-8138. 
21.. And not as a right. See R v Mati and Others, 1960 (1) SA 304 (A) at 306; and S v Chaane en 
Andere, supra. 
22 .. In R v Mati and Others, supra at 306H-307 A, Schreiner JA said in this regard that: "There is no rule 
of law that a person who is being tried for an offence that may, if he is convicted, result in a death 
sentence must, unless he objects, be defended by counsel. But it is a well-established and most salutary 
practice that, whenever there is a risk that the death sentence may be imposed ... the State should 
provide defence by counsel if the accused has not made his own arrangements in that behalf. It is 
disquieting to think that under our system of procedure ... it is possible for an accused person to be ... 
sentenced to death after a trial in which, by reason of his poverty, he has had to conduct his own defence." 
(my emphasis) See also Nicholas AJA in S v Rudman; S v Mthwana, 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 3791-J. 
23 .. It it noteworthy that in S v Maduna and Others, 1978 (2) SA 777 (D) pro Deo counsel was provided 
even to a witness who had been detained for interrogation under the provisions of Section 6 of the 
Terrorism Act, 83of1967. 
24 .. The trial judge was required in terms of this rule of practice to reassure the accused that this was 
indeed the case. See S v Tyebela, supra. 
25 .. See DL Carey-Miller 'Some Aspects of Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings', in (1972) 89 SALJ 71, at 
72. See also S v Gibson, 1979 (4) SA 115 (D). In S v Mayo, 1990 (1) SACR 659 (E) at 661 C Jones J 
noted the difficulties experienced by pro Deo counsel who did not have the advantage of an instructing 
attorney. 
26 .. Per Nienaber Jin S v Davids; S v Dladla, 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 1971-198A. However, the learned 
judge observed at 198J-199A that the bar had assumed the burden of providing, and the State had 
assumed the burden of paying for, pro Deo counsel. 
27 .. Ibidem at 198A. See also Bristowe J, ibidem at 206G. 
28 .. Act No. 22 of 1969, which came into effect on 29 March 1971. 
29 .. For which see Pelser in the House of Assembly Debates, supra. 
30 .. See Steytler, The Undefended Accused on Trial, supra at 18. 
31 .. Ibidem at 17. 
32 .. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
33 .. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
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for another eleven years before its victims could exercise their inalienable right to vote, despite its 
perpetrators' avowed commitment to the principle of equality of all under the law. 
35 .. Save to say that, as Van Zyl Smit observed in (1988) 4 SAJHR 363 at 366, "[e]quality before the law 
is so manifestly incompatible with the possibility that an important right may be available only to a wealthy 
minority, those who can afford counsel, that judicial steps towards the elimination of this possibility'' could 
not be regarded as a fundamental innovation. 
36 .. 1978 (3) SA 290 (T). 
37 .. Ibidem at 293H-294A. 
38 .. Supra. 
39 .. Ibidem at 196F-J. See also Didcott Jin S v Khanyile and Another, supra at 818C-G. 
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40 .. Supra at 800C-D. See also Didcott Jin S v Davids; S v Dladla, 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 192H-193C; 
Nienaber J, ibidem at 194E-G, at 195A-196B and at 200C-D; and Bristowe J, ibidem at 204C-D and at 
2061-J. 
41.. Ibidem at BOOE. 
42 .. Ibidem at 800F-J. 
43 .. Ibidem at 801A. 
44 .. Ibidem at 813E-F. 
45 .. Ibidem at 814B-C. See also Didcott Jin S v Davids; S v Dladla, 1989 (4) SA 172 (N), at 184G-185A 
and at 186G-H. 
46 .. Ibidem at 814G. At 815C-816H Didcott J suggested what the Courts could do to determine the 
fairness or otherwise of acquiring or not acquiring legal aid or pro bona defence for an accused in a 
particular case. 
47 .. Ibidem at 814F-G. 
48 .. Supra. 
49 .. 1989 (3) SA 655 (Ck}. 
50 .. 1990 (3) SA 185 (A) at 2030-G. 
51.. 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 179. 
52 .. With whose approach Bristowe J broadly agreed after delivering his own judgment. Ibidem at 208J-
209A. 
53 .. Quite correctly in my view. 
54 .. Supra. 
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56 .. In S v Davids; S v Dladla, supra at 1858. 
57 .. Ibidem at 198F-I. 
58 .. Ibidem at 1980. See also 199F-200B. 
59 .. Ibidem at 200E. 
60 .. Ibidem at 205E. 
61 .. Ibidem at 205E-F. 
62 .. Ibidem at 180E-F. 
63 .. 1992 (1) SA 343. 
64 .. Ibidem. 
65 .. Ibidem at 373C. See also ibidem at 380F. 
66 .. Ibidem at 378H. 
67 .. Which, loosely translated, means that judges do not make law but merely declare it. 
68 .. Ibidem at 382H. 
69 .. Ibidem at 384F. In his concurring judgment, Corbett CJ too in principle had no problem with the 
Khanyile rule; he declared that "[t]he ideal for which Didcott J (and the judges who agreed with him) 
strove ... viz the provision of free legal representation to all indigent persons accused of serious crimes 
who desire such representation, is unquestionably a most worthy one. Indeed it is a sine qua non of a 
complete system of criminal justice; and any system which lacks it is flawed." Ibidem at 392F-G. 
70 .. Ibidem at 384C-D. 
71 .. Ibidem at 386F. 
72 .. Ibidem at 386G-H. 
73 .. At 392G, Corbett CJ said that the Didcott J ideal expressed in Khanyile was one "which under 
present circumstances in South Africa is not capable of attainment. All the same the ideal should never 
be lost sight of and it should continue to guide and stimulate all who are concerned with the improvement 
of our criminal justice system." 
74 .. Section 25(3)(e). This brought our constitutional system into line with international human rights 
instruments such as Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The significance of the portion in italics will become 
apparent below. 
75 .. 1992 (1) SACR 28 (W). It is noted that this decision was, in this regard, contrary to that of Goldstone 
J in S v Radebe; S v Mbonani, supra. 
76 .. Supra. 
77 .. 1994 (3) SA 776 (T). 
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CHAPTER NINE 
TFIB RIGHT TO AF AIR TRIAL AND ACCESS 
TO INFORMATION 
INTRODUCTION 
P rior to the advent of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the intervention of the Constitutional Court in Shabalala and Others v Attorney-
General of the Transvaal and Another, 1 statements taken by the police from potential 
witnesses in the investigation of crime were protected against disclosure by a special 
common law privilege which operated in favour of the State. Thus, every criminal trial 
in South Africa was, in general, conducted on the basis that an accused had no right 
of access to statements made to the police by witnesses the State sought to call to give 
evidence. 
This privilege, as will appear more fully below, was a very wide one, covering not only 
the statements of witnesses, but, in certain circumstances, also entries in investigation 
diaries and police pocket books. The nature of this "blanket privilege", the validity of 
which was recognised by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in R v Steyn2 as 
an established practice, was not exactly the same as that of the legal professional 
privilege, however. 3 
Furthermore, under our law, a practice, in terms of which the accused or his or her legal 
representative did not have any right to consult with witnesses for the State without the 
permission of the prosecuting authority, was accepted and given effect to by our courts.4 
This practice, the origins of which do not seem to have been traceable to our common 
law or to any specific statutory provision, appears to have been based on ethical rules 
of professional practice in the Republic and abroad. 5 A breach of this rule might, in 
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certain circumstances, constitute an irregularity in a trial.6 Besides, any legal practitioner 
who was in breach of this practice might be guilty of unprofessional and unethical 
conduct.7 
In Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of the Transvaal and Another,8 the 
Constitutional Court had to decide two issues9 that were referred to it by Cloete J who 
heard the matter in Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of the Transvaal and 
Others.10 In the latter matter, the six applicants, who had been indicted in the eastern 
and south eastern circuit local division in Barberton on a count of murder, had, through 
their pro deo counsel, made an informal application from the Bar for access to the police 
dossier. Cloete J had then ruled that a substantive application be brought on notice of 
motion supported by affidavits. 
In their applications, the applicants submitted that they were, as a matter of right, 11 
entitled to access to the police dossier relevant to the matter, irrespective of whether 
or not further particulars had been requested or supplied under the Criminal Procedure 
Act. 12 They further applied for an order compelling the State to make available to the 
accused and/or to their legal representatives all the witnesses for the prosecution for 
the purposes of consultation with them in order to prepare for the trial. 
The first respondent, the Attorney-General of the Transvaal, submitted that Section 23 
of the Constitution should not be interpreted as conferring any rights on an accused 
in violation of the "blanket dossier privilege". On behalf of the second respondent, the 
Commissioner of the South African Police Services, it was contended that in essence 
the provisions of Section 23 of the Constitution had no application in criminal 
proceedings. 13 
For Cloete J, two questions arose in this regard, namely: (1) whether Section 23 could 
be used by an accused in criminal proceedings to obtain further information; and (2) if 
so, whether the applicants in casu should be given access to the police docket. 14 In 
order to grasp the importance of the decision of the Constitutional Court in Shabalala 
and Others, 15 it is essential to present a brief summary of the law in this regard prior 
to the Court's intervention. 
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THE LAW PRIOR TO SHABALALA AND OTHERS 
Prior to the intervention of the Constitutional Court, police dockets were privileged and, 
therefore, generally inaccessible to the defence. The common law position relating to 
the contents of police dossiers was as defined in R v Steyn,16 namely that, statements 
procured from state witnesses for the purpose that what they said would be given in 
evidence in a lawsuit that was contemplated were protected against disclosure until, at 
least, the conclusion of the proceedings, which would include any appeal after the 
decision of the court of first instance. 17 However, the Court acknowledged that, as the 
prosecution stands in a special relation to the court, 18 where there was a serious 
discrepancy between such a statement and what the witness subsequently said on oath 
at the trial, the court had the right to expect the prosecutor to, suo moto, direct attention 
to the discrepancy and, unless there were special and cogent reasons to the contrary, 
make available to the defence for purposes of cross examination the statement and any 
other documents or copies thereof which would be handed in at the trial. 19 
SCOPE OF THE DOCKET PRIVILEGE 
In subsequent cases this privilege was made applicable in many diverse circumstances. 
In one matter,20 for example, it was extended to notes made by a state witness. 21 It also 
affected statements taken by the police in contemplation of a prosecution,22 even if the 
witnesses were not used by the prosecution23 and were given to the defence. In some 
circumstances, the police pocket books,24 notes made by the investigating officer and 
the advice and instructions of a "checking officer",25 and any and all communications 
and notes that constituted "part ot the litigation brief' were covered by the privilege.26 
An interesting case was Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Wagner,27 where 
the Appellate Division extended the privilege to a situation where the witness had 
refreshed his memory outside the court proceedings. In that case it was held that a 
prosecutor whose witness had refreshed his memory by reading his statement before 
he entered the witness box to give his testimony had not waived the docket privilege.28 
It would be a different matter altogether if the witness had refreshed his or her memory 
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in the witness-box with the express or tacit approval of the prosecutor.29 In other words, 
while "[o]ne of the rules applicable to the use of notes to refresh memory is that a 
witness, who uses a document to refresh his memory, must be prepared to produce it 
for inspection to the opposing party and to the court",30 a distinction was always made 
between the use of an aide-memoire and testimony given from the statement by a 
witness in the box. 31 
WAIVER OF THE DOCKET PRIVILEGE 
Although, as Williamson J said, there was "no inherent power in a court to override a 
legitimate claim of privilege",32 the dossier privilege could, of course, be waived either 
by the State33 or by a party, expressly or tacitly,34 in which event the opposing party 
would be entitled to see the relevant document. It could also be waived, as stated 
above, when a witness refreshed his or her memory by reading from a document in the 
witness box, as well as when the statement was made available to the defence because 
there was a material discrepancy between a State witness' statement and what he or 
she subsequently said in evidence in court. 
OUR COURTS AND SECTION 23 
Soon after the Constitution became the supreme law of the Republic,35 a series of 
matters in which the validity of the blanket docket privilege was raised came before the 
courts. There was the cluster of three judgments, namely S v Fani and Four Others, 36 
S v James,37 and S v Smith and Another,38 common to all of which was a recognition 
of the continued existence of the blanket docket privilege as recognised in R v Steyn.39 
In S v Fani and Four Others,40 where the relevant accused, the applicant, was, 
together with four others, charged with murder and with malicious injury to property, 
applied for an order compelling the State to make available to him the contents of the 
police investigation docket. Jones J, observing that in a justice system such as ours, 
where the purpose of criminal proceedings is to hold a fair and objective inquiry so as 
to place the court in a position to arrive at the truth, took the view that an accused 
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person's right to a fair trial as envisaged in Section 25(3) of the Constitution entitled 
him or her to more information than was given subject to the docket privilege.41 He thus, 
in an obiter dictum, provided a list of what he thought ought to be timeously made 
available to an accused person before such a fair trial could be held.42 
However, the learned judge refused to part with the past judgments of the Supreme 
Court on this question. He said that: 
[a] departure from those decisions may or may not prove necessary in the future to give 
effect to the provisions of the new Constitution. But such a departurn will be radical. 
Radical and sweeping changes should not be made lightly, and certainly not by a judge 
of first instance who has not heard argument on all the possible consequences of the 
proposed change because these arguments are not necessary for purposes of the 
present ruling. Of course, judges of first instance must give effect to the provisions of the 
Constitution, even if this means a radical departure from pre-existing law. In this instance, 
however, it is neither necessary nor even desirable that I do so. This is because, as I see 
it, effect can be given to the meaning and the spirit of the new Constitution without re-
writing or even encroaching upon the common Jaw of privilege.43 (my italics) 
Accepting that the common law docket privilege was reasonable and justifiable in a 
society such as ours,44 Jones J concluded that in casu it was not inconsistent with the 
right to a fair trial and the right to information held by the State. On the contrary, he 
held, it could coexist with the rights entrenched in Sections 23 and 25(3) of the 
Constitution.45 On this basis, he then ruled that the defence was not entitled to, and 
the prosecution was not obliged to give it, access to the police docket.46 
In S v James,47 where the accused was charged with murder and with attempted rape, 
the same issue arose. While accepting that information in the possession of the State 
as envisaged in Section 23 of the Constitution must be disclosed to the accused, 
Zietsman JP considered that this was done and achieved by requiring each state 
witness to testify in open court where their allegations can be challenged and refuted 
in cross-examination by or on behalf of the accused.48 
Zietsman JP was indeed averse to reading into Section 23 the notion that the common 
law docket privilege no longer applied to documents in the possession of the 
prosecution and that these must be supplied to the accused before he or she is asked 
to plead.49 He did not accept Jones J's suggestion50 that summaries of witness 
statements should be furnished to the accused either.51 
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The learned judge accepted that the Section 25(3)(b) constitutional requirement that an 
accused should be informed sufficiently of the charge against him or her required that 
the accused be given sufficient information to enable him or her to understand the 
allegations against him or her, as well as to prepare his or her defence and to plead to 
the charge/s. 52 However, he held that what had been supplied in casu by way of the 
summary of substantial facts53 and other information was adequate, and therefore 
dismissed the application.54 
In S v Smith and Another,55 the two accused were charged with two counts of murder 
and one of robbery with aggravating circumstances. At the commencement of the trial 
in the Supreme Court, a similar request was made at the instance of Accused Number 
One for all state witness statements or, in the alternative, summaries of the evidence 
of all the key witnesses of the state.56 The Court57 referred with approval to the 
reasoning of Jones J in S v Fani and Four Others58 that the common law docket 
privilege was not inconsistent with the Constitution. 
However, because in casu the summary of substantial facts failed to inform the accused 
adequately of the charges he had to meet, the Court held that the most expeditious 
method of conveying the information necessary to achieve this object would be to order 
the state to furnish the defence with the statements of witnesses.59 Van Rooyen AJ 
further stated in an obiter dictum that "[t]he accused are also entitled to be appraised 
of any information contained in the statements of State witnesses who are not going to 
be called, if that information tends in any way to assist the accused. That much seems 
to be plain from the provisions of section 23."60 (my emphasis) 
On the other hand, in S v Sefadi,61 where the accused was charged with murder and 
robbery with aggravating circumstances, the pro deo counsel asked for a ruling to the 
effect that he was,62 as such, entitled to access to information contained in the police 
docket. After a careful scrutiny of the submissions of the State and the defence in this 
regard, Marnewick AJ ruled that the State was obliged to provide the defence with 
summaries of the contents of all statements that had been taken by the police from all 
potential witnesses. 63 To the learned acting judge the common law docket privilege 
claimed by the State was "in apparent conflict with the provisions of Section 23 of the 
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Constitution".64 This view, needless to say, was contrary to the one taken by Jones J 
in S v Fani and Four Others.65 
Of critical importance was the learned acting judge's observation that the blanket 
privilege, in its existing form, might even violate the provisions of Section 8(1 )66 of the 
Constitution. In this regard, he said that: 
Section 25(3) guarantees every accused person a fair trial. A trial in a criminal 
case is in the nature of a contest. A fair trial requires, by its nature, equality 
between the contestants ... When only one of the contestants has access to the 
statements taken by the police from potential witnesses, the contest can, in my 
judgment, be neither equal nor fair. 67 (my italics) 
The Court also considered whether the blanket docket privilege, as it stood, met the 
requirements of the general limitation clause.68 For this purpose, the Court said, "the 
justification for the limitation of the relevant rights by the privilege must be sought in the 
underlying reasons for the privilege, not in the fact of the existence of the privilege."69 
After assessing the validity of the arguments of the State and the defence in this regard, 
and after peering into the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Germany for assistance, the Court concluded that the privilege, as it stood, constituted 
an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of the right of access to information held by 
the State and required for the protection and exercise of the accused's right to a fair 
trial. 70 
However, the learned acting judge conceded that the relevant rights were not absolute. 
He cited the examples of England and Germany where appropriate limitations were 
acceptable.71 
In Shabalala and Others,72 as stated above, the basic question was whether or not the 
"blanket dossier privilege" was consistent with the Constitution.73 Cloete J74 did not 
have any difficulty to conclude that Section 23 of the Constitution gave an accused the 
right of access to such information held by the attorney-general as is required for the 
exercise or protection of his or her constitutional right "to adduce and challenge 
evidence". 75 The learned judge rejected the contention of the second respondent that 
in criminal proceedings the provisions of Section 23 were superfluous as the accused 
already had the constitutional righf6 "to be informed with sufficient particularity of the 
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charge".n He also rejected a further submission by the second respondent that, in any 
event, because adequate provision had been made in the Criminal Procedure Act for 
this, it was unnecessary for the accused to rely on Section 23 as well.78 
However, Cloete J observed that Section 23 contained an important internal limitation 
relating to the purpose for which information in the possession of the State was 
"required".79 This word, which was found in the internal limitation, and which the learned 
judge said postulated an element of necessity, showed, according to him, that it was not 
the intention of the drafters of the Constitution to, by means of Section 23, grant an 
accused person an automatic right of access to the police dossier.80 The accused would 
be entitled to have access to the police dossier or part thereof only if he or she could 
show that the information was "required" to exercise or protect any of his or her fair trial 
rights in terms of Section 25(3) of the Constitution.81 In other words, the accused bore 
the onus to show that the information was so "required",82 while, as the learned judge 
further said, the prosecution bore the onus to rebut that under Section 33(1) of the 
Constitution, should it wish to do so.83 
When he applied this approach to the matter before him, Cloete J concluded that in 
casu the applicants failed at the first hurdle.84 Having been unable to find reasons for 
allowing the applicants access to the whole dossier in the matter, he then dismissed the 
application. For the same reasons, he did not want, at the instance of the applicants, 
to depart from an old practice of allowing an accused or his/her legal representative to 
consult with state witnesses only with the consent of the prosecution.85 
Notwithstanding his conclusions, Cloete J,86 relying on the provisions of Section 102(8) 
of the Constitution,87 referred the matter to the Constitutional Court for its decision 
because he was of the view that constitutional questions of great public importance had 
been raised in the proceedings. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT INTERVENES 
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The Constitutional Court's judgment in Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of 
the Transvaal and Another88 was given by Mahomed DP, (as he then was)89 whose 
characteristic erudition and Solomonic wisdom once again shoned through in the 
matter. Needless to say, the Court had to wade through the thick mass of judicial 
confusion that, as was shown above, had ensued as our judges were grappling with the 
provisions of Section 23 vis-a-vis the right to a fair trial guaranteed in the Constitution. 
For Mahomed DP (as he then was), the starting point in respect of both questions that 
had to be decided by the Court90 was the right to a fair trial as guaranteed in the 
provisions of Section 25(3) of the Constitution.91 The provisions of Section 23, 
although not unimportant, would, as the learned Deputy President of the Constitutional 
Court pointed out, not deny or give to the accused anything he or she was or was not 
legitimately entitled to under Section 25(3).92 
With regard to the first issue, the Court ruled that, because the "blanket docket 
privilege" from the pre-constitutional era recognised in Steyn's case denied an accused 
person access to the police docket in all circumstances, it could not survive the 
discipline of the Constitution.93 The Court thus declared94 that the privilege was, to the 
extent to which it protected from disclosure all the documents in a police docket, in all 
circumstances, regardless as to whether or not such disclosure was justified for the 
purposes of enabling the accused properly to exercise his or her right to a fair trial, 
inconsistent with the Constitution.95 
Similarly, the Court found that the blanket prohibition of consultation with state 
witnesses without the consent of the prosecuting authority, regardless of the 
circumstances, was too wide and might, in some cases, impair the right of the accused 
to a fair trial. Moreover, Mahomed DP (as he then was) said, such a blanket rule of 
exclusion could not be justified under the general limitation clause as it was 
unreasonable, unjustifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality and unnecessary.96 Reaffirming that the accused had a right to consult with 
state witnesses without the permission of the prosecuting authority where his or her 
right to a fair trial would otherwise be impaired, he thus held that insofar and to the 
extent that such a rule of practice denied the accused such a right, in all cases and 
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regardless of the circumstances, it was inconsistent with the Constitution,97 and 
therefore invalid. 
In a nutshell, ordinarily the right to a fair trial would, according to the Court, encompass 
both the right of access to the statements of state witnesses as well as the necessary 
or relevant contents of a police docket, and a right to consult state witnesses without 
the permission of the prosecuting authority if, on the facts of a particular case, the 
accused cannot obtain a fair trial without such access and consultation. However, 
despite this reasoning, Mahomed DP refused to make any rigid rules and left the 
resolution of the two questions, wherever and whenever they arose, to the exercise of 
a proper discretion by the trial court having regard to the circumstances of each case. 
In respect of both questions, the Court recognised the right of the State to resist a claim 
by the accused for access to any document in the police docket98 or for consultation 
with state witnesses without the permission of the prosecuting authority. Where the 
State seeks to justify denial of such access or consultation, it is today left to the trial 
court to balance the accused's needs for a fair trial against the legitimate interests of the 
State and, exercising its discretion, to permit access and/or consultation in the interest 
of justice, subject to suitable safeguards.99 The two questions, it must be emphasised, 
cannot be answered in the abstract; the trial court has to have regard to the particular 
circumstances of each case where they arise. 
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Today, in view of the Constitutional Court's decision in Shabalala, where the State 
refuses an accused person access to State witnesses for consultation with them or to 
relevant information in the police docket, our courts should decide objectively100 whether 
or not to use their discretion in favour of an accused person and allow him or her or his 
or her legal representative to consult with witnesses for the prosecution or have access 
to all relevant information in the possession of the State; the State no longer has a final 
say in this regard. Instead, when challenged by an accused person, it bears the onus 
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to justify its opposition to allowing the accused person access to State witnesses for 
consultation with them101 or to disclosure of the relevant information. 102 
For this purpose, the right of access to information guaranteed in Section 23 of the 
Constitution might come in handy. As pointed out above, however, Mahomed DP in 
the Shabalala case seems to have ascribed a minor, albeit not unimportant role, to the 
provisions of Section 23, because, for him, the whole question turned solely on the 
accused person's right to a fair trial. 103 A narrow and restrictive reading of his approach 
may unfortunately lead to an erroneous assumption that under our law the principle that 
"the fruits of the investigation which are in the possession of the Crown are not the 
property of the Crown for use in securing a conviction but the property of the public to 
be used to ensure that justice is done"104 has not yet been fully accepted. One can even 
imagine conservative elements in the employ of the State seeking to rely upon this to 
hide and horde information and use it as a weapon to surprise their adversaries in 
criminal trials. The Court missed an opportunity to use two constitutionally guaranteed 
rights to bolster each other. 
And yet, it is clear from his judgment that the learned Deputy President of the 
Constitutional Court accepted the principle that an accused is ordinarily entitled to 
discovery of documentation in the possession of the prosecuting authority in order to 
enable him or her properly to exercise the right to a fair trial. 105 In my opinion, therefore, 
Mahomed DP did not necessarily find any fault with Cloete J's basic reasoning that the 
accused were generally 
entitled to invoke section 23 for the purpose of obtaining access to all information 
held by the attorney-general in so far as such information is required for the 
exercise or protection of their right to a fair trial and in particular, to adduce and 
challenge evidence.106 (my italics) 
Indeed, Mahomed DP did not seek to discard an important provision of the 
Constitution which, in its entirety, he said constituted "a decisive break from a culture 
of Apartheid and racism to a constitutionally protected culture of openness and 
democracy and universal human rights for South Africans of all ages, classes and 
colours", 107 and which, as he correctly pointed out, imported "a radical movement away 
from the previous state of the law."108 The learned Deputy President of the 
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Constitutional Court could not have sought to discourage reliance upon the provisions 
of Section 23 which, to paraphrase Heath J, fitted in with this whole spirit of 
transparency and openness.109 
At no stage did Mahomed DP (as he then was) suggest that an accused person should 
find solace solely in the information the State provides under the Criminal Procedure 
Act;110 the critical thing was that the information requested from the State (whatever it 
was) by or at the instance of an accused person must be required for the exercise or 
protection of his or her right to a fair trial. As Cloete J1 11 had quite correctly pointed out, 
though there might have been some overlapping with Section 23, Section 25(3)(b) of 
the Constitution which required that an accused should "be informed with sufficient 
particularity of the charge" was not exhaustive of an accused person's rights, and the 
former section was, therefore, not superfluous. 
In other words, as is the case in Canada, in our law "[t]he principle has been accepted 
that the search for truth is advanced rather than retarded by disclosure of all relevant 
material."112 (my italics) If our criminal justice system is to be marked by a search for 
truth, rather than by a fiendish desire on the part of the State to secure easy conviction 
of accused persons, then disclosure and discovery of all relevant material as was 
envisaged in the provisions of Sections 23 and 25(3) of the Constitution, rather than 
suppression of information, must be the starting point. 113 Though Mahomed DP in 
Shabalala stated the starting point to be the right to a fair trial, the conclusion would be 
the same: All the information required to enable an accused person to enjoy the right 
to a fair trial, including the right to adduce and/or challenge evidence, ought to be 
furnished to him or her by the prosecuting authority. 
The right to a fair trial can, I submit, only be enhanced by access to all relevant 
information, and can suffer irreparably if relevant information is not disclosed. The 
provisions of Section 23 could only enhance, and certainly not undermine, an accused 
person's exercise or protection of his or her constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair 
trial. The Attorneys-General, 114 as Cloete J pointed out, are part of the State and the 
reference in Section 23 to "all information held by the State or any of its organs at any 
level of government" included information held by the Attorney-General as such. 115 
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Therefore, such information, to the extent that it was required for the purpose of 
exercising or protecting a basic right, 116 could not be kept back from an accused person 
merely because Mahomed DP said he could not see how Section 23 could help where 
Section 25(3) could not. 117 The provisions of the two sections were, I would submit, not 
mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing. 
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provision for discovery as such in criminal litigation ... the provisions of section 23 confer a very wide 
and general entitlement to information. Any organ of government is obliged to grant a person access 
to all information in its possession and is not entitled to limit such a right or to obstruct such access save 
on grounds provided for by the Constitution." (my emphasis) According to Kroon J and Froneman J in 
Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another, 1994 (2) BCLR 75 (E) at 89A-C, "Section 23 is ... 
something more than a mere constitutional right to discovery ... Its application need therefore not be 
restricted to the exercise or protection of rights by way of litigation, but would extend also to non-judicial 
remedies aimed at the exercise or protection of such rights." 
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14 .. Shabalala and Others, 1994 (6) BCLR at 96. 
15 .. Supra. 
16 .. Supra. 
17 .. Ibidem, at 335A-B. Note that Rule 4.3.2 (c) of the Uniform Rules of Professional Ethics of the 
various Societies of Advocates broadly defines a witness for the prosecution in relation to any charge 
against an accused person, inter alia, as any person "from whom at any time, whether before or after the 
accused person was arrested or charged, the prosecutor has or the police have obtained a statement in 
connection with such charge or the events from which it has ensued". 
18 .. In R v Holliday, 1924 AD 250 at 255, Innes CJ made it clear that the primary duty of the prosecution 
is not to secure a conviction (at all costs) but to assist the court in ascertaining the truth. See also R v 
Riekert, 1954 (4) SA 254 (SW) at 2610-G; R v M, 1959 (1) SA 434 (A) at 439F; Erasmus Jin S v Jija 
and Others, supra at 68A; and Cloete J in Shabalala and Others v The Attorney-General of Transvaal 
and Others, op. cit. 1130-J. See further R v Berens [1985] 176 ER 815, at 822; and Rand Jin Boucher 
v The Queen, (1955) 110 CCC 263 [1955] SCR 16, 20 CR 1 at 270. 
For this reason, as Innes CJ in R v Holliday, ibidem, pointed out, it is part of the duty of the prosecution 
to bring to the notice of the court information in its possession which may be favourable to the defence. 
See also S v Van Rensburg, 1963 (2) SA 343 (N); and Jones J in S v Fani and Four Others, 1994 (1) 
BCLR 43 (E) at 46. For the position adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court on this question, see 
Sopinka Jin R v Stinchcombe, 1992 LRC (Crim) 68 at 76. 
19 .. R v Steyn, op cit 336, where Greenberg JA referred to what he described as "the practice of 
prosecutors, where there is a conflict between a statement by the witness and the evidence he gives in 
court, to make the statement available", and at 337, where the learned judge of the Appellate Division said 
he hoped that the duty to observe this practice would be carried out by every prosecutor. 
20 .. S v Alexander and Others (1), 1965 (2) SA 796 (A). 
21 .. Ibidem, at 812G-H, where Ogilvie Thompson JA said:" ... Kotzee's notes formed part of his witness-
statement and, as such, were at the trial covered by the privilege attaching to that statement ... " 
22 .. S v Band Another, 1980 (2) SA 947 (A) at 952F-H where Van Winsen AJA (as he then was) said 
that statements taken by the police in the contemplation of a prosecution were, in regard to the privilege 
from disclosure, on the same footing as documents brought into existence for the purpose of civil litigation 
and were, therefore, similarly privileged. 
23 .. Van Winsen AJA, ibidem, concluded that the privilege extended not only to statements taken from 
the witnesses testifying in the case but also to statements taken from persons with a view to their testifying 
in contemplated litigation. However, in this regard see the obiter remarks of Van Rooyen AJ in S v Smith 
and Another, 1994 (1) BCLR 63 (SE) at 740-E. 
24 .. In S v Mayo and Another, 1990 (1) SACR 659 (E) at 662G, for example, Jones J ruled that "at this 
stage the State is not obliged to disclose the content of the police pocket book to defence counsel. I need 
only add that this is a ruling which is reversible in the event of further cross-examination or further facts 
coming to light which show that in fact the contents of the pocket book are relevant." See also S v 
Majikela and Others, 1991 (1) SACR 509 (E) at 518F-G, where Cooper J (quoting from the judgment of 
Eksteen JA in S v Mavela, 1990 (1) SACR 582 (A) at 590G-591A) said that: " ... a police pocket book is 
a private official document not accessible to public scrutiny. In the present instance it appears that the 
pocket books of the investigating team reflect their investigations relating to the present charges. The 
entries were made for the purpose of drafting their statements for their inclusion in the police docket for 
submission to the Attorney-General. Therefore they must be regarded as an integral part of the witness' 
statements. Accordingly they are privileged documents." 
It is observed, however, that on an earlier occasion, Ogilvie Thompson JA, in S v Alexander and Others, 
supra at 811 D-E had remarked that: "That a witness may be required to produce, and be cross-examined 
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on, notes contemporaneously made by him which are still in his possession is indisputable: a policeman's 
note-book affords a familiar example. Refusal so to produce such notes may, under certain 
circumstances, vitiate a conviction ... "(my emphasis) See also Mullins J in S v Mpumlo and Others, 1987 
(2) SA 442 (SE) at 447G-H and at 449A-C. 
25 .. See Eksteen JA in S v Mavela, 1990 (1) SACR 582 (A) at 590G-J. 
26 .. In S v Schreuder en 'n Ander, 1958 (1) SA 48 (SWA) at 54A-D. See also S v Yengeni and Others 
(1), 1990 (1) SA 639 (C) at 6428-1. 
27 .. 1965 (4) SA 507 (A). 
28 .. See the remarks of Rumpff JA (as he then was), ibidem at 5148-D. See also Le Roux Jin Van den 
Berg en 'n Ander v Streeklanddros, Vanderbiljpark en Andere, 1985 (3) SA 960 (T), regarding the 
position where a witness refreshed his memory during an adjournment. 
29 .. See LH Hoffmann and D Zeffertt, The South African Law of Evidence (4th ed, 8utterworths, 
Durban, 1989), at 265, where the authors submitted that where that happened, the prosecutor's conduct, 
if he or she allowed the witness to do so, had reached a point of disclosure, where fairness demanded 
that the privilege cease. 
30 .. Ibidem, at 264. 
31 .. See De Vos Jin S v Tshomi, 1983 (1) SA 1159 (C). 
32 .. In S v Mpetha and Others (1), 1982 (2) SA 253 (C) at 259C. 
33 .. See Greenberg JA in R v Steyn, op cit 331 D-E. See also Ogilvie Thompson JA in S v Alexander and 
Others (1), op cit 812G-H. 
34 .. S v Mavela, op cit 591 B-E. See also Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Wagner, supra at 
514G-H on this. See further Burnell v British Transport Commission, [1955) 3 All ER 822. 
35 .. It came into effect on 27 April 1994. 
36 .. 1994 (1) BCLR43 (E). 
37 .. 1994 (1) BCLR 57 (E). 
38 .. 1994 (1) BCLR 63 (SE). 
39 .. Supra. 
40 .. Supra. 
41 .. Ibidem, at 46. 
42 .. Ibidem, at 461-47G. Note that item 6 on the list included summaries of witness statements. 
43 .. Ibidem, at 48. Note that Cloete J in Shabalala and Others v The Attorney-General of Transvaal 
and Others, op cit 101 E-H agreed to these views and even added that "the baby should not be thrown 
out with the bath water." 
44 .. In other words, that it did not violate the limitation clause. 
45 .. Ibidem, at 49. 
46 .. Ibidem. 
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47 .. 1994 (1) 8CLR 57 (E). 
48 .. Ibidem, at 61C-D. 
49 .. Ibidem, 61 D-E, where (to paraphrase him) the learned judge further said that to hold that such 
documents should be supplied to the defence would destroy the necessary confidentiality and prejudice 
the interests of the prosecution, which was not the intention of the legislature. 
50 .. In S v Fani and Four Others, supra at 47. 
51.. S v James, supra at 61 F-1. 
52 .. Ibidem, at 611-628. 
53 .. Ibidem, at 620-E. However, as Jones J pointed out in S v Fani and Four Others, supra at 46, it is 
noteworthy that the summary of substantial facts in practice "has not always . . . measured up to the 
requirement of sufficient information to prepare properly for trial, and hence it does not necessarily 
facilitate a fair trial within the meaning of the new Constitution. It often says little more than the indictment 
itself ... the information contained in this document has become less and less informative as the years go 
by." See also Marnewick AJ in S v Sefadi, 1994 (2) 8CLR 23 (D) at 360. 
Moreover, as Cloete J observed in Shabalala and Others v The Attorney-General of Transvaal and 
Others, 1994 (6) 8CLR 85 (T) at 97, "[t]he content of the summary of substantial facts depends on the 
opinion of the attorney-general, and the opinions of attorneys-general have frequently been conservative 
II 
Besides, as Cloete J, ibidem at 988-D commented, not all accused persons are furnished with the 
summary of substantial facts; the accused appearing either in the regional or magistrates' courts, who 
constitute the majority of persons who appear daily before our courts on criminal charges, do not enjoy 
the advantage of this procedure. See also Mahomed DP in Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General 
of the Transvaal and Another, 1995 (12) 8CLR 1593 (CC) at 1603, paragraph 21. 
54 .. Ibidem, at 62E. 
55 .. 1994 (1) BCLR 63 (SE). 
56 .. On the strength of the provisions of Section 23, read with Section 25(3)(b) and (d) of the 
Constitution. 
57 .. Ibidem, at 70H-71 B, where Van Rooyen AJ said, inter alia, that "both section 23 and section 25(3) 
should be read against the background of the existence of a privilege attaching to the statements of State 
witnesses." 
58 .. Supra, at 49. 
59 .. S v Smith and Another, supra at 670 and at 72E-F. 
60 .. Ibidem, at 740-E. 
61 .. 1994 (2) BCLR 23 (D). 
62 .. On the strength of Sections 23, 25 and 33(1) of the Constitution. 
63 .. S v Sefadi, supra at 25. 
64 .. Ibidem, at 27 and 38. At 39 Marnewick AJ concluded that: "the privilege in its existing form is ... in 
conflict with the provisions of sections 23 and 25(3) of the Constitution. In terms of Section 4(1) of the 
Constitution it therefore no longer has any force or effect." (my emphasis) 
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At 28 the judge said that" ... the information contained in witness statements in the possession of the 
police or the prosecutor is a striking example of information held by the State ... which ... may be required 
for the exercise of a right, namely the right to a fair trial." See also ibidem at 36. 
65 .. Supra at 49. 
66 .. The equality clause. 
67 .. Ibidem, at 39. See also ibidem at 27G-28C. Further, see the remarks of Heath Jin S v Majavu, 1994 
(2) 8CLR 56 (CkGD) at 771-788 on the importance of the equality clause in this regard. 
However, note that the fundamental flaw in this reasoning, according to Cloete J in Shabalala and Others 
v The Attorney-General of Transvaal and Others, op cit 1140-F, "is that an accused will never be in 
an equal position to the prosecutor for so long as he is entitled to remain silent during the proceedings and 
the trial and not to testify during trial - rights which are entrenched in section 25(3 )( c) of the Constitution." 
68 .. Section 33(1) of the Constitution. At 28, Mamewick AJ outlined the four requirements in this regard. 
See also Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another, op cit 89H-I. 
69 .. Ibidem, at 37. 
70 .. Ibidem, at 38 and 39. 
71 .. Ibidem, at 39. 
72 .. 1994 (6) 8CLR. 
73 .. Particularly Section 23. 
74 .. Ibidem, at 97. 
75 .. Section 25(3}(d) of the Constitution. 
76 .. Under Section 25(3}(b} of the Constitution. See the remarks of Heath J in S v Majavu, supra at 77F-
G in this regard. 
77 .. Shabalala and Others, 1994 (6) BCLR at 97 and 119. 
78 .. Ibidem. At 98 the learned judge concluded that: "An accused may ... require information in addition 
to that for which provision is made in the Criminal Procedure Act in order to exercise or protect his right 
to adduce and challenge evidence ... As matters presently stand, section 23 of the Constitution is an 
accused's only means of obtaining such additional information." See also ibidem, at 100, where the 
learned judge further said that the applicants in casu were entitled to invoke Section 23 for the purpose 
of obtaining access to all information held by the attorney-general in so far as such information was 
required for the exercise or protection of their right to a fair trial and, in particular, to adduce and challenge 
evidence. 
79 .. Ibidem, at 1008-101 C. For the various meanings of the word "required" which was used in Section 
23, see Myburgh Jin Khala v The Minister of Safety and Security, op cit 94G-95C. In this regard, see 
also Azhar Cachalia et al, Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 
1994) who said at 70, inter a/ia, that the Section 23 right was qualified in that the information requested 
must be required for the exercise or protection of a person's rights which were not limited to the rights 
contained in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 
80 .. Ibidem, at 119G-H. 
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81 .. Ibidem, at 119H. As Myburgh J pointed out in Khala v The Minister of Safety and Security, op cit 
96E, unless that requirement was met, the State would not be obliged to make the relevant information 
available. 
82 .. Ibidem, at 119H-1. As Myburgh J pointed out in Khala v The Minister of Safety and Security, op cit 
95C-D, "[t]he enquiry in each case should be a factual one: Is the information required for the protection 
or exercise of a person's rights?" 
83 .. Ibidem, at 1191-120A. 
84 .. Ibidem, at 1208. 
85 .. Ibidem, at 1218-C. 
86 .. Ibidem, at 121D-H. 
87 .. Which allowed any division of the Supreme Court to refer to the Constitutional Court for its ruling 
constitutional issues of public importance raised in a matter, notwithstanding the fact that the matter itself 
had already been disposed of. 
88 .. 1995 (12) 8CLR 1593 (CC). 
89 .. In whose judgment all the other members of the Court concurred. See ibidem, at 1623. 
90 .. For which see ibidem, at 1599, paragraph 9. 
91 .. Ibidem, at 1607, paragraph 34, at 1608, paragraph 36, and at 1619, paragraph 63 respectively. 
92 .. Ibidem, at 1607, paragraph 34, and at 1608, paragraph 35. 
93 .. Ibidem, at 1616, paragraph 55. 
94 .. Ibidem, at 1621, paragraph 72. 
95 .. And, therefore, in terms of Section 4(1) thereof, to that extent, invalid. 
96 .. Ibidem, at 1620-1621, paragraphs 68-69. 
97 .. Ibidem, at 1622. 
98 .. In other words, the Court accepted that, as Sopinka J pointed in R v Stinchcombe, supra at 76, the 
obligation on the part of the State to discover and disclose information "is not absolute. It is subject to the 
discretion of Counsel for the Crown. This discretion extends both to the withholding of information 
and to the timing of disclosure." Regarding what should be disclosed in this regard, Sopinka J's 
remarks, ibidem at 78, [namely that "a// relevant information must be disclosed subject to the 
reviewable discretion of the Crown. The material must include not only that which the Crown intends to 
introduce into evidence but also that which it does not. No distinction should be made between inculpatory 
and exculpatory evidence ... The Crown must ... disclose relevant material whether it is inculpatory or 
exculpatory." (my emphasis)] will come in handy in our situation. Mahomed DP in Shabalala, supra at 
16211-16228 indeed acknowledged this. 
99 .. See Mahomed DP in Shabalala, at 1622 and 1623 respectively. 
100 .. Mahomed DP, ibidem at 1615, paragraph 55, and at 1621, paragraph 71, said that the test is an 
objective one and that "[i]t is not sufficient to demonstrate that the belief is held bona fide. It must be 
shown that a reasonable person in the position of the prosecution would be entitled to hold such a belief'. 
101.. Ibidem, at 1621, paragraph 71. 
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102 .. Ibidem, at 1615, paragraph 55. 
103 .. Ibidem, at 1607, paragraph 34, and at 1608, paragraphs 35 and 36. 
104 .. Per Sopinka Jin R v Stinchcombe, supra at 72. 
105 .. Ibidem, at 1622A-B. 
106 .. In Shabalala and Others v The Attorney-General of Transvaal and Others, op cit 1 OOA. See also 
ibidem, at 119F-H. See further Heath Jin S v Majavu, op cit 77F-G. 
107 .. In Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of the Transvaal and Another, op cit 1605, 
paragraph 26. See also Mahomed J (as he then was) in S v Mhlungu and Others, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) 
at 8731-874C. 
108 .. Ibidem, at 1606, paragraph 29. 
109 .. In S v Majavu, op cit 760 
110 .. A State submission which Cloete J quite correctly rejected in Shabalala and Others v Attorney-
General of Transvaal and Others, supra at 97-98. 
111.. Ibidem, at 970-F. 
112 .. Per Sopinka Jin R v Stinchcombe, op cit 74. 
113 .. See the Canadian case of Regina v Bourget, 1988 (41) DLR (4th) 756 at 757. 
114 .. In whom, in terms of Section 108(1) of the Constitution, vested the authority to institute criminal 
prosecutions on behalf of the State. 
115 .. In Shabalala and Others v The Attorney-General of Transvaal and Others, op cit 99H. 
116 .. Namely the right to a fair trial in this instance. 
117.. In Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of the Transvaaal and Another, op cit 1607, 
paragraph 55. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
TIIB DEATH PENAL IT, HUMAN RIGHTS 
UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL 
SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
F or a very long time our legal system was saddled with a controversy regarding the death penalty. 1 Civil libertarians2 campaigned tirelessly for its abolition while 
there was also a strong lobby for its retention as a form of punishment.3 The most 
important reason advanced for the retention of the death penalty was, and still is, that 
society in general demands retribution for serious crimes.4 Some of the retentionists 
regard the death penalty as a reflection of the will of the Almighty,5 while others, though 
denying that they regard it as a panacea for our unacceptably high levels of crime, have 
argued that, "[t]o uphold law and order and to ensure respect and confidence in our 
criminal justice system, capital punishment in our particular· circumstances is 
imperative."6 
It is important to note that the chasm between the people who want the death penalty 
to be abolished and those who want it to be retained is not that wide; if anything, the 
distinction between them is as clear as muddy water and it depends on the levels of 
violent crime at any particular moment. However, the racial breakdown of the two 
camps, with indigenous Africans always dominating the abolitionist camp, confirms the 
public perception that the death penalty was essentially an instrument of apartheid. 7 
The legal position prior to the Constitutional Court's judgment in S v Makwanyane,8 the 
judgment of the Constitutional Court in Makwanyane itself, and subsequent 
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developments in respect of the right to life and the death penalty all constitute the 
subjects to be investigated in this chapter. 
THE LAW PRIOR TO MAKWANYANE 
For the purpose of this thesis, only the law of the old Republic of South Africa9 will be 
considered. The formerly nominally independent TBVC territories had similar 
legislation10 and only the Ciskei had formally abolished the death penalty11 by the time 
the (interim) Constitution became law and when the Makwanyane decision of the 
Constitutional Court was given. 
PRIOR TO 1990 
Until 1958, there were only three capital crimes in South Africa, namely murder, 12 
treason 13 and rape. 14 The death penalty was mandatory only in the case of murder 
where extenuating circumstances could not be found. In 1958 robbery and 
housebreaking with aggravating circumstances 15 were added to these. 16 Subsequently, 
sabotage, 17 receiving training that could further the objects of communism or advocating 
abroad economic or social change in South Africa by violent means through the aid of 
a foreign government or institution where the accused was a resident or a former 
resident of the Republic, 18 kidnapping and child stealing, 19 and "participation in terroristic 
activities"20 were added to the list of capital crimes. 
Under the Internal Security Act, 21 provision was made for the death penalty for 
"terrorism". This offence is very broadly defined and includes acts or threats of violence 
and attempted acts of violence carried out with the intent to, inter a/ia, overthrow or 
endanger the state authority, or bring about or promote any constitutional, political, 
industrial, social or economic change in the Republic,22 or to "induce the Government 
of the Republic to do or to abstain from doing any act or to adopt or to abandon a 
particular standpoint."23 Conspiring with, or inciting, instigating, commanding, advising, 
aiding, encouraging or procuring any other person to commit terrorism as defined in the 
Act could also result in capital punishment. 24 
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Before 1990, there was no automatic right of appeal against the decision of the 
Supreme Court to, inter alia, impose the death penalty. The accused first had to apply 
to the trial judge for leave to appeal. If this was denied, the convicted person could 
petition the Chief Justice for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court; the Chief Justice's decision in this regard was final. If the condemned person was 
granted leave to appeal, the Appellate Division would then deal with the appeal and 
decide whether to confirm the sentence of death. If all else had failed, the person 
sentenced to death could appeal to the State President of the Republic for clemency. 
The State President could use the constitutional power to reprieve a condemned person 
by commuting his or her death sentence to any other competent sentence.25 Therefore, 
as Mr HJ Coetsee, then Minister of Justice pointed out, no person could be executed 
before the death sentence had been confirmed by the Appellate Division and before the 
Sate President had decided whether or not to grant such a person a reprieve. 26 
THE 1990 REFORMS 
On 2 February 1990, Mr FW de Klerk, then State President, announced the suspension 
of the execution of the death penalty as part of an epoch-making speech which set 
South Africa on a new path. 27 The suspension of the execution of the death penalty was 
pending certain reforms which were subsequently brought about by means of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act28 on 27 July 1990.29 
Whereas before these reforms the death penalty was obligatory in all cases of murder 
where the court found no extenuating circumstances, in terms of the amended Section 
277 of the Criminal Procedure Act30 courts could choose not to impose capital 
punishment; after a conviction of murder, or of one of the other capital offences, the 
death penalty was a discretionary sentence. It was to be imposed only if the presiding 
judge or the court was satisfied that it was the only appropriate sentence.31 As Friedman 
AJA pointed out in S v Masina and Others,32 a completely new approach in this regard 
was embarked upon. If, in the circumstances of a particular case there was another 
appropriate sentence, for example life imprisonment, then the death penalty could not 
be regarded as the only proper sentence.33 The consequences of this were very clear; 
those judges who had all along been agonising over the legitimacy of the death penalty 
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would now be at liberty to obviate its imposition and, instead, impose long sentences 
of imprisonment, including life imprisonment. 34 
Furthermore, the narrow concept of extenuating circumstances the presence of which 
the accused had to establish on a balance of probabilities, was replaced by the broader 
concept of mitigating factors35 which would allow the courts to take into account even 
factors that were unrelated to the crime, such as the accused's behaviour after the 
commission of the crime. 36 
Lastly, before the 1990 amendment of Section 277 the death penalty was a matter for 
the presiding judge alone, in the decision of which the assessors (if any) did not play 
any formal role. However, under the amended Section 277 the judge was now to 
conjointly with the assessors make a finding on the presence or absence of mitigating 
or aggravating circumstances, and have to be satisfied that it was the only appropriate 
sentence before imposing it.37 
The sentence of death could be passed by a superior court only;38 magistrates' courts 
did not have jurisdiction to pass this form of penalty. It could not be imposed upon any 
person "who was under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the act 
which constituted the offence concerned."39 Where the age of an accused at the time 
of the commission of such an offence was placed in issue, the onus was upon "the 
State to show beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was 18 years of age or older 
at the relevant time."40 
The death penalty was to be imposed only in the most exceptional cases, where there 
were no prospects of rehabilitation and the objects of punishment could not be achieved 
in any other way. 41 The Court was required to identify mitigating and aggravating 
factors, and the State bore the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence 
of aggravating factors and to negative beyond reasonable doubt the existence of 
mitigating factors relied upon by the accused.42 The subjective factors which might have 
influenced the accused's conduct were to be taken into account43 and related to the 
main objects of punishment.44 As Holmes JA said in S v Letsolo,45 in this process, 
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every relevant consideration was to receive the most scrupulous care and reasoned 
attention. 
A full right of appeal, including the right to dispute the sentence without having to 
establish an irregularity or misdirection on the part of the trial judge, was available to 
persons sentenced to death. The Appellate Division was empowered to set the 
sentence of death aside if it would not have imposed it itself and it had laid down criteria 
for the exercise of that power by itself and other Courts.46 Even if the person sentenced 
to death did not appeal, the Appellate Division was required to review the case and to 
set aside the sentence if in its opinion it was not a proper sentence.47 
SECTION 9 OF THE (INTERIM) CONSTITUTION 
Makwanyane was decided thirteen months after the adoption of the (interim) 
Constitution which provided, inter alia, that: 
[e]very person shall have the right to life.48 
This formulation was, needless to say, a result of the compromise between two 
extremes, viz. abolition and retention of capital punishment, reached in the World Trade 
Centre negotiations. In the negotiations, the African National Congress,49 on the one 
hand, supported by numerous groups such as a group of Western Cape lawyers,50 
demanded the absolute and unconditional abolition of the death penalty. The National 
Party, on the other, would make provision for the death penalty which would be imposed 
and executed subject to Article 6 of the United Nations International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.51 The Democratic Party provided in its draft proposals 
submitted to the World Trade Centre negotiations that "no person shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his or her life". The lnkatha Freedom Party, while itself unequivocally calling 
for the abolition of capital punishment, did so in a rather restrained fashion. 52 
Though the Chief Justice, Michael M Corbett, submitted that Section 33(1 )(b),53 read 
with Section 9 of the (interim) Constitution, effectively abolished the death penalty, 54 
the controversy over capital punishment had not ended. Section 9 of the Constitution 
could be interpreted in various ways, leading to different results.55 On a matter such as 
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this, where the political divisions were unbridgeable, and where the (interim) 
Constitution itself did not abolish the death penalty in clear and unambiguous terms, 
an authoritative interpretation of the provisions of Section 9 could only be given by the 
Constitutional Court.56 
The South African Law Commission57 and the Democratic Party58 proposed that the 
issue of the death penalty ought to be referred to the then-to-be-formed constitutional 
court. The issue eventually came before the Constitutional Court, and, as will be shown 
below, the Court abolished the death penalty largely on the grounds that it was 
inconsistent with the right to life guaranteed in the Constitution,59 despite the ruling in 
the unanimous judgment delivered by Chaskalson P, according to which the primary 
ground for finding the death penalty unconstitutional was that it violated the right not to 
be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT INTERVENES 
Eventually the issue came before the Constitutional Court which ruled that the death 
penalty was not compatible with the (interim) Constitution because it, inter alia, 
negated the seminal right to life enshrined in Chapter 3 of the (interim) Constitution.60 
THE CASE OF S V MAKWANYANE EN 'N ANDER61 
In this matter, to which the case before the Constitutional Court was a sequel, the two 
accused had been convicted in the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme Court 
on four counts of murder,62 one count of attempted murder and one count of robbery 
with aggravating circumstances,63 all of which were committed during a robbery from 
a bank security vehicle which was delivering monthly wages to the Coronation Hospital 
in Johannesburg. They had appealed to the Appellate Division against both the 
convictions and the sentences and their appeals in respect of the convictions and long 
term sentences of imprisonment were dismissed. However, because of the issue of the 
validity of the death penalty, the Appellate Division64 postponed the further hearing of 
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the appeals against the death sentences, pending a decision of the Constitutional 
Court. 
Though the matter was not formally referred to the Constitutional Court by the Appellate 
Division,65 the Constitutional Court had to decide two basic questions, namely: 
(1) the constitutionality of the provisions of Section 277(1 )(a)66 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act; and 
(2) the implications of the provisions of Section 241 (8) of the (interim) 
Constitution with regard to all matters concluded prior to the date of 
commencement of the (interim) Constitution.67 
Unfortunately, in my opinion, the remark of Grosskopf JA that the further consideration 
of the appeals against the death sentences be postponed pending a decision of the 
Constitutional Court regarding the constitutional validity of the death penalty "in gevalle 
soos hierdie'68 compelled the Constitutional Court to confine its work in this regard to 
the provisions of Section 277(1 )(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, instead of dealing 
comprehensively with the constitutional validity of the death penalty as a form of 
punishment per se.69 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEA TH PENAL TY 
For this purpose, Chapter 3 of the (interim) Constitution, which set out the fundamental 
rights which all persons would be entitled to in the nascent democracy, was relevant. 
The starting point for the Court was Section 9 which, without dealing specifically with 
the death penalty, merely provided that "[e]very person shall have the right to life."70 
Lamenting this, Chaskalson P remarked that: 
[i]t would no doubt have been better if the framers of the Constitution had stated 
specifically, either that the death penalty is not a competent penalty, or that it is 
permissible in circumstances sanctioned by law. This, however, was not done 
and it has been left to this Court to decide whether the penalty is consistent with 
the provisions of the Constitution. That is the extent and limit of the Court's power 
in this case.71 
The fact that, in the view of Chaskalson P, the Constitution did not specifically 
proscribe the death penalty did not deter the Court from proceeding to determine the 
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question, however. Chaskalson P suggested that the next logical thing to do would be 
to look at Section 11 (2) of the (interim) Constitution, 72 the constitutional provision which 
dealt specificalfy with the question of punishment; this was the section which prohibited 
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" albeit without defining what 
constituted such treatment or punishment.73 The Court then had to give meaning to 
these words74 and relate them to the issue of capital punishment as then sanctioned by 
our law. 
For this purpose, the Court acknowledged that it would have to go beyond the ordinary 
meaning of the words to be interpreted and look at both their context75 and their 
purpose, as well as the history and background to the adoption of the (interim) 
Constitution. On this basis, Chaskalson P had no difficulty in concluding that, prima 
facie, the death penalty is indeed a cruel, inhuman and degrading form of punishment. 76 
However, in the same breath, he said: 
[t]he question is not, however, whether the death sentence is a cruel, inhuman 
or degrading punishment in the ordinary meaning of these words but whether it 
is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment within the meaning of s 11 (2) of our 
Constitution. The accused, who rely on s 11 (2) of the Constitution, carry the 
initial onus of establishing this proposition. 77 
After a long excursion which took him through international human rights instruments 
and the experiences and practices of other countries, Chaskalson P indeed concluded 
that the carrying out of the death penalty destroyed life which was protected without 
reservation in Section 9, and that it annihilated human dignity protected under Section 
10 of our Constitution. He thus declared that he was satisfied that in the context of our 
Constitution the death penalty was a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.78 
While Chaskalson P correctly understood the role of the Court to be to decide whether 
the provisions of pre-constitutional law making the death penalty a competent sentence 
for murder and other crimes were consistent with the (interim) Constitution,79 he was 
not willing to go beyond the question that was referred to the Court by the Appellate 
Division, however. His judicial eye was always focused on the validity of capital 
punishment in respect of murder.80 
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Thus, after he had concluded that the death penalty was indeed a cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment which violated our Constitution, he then sought to determine 
whether it was not, nevertheless, as a penalty for murder in the circumstances 
contemplated in Sections 277(1 )(a), 316A and 322(2A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
protected by the limitation clause. For this purpose, using his legal scalpel, he dissected 
the arguments proffered by the Attorney-General, all of which were based on the 
foremost objects of punishment. At the end of this process, he came to the conclusion 
that: 
the clear and convincing case that is required to justify the death sentence as a 
penalty for murder has not been made out. The requirements of s 33( 1) have 
accordingly not been satisfied, and it follows that the provisions of s 277(1 )(a) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 must be held to be inconsistent withs 
11 (2) of the Constitution.81 
In other words, though he was amply aware that the Court was required to pronounce 
on the validity of capital punishment,82 instead of declaring capital punishment per se 
to be inconsistent with our Constitution and therefore invalid, the President of the 
Constitutional Court limited his enquiry to the validity of the penalty in cases of murder.83 
So, for him the question to be answered in Makwanyane84 was whether the death 
penalty was justifiable under our Constitution as a penalty for murder, rather than as 
a penalty under our criminal justice system.85 
At the end of his lengthy, erudite and illuminating judgment, the President of the Court 
indeed confirmed this when he said that: 
I have dealt in this judgment only with the provisions of s 277(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, but it is clear that if ss (1 )(a} is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, ss (1 )(c}-(f) must also be unconstitutional, so too must provisions 
of legislation corresponding to s 277(1 )(a), (c), (d), (e) and (f) that are in force in 
parts of the national territory in terms of s 229 of the Constitution. 86 (my italics) 
Thus, Chaskalson P neatly skirted around the provisions of Section 276(1 )(a) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, in terms of which the sentence of death may, subject to the 
provisions of this Act and any other law and of the common law, be passed upon a 
person convicted of an offence. Neither was he prepared to deal with the provisions of 
Section 277(1 )(b) of this Act, in terms of which the sentence of death may be passed 
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by a superior court in the case of a conviction for ''treason committed when the Republic 
is in a state of war." This, he said, was because: 
[d]ifferent considerations arising from s 33(1) might possibly apply to para (b), 
which makes provision for the imposition of the death sentence for treason 
committed when the Republic is in a state of war. No argument was addressed 
to us on this issue, and I refrain from expressing any views thereon.87 
THE INDIVIDUAL PREDILECTIONS AND IDIOSYNCRASIES OF THE OTHER 
JUDGES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
While all the judges of the Constitutional Court concurred in the judgment of Chaskalson 
P and in the order he gave, each one of them gave his or her own separate judgment 
which exhibited interesting personal nuances. 88 In their separate judgments most of the 
judges strike one as actually having sought a complete abolititon of the death penalty 
as a form of punishment in the Republic. And yet they all prefaced their remarks by 
agreeing with Chaskalson P who deliberately confined his judgment to the 
constitutionality or otherwise of the provisions of Section 277{1 ){a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.89 
For Ackermann J, however, the death penalty as a form of punishment was simply to 
be abolished.90 The conclusion to which the learned judge of the Court came was that 
this form of punishment was arbitrary and unequal, and violated Section 9 of the 
{interim) Constitution which unquestionably encompassed the individual's "right not to 
be deliberately put to death by the State in a way which is arbitrary and unequal. "91 
However, if it was to be abolished, society ought to be given a guarantee by the State 
that it would be protected from further harm by unreformed recidivist murderers and 
rapists. 
[w]ith the abolition of the death penalty society needs a firm assurance that the 
unreformed recidivist murderer or rapist will not be released from prison, 
however long the sentence served by the prisoner may have been, if there is a 
reasonable possibility that the prisoner will repeat the crime. Society needs to be 
assured that in such cases the State will see to it that such a recidivist will remain 
in prison permanently ... If there is an individual right not to be put to death by the 
criminal justice system, there is a correlative obligation on the State, through the 
criminal justice system, to protect society from once again being harmed by the 
unreformed recidivist killer or rapist. The right and the obligation are inseparably 
part of the same constitutional State compact.92 
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Didcott J agreed with Chaskalson P that the Constitution outlawed capital punishment 
in the Republic "for the crimes covered by his judgment. "93 In other words, the learned 
judge, like Chaskalson P ,94 was prepared to confine the outlawing of capital punishment 
to murder, robbery or attempted robbery with aggravating circumstances, kidnaping, 
child-stealing and rape. 
And yet, a careful reading of paragraph 17 4 of the judgment suggests that the learned 
judge actually wanted a complete abolition of capital punishment which he found to be 
a violation of the right to life95 of every person and a contravention of the right of every 
individual not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, both of which 
were protected by Sections 9 and 11 (2) of the Constitution respectively. For him, the 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act96 that sanctioned sentences of death were 
not saved from nullification by the limitation clause97 in their clash with Sections 9 and 
11 (2)98 of the Constitution. In his concluding remarks, the learned judge then said: 
South Africa has experienced too much savagery. The wanton killing must stop 
before it makes a mockery of the civilised, humane and compassionate society 
to which the nation aspires and has constitutionally pledged itself. And the State 
must set the example by demonstrating the priceless value it places on the lives 
of all its subjects, even the worst.99 (my italics) 
So, in essence, Didcott J did not completely agree with Chaskalson P in whose 
judgment he nonetheless concurred. He could not agree with Chaskalson P and adopt 
a position seeking to preserve the State's right to kill people for treason and terrorism 
committed while the Republic was in a state of war, 100 which is diametrically opposed 
to the position taken in his judgment, and, in the same breath, sustain his commitment 
to the abolition of the death penalty. 
Though Kentridge AJ concurred in the judgment of Chaskalson P, for him the issue was 
simple; the framers of the (interim) Constitution had imposed upo'n the Constitutional 
Court the inescapable duty of deciding whether the death penalty for murder was 
consistent with Chapter 3 of the (interim) Constitution.101 Though the learned acting 
judge conceded that there was "ample objective evidence that evolving standards of 
civilisation demonstrate the unacceptability of the death penalty in countries which are 
or aspire to be free and democratic societies", 102 and even though he was prepared to 
deprecate the deliberate execution of a human being, however depraved and criminal 
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his conduct, he was still talking about the constitutionality of capital punishment with 
regard to murder and murderers. He thus concluded that: 
[a]s a civilised society it is not open to us, in my opinion, to express our moral 
outrage by executing even the worst of murderers any more than we could do 
so by the public hangings or mutilations of a bygone time.103 (my italics) 
If the Kentridge AJ approach 104 were to be followed, the question of the constitutionality 
of the death penalty would have to be dealt with separately in respect of each of the 
offences for which it could be imposed prior to the Makwanyane decision. But, 
fortunately, Chaskalson P was prepared to go beyond the validity of the provisions of 
Section 277(1 )(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, albeit cautiously and to a limited 
extent. 105 
For Kriegler J, on the other hand, the issue for decision was simply whether the 
Constitution had outlawed capital punishment as sanctioned by relevant provisions of 
the Criminal Procedure Act and corresponding legislation in the then Transkei, 
Bophuthatswanaand Venda. 106 For the purpose of answering this question, the learned 
judge used the provisions of Section 9 of the (interim) Constitution as the starting 
point, further than which he said one need not go. 107 To him, whatever else Section 9 
might have meant, at the very least it indicated that the State may not deliberately 
deprive any person of his or her life. As against that general prohibition, the provisions 
of Section 277(1 )108 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which sanctioned a judicial order 
for the deprivation of a person's life, were unconstitutional and could be struck down 
under Section 4(1) of the (interim) Constitution. 109 
Kriegler J then proceeded to look into whether or not the provisions of Section 277(1) 
could be salvaged by the limitation clause. After having considered the deterrent and 
retributive value of Section 277 ( 1 ), he concluded that: 
the death penalty has no demonstrable penological value over and above that 
of long-term imprisonment. No empirical study, no statistical exercise and no 
theoretical analysis has been able to demonstrate that capital punishment has 
any deterrent force greater than that of a really heavy sentence of imprisonment 
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... capital punishment cannot be vindicated by the provisions of s 33(1) of the 
Constitution. It simply cannot be reasonable to sanction judicial killing without 
knowing whether it has any marginal deterrent value. 
Having concluded that capital punishment is inconsistent with s 9 of the 
Constitution and cannot be saved bys 33(1), I find it unnecessary to consider its 
possible inconsistency with any other fundamental rights protected by chap 3. 110 
(my italics) 
However, after taking such a great and clear stand against capital punishment, Kriegler 
J suddenly, in a footnote for that matter,111 associated himself with the approach of 
Chaskalson P with regard to the provisions of Section 277(1 )(b)112 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. The implications of this are discussed below. 
Langa J, immediately after associating himself with the judgment of Chaskalson P, 
declared that the death sentence provided for in Section 277(1 )113 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act was unconstitutional because it violated the right to life, the right to 
respect for human dignity and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment. 114 However, the learned judge, whilst claiming to be putting 
more emphasis on the right to life, was quick to point out that the right to life did not 
mean that every person had the right not to be deliberately put to death by the State as 
punishment, as envisaged in Section 277(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 115 
After making this startling statement, he then looked into whether or not the provisions 
of Section 277(1) could be salvaged by the limitation clause. After that his judgment 
indulges in a discussion of ubuntu, an important concept which permeates our political, 
constitutional and social orientation and constitutes an important feature of the society 
South Africa seeks to become, before it returns to the conclusion that: 
as a 'punishment' the death penalty is a violation of the right to life. It is cruel, 
inhuman and degrading. It is also a severe affront to human dignity ... Section 
277 of the Criminal Procedure Act cannot be saved by the provisions of s 33{1) 
of the Constitution in respect of any of the rights affected. The punishment is not 
reasonable on any basis. In view of the available alternative sentence of a long 
term of imprisonment, it is also unnecessary. 116 
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So for Langa J, the death penalty in its entirety was unconstitutional, though he too 
associated himself with the judgment and the order given by Chaskalson P. 
For Madala J too, capital punishment was "clearly offensive to the cardinal principles 
for which or Constitution stands."117 His judgement, like that of Langa J, turned on the 
concept of ubuntu, which he said permeated the entire (interim) Constitution and 
carried in it ''the ideas of humaneness, social justice and fairness."118 
On the basis of ubuntu, he rejected capital punishment which he described as "a 
punishment which involves so much pain and suffering that civilised society ought not 
to tolerate it even in spite of the current high rate of crime. And society ought to tolerate 
the death penalty even less when considering that it has any greater deterrent effect on 
would-be murderers than life imprisonment."119 Believing as he did in rehabilitation of 
offenders, 120 the learned judge also said that: 
the death penalty rejects the possibility of rehabilitation of the convicted persons, 
condemning them as "no good" once and for all, and drafting them to the death 
row and the gallows. One must then ask whether such rejection of rehabilitation 
as a possibility accords with the concept of ubuntu.121 
Furthermore, the judge rejected capital punishment because it violated Section 11 (2) 
of the Constitution. For a judge who rejected the death penalty in such clear and 
unambiguous terms 122 to nonetheless, wittingly or unwittingly, associate himself with a 
position seeking to retain it in cases of treason committed while the Republic is in a 
state of war is surprising, to say the least. 
Mahomed DP (as he then was) too, whose position on the death penalty was made 
clear at the very outset, 123 was nonetheless prepared, for inexplicable and unfathomable 
considerations, to leave the question of the validity of the provisions of Section 
277(1 )(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act open. 124 While his ubuntu-based approach 
would not permit him to countenance the deliberate annihilation of human life 
sanctioned by the death penalty, 125 he could not bring himself round to extending this 
approach to cases of treason committed while the Republic is in a state of war. While 
he, like Chaskalson P, 126 correctly pointed out that the framers of the (interim) 
Constitution had elected not to state their position on the death penalty in clearer 
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terms, but had left it to the Constitutional Court to deal with its constitutionality, he 
shrank from declaring capital punishment as null and void in absolute terms. Though 
in S v Mhlongo 127 he described it as the ultimate and the most incomparably extreme 
form of punishment involving the planned and calculated termination of life itself, he also 
left the question as to whether capital punishment negated the essential content of the 
right to life open. 128 
In his characteristically erudite judgment, however, Mahomed DP (as he then was) 
demonstrated that capital punishment violated the right to life,129 the right to equality,130 
the right human dignity131 and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment or treatment. 132 
Mokgoro J, 133 whose judgment was also predicated upon ubuntu, unlike Mahomed DP 
(as he then was), 134 was prepared to declare that "[t]he death penalty violates the 
essential content of the right to life embodied ins 9, in that it extinguishes life itself."135 
For her, Section 277(1 )136 of the Criminal Procedure Act, was unconstitutional for 
violating the provisions of Sections 9, 1 O and 11 (2) of the Constitution. 137 
Proceeding as she did from the ubuntu point of view, Mokgoro J could not countenance 
the deliberate and calculated killing of even the vilest human being by the State as a 
form of punishment. She, instead, expected the State, as the representative of its 
people, to set the standard for moral values in society, and not accord legal sanction 
to vengeance. 138 
However, while, as far as she was concerned, there was no room for capital punishment 
in the new constitutional order, she too associated herself with the judgment and order 
given by Chaskalson P which skirted around the question of the validity of the death 
penalty in cases of treason committed while the Republic was at war. 
For O'Regan J, put simply, the question to be decided by the Constitutional Court was 
whether capital punishment that had been imposed upon the accused in S v 
Makwanyane en 'n Ander139 was constitutional. In other words, did "our Constitution 
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permit any convicted criminal, however heinous the crime, to be put to death by the 
Government as punishment for that crime?"140 
To answer this question, the learned judge began with Section 9 of the Constitution, 
the formulation of which she pointed out was unusual in human rights instruments and 
jurisprudence. 141 Proceeding from the point of view of purposive interpretation of the 
right to life as encapsulated in the Constitution, she stated that the right to life was not 
confined to mere physical existence of a human being; it constitutes the essence of the 
new society that is emerging from the ruins of apartheid and is entwined with the right 
to human dignity, without which it is substantially diminished. 142 
Moreover, for O'Regan J, all the rights entrenched in the Constitution were "available 
to all South Africans, no matter how atrocious their conduct. "143 Therefore, as Mad ala 
J put it his own judgment, the death penalty would be unacceptable in such a society; 
it should not take its standards and values from the murderers, rapists, robbers and the 
like, but should seek to impose its own standards and values on them. 144 
She did not find it difficult at all to say that, the purpose of capital punishment being to 
kill convicted criminals, to deprive them of their physical existence, "[i]ts inevitable result 
is the denial of human life. It is hard to see how this methodical and deliberate 
destruction of life by the Government can be anything other than a breach of the right 
to life ... The implementation of the death penalty is also a denial of the individual's right 
to dignity."145 She was also not persuaded that the death penalty could be salvaged by 
the limitation clause as it did not meet the requirements of reasonableness, justifiability 
and necessity. 146 
Without ever alluding to the provisions of Section 277(1 )(b) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, O'Regan J came to the conclusion that: 
the death penalty is unconstitutional. It is a breach of the rights to life and dignity 
that are entrenched in ss 9 and 1 O of our Constitution, as well as a breach of the 
prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment contained in s 11 (2). 
The new Constitution stands as a monument to this society's commitment to a 
future in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect. We 
cannot postpone giving effect to that commitment.147 
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The last individual remarks in the Makwanyane judgment were made by Sachs J who 
first declared his full agreement with Chaskalson P and then expressed disappointment 
that the latter's judgment "places greater reliance on the prohibition of cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment than it does on the right to life. "148 
For Sachs J, the starting-point in the analysis of capital punishment ought to be the right 
to life. For this purpose, the Court's primary duty was to interpret the provisions of 
Section 9 of the (interim) Constitution, 149 and not to articulate the personal views and 
feelings of its judges.150 
The unqualified and unadorned words of Section 9, in the judge's view, effectively 
outlawed capital punishment. The limitation clause 151 could not save the death penalty 
from this as, according to the learned judge, the death penalty, by its very nature, 
entails not limiting a person's life but extinguishing it. 152 
The judge also said that constitutionalism, on which our new order is based, was "about 
the protection and development of rights, not their extinction."153 Thus, in the absence 
of a clear intention to the contrary, the unqualified and unadorned words of Section 9 
should be read to mean exactly what they said. As the provision stood, the State was 
not given any power to use its sovereignty deliberately to take a person's life. 154 
Lastly, while agreeing with Chaskalson P that the framers of the Constitution left the 
question of the validity of the death penalty for the Constitutional Court to decide, 
they effectively closed the door by the language they used and the values they 
required us to uphold. It is difficult to see how they could have done otherwise. 
In a founding document dealing with fundamental rights you either authorise the 
death sentence or you do not. In my view, the values expressed by s 9 are 
conclusive of the matter. Everyone, including the most abominable of human 
beings, has the right to life, and capital punishment is therefore 
unconstitutional.155 (my italics) 
Once again, one wonders why this judge, like many others in Makwanyane, after 
succinctly and unequivocally declaring capital punishment to be unconstitutional, 
nonetheless decided to associate himself with the somewhat narrow, cautious and 
conservative position of the President of the Constitutional Court on the issue. 
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THE COURT AND PUBLIC OPINION 
Part of the debate regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty was that it was 
necessary to consult the people by means of a referendum before a decision was made 
whether to retain or abolish it.156 Participating in the parliamentary debate of 17 June 
1993 on a free basis and propounding his own view, Mr NJJ Van R Koornhof MP (NP) 
said in this regard that: 
[m]any people and especially the public argue that the death penalty should be 
retained simply because public opinion wants it. This is a fallacious argument. 
Nowhere in the world have leaders permitted themselves to be prescribed t':> by 
public opinion on such a moral case. If this were to be so, what would we do in 
this Parliament if public opinion chose torture. Would we introduce it? 
... Public opinion in South Africa is emotionality loaded in favour of the death 
penalty at present. In such circumstances there is no answer. The public must 
not tum the death penalty into a magic formula, however, which will restore law 
and order. This will not happen.157 
In Makwanyane the Attorney-General had argued that contemporary public attitudes 
regarding what was cruel, inhuman or degrading were very important. He had also 
argued that South Africans in general would not regard capital punishment for extreme 
cases of murder as a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. Whilst Chaskalson P 
conceded that both propositions might be correct, he had the following to say in this 
regard: 
[t]he question before us ... is not what the majority of South Africans believe a 
proper sentence for murder should be. It is whether the Constitution allows the 
sentence. 
Public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but, in itself, it is no 
substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to 
uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be decisive, 
there would be no need for constitutional adjudication. The protection of rights 
could then be left to Parliament, which has a mandate from the public, and is 
answerable to the public for the way its mandate is exercised, but this would be 
a return to parliamentary sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order 
established by the 1993 Constitution. By the same token the issue of the 
constitutionality of capital punishment cannot be referred to a referendum, in 
which a majority view would prevail over the wishes of any minority. The very 
reason for establishing the new legal order, and for vesting the power of judicial 
review of all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of minorities and 
others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic 
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process. Those who are entitled to claim this protection include social outcasts 
and marginalised people of our society. It is only if there is a willingness to 
protect the worst and the weakest amongst us that all of us can be secure that 
our rights will be protected. 
This Court cannot allow itself to be diverted from its duty to act as an 
independent arbiter of the Constitution by making choices on the basis that they 
will find favour with the public. 158 (my italics) 
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
MAKWANYANE DECISION 
In civil libertarian circles the historic Makwanyane decision was welcomed 
enthusiastically. 159 In general (and this phrase is used advisedly), the Constitutional 
Court ruled in favour of the right to life and adjudged the death penalty to be 
inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution. It emphasised, ex abundanti cautela in my 
opinion, that Makwanyane and the rest of those convicts who were awaiting their 
appointments with the executioner160 would not be executed as the State and all its 
organs were bound by the decision. 161 Our judges too will, again in general, no longer 
impose the death penalty as it has ceased being part of our system of criminal justice. 
However, as stated above, Chaskalson P, whose judicial eye was obviously fixated 
upon murder, left the question of the applicability of the death penalty in respect of 
treason committed whilst the Republic is in a state of war162 open; the order he gave 
was specifically confined to the question of the validity of paragraphs (a),163 (c),164 (d),165 
(e)166 and (f)167 of Section 277(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act as well as to 
corresponding provisions of legislation then still applicable in certain parts of the 
national territory, which the Court declared to be in conflict with the (interim) 
Constitution and therefore invalid. 168 This, the learned President of the Constitutional 
Court said, was because "[d]ifferent considerations arising from s 33(1) might possibly 
apply to para (b), which makes provision for the imposition of the death sentence for 
treason committed when the Republic is in a state of war. No argument was addressed 
to us on this issue, and I refrain from expressing any views thereon."169 (my italics) In 
other words, the Court felt that it was possible that "[a] punishment as extreme and as 
irrevocable as death"170 could be reasonable, justifiable and necessary as a penalty for 
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treason committed when the Republic is in a state of war, even though it would negate 
the essential content of the right to life. 
Neither was the question of the imposition of the death penalty in respect of acts of 
terrorism addressed.171 It is thus, in my opinion, still possible for the death penalty to be 
imposed in terms of the provisions of Section 54(1) of the Internal Security Act, albeit 
subject to the decision of the Appellate Division 172 in S v Mncube en 'n Ander. 173 
As a result, the death penalty in South Africa has not been completely ruled out as "the 
proper sentence"; 174 it was declared to be inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution 
and therefore invalid only in respect of a conviction for murder, robbery or attempted 
robbery with aggravating circumstances, kidnaping, child-stealing and rape. 175 Thus, if 
it turns out to be the only appropriate sentence in respect of a person charged with and 
convicted of the elastic crime of treason 176 or, a priori, terrorism 177 "committed while the 
Republic is in a state ofwar",178 the death penalty may still be imposed. If such a person 
has exhausted all the remedies available within the Criminal Procedure Act and has 
failed to gain a presidential reprieve, the State may, theoretically at least, still hang him 
or her179 to crush political dissent. 
The Constitutional Court, whose collective commitment to human rights could not be 
gainsaid, had a golden opportunity in Makwanyane to rid the Republic once and for all 
time of the scourge of capital punishment but refused to do so 180 in respect of treason 
and, a priori, terrorism. 181 By doing so, it might have thought it wise to leave room for the 
State to act in "self-defence" when the nation is confronted by a real and immediate 
threat to the lives of many of its citizens and to its very survival. While this may be 
acceptable and indeed justifiable in any democracy, the death penalty may not be 
justified this way; for it "is not an act of self-defence against an immediate threat to life. 
It is the premeditated killing of a prisoner who could be dealt with equally well by less 
harsh means. "182 
If the Constitutional Court thought that the threat of the death penalty might deter 
people from committing politically motivated crimes, it was grossly mistaken. "If 
anything, the possibility of political martyrdom through execution may encourage people 
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to commit such crimes."183 The execution of many of our own people from Vuyisile Mini 
in the early sixties, through Solomon Mahlangu in the seventies, to Mosololi in the 
eighties for politically motivated crimes indeed spurred many young people on to 
struggle even more vigorously against the system of apartheid. 
Because the Constitutional Court shrank from the task of declaring capital punishment 
as being inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution in respect of all offences, the 
debate and the political controversy generated by the issue of capital punishment 
continued. Only the Constitutional Assembly, in the course of making a new constitution 
for the Republic, or Parliament, 184 could be expected to resolve the issue, therefore. 
Needless to say, the Constitutional Assembly, or for that matter, Parliament, would, 
unfortunately, decide the issue by means of the vote. The Constitutional Assembly, in 
the (new) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 185 merely reiterated that: 
"[e]veryone has the right to life." 
In sum, in its interpretation of the right to life as protected in our fundamental law, our 
Constitutional Court, the Court of final instance with the necessary constitutional power 
over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the (interim) 
Constitution, 186 did not heed the remarks of Jackson J that: 
[t]he very purpose of a bill of rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities 
... and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's 
right to life ... and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to (the) vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections. 187 (my italics) 
THE DEBATE CONTINUES 
Despite, and perhaps due to, the judgment and the order of the Constitutional Court in 
Makwanyane, the debate about the death penalty continued unabated. As will be 
shown below, the retentionist lobby, even in Parliament, was extremely incensed by the 
judgment. The old, hackneyed argument, namely that the death penalty has a greater 
deterrent value than any other sentence, was pressed upon the public even more 
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vigorously. The abolitionist lobby, needless to say, emboldened and bolstered up by 
Makwanyane, fought back ferociously in and outside Parliament. 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE 
The National Party moved a motion in National Assembly, calling for a national 
referendum on the issue of the death penalty, which was debated on 19 June 1995. 
Presenting the motion, Mr DPA Schutte MP stated, inter alia, that the Constitutional 
Court had found that the (interim) Constitution did outlaw capital punishment.188 
Responding on behalf of the African National Congress, Mr JH de Lange MP accused 
the National Party of seeking to use the Makwanyane judgment in the context of the 
then impending local government elections 189 and also of attempting to undermine and 
discredit the Constitutional Court. 190 In the course of his input, he described the 
Makwanyane judgment as one of the greatest judgments ever handed down by a 
South African Court, the content and style of which were beyond reproach. As a result, 
he had come to the conclusion that in years to come it would "be extensively utilised 
and quoted not only in South Africa, but also in many other parts of the world."191 For 
Mr De Lange the proper place where the question as to whether to abolish or retain 
capital punishment as part of our criminal justice system was the Constitutional 
Assembly, where a new Constitution for the Republic was being made. 192 
Lamenting the so-called abolition of the death penalty against the background of 
unprecedented levels of violent crime in our society, Mr J Chiole, on behalf of the 
Freedom Front, requested the Government 
to take the necessary constitutional steps to reintroduce the death sentence, 
after which reconsideration can again be given to the abolition thereof after five 
years if a drastic improvement is experienced.193 
Exhibiting his ignorance of how courts function in general, and, in particular, of the place 
and role of the new Court in our legal system, Mr Chiole then berated the National Party 
for having negotiated the transitional Constitution on the basis of which the 
Constitutional Court unilaterally decided that the death sentence was unconstitutional. 194 
It obviously had not dawned upon the Honourable Member of Parliament that the 
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Constitutional Court, as the court of final instance over all matters relating to the 
interpretaion, protection and enforcement of the provisions of the (interim) 
Constitution, 195 and the decisions of which were binding upon all persons and all 
legislative, executive and judicial organs of state, 196 had the right and the power, as 
such, to make decisions without any person or structure of government having the 
power to veto them. 197 
In a similar vein, Ms NE Masango MP, speaking for the National Party, lamented that 
the death penalty was abolished, presumably by the Constitutional Court, without 
consultation with the people. 198 She reiterated Schutte's call for a referendum, failing 
which the people would "start resorting to unlawful means in order to appease revenge 
and avenge the victims of violence in South Africa."199 
Even more scathing in his attack on the Constitutional Court's decision in Makwanyane 
was Reverend KR Meshoe MP who said that: 
the ACDP would like to record its rejection of the Constitutional Court's decision 
to abolish the death penalty without providing an effective alternative to deal with 
crime. Once again, the rights of criminals were favoured over the rights of peace-
loving and law-abiding citizens. The intellectual elite in the Constitutional Court 
chose to undermine the wishes of the majority of South Africans who are 
concerned about their safety and about the escalating crime rate in this 
country.200 (my italics) 
Describing the National Party's call for a referendum on the death penalty as a 
dangerous danse macabre, Mr AJ Leon MP mauled the National Party for its 
inconsistency201 and for seeking to overturn the unanimous decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Makwanyane. He told the National Assembly he wondered how 
the NP would feel if certain other sensitive matters, such as expropriation of property 
without compensation and Die Stem as part of the national anthem, were subject to a 
popular vote.202 
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THE PUBLIC DEBATE 
As luck would have it, the rate of violent crime, with a spate of motor-vehicle high-
jackings accompanied by murder, gave the impression that the country had been turned 
into a jungle ruled by thugs of all hues after the Makwanyane judgment. As many 
people and communities were thrown into a state of panic, the cry for the return of the 
death sentence for murder and related offences grew even louder. 203 The call for a 
referendum on the question became even stronger2°4 as people believed that the State 
had to adopt firmer measures against crime in the name of some greater good. 205 
As the press continued to quote Tokyo Sexwale, the Premier of Gauteng, as having 
said he believed a referendum should be held on the issue of capital punishment, the 
African National Congress issued a statement in which it said, inter a/ia, that it would 
not adopt any position that undermined the authority of the Constitutional Court to rule 
on constitutional matters without political interference.206 The Citizen207 quoted Mr 
Mosibudi Mangena, President of the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) as having 
said that "although AZAPO in principle opposed the death penalty, once society had 
normalised and the courts were free of racism, the issue of the death penalty should be 
decided by the public in a referendum." 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE 
The Constitutional Committee of the Constitutional Assembly did not help in laying the 
debate to rest either; instead, the country went back to square one. In the Working 
Draft of the New Constitution,208 it gave the citizenry an option between retaining the 
position in the (interim) Constitution209 and supporting an exception to the right to life, 
namely that this right could be limited by not being applicable in respect of the execution 
of a court sentence following conviction for a crime for which the death penalty is 
prescribed by an Act of Parliament. 210 
Assuming we adopted the first option placed before us by the Constitutional Committee 
of the Constitutional Assembly, we would then be confronted with the Chaskalson P 
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interpretation in Makwanyane which, as stated above, did not effectively abolish the 
death penalty. As stated above, the Constitutional Assembly indeed opted for the first 
option and merely reiterated that "everyone has the right to life."211 
THE LA TEST DEVELOPMENT 
The issue of the death penalty is now before Parliament. At the time of writing, the 
Minister of Justice had already tabled in Parliament a Bill212 intended, inter alia, to 
amend certain laws so as to repeal provisions relating to capital punishment".213 Of 
particular note in this regard is that the Bill goes beyond the Makwanyane decision of 
the Constitutional Court and seeks to repeal the provisions of Section 277214 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act in their entirety.215 Should this Bill be passed, Parliament shall 
have expunged from our statute book capital punishment as a penal option. 
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inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. See 451, paragraph 143. As far as he was concerned, 
the right to life was merely "another factor crucially relevant to the question whether the death sentence 
is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment within the meaning of s 11 (2) of our Constitution." At 429, 
paragraph 80. See also 434, paragraph 95, where both the right to life and the right to human dignity are 
regarded in the same vein. 
73 .. Ibid at 403. It is important to note that the ANC-led government of the Republic, represented by 
George Bizos SC, accepted that the death penalty was a cruel, inhuman and degrading form of 
punishment which should be declared unconstitutional. See ibid at 404. 
74 .. Ibidem. 
75 .. Which included, in particular, other provisions of Chapter 3, such as Sections 8, 9 and 10, which the 
President of the Court treated as giving meaning to Section 11 (2), the provision which dealt specifically 
with punishment. 
76 .. At 409-410, paragraph 26. 
77 .. Ibidem. 
78 .. At 434, paragraph 95. 
79 .. At 409, paragraph 25. 
80 .. Ibidem. 
81 .. At 451, paragraph 146. 
82 .. See his remark at 402, paragraph 5. 
83 .. At 434, paragraph 96. 
84 .. As raised by Grosskopf JA in Makwanyane en 'n Ander, op cit 873E. 
85 .. Although, in his rejection of retribution he was prepared to say that: "[t]o be consistent with the value 
of ubuntu, ours should be a society that 'wishes to prevent crime ... (not) to kill criminals simply to get even 
with them'." At 446, paragraph 131. 
86 .. At 452, paragraph 149. 
87 .. Ibidem. 
88 .. See PM Maduna, 'The Death Penalty and Human Rights', in ( 1996) 12 SAJHR 193 at 198ff for a brief 
discussion of the views of some the judges of the Constitutional Court in this regard. See also Heinz Klug, 
'Striking Down Death', ibidem, 61 at 66. 
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89 .. S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit452, paragraph 149. However, he extended the order he gave 
to the provisions of sub-section (1 )(c)-(f) of the Act and to provisions of legislation corresponding to these 
that were applicable in certain parts of the national territory. 
90 .. At 460, paragraph 171. 
91 .. At 458, paragraph 166. 
92 .. At460, paragraphs 170 and 171. 
93 .. At 461, paragraph 173. 
94 .. For whose judgment, see Makwanyane at 452 paragraph 149. 
95 .. At 176, paragraph 176, the judge said that the proclamation of the right to life "and the respect for it 
demanded from the State must surely entitle one, at the very least, not to be put to death by the State 
deliberately, systematically and as an act of policy that denies in principle the value of the victim's life." 
(my italics) 
96 .. Such as Section 276(1)(a) and 277(1) of the Act. 
97 .. Section 33(1) of the Constitution. 
98 .. At 464, paragraph 179, Didcott J said that: "every sentence of death must be stamped, for the 
purposes of s 11(2), as an intrinsically cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment." 
99 .. At 469, paragraph 190. 
100 .. Which is implied inthe judgment of Chaskalson P. See Makwanyane, at 452 and 453. 
101 .. At 469, paragraph 192. See also 471, paragraph 196, where the learned acting judge said that, in 
his opinion, the true issue for decision was whether or not the death penalty for murder was a cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment. In a sense, the learned acting judge might have been right in that this 
was indeed the primary question in Makwanyane. But then, as Chaskalson P pointed out at 402, 
paragraph 5, the issue the Court had to grapple with was larger than murder; it had been left to it to decide 
whether the death penalty per se was or was not inconsistent with the Constitution. 
102. At 472, paragraph 199. 
103 .. At 475, paragraph 203. 
104 .. Which, incidentally he adopted even in S v Zuma and Another, at when dealing with statutory 
presumptions. 
105 .. See the discussion of the jurisprudential implications of Makwanyane below. 
106 .. At 475-476, paragraph 206. 
107 .. At 4 76, paragraph 208. 
108 .. As a whole, I suggest, and not only as far as sub-sections 1 (a), (c), (d}, (e) and (f). 
109 .. At 476-477, paragraph 208. 
110 .. At 478, paragraphs 212, 213 and 214. 
111 .. See 478, paragraph 213, footnote 205. 
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112 .. That is the availability of capital punishment in cases of treason committed while the Republic is in 
a state of war. 
113 .. As a whole. 
114 .. See Makwanyane, at 479, paragraph 216. 
115 .. See Makwanyane, at 479, paragraph 217. This remark would seem to be contradicting Kriegler J's 
statement in paragraph 208 referred to above. 
116 .. At 483, paragraph 234. 
117 .. At 483, paragraph 235. 
118 .. At 484, paragraph 237. 
119 .. At 484, paragraph 239. 
120 .. Ibidem, paragraphs 242 and 243. 
121 .. Ibidem, paragraph 241. 
122 .. At 487, paragraph 260, the learned judge concluded his judgment, in which he did not even once 
refer to the question of the validity or otherwise of the provisions of Section 277(1 )(b) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, by stating that, in his view, "the death penalty does not belong to the society envisaged 
in the Constitution, is clearly in conflict with the Constitution generally and runs counter to the concept of 
ubuntu; additionally and just as importantly, it violates the provisions of s 11 (2) of the Constitution and, 
for those reasons, should be declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect." (my italics) 
123 .. At 489, paragraph 267, the learned judge stated categorically that the death penalty as a form of 
punishment violated crucial sections of the Constitution and could not be saved by the limitations 
permitted in terms of Section 33(1) thereof. See also 493, paragraph 282, and 497, paragraph 296. 
124 .. At 497, paragraph 297. 
125 .. See S v Mhlongo, 1994 (1) SACR 584 (A) at 587E-G, for how the learned judge had earlier on 
described capital punishment. 
126 .. At 402, paragraph 5. 
127 .. Op cit 587. 
128 .. See Makwanyane, op cit 497-498, paragraph 298. 
129 .. Which, at 489, paragraph 268, described as guaranteed in peremptory terms in Section 9 of the 
Constitution. 
130 .. As guaranteed in Section 8 of the Constitution. See Mahomed J at 491-492, paragraph 273. 
131 .. Section 10 of the Constitution. Ibidem, at 490, paragraph 271. 
132 .. Section 11 (2) of the Constitution. Ibidem, at 492, paragraphs 275-281. 
133 .. Who hastened to point out, correctly in my view, that, although in the Makwanyane matter "the Court 
had been called upon to decide the issue of consitutionality and not to engage in a debate on the 
desirability of abolition or retention" of the death penalty, it was inevitable for it to make necessary value 
choices. See 498-499, paragraph 303. 
134 .. Makwanyane, op cit 497-498, paragraph 298. 
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135 .. Ibidem, at 503, paragraph 313. 
136 .. In its entirety. 
137 .. At 503-504, paragraph 317. 
138 .. At 503, paragraph 316. 
139 .. Op cit. 
140 .. S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit 504, paragraph 320. 
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141 .. At 505, paragraph 324, where she quite rightly pointed out that: "In choosing this formulation, the 
drafters ... specifically avoided either expressly preserving the death penalty or expressly outlawing it." 
142 .. At 506, paragraphs 326 and 327. 
143 .. At 507, paragraph 331. 
144 .. At 485, paragraph 247. 
145 .. At 508, paragraphs 334 and 335. 
146 .. At 510, paragraph 343. 
147 .. At 510, paragraph 344. See also 509, paragraph 337. 
148 .. At 510-511, paragraph 346. Note that O'Regan J too, at 509, paragraph 337, remarked that Section 
277 of the Criminal Procedure Act was a violation not only of Section 11 (2) of the Constitution as held 
by Chaskalson P, but was also a breach of the right to life and the right to dignity. 
149 .. Which, at 511, paragraph 350, the learned judge described as unqualified words which "are binding 
on the State ... and, on the face of it, outlaw capital punishment." 
150 .. Ibidem, paragraph 349. 
151 .. Section 33(1) of the Constitution. 
152 .. Makwanyane, op cit 511, paragraphs 350 and 351. See also 512, paragraph 354. 
153 .. At 513, paragraph 356. 
154 .. Ibidem. 
155 .. At 520-521, paragraph 392. 
156 .. Rev C Pillay MP, speaking for his party, Solidarity, said, inter a/ia, that: "a referendum should be 
conducted to ascertain the popular view of the majority of South Africans." See Hansard, col. 11332 (17 
June 1993). However, as in terms of both the Electoral Act, 45 of 1979, and the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 110 of 1983, the indigenous African majority were not allowed the 
franchise, it should be noted that there was no way a referendum could have been used to ascertain their 
views on the death penalty then. The issue could have been decided, like everything else, by the white 
minority who then constituted the majority among those who were privileged to have the right to vote. 
157 .. Ibidem, col. 11340-11341. 
158 .. At 431, paragraphs 87 to 89 inclusive. See also Didcott J, ibidem at 468, paragraph 188; Madala J 
at 486-487, from paragraph 255 to 259 inclusive, and Mokgoro J, at 499-500, paragraph 305. 
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159 .. See George Devenish, "Death Penalty: A Right to Life?", in Focus (University of Natal, Scottsville, 
Winter 1995), at 5. 
160 .. See Chaskalson P in Makwanyane at 402 about the numbers that were affected. Note that, 
according to Mr DP du Plessis MP, in Hansard, col. 11376 (17 June 1993), no death sentence had been 
carried out since 14 November 1989. 
Note further that keeping people on death row for such long periods in harsh and degrading conditions, 
would, in Zimbabwe, have been unconstitutional. See the decision of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court, their 
equivalent of our Appellate Division, as given by Gubbay CJ in Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney-General, Zimbabwe, and Others, 1993 (4) SA 239 (ZS). See also Lord 
Griffiths in Pratt v Attorney-General for Jamaica and Another, [1993] 4 All ER 769 (PC) in this regard. 
161 .. At 452 and 453 of the judgment. This, in my opinion, would be a natural effect of the decision in 
terms of the provisions of Section 98(4) of the Constitution. 
162 .. Section 277(1 )(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
163 .. Murder. 
164 .. Robbery or attempted robbery, if the court finds aggravating circumstances to have been present. 
165 .. Kidnapping. 
166 .. Child-stealing 
167 .. Rape. 
168 .. S v Makwanyane, op cit at 453. 
169 .. Ibidem at 452. See also Kriegler J, ibid at 478, paragraph 213 (footnote 205), and Mahomed J, 
ibidem at 497, paragraph 297. Didcott J, ibidem at 461, paragraph 173, by implication, also left this 
question open. For Kentridge AJ, "the right to life must accommodate ... the right of the State to defend 
itself against insurrection." Ibidem at 469, paragraph 193. 
170 .. Per Wright CJ in People v Anderson, 493 P 2d 880 (Cal 1972) at 897. 
171 .. Presumably also because this question did not arise in Makwanyane. 
172 .. Now referred to as the Supreme Court of Appeal under Section 166(b) of the (new) Constitution. 
173 .. Namely that the death penalty can be imposed as the proper sentence only in respect of terrorism 
committed while the Republic is in a state of war. 
174 .. Further proof of this, if any is required, is that, unlike Decree 16of1990 (Ciskei), the Makwanyane 
decision of the Constitutional Court did not deal with the constitutional validity of the provisions of Sections 
276(1 )(a) and 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act which, respectively, provide for "the sentence of death" 
as one of the "sentences which may be passed upon a person convicted of an offence" and how such a 
sentence should be carried out. 
175 .. S v Makwanyane and Another, op cit at 452 and 453. 
176 .. Section 277(1 )(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Any act, by commissio or ommissio (R v 
Labuschagne, 1941 TPD 271 at 275; S v Banda, 1990 (3) SA 466 (B) 512A-B), if committed with the 
necessary hostile intent, is sufficient to constitute high treason; violence against the state, either actual 
or contemplated, is not a necessary element of the crime of high treason (S v Mayekiso, 1988 (4) SA 738 
(W) at 751 D). 
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177 .. In terms of Section 54(1) of the Internal Security Act. 
178 .. That is, international or civil war. 
179 .. We should not easily lose sight of the fate of Jopie Fourie who was court martialled, sentenced to 
death on 19 December 1914 and executed by firing squad the following day for treason after allegedly 
joining a rebellion as an officer of the Union Defence Force. 
180 .. A careful reading of the remarks of Chaskalson Pat 402, paragraph 5, and 452, paragraph 149, 
suggests that the Constitutional Court was not prepared to say that the death penalty per se was 
inconsistent with the Constitution but that, on the contrary, it was "permissible in circumstances 
sanctioned by law." 
181 .. Committed while the Republic is in a state of war. 
182 .. Amnesty International, op cit 2. 
183 .. Ibidem, at 5. 
184 .. Parliament could simply follow the example of Decree 16 of 1990 (Ck) and deal with specific 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act which sanction the death sentence. The Citizen, 28 November 
1995, reported that Advocate AM Omar, the Minister ofJustice,intended to introduce an Abolition of the 
Death Penalty Bill in Parliament, which would formally abolish the death penalty so as broadly speaking 
to bring our criminal law into line with the Makwanyane decision. 
185 .. Section 11. 
186 .. Section 98(2) of the Constitution. 
187 .. In West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette and Others, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) at 638. 
A point which Chaskalson P made in Makwanyane, op cit 431. 
188 .. Debates of the National Assembly, col. 2826 ( 19 June 1995. According to Mr BM Skosana MP, 
ibidem col. 2833, "[t]he Constitutional Court ... stated that, in terms of our Constitution, the Government 
may not kill any wrongdoers in order to punish them. Today ... our Constitution tells us that Government 
may not resort to or employ capital punishment, and this is the supreme law of our land until it is changed 
by virtue of a constitutional amendment." However, a careful scrutiny of the Makwanyane judgment 
suggests that this view or conclusion was incorrect; Government may still kill persons guilty of treason or 
terrorism committed while the Republic is in a state of war. 
189 .. Which were scheduled to take place generally on 1 November 1995. 
190 .. Ibidem, col. 2828. See also ibidem, cols. 2829 and 2830. Mr BM Skosana MP expressed a similar 
concern on behalf of the IFP. Ibidem, col. 2832. See further Advocate AM Omar MP (the Minister of 
Justice), ibidem, col. 2848. 
191 .. Ibidem, col. 2829. Bearing in mind the international trend towards abolition, those countries that have 
already abolished capital punishment would have very little, if anything, to learn from Makwanyane. 
192 .. Ibidem, col. 2831. Needless to say, the issue of the death penalty would then have to be settled in 
the Constitutional Assembly by means of the vote! As stated above, the Constitutional Assembly did not 
address the issue; it merely reiterated that everyone has the right to life. 
193 .. Ibidem, col. 2834. In the light of the Makwanyane decision, Schutte MP too called "for the 
amendment of our Constitution to bring it in line with the constitutions of the USA and India, as well as with 
all major conventions and charters on human rights." Ibidem, col. 2844. 
194 .. Ibidem, col. 2836. 
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195 .. Section 98(2) of the Constitution. 
196 .. Section 98(4) of the Constitution. 
197 .. A point which Ms TE Mtintso MP made succintly. Debates of the National Assembly, op cit col. 
2838. 
198 .. Ibidem, col. 2840. 
199 .. Ibidem. 
200 .. Ibidem, col. 2841-2842. See also Mr GC Oosthuizen MP (NP), who described the Court's ruling on 
the death penalty as, inter alia, lacking common sense. Ibidem, col. 2843. 
201 .. Op cit col. 2836-2837. 
202 .. Ibidem, col. 2837. See also RK Sizani MP, ibidem, col. 2841, and Advocate AM Omar MP, ibidem, 
col. 2849. 
203 .. See "Most South Africans Favour Death Penalty", in The Citizen, 1 December 1995, on the findings 
of a Market Research Africa survey in this regard. According to the results of that survey, more than 75% 
of South Africans wanted the death penalty to be reintroduced for serious crimes. Note in particular the 
observation that "[t}he more people earn, the more they want the death penalty reintroduced", and that 
"[m]ost 'don't knows' were in the lowest income group". See also "77% Poll in Favour of Death Penalty", 
in the Pretoria News, 4 December 1995. 
204 .. See "Death Penalty: Signatures Pour in", in The Citizen, 30 November, 1995. 
205 .. As Sharon Chetty, "Case against Hanging", in the Sowetan, 30 November 1995 said, "[t]he return 
of the death penalty has been equated with a drop in crime - people fed up with living under siege believe 
only the hangman's noose would be a strong enough deterrent for criminals." (my italics) 
206 .. See "ANC Reiterates Stand on Death Penalty", in The Citizen, 28 November 1995. See also "ANC 
Youth Reject Death Penalty Call", in The Citizen, 30 November 1995. 
207 .. "People Can Decide on Death Penalty Later'', 5 December 1995. 
208 .. Released in Johannesburg on 22 November 1995. 
209 .. That is, the position encapsulated in Section 9 of the (interim) Constitution. 
210 .. See Article 10 of the Working Draft of the New Constitution. 
211. Section 11 of the (new) Constitution. 
212. The Criminal Law Amendment Bill [B 46-97] 
213. See the preamble to the Bill. 
214. In terms of which a superior court might impose the sentence of death, inter alia, for "treason 
committed when the Republic is in a state of war''. 
215. See Clause 36 of the Bill. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CORPORAL PVNISHAmNT AND TIIB NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
INTRODUCTION 
T he Criminal Procedure Act, 1 among other statutes, provided for a whipping2 as a sentence our courts may impose upon persons convicted of committing certain 
offences. 3 The whipping may be imposed either in addition to or in lieu of any other 
punishment that may otherwise be imposed: Provided that courts shall not impose a 
whipping in addition to any sentence of imprisonment, with or without the option of a 
fine, unless the sentence of imprisonment is suspended wholly or partly.4 
Whipping entails the use of a cane to administer cuts to an accused.5 The number of 
cuts, which a court has a discretion to impose, may not exceed the number of seven 
strokes.6 A heavy cane may not be used for the purpose of administering whipping. 7 
Neither may a lash8 nor a stick9 be used. 
The Criminal Procedure Act, as stated above, provides a list of the offences for which 
a sentence of whipping may be imposed. It cannot be imposed for any other offence. 10 
Our Courts have a discretion in this regard and do not have an obligation to impose a 
sentence of whipping merely because one of the offences for which it may be imposed 
has been committed .11 
No person of or over the age of thirty years may be sentenced to a whipping. 12 Where 
an accused turns thirty on the day of the sentence, he is above the age of thirty for the 
purposes of a whipping as a sentence and, therefore, the sentence of a whipping may 
not be imposed upon him. 13 This notwithstanding, a commissioned officer of the 
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correctional services, sitting as a court, 14 may sentence a prisoner under the age of forty 
years to a whipping pursuant to prison proceedings.15 In other words, our correctional 
services have their own age limit, namely forty years, for purposes of the sentence of 
a whipping. 16 
No one may be subjected to a whipping more than twice. 17 Furthermore, no person may 
be subjected to a whipping within a period of three years of the last occasion on which 
he was sentenced to a whipping. 18 
Where a psychoneurotic or psychopathic condition contributed towards the commission 
of the offence, our courts may not impose a sentence of whipping.19 
Lastly, whipping as a sentence which our courts may impose is reserved for male 
offenders only.20 Thus, a woman, regardless of her age, may not be subjected to a 
whipping, even where a whipping is compulsory for a particular crime.21 
JUVENILE WHIPPING 
Prior to the decision of the Constitutional Court in S v Williams and Others,22 the 
Criminal Procedure Act provided for juvenile whipping as a sentencing option affecting 
male persons under the age of twenty-one convicted of any offence.23 Thus, a male 
person under the age of twenty-one, certified by a district surgeon or an assistant 
district surgeon to be in a fit state of health to undergo the whipping,24 could, in lieu of 
any other punishment,25 be sentenced to a moderate correction of whipping not 
exceeding seven strokes which were to be administered by a person and at a place to 
be determined by the court imposing the sentence.26 The whipping was to be inflicted 
over the buttocks covered with normal attire. 27 
The age28 of the person convicted and thus sentenced was of great importance. Where 
the accused was below the age of puberty, whipping was usually not regarded as 
appropriate by our courts. 29 
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Where it was proved that a psychoneurotic or psychopathic condition had contributed 
towards the commission of the offence, the courts were by law not allowed to impose 
a whipping upon the juvenile offender affected. Furthermore, where a district surgeon 
or an assistant district surgeon had, after examining the convict, certified him not to be 
in a fit state of health to receive a whipping, the court might amend the sentence as it 
deemed fit.30 
Though a whipping was appropriate where an act of violence had been committed, 31 it 
was not necessarily resorted to only in cases where there were aggravating 
circumstances. 32 
OUR COURTS AND CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
For over three decades before the intervention of the Constitutional Court, some of our 
judges33 were very critical of the use of corporal punishment as a method of dealing with 
crime. In S v Kumalo and Others,34 for instance, Fannin J described it as "punishment 
of a particularly severe kind ... brutal in its nature ... a severe assault upon not only the 
person of the recipient but upon his dignity as a human being". 35 In S v Myute and 
Others; S v Baby,36 De Wet CJ described it as "a very severe and humiliating form of 
punishment",37 while Conradie J, in S v Staggie,38 referred to it as "'n uiterste 
strafvorm".39 For Steyn JA too corporal punishment was "'n erg vernederende en fisies 
baie pynlike vorm van bestraffing".40 
There was also ample evidence that civilised and reforming societies were abandoning 
corporal punishment as a mechanism for dealing with crime. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, this form of punishment was abolished for all common law offences in 1914.41 
Subsequently, whipping as a sentence was abolished altogether in 1948,42 pursuant to 
the report of the Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment (1938).43 Canada 
abolished corporal punishment in 1972,44 while the provisions of Article 1 (1) and 2(2) 
of the German Constitution have been interpreted to mean that corporal punishment 
imposed by judicial officers is unconstitutional. 
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In Zimbabwe, Greenland J had no hesitation to rule that corporal punishment was a 
"cruel and inhuman punishment".45 In Namibia, Mahomed AJA (as he then was} had no 
difficulty in coming to the conclusion that corporal punishment inflicted upon both adults 
and juveniles by organs of State in consequence of a sentence was indeed a form of 
inhuman or degrading punishment as envisaged in Article 8(2}(b} of the Namibian 
Constitution. 46 
Against this background, Mr AP Dippenaar, who was the presiding officer in the matter 
involving Williams, doubting whether corporal punishment would not violate some of the 
provisions of the (interim} Constitution, decided to suspend the administration of the 
punishment to the accused and requested that the sentence he had imposed be 
subjected to special review. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT INTERVENES 
In S v Wand Others,47 the Full Bench of the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme 
Court, dealing with six criminal review48 cases in which sentences of whipping had been 
imposed, referred to the Constitutional Court for its decision the question of the 
constitutional validity of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act allowing for the 
imposition of such a penalty.49 
In S v Williams and Others, Langa J,50 pointed out that, as the provisions being 
challenged related to juvenile whipping, the issue to be decided by the Court was 
whether juvenile whipping, on its own merits or demerits, was consistent with the 
(interim} Constitution.51 This was the position of the learned judge, notwithstanding the 
fact that when the matter was argued before the Constitutional Court, "it was common 
cause between the applicants and the State that the provisions in our law which 
authorised corporal punishment for adults are inconsistent with the Constitution."52 
Neither was the learned judge prepared to deal with the constitutionality of corporal 
punishment in schools as that issue was not before the Court. 53 
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It was contended on behalf of the applicants that the relevant provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Act were unconstitutional because they were inconsistent with certain 
provisions of the (interim) Constitution.54 Mr Slabbert, a member of the Western Cape 
attorney-general's office who appeared before the Court as amicus curriae, argued that, 
while the infliction of corporal punishment upon an adult may be difficult to justify, 
juvenile whipping was no different from, and no more reprehensible than, other forms 
of punishment, and, therefore, did not constitute a violation of any of the rights of 
juveniles.55 
After considering international developments regarding the question of corporal 
punishment, as well as numerous South African judgments in which this form of 
punishment was severely criticised, Langa J had no difficulty in coming to the 
conclusion that ''the institutionalised use of violence by the State on juvenile offenders 
authorised by section 294" of the Criminal Procedure Act was indeed a cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment, which violated Sections 10 and 11 (2) of the (interim) 
Constitution.56 Subsequent to this conclusion, he proceeded to determine whether the 
infliction of corporal punishment upon juveniles could not be salvaged by the general 
limitation clause.57 
It is noteworthy that the applicants had contended that the general limitation clause was 
not applicable as the rights protected by Section 11 (2) of the (interim) Constitution 
were not capable of limitation. If this contention was accepted, it would mean that once 
a violation had been established, no further enquiry would ensue. In this regard, the 
learned judge refused to follow Mahomed AJA58 and, following the reasoning of 
Chaskalson Pin S v Makwanyane and Another,59 decided that the general limitation 
clause was applicable.60 
The learned Judge carefully scrutinised the contention of Mr Slabbert that juvenile 
whipping was reasonable, justifiable and necessary as required in terms of the general 
limitation clause.61 In particular he rejected the notion that juvenile whipping constituted 
a better alternative to imprisonment and observed that there was indeed a shift of 
emphasis, albeit a painfully slow one, from retribution to rehabilitation.62 He also 
analysed the contention that corporal punishment had a deterrent effect and concluded 
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that whatever deterrent value it may have, it would not be sufficiently significant to 
enable the State to override a right entrenched in the (interim) Constitution.63 
On the basis of all this, the learned judge found that the provisions of Section 294 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, which in their entirety violated the provisions of Sections 10 
and 11 (2) of the (interim) Constitution, were unconstitutional and could not be 
salvaged by the general limitation clause.64 He then declared to be invalid and of no 
force and effect the provisions of Section 294 in their entirety, as well as the words "or 
a whipping" in Section 290(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, with effect from the date 
of the order given in the matter. Thus, whatever sentences that might have been 
imposed by the Courts in terms of Section 294 could from then not be carried out.65 
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
WILLIAMS JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to the Constitutional Court's decision in Williams, it became unconstitutional 
for juvenile offenders to be whipped as punishment under our law. Binding as the 
decision was upon "all persons and all legislative, executive and judicial organs of 
state",66 judicial juvenile whipping was thus effectively abolished and could not be 
imposed any longer. 
However, as was pointed out above, Langa J confined his judgment to the provisions 
of Section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act pertaining to juvenile whipping. Corporal 
punishment inflicted on male adults between the ages of 21 and 30 years, as well as 
whipping in the schools, were not affected as the sole issue the Court was called upon 
to determine was whether juvenile whipping was consistent with the (interim) 
Constitution.67 Because of the relevance of the provisions of Section 290(2) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act to the question of juvenile whipping, the learned judge 
deemed it fit to extend his judgment and order to them. 
The Constitutional Court, in other words, did not in the Williams judgment abolish 
corporal punishment per se. It simply did not regard it as its duty to do so.68 The 
provisions of Sections 112, 276(1 )(g), 292 and 293 of the Criminal Procedure Act, as 
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well as many other provisions in our law allowing for corporal punishment to be imposed 
by our Courts were, therefore, left intact. 
While this judgment was, in a sense, confirming the Court's broad approach, namely 
that it confines its rulings to what it has been called upon to decide in the "cases and 
controversies" that are appropriately brought before it, it is noteworthy that in 
Makwanyane it was prepared to mero motu go beyond what it was called upon to 
decide. This does not augur well for the development of our human rights jurisprudence 
and constitutional adjudication. For one thing, it fosters casuistry and ad hoc 
development. 
An anomalous situation thus resulted: While juveniles were no longer to be whipped, 
thanks to Williams, adults could still be whipped as a punishment under the law. This 
would be the case, notwithstanding the fact that Langa J acknowledged that when the 
matter was argued before the Constitutional Court, there was consensus between the 
parties that the provisions in our law which authorised judicial corporal punishment for 
adults were inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution.69 This, moreover, was despite 
the fact that the learned judge had also acknowledged that South African jurisprudence 
had, for at least three decades before the Williams decision, "been experiencing a 
growing unanimity in judicial condemnation of corporal punishment for adults."70 Despite 
all this, to paraphrase the learned Judge, judicial corporal punishment for male adults 
would remain in the statute book till it had either been set aside by a competent body 
or authority or till the relevant legislation had been repealed. 71 
Furthermore, whereas juveniles could no longer be whipped as a punishment imposed 
by the Courts, they could still be whipped at schools72 and in prison.73 
While, technically, it might be correct for judges to confine their judgments to issues that 
come before them for decision, it should always be borne in mind that the Constitutional 
Court is not akin to a division of the Supreme Court; it has "jurisdiction in the Republic 
as the court of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and 
enforcement of the provisions of' the (interim) Constitution,74 and the exclusive power75 
to inquire "into the constitutionality of any law, including an Act of Parliament". 76 
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This awesome power, in my opinion, should enable the Court to help expand human 
rights as well as the values enshrined in the (interim) Constitution. It should be able 
to rummage through any law or statute, the provisions of which are sought to be 
impugned; the (interim) Constitution allows it to consider every conceivable aspect of 
the law without being confined to the averments of applicants or the formulations of 
questions referred to it. It can, therefore, not adopt a narrow view of its work and confine 
itself to the issues that come before it for determination particularly if doing so leads to 
absurd results such as leaving corporal punishment for male adults and for pupils at 
schools intact while abolishing judicial corporal punishment in respect of juveniles. 
The approach of Langa J in Williams did not differ very much from that of the Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe which, in S v Ncube; S v·Tshuma, S v Ndhlovu,77 first abolished 
judicial corporal punishment for adults on the basis that it violated the provisions of 
Section 15(1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution and subsequently in S v A Juvenile,78 
abolished judicial corporal punishment for juveniles on the same basis. Because Langa 
J, while accepting that the whipping of both adults and juveniles was, "in itself, a severe 
affront to their dignity as human beings",79 refused to rule that the infliction of corporal 
punishment upon both adults and juveniles violated the (interim) Constitution, we 
would have to wait till concrete cases came before the Court in which the issues of 
corporal punishment for adults and corporal punishment at schools were raised, failing 
which Parliament would have to intervene and pass appropriate legislation in this 
regard. The presence on the Constitutional Court of Mahomed J80 and Didcott J,81 
obviously did not help. 
Perhaps Langa J might have preferred the question to be determined by the Court in 
Williams to have been phrased the way it was formulated in Ex Parte Attorney-
General, Namibia: In Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State.82 However, in 
my opinion, it was not necessary for that to be the case; he could have dealt with the 
whole gamut of the question of corporal punishment authorised in our criminal justice 
and social system on the basis that it flew in the face of the values the emerging 
democratic South African society seeks to espouse.83 Moreover, as the court of final 
instance in the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the provisions of the 
(interim) Constitution, the Court ought to be able to deal with broader issues relating 
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to a law or executive action being sought to be impugned, even if they are not, stricto 
sensu, relevant to a given case, so long as they are, for the same reasons, 
unconstitutional. 84 
This will enable the polity to prevent an absolutely manifest unconstitutionality and 
injustice from continuing without anyone being able to do anything about it. As Langa 
J himself had quite correctly noted, the enactment of the (interim) Constitution created 
a framework within which significant changes could be brought about in our criminal 
justice system85 if, in particular, the judges of our Constitutional Court were at all times 
prepared to act more robustly and imaginatively in defending and expanding human 
rights as they interpreted, protected and enforced the provisions of the (interim) 
Constitution. 
Lastly, the approach of Langa J in Williams was, in any event, retrogressive when 
viewed against the decision the Constitutional Court had given three days before in S 
v Makwanyane and Another,86 in which Chaskalson P was prepared, mero motu, to 
extend his order to the provisions of Section 277(1 )(c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. The President of the Court, it is observed, did that, notwithstanding the 
fact that the issue that had been referred to it by the Appellate Division related solely 
to the constitutionality of the provisions of Section 277(1 )(a) of that Act.87 As a result, 
it became unnecessary for the Court to wait for further concrete proceedings or 
controversies in which it could determine the constitutionality of the death penalty as a 
punishment for robbery or attempted robbery (with aggravating circumstances), 
kidnaping, child-stealing and rape. 
The learned judge and the Constitutional Court should, and could, have followed its own 
reasoning in Makwanyane in this regard, I contend. Doing so would have created 
certainty in our law with regard to the constitutionality of corporal punishment inflicted 
by organs of state upon both adults and juveniles. It would also have brought our law 
into line with the jurisprudence of many countries, including our neighbours, Zimbabwe 
and Namibia, on this question. 
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THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT 
The whole issue of corporal punishment is now before Parliament. At the time of 
writing, the Minister of Justice had already tabled in Parliament a short Bill88 which 
seeks "[t]o provide for the abolishment of corporal punishment authorised in the 
legislation".89 The Bill thus goes beyond Langa J's decision in Williams and seeks to 
abolish all reference to corporal punishment in our statute book. This will help in 
addressing the anomaly of preserving this form of punishment for male adults below the 
age of thirty years, which was a direct consequence of Langa J's decision. 
Should this Bill, for the passing of which only a simple majority is required, be enacted 
by Parliament, our country will have joined numerous other jurisdictions where corporal 
punishment has been totally abolished. 
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consistent with the provisions of the Constitution." (my italics) 
It is further noted that the learned judge, after observing at 876, paragraph 44, that "[d]ifferences between 
adult and juvenile whipping have ... little or no relevance to the enquiry", had quoted with approval the 
remarks of Mr Klecker who said in Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom, (1980) 3 EHRR 531 at 
556, that: "Corporal punishment amounts to a total lack of respect for the human being; it therefore cannot 
depend on the age of the human being ... " (my italics) At 877, paragraph 45. 
84 .. It is my contention, in other words, that the powers of our Constitutional Court are sufficiently broad 
not to warrant the enactment of a special provision similar to Article 78 of the (German) Law on the 
Federal Constitutional Court of 1951 which provides that: "If further provisions of the same law are 
incompatible with the Basic Law or other federal law for the same reasons, the Federal Constitutional 
Court may also declare them null and void." (my italics) 
85 .. S v Williams, op cit 884, paragraph 76. 
86 .. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
87 .. Ibidem, at 452, paragraph 149. However, it is noted that the general view of the President of the 
Constitutional Court with regard to constitutional adjudication is that: "It is not ordinarily desirable for ·a 
Court to give rulings in the abstract on issues which are not the subject of controversy and are only of 
academic interest..." See Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei and Others, 1995 (10) BCLR 1424 (CC) at 
1429. In other words, in his view, our Courts must decide no more than is necessary in any particular 
case. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
COMMITTAL TO PRISON IN RESPECT OF 
DEBT 
INTRODUCTION 
F or a long time in the history of South Africa, prior to the decision of the Constitutional Court in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa; 
Matiso and Others v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and Others, 1 our 
law sanctioned the incarceration of judgment debtors for failure to satisfy their debts. 
This practice dated back to the pre-Union era, during which "[c]ivil imprisonment, as it 
applied in Holland by 1652, was part of the law in force at the Cape under Dutch rule. "2 
Thus, for example, in 1813 imprisonment for debt under the Proclamation of 5 
February 1813 was limited to a maximum of six months' detention if the creditor's claim 
(excluding costs) did not exceed fifty rixdollars and to a maximum of one month's 
detention if it did not exceed twenty rixdollars.3 Such detention in no way discharged the 
debt or deprived the creditor of his or her other legal remedies.4 
From 1944 civil imprisonment as was then understood ceased being part of the practice 
of magistrates' courts. However, the incarceration of judgment debtors did not end; 
instead, the Magistrates' Courts Act, 19445 provided for the imprisonment of judgment 
debtors on the grounds of contempt of court6 arising from non-compliance with an order 
ad pecuniam solvendam.7 Under the Act, a judgment creditor could cause a notice to 
be issued calling upon the judgment debtor to appear at an inquiry into his or her 
financial affairs in a case where a judgment for the payment of money remained 
unsatisfied for a period of ten days, where it appeared prima facie that the debtor had 
no attachable movable assets for the purpose and yet where the debtor had not made 
a reasonable offer to liquidate the debt in instalments.8 At the inquiry into the judgment 
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debtor's financial position, the court could make an order for the debt to be settled in 
instalments. 
For the purposes of the Magistrates' Courts Act, the notice to appear at such an 
inquiry was an order of court.9 Wilfully disobeying such an order or failure to comply with 
the court's order to pay the debt in instalments constituted an offence of contempt of 
court punishable, inter alia, by the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding three months. 10 
Eight years later, in 1952, the Magistrates' Court Act was amended11 in this regard. 
While a judgment debtor who was in default of payment of his or her debt could still be 
called upon by notice to attend a financial enquiry where he or she would be ordered 
to pay the debt in instalments, 12 the court could under the new procedure issue a 
warrant for the arrest of a judgment debtor who failed to appear at the enquiry. 13 When 
the debtor was brought before the court on the warrant, the court could summarily 
inquire into his or her failure to appear at the financial inquiry; if he or she did not have 
a reasonable excuse or explanation, it could sentence him or her, inter alia, to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months. 14 The court could, at the same 
hearing, also conduct a financial inquiry and order that the debt be paid in instalments. 15 
If the judgment debtor then failed to comply with the order to pay the debt in 
instalments, he or she would be called upon anew to appear in court; 16 failing this, or 
if the court was not satisfied that the debtor's non-compliance was due to circumstances 
beyond his or her control, the court could then commit the debtor to prison for a period 
not exceeding thirty days. 17 The court could at any time suspend or discharge the order 
of committal upon such terms as it might deem reasonable. 18 
Two years later, the Magistrates' Courts Act was once again amended19 to repeal the 
power of the court to inquire summarily into the judgment debtor's failure to comply with 
a notice to attend a financial inquiry and the accompanying punitive jurisdiction. 
However, the imposition of civil imprisonment for non-compliance with the court's order 
that the judgment be paid in instalments was retained. Fourteen years later, the 
requirement that a notice to attend a financial inquiry should be served upon the 
judgment debtor personally was done away with by means of a further amendment. 20 
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Thus, from then on, such a notice could be served upon the debtor in any of the diverse 
recognised modes of service. 21 
By means of the Abolition of Civil Imprisonment Act,22 Parliament finally abolished 
civil imprisonment. However, the old practice of committing judgment debtors to prison 
for contempt of court in the event of non-compliance with magistrates' orders to pay 
their debts in instalments or otherwise was further entrenched.23 
THE LAW AT THE POINT OF MAT/SO 
When Melunsky J and Froneman J gave their judgment in Matiso and Others v The 
Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and Others, 24 the legal position25 
regarding the enforcement of judgment debts could, for the purpose of this thesis, 
briefly be described as follows: 
1) A judgment debtor who failed to comply with a court's judgment for the payment 
of a sum of money26 or with an order to pay such a debt in specified instalments 
or otherwise within ten days from which the judgment or order was given, could, 
by notice,27 be called upon to appear before the court in chambers to show 
cause why he or she should not be committed to prison for contempt of court, 
and why he or she should not be ordered to pay the debt in instalments or 
otherwise.28 As pointed out above, in accordance with the rules of service, such 
a notice need not be served upon the judgment debtor personally. 29 
2) Upon the return day of the notice, or, as the case may be, upon any date to 
which the proceedings might have been postponed, the court was required to 
inquire into the judgment debtor's financial position.30 At the financial inquiry, the 
court could, inter alia, order that the judgment debt be paid in specified 
instalments. 31 For this reason, the court could postpone the inquiry into the 
reasons why the judgment debtor should not be committed to prison. 32 
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3) Upon the return day of the notice, whether the judgment debtor did or did not 
appear (in person or through a representative) before the court in chambers, the 
court could grant an order for his or her committal to prison for contempt of court 
essentially for non-compliance with an order ad pecuniam solvendam,33 for a 
period not exceeding ninety days or, in lieu thereof, sentence him or her to 
periodical imprisonment for a period not exceeding 2160 hours for failing to 
satisfy the judgment. 34 For this purpose, the court could authorise the issue of a 
warrant for his or her arrest and detention in any specified prison. 35 
4) Ordinarily, the judgment debtor thus committed to prison would remain in prison 
till the expiry of the period for which he or she was so committed,36 unless duly 
released upon an order given by a judge of the Supreme Court or by any judicial 
officer of the district in which the order for committal was made or of the district 
in which the prison where the judgment debtor was incarcerated was situate.37 
5) Otherwise, where the judgment creditor, or the judgment debtor's attorney, or the 
messenger of the court certified in writing that the judgment debt and costs had 
since been paid, or, in the case of an order that the debt be paid in instalments, 
that arrear instalments and any costs had since been paid, the judgment debtor 
was released forthwith from prison by the officer in charge of the relevant 
prison.38 
6) Lastly, the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court had held (per Van 
Dijkhorst J) in Quentin's v Komane39 that in the debt recovery procedure under 
Section 65A(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act there could only be one notice 
and that a judgment debtor could be committed to prison for contempt of court 
for failure to comply with an order ad pecuniam solvendam once only.40 The 
approach of the Court was that because of the drastic inroads committal to 
prison for failure to satisfy a civil judgment made into the freedom of the 
individual, the relevant provisions ought to be interpreted restrictively rather than 
extensively.41 
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In sum, at the time when Melunsky J and Froneman J referred the matter in Matiso and 
Others42 to the Constitutional Court, our law, through the use of contempt of court, in 
general sanctioned the criminalisation of non-compliance with an order ad pecuniam 
solvendam at the instance of a judgment creditor.43 While the judgment debtor was 
ostensibly committed to prison for the criminal offence of contempt of court, it was 
interesting to note that upon payment of the judgment debt or arrear instalments, the 
judgment debtor was entitled to be released forthwith from prison;44 in other words, 
payment of the judgment debt or arrear instalments effectively nullified the contempt of 
court. 
Furthermore, as was stated above, it was only the magistrates' courts that had the 
power to order the imprisonment of a judgment debtor for contempt of court as a sequel 
to non-compliance with an order ad pecuniam so/vendam; the Supreme Court was not 
having a similar power.45 As the South African Law Commission pointed out, this 
anomalous situation entailed that even in cases where judgments of the Supreme Court 
were involved, action was taken against judgment debtors for contempt of court under 
the provisions of Section 65M of the Magistrates' Courts Act while the Supreme Court 
which passed the judgment did not necessarily regard non-compliance with an order ad 
pecuniam solvendam as contempt of court.46 
MA TISO AND OTHERS 
In Matiso and Others v The Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and 
Others47 the first applicant was detained under a warrant for her arrest issued in terms 
of Sections 65F(1) and 65H of the Magistrates' Courts Act. Contending that under the 
new constitutional order a person could be incarcerated or detained only after having 
been convicted of a criminal offence and after a fair trial, she brought an urgent 
application for her immediate release on the grounds that the relevant provisions of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act which sanctioned the incarceration of a judgment debtor for 
contempt of court relating to non-compliance with an order ad pecuniam solvendam 
infringed the rights entrenched in Sections 11 (1 )48 and 25(3)49 of the (interim) 
Constitution and were, therefore, invalid. Pending a decision of the Constitutional 
Court on this question, she also sought an order for the immediate release of all other 
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judgment debtors in the custody of the first respondent, as well as an interdict 
prohibiting the first respondent from receiving any other judgment debtors into his 
custody.50 
Believing that a decision of the Constitutional Court would be decisive of the matter and 
that it was in the interests of justice that the matter be referred to that Court,51 Melunsky 
J gave an order for the immediate release of the first applicant and referred the matter 
to that Court.52 With regard to the other applicants, Froneman J, after an interesting 
scholastic exegesis on interpretation of statutes in the new constitutional order, made 
a similar order and also referred the allegedly offending provisions of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act to the Constitutional Court for its decision.53 
ENTER THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Before the Constitutional Court two matters54 raising the constitutionality of the 
imprisonment of judgment debtors for contempt of court under Sections 65A to 65M of 
the Magistrates' Courts Act were heard simultaneously.55 The decision of the Court 
was thus reported as Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa; 
Matiso and Others v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and Others.56 In 
the matter, the Court had been called upon to determine whether the relevant 
provisions of the Magistrates' Courts Act which sanctioned the arrest and 
incarceration of a person for contempt of court deriving from non-compliance with an 
order ad pecuniam solvendam were not invalid due to, and to the extent of, their 
inconsistency with the (interim) Constitution. 
As Kriegler J (for the majority57) pointed out, while on the face of it the system of 
imprisonment for debt might have been intended to compel judgment debtors who were 
unwilling to pay their debts, it unavoidably affected mostly those indigent, illiterate and 
uninformed persons who did not have the means to pay their debts, who could not 
afford legal representation and who did not know their rights.58 Such persons were in 
many instances committed to prison for debt without ever having had notice of the 
original judgment or the notice to appear at the hearing in terms of Section 65A(1) of 
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the Magistrates' Courts Act.59 Needless to say, to anyone in such persons' 
circumstances the provisions of Section 65F(3)60 could offer only cold comfort. 
For the purpose of determining the constitutionality of the impugned provisions of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act, Kriegler J followed the usual "two-stage approach".61 
THE FIRST STAGE 
The first part of the enquiry entailed the determination of whether the disputed 
provisions62 limited any of the Chapter 3 rights. Kriegler J did not hesitate to identify the 
most fundamental right limited by arrest and incarceration in this regard; for the teamed 
judge of the Constitutional Court such a right was the right to freedom and security of 
the person, which included the right not to be detained without tria/.63 He held that: 
[c]ertainly to put someone in prison is a limitation of that person's right to 
freedom. To do so without any criminal charge being levelled or any trial being 
held is manifestly a radical encroachment upon such right.64 (my emphasis) 
Once he came to the conclusion that the impugned provisions of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act violated this basic right, he then had to proceed to the next stage. 
THE SECOND STAGE 
The next question for the learned judge to consider was whether the relevant provisions 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act which he had adjudged to be limiting the right to 
freedom and security of the person were, nonetheless, a justifiable limitation.65 Though 
he accepted that the goal of the relevant provisions of the Magistrates' Courts Act was 
a legitimate and reasonable government objective to enforce judgment debts, Kriegler 
J found that because the provisions were rather overbroad as a means of achieving that 
goal, they were unreasonable.66 
SEVERABILITY 
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After concluding that the limitation entailed in the impugned provisions of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act were overbroad and therefore unreasonable, the Court then 
had to consider the question of severability.67 Though it would not be possible to excise 
only those provisions which failed to distinguish between those judgment debtors who 
could but were not willing to pay and those who could not pay their debts at all, Kriegler 
J found that it would be possible to expunge from the statute those provisions which 
made up the option of imprisonment.68 This, the learned judge held, would not defeat 
the object of Sections 65A to 65M of the Magistrates' Courts Act which is basically ''to 
provide a system to assist in the collection of debts. Removing one of the options 
available under the system does not render the system that remains contrary to the 
purpose of the legislative scheme. Accordingly, the infringing provisions can be severed 
and the balance of the system can usefully remain in force. "69 
Kriegler J was not persuaded of the validity of the argument7° presented on behalf of 
the Association of Law Societies by two amici curiae. 71 Instead, he held that the system 
of imprisonment for contempt of court due to non-compliance with an order ad 
pecuniam solvendam was so manifestly inconsistent with the right to freedom and so 
indefensible as a limitation that there was no warrant for it to be retained even 
temporarily. 72 
Accordingly, the learned judge gave an order which severed those portions which made 
up the option of civil imprisonment for debt from the provisions of Sections 65A to 65M 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act, thus leaving the debt collection system otherwise 
intact. 73 Therefore, with effect from 22 September 1995, the date of the order, the 
committal or continuing imprisonment of any judgment debtor in terms of Section 65F 
or 65G of the Act became invalid.74 
To the extent that Kriegler J's judgment had a tremendous impact on our debt collection 
system, the next part will summarise the debt collection system subsequent to the 
judgment. 
THE DEBT COLLECTION SYSTEM TODAY 
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Having surgically excised from the debt collection system all the offending provisions, 
Kriegler J stressed that "[a]ll other provisions of sections 65A-65M of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act remain in force."75 Thus, our debt collection system today may be 
summarised as follows: 
1) After a court76 has given judgment for the payment of a sum of money, but 
before the judgment creditor has issued a notice calling upon him or her or it to 
show cause why he or she or it should not be ordered to pay the judgment debt 
in instalments or otherwise,77 the judgment debtor may make an offer in writing 
to the judgment creditor to pay the judgment debt in specified instalments or 
otherwise. If the judgment creditor or his or her or its attorney accepts the offer, 
the clerk of court 1111lS1, at the written request of the judgment creditor or his or 
her or its attorney, order that the debt be paid in specified instalments or 
otherwise in accordance with the judgment debtor's offer. The order of the clerk 
of court is deemed to be the order of the court referred to in Section 65A(1) of 
the Act.78 
2) If the judgment for the payment of a sum of money or, as the case may be, the 
order79 that the judgment debt be paid in specified instalments or otherwise, has 
remained unsatisfied for a period of ten days from the date of the judgment or 
of the order, the judgment creditor may issue a notice calling upon the judgment 
debtor to appear before the court in chambers upon a date specified in the notice 
to show cause why the debt should not be paid in instalments or otherwise.80 
Such a notice shall not be issued in any matter where the judgment debtor was 
not present in person or represented by any person when the judgment was 
given, unless there is proof that he or she or it is, or has been made, aware of 
the judgment.81 Furthermore, if the court has ordered that the judgment debt 
shall be paid in instalments, the notice shall not be issued unless the judgment 
creditor has delivered an affidavit or affirmation, or his or her or its attorney has 
delivered a certificate to the clerk of court in which is mentioned: (i) the 
outstanding balance of the judgment debt; (ii) in what respects it is alleged that 
the judgment debtor has failed to comply with the court's order; (iii) to what 
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extent he or she or it is in arrears with the payment of instalments; and (iv) that 
the judgment debtor was advised by registered letter of the terms of the 
judgment and of the consequences of his or her or its failure to satisfy it.82 
3) Upon the date specified in the said notice or, as the case may be, upon any date 
to which the hearing may have been postponed, the court determines the 
judgment debtor's financial position.83 In such an enquiry the function of the court 
is not confined to the determination of the debtor's financial position, however.84 
4) If at such an inquiry the court is satisfied that the judgment debtor has movable 
or immovable property that may be attached and sold to satisfy the judgment 
debt or any part thereof, it may authorise the issue of a warrant of execution 
against such property or any portion thereof as it may deem fit.85 The court may, 
however, also suspend execution against the debtor either mero motu86 or upon 
application by the debtor,87 if it is satisfied that the debtor cannot pay the debt all 
at once but may do so in reasonable instalments or consents to either an 
emoluments order or a garnishee order being made against him or her or it.88 For 
this purpose or reason, the court may postpone the proceedings sine die. The 
authorization of the issue of a warrant of execution as envisaged in this section 
serves as an interdict restraining the judgment debtor from alienating or 
disposing of the said property pending execution.89 
Though nothing prevents a judgment creditor from going for execution 
immediately in case of failure on the part of the judgment debtor to pay the debt 
forthwith,90 the creditor is, somehow, restrained by the Act from doing so as he 
or she or it shall generally91 not get costs in connection with the issue and 
execution of a warrant of execution where a nu/la bona return is made.92 This, 
in other words, compels a creditor who has any doubt as to whether the debtor 
possesses any attachable movable assets to proceed to execution cautiously 
and via the proceedings provided for in the provisions of Section 65A(1) of the 
Act.93 
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5) The court may also order the attachment of a debt due to the judgment debtor,94 
or, whether or not the debtor has made an offer in writing to the creditor or the 
creditor's attorney undertaking to settle the debt in specified instalments or 
otherwise, authorise the issue of an emoluments order for the payment of the 
debt and costs by the employer of the judgment debtor, 95 or order that the debt 
and costs be paid in specified instalments, 96 or both such specified instalments 
and emoluments. 97 
6) Where the judgment debtor, whose total debts do not exceed the amount that 
is determined for this purpose by the Minister of Justice98 from time to time, is 
unable to pay the judgment debt forthwith or to meet his or her financial 
obligations and does not have sufficient attachable assets, the court may, upon 
application by him or her, make an order on such conditions as it may deem fit 
providing for the administration of his or her or its estate and for the payment of 
his or her debts in instalments or otherwise.99 If the debtor has made an 
application for such an administration order, the Section 65A(1) hearing is 
postponed sine die pending the outcome of the application. 100 Even if the debtor 
has not lodged such an application, the court may postpone the hearing mero 
motu if it appears that the debtor has other debts as well which should be treated 
collectively for the purposes of an administration order, to enable the debtor to 
file a full statement of his or her or its affairs. 101 
It needs to be stressed that, in the light of the Constitutional Court's judgment and order 
in Coetzee, Matiso and Others, 102 the option to commit a judgment debtor to prison (at 
the instance of a judgment creditor) for contempt of court for non-compliance with an 
order ad pecuniam solvendam103 is no longer available to the courts as part of our debt 
collection system. Our law today, in other words, does not "hold constitutional a system 
which ... confers on creditors the power to consign the person of an impecunious debtor 
to prison at will and without the interposition of a judicial officer."104 (my emphasis) 
However, as Langa J pointed out, it is extremely important to make a distinction 
between what was decided and what was not in the matter. 105 
THE EFFECT ON ''CIVIL CONTEMPT'' 
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While the Constitutional Court, for the right reasons, expunged from our debt collection 
system civil imprisonment for debt, it did not, in my opinion, do away with committal for 
non-compliance with an order ad factum praestandum in relation to the payment of 
debts. 106 In other words, as Snyman put it, "there is nothing to prevent the attorney-
general from indicting for criminal contempt in such a case if he thinks the 
circumstances merit public prosecution."107 (my emphasis) In a proper case, where all 
the elements of the offence of contempt of court are present, a prosecution should 
ensue.108 Otherwise, a real scoundrel, against whom a court has properly given an order 
ad pecuniam solvendam, and who intentionally refuses to comply with it, can take cover 
behind Kriegler J's judgment in Coetzee, Matiso and Others and, from the safety of 
that judgment, cock a snook and snarl at the court with impunity. It surely was not the 
intention of Kriegler J to throw the administration of justice into a state of utter chaos 
and confusion and undermine the public's respect therefor. 
Though the question was not dealt with appropriately by the Court, what Kriegler J 
surely sought to do was to prevent the persecution of judgment debtors solely 'kH 
failure to pay their debts and not their prosecution for contempt of court arising from 
their disobedience and wilful refusal to pay. 109 For this reason, I am prepared to align 
myself with the reasoning of Didcott J who said that it would not necessarily be totally 
unconstitutional for a recalcitrant judgment debtor to be committed to prison for a short 
spell for contempt of court "once certain conditions were met", 110 even though the 
contempt essentially has a close relationship with a court's order ad pecuniam 
so/vendam. 111 
The Kriegler judgment, again for the right reasons, left intact the provisions of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act which render certain acts associated with orders ad pecuniam 
solvendam punishable offences. 112 For example, in addition to the offences relating to 
execution, 113 a garnishee who dismisses or terminates the service of a judgment debtor 
not occupying a position of trust in which he or she handles or has at his or her disposal 
moneys, is guilty of an offence and, may in certain circumstances, be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months.114 Similarly, failure or neglect on 
the part of an employer to furnish a written statement containing full particulars of a 
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judgment debtor in his/her/its employ within a reasonable time after a request by the 
debtor/employee, or wilful or negligent furnishing of incorrect relevant particulars by 
such an employer, is a punishable offence.115 It would indeed be absurd to suggest that, 
while such a garnishee or employer may, in these specific circumstances, be punished 
for an offence which essentially derives from an order ad pecuniam solvendam, the 
judgment debtor will escape punishment merely because of the Kriegler judgment in 
Coetzee, Matiso and Others. 
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representation by persons allowed to represent others in terms of Section 20 of the Act read with Rule 52, 
ie advocates and attorneys of the Supreme Court of South Africa. 
The clerk of court, and not a magistrate, must determine whether the requisite proof is satisfactory before 
the Section 65A(1} notice is issued. See Greek Farming Syndicate Ltd v Zevenfontein Ltd, 1926 CPD 
248. 
82 .. Ibidem, Section 65A(4}. 
83 .. Ibidem, Section 650. According to HJ Erasmus Jones and Buckle: The Civil Practice of the 
Magistrates' Courts in South Africa (8th ed, Vol. 1, Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1988) at 255, "This and the 
following sections make provision for a procedure whereby the judgment debtor's financial position can 
be determined in order to enable the judgment creditor to obtain from his debtor as much as the latter can 
really afford to pay, avoiding as far as is possible the expense of issuing a warrant of execution against 
movable property which may prove abortive." 
84 .. See Ferreira v Malherbe, 1962 (4) SA 523 (E) at 528; and First Consolidated Holdings (Pty} Ltd 
v Templeton NO, 1984 (3) SA 225 (N) at 231. 
85 .. Section 65E(1 )(a)(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act. 
86 .. Ibidem, Section 65E(1 )(a)(i1). 
87 .. Ibidem, Section 65E(1 )(c). 
88 .. Ibidem, Section 73(1 ). 
89 .. Ibidem, Section 65E(2). 
90 .. Ibidem, Section 66(1 )(a). 
91 .. Except "on good cause shown". See Silber v Ozen Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd, 1954 (2) SA 345 (A) at 
352; and Stuart Nixon Estate Agency (Pty} Ltd v Brigadoon (Pty) Ltd, 1970 (1) SA 97 (N) at 100 for 
the meaning of this phrase. 
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92 .. Ibidem, Section 65E(4). 
93 .. See JM Fourie The New Debt Collecting Procedures (2nd ed, Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1981) at 36. 
94 .. Ibidem, Section 65E(1 )(b), read with Section 72. 
95 .. Ibidem, Section 65E(1 )(c), read with Section 65J(1 ). 
96 .. Ibidem, Section 65E(1 )(c). The judgment debtor's ability to pay the debt and costs in reasonable 
instalments is an important consideration in this regard. See Mullins AJ (as he then was) in Standard 
Bank of SA Ltd v Clemans, 1982 (4) SA 408 (SE) at 410-411. 
97 .. Ibidem, Section 65E{1)(c). 
98 .. Ibidem, Section 1. 
99 .. Ibidem, Section 74{1 ). 
100 .. Ibidem, Section 651(1). 
101 .. Ibidem, Section 651(2). 
102 .. Op. cit. 1393-1394. 
103 .. The victims of which, as Sachs J, ibidem at 1416, paragraph 66, pointed out, were the most 
vulnerable members of our society, the millions of unemployed persons, who could thus not be subjected 
to emoluments orders, and those who did not have any property which could be attached to satisfy their 
judgment debts. 
At 1417, paragraph 67, the learned judge further observed that the operational effect of that procedure 
could also "to a degree be discriminatory in that the rich who did not pay their debts would in practice be 
dealt with in the Supreme Court by bankruptcy procedures which respected due process, while the non-
paying poor would continue to be faced with summary committal in the Magistrate's Court", a drastic 
power which, strangely enough, was not available in the Supreme Court. 
104 .. Per Langa J, ibidem at 1399, paragraph 35. In this regard, the Kriegler judgment has brought our 
law into line with international human rights instruments. See, for example, Article XXV of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; Article 7(7} of the American Convention on Human 
Rights; and Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
105 .. Ibidem, at 1397, paragraph 30. 
106 .. Sachs J, ibidem at 1419, paragraph 72, in fact pointed out that the Court's judgment did not mean 
"that there could never be circumstances which could justify the use of the back-up of prison to ensure 
that court orders for payment of judgment debts were obeyed in the same way as other orders." 
107 .. Criminal Law, op cit 317. See also S v Beyers, 1968 (3) SA 70 (A) at 80-81. 
108 .. Burchell and Milton, Principles of Criminal Law, op cit 633, said "'Civil' contempt is ... committed 
by failing to obey an order of court (provided the definition of the crime is satisfied) and it does not matter 
that the court order which is disobeyed was made in a civil case." 
109 .. In Coetzee, Matiso and Others, op cit 1393, paragraph 17, the learned judge showed that he was 
conscious of the need to make a distinction between the two types of judgment debtors. The problem, as 
he saw it, was that in the particular instance, it would not be possible to sever from the relevant provisions 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act only those portions which failed "to distinguish between the two categories 
of debtors. In order to do so, this Court would have to engage in the details of lawmaking, a constitutional 
activity given to the legislature." 
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Of particular note in this regard was Langa J's remark, ibidem at 1397-1398, paragraph 32, namely that, 
while it was clear that it could never be constitutional to imprison a person who failed to pay a judgment 
debt because of a lack of means to do so, what the Kriegler judgment did not settle however, was 
whether, provided certain conditions were fulfilled, it would still be unconstitutional to commit judgment 
debtors who wilfully refused to settle their debts even though they had the means. The learned judge 
thought that it was not necessary to address that question in casu. See also Sachs J, ibidem at 1407, 
paragraph 52 and at 1419, paragraph 72. 
110 .. Ibidem, 1394, paragraph 20. 
111 .. In other words, as Sachs J, ibidem at 1407, paragraph 52, pointed out, even though imprisonment 
for debt, like torture and slavery, is internationally one of the prohibited practices in relation to which there 
is no derogation permissible, the concept or definition thereof can be qualified. 
112.. As Sachs J, ibidem at 1408, paragraph 54, said, the conclusion he came to after scanning 
international human rights instruments in this regard, was that such "international instruments repudiate 
the core element of the institution of civil imprisonment, namely the locking up of people merely because 
they fail to pay contractual debts, but that there is a penumbra relating to money payments in which 
imprisonment can be used in appropriately defined circumstances." (my emphasis) 
113 .. Section 107 of the Magistrates' Courts Act. 
114 .. Ibidem, Section 106A. 
115 .. Ibidem, Section 1068. 
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CHAPTER 
THE PROVINCES TAJ(E ON THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
T he (interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa established a decentralised form of government consisting of a national government and nine 
provinces 1 which replaced the erstwhile four provincial governments of the old Republic 
of South Africa2 and its four nominally independent3 and six self-governing 'homelands'.4 
Each of the nine provinces was given power to set up an elected provincial legislature5 
and a provincial executive council6 led by the Premier of the province.7 Furthermore, the 
provinces were entitled to enact their own provincial constitutions8 and, subject to the 
Constitution,9 exercised legislative powers which were wider than those of the previous 
provincial councils. 10 As Van Wyk pointed out, the provincial dispensation resembled 
"the most striking deviation from what used to be the South African Constitution."11 
This radical deviation from the previous constitutional order established an order where 
governmental power was distributed between a national authority12 and the nine 
provincial authorities in such a way that each individual in a province would be subject 
to the laws of two seemingly 'coordinate' authorities, 13 the national authority and the 
authority of his or her respective province. The national government, with authority to 
govern the entire national territory of the Republic and make laws in respect of all 
matters, 14 was at a higher level, while the authority of each province was restricted to 
its own provincial territory. 15 However, the relationship between the national 
government and the provinces was not succinctly defined in the Constitution. 16 
Moreover, the national government17 could, subject to the Constitution,18 intervene in 
the areas of competence assigned to the provinces. 19 
Penuell M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 388 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
It is important to emphasise at this stage that, though under the new constitutional 
configuration an important and basic tenet of federalism, namely the distribution of 
legislative and executive powers between two independent and coordinate levels of 
government, was accepted by the framers of the Constitution, the boundaries, the 
legislative and executive powers of the provinces could, subject to the Constitution, 
be taken away or altered by Parliament.20 This element distinguished our nascent 
constitutional system from the federal order of Canada, for example.21 
In this new constitutional system, provision was also made for the power to amend the 
Constitution.22 However, unlike in the past, when we had a flexible constitution and 
where an ordinary statute passed by the State's central legislative body could amend 
the constitution, the power-distributing parts of the Constitution were specifically 
protected from change by the unilateral action of Parliament. This made it clear that the 
amending process included procedures requiring the support not only of Parliament, 
but, in certain respects, that of an affected province or provinces as well.23 As will 
become clearer below, if such procedures were followed, any purported amendment of 
the Constitution would be constitutionally unassailable. 
Once the distribution of power between the national government and the provinces was 
entrenched, it became necessary to establish appropriate mechanisms for settling the 
perennial disputes as to whether or not a particular legislative or executive body had the 
power to enact or administer a particular statute or exercise a particular power.24 The 
framers of the Constitution made a conscious decision to give the full power of judicial 
review to non-elected judges to make decisions of great political significance. 
If statutes or executive actions were adjudged to be outside the powers of the enacting 
or executive body, they were ultra vires and therefore invalid. Thus it became clear that 
our courts were destined to play a new and even more important role in the new 
dispensation with regard to questions about the extent of governmental power.25 
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Locus STAND/ AND THE LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
Prior to the Appellate Division decision in Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Another v Government of KwaZulu and Another,26 it was argued that the 
lower levels of government, as part of the State, did not have locus standi to sue the 
centre or to have courts adjudicate disputes between themselves and the centre, or vice 
versa. The basis of this argument was that the plaintiff or applicant did not have an 
independent existence and capacity from that of the defendant or respondent and that 
it, therefore, had no locus standi to bring the challenge to court. 
The argument was that the State could not sue itself, in other words.27 Thus, though 
there were earlier instances28 where disputes between organs of the State were 
adjudicated upon without the issue of standing being placed in question, in Natal 
Provincial Administration v South African Railways and Harbours,29 for example, 
the then Natal Provincial Administration was prevented from bringing an action against 
the South African Railways and Harbours on the same basis. 
The Appellate Division did not effectively change that position in the Government of 
the Repubic of South Africa and Another v Government of KwaZulu and Another 
decision, however. The four provinces of the erstwhile Republic of South Africa were 
thus not granted locus standi by this case to sue other organs of the State. Rabie CJ30 
pointed out that he took into account that, though KwaZulu, as a self-governing territory, 
was not an entity that was completely severed from the State, Parliament had in certain 
respects permitted it to act independently of the State. Unlike the four provinces, it was 
not regarded as a mere instrument or representative of the State. The Chief Justice was 
at pains to point out that it was in view of the special status occupied by a self-
governing territory in the previous race-based constitutional system that the 
Government of KwaZulu was entitled to institute legal proceedings against the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa. 31 
An important feature of the new constitutional order was the recognition of this right in 
the Constitution. In terms of Section 82(1 )(d) of the Constitution the President of the 
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Republic had the power ''to refer disputes of a constitutional nature ... between organs 
of state at any level of government to the Constitutional Court or other appropriate 
institution, commission or body for resolution". Furthermore, the Constitutional Court 
was granted the jurisdiction to adjudicate "any dispute of a constitutional nature 
between organs of state at any level of government",32 while the provincial and local 
divisions of the Supreme Court were accorded jurisdiction with regard to "any dispute 
of a constitutional nature between local governments or between a local government 
and a provincial government".33 
THE PROVINCES 
GOVERNMENT ON 
TAKE THE NATIONAL 
In the very first year of its existence, the Constitutional Court was called upon to 
intervene in two matters, namely Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature 
and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,34 and Premier 
of KwaZulu-Natal and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others,35 both of which essentially involved the distribution of competences and powers 
between the national government and provincial governments. The relevant provinces 
complained that the conduct of the national government in both matters had infringed 
their constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
In respect of the first matter, a simultaneous challenge on non-constitutional grounds 
was brought in the Cape Provincial Division on an urgency basis.36 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN CAPE AND OTHERS 
In this case, fundamental questions of constitutional law pertaining to the distribution 
of power between the national government and provinces were raised. 
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A Summary of the Facts of the Matter 
The Origin of the Dispute 
The President of the Republic, the first respondent in the matter, purporting to act under 
the provisions of Section 235(8) of the Constitution,37 assigned the executive authority 
for the administration of the Local Government Transition Act38 to provincial 
administrators to be designated by the Premiers of each of the nine provinces. The 
Premier of the Western Cape, the second applicant in the matter, designated for that 
purpose the Western Cape Member of the Executive Council responsible for Local 
Government,39 the third applicant in the matter, whose duties, as administrator of the 
Local Government Transition Act, included demarcation and delimitation of the 
province in preparation for the local government elections then scheduled to be held on 
1 November 1995 in the whole of the national territory. 
In terms of the Local Government Transition Act,40 the administrator thus designated 
was required to exercise the powers conferred upon him or her by the Act with the 
concurrence of a Provincial Committee for Local Government41 established for each 
province by the Transitional Executive Authority, failing which the dispute thus arising 
was to be referred to the Special Electoral Court.42 Members of the Provincial 
Committee would continue to hold office at the pleasure of the provincial· executive 
councils which were entitled to fill vacancies.43 
The Executive Council of the Western Cape delegated the authority to fill vacancies and 
also to dismiss and replace members of the Provincial Committee for Local Government 
for the province to the administrator of the Local Government Transition Act. The 
administrator, purporting to use this delegated authority, filled a vacancy occasioned by 
a resignation and also dimissed and replaced a serving member of the Provincial 
Committee. This was done by way of appointing the fourth and fifth applicants to the 
Provincial Committee. It was apparent that the member thus dismissed was opposed 
to the demarcation proposal of the administrator and, had he remained on the 
Committee, he would have prevented the administrator from obtaining the necessary 
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two-thirds majority support of the Committee44 for his demarcation proposal. Dismissing 
him made it possible for the administrator to avoid a dispute which would have had to 
be taken to the Special Electoral Court45 for resolution. 
The President of the Republic Responds 
In the light of, and in effect in response to, the political antics of the administrator,46 the 
President of the Republic, purporting to use the powers conferred upon him by Section 
16A of the Local Government Transition Act, effected certain amendments to the Act 
by Proclamation R5847 and Proclamation R59.43 These two Proclamations, as will 
appear more fully below, constituted part of the gist of the dispute in this matter. 
Proclamation R58 amended Section 3(5) of the Act by transferring the power to appoint 
and dismiss Committee members49 from the provincial Executive Councils to the 
national government.50 In terms of Proclamation R58 the appointments of members of 
Committees made after 30 April 1995 were terminated, 51 thus effectively nullifying the 
appointment of the fourth and fifth applicants in the matter. 
Proclamation R59 amended Section 1 O of the Act. This amendment made the exercise 
of the administrator's powers relating, inter alia, to the demarcation of local government 
structures and the division of such structures into wards subject to the provisions of a 
new subsection, namely Section 10(4).52 Moreover, Section 2 of Proclamation R59 
made the amendment explicitly retroactive,53 thus nullifying the administrator's 
demarcation proposal that had been handled in the manner stated above. 
The combined effect of the two proclamations was to nullify the appointment by the 
administrator of the Act of the fourth and fifth applicants retrospectively and also to 
nullify the administrator's controversial demarcation proposal which the reformed 
Committee had approved. Lastly, the second respondent, the President of the Republic, 
acting in consultation with the third respondent54 and after consultation with the second 
applicant,55 appointed the fourth and fifth respondents to replace the member of the 
Committee who had resigned as well as the member thereof who had been dismissed 
by the administrator of the Act. 
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The Order Sought by the Applicants 
The constitutionality of Section 16A, the two presidential Proclamations, as well as of 
all action taken thereunder was impugned in the matter. The applicants, having been 
granted direct access to the Constitutional Court,56 sought an order: (1) declaring 
unconstitutional the amendments to the Local Government Transition Act effected 
by Proclamations R58 and R59; (2) setting aside the Proclamations themselves; (3) 
setting aside the appointment of the fourth and fifth respondents as members of the 
Provincial Committee for Local Government for the Western Cape Province; (4) 
reinstating the fourth and fifth applicants as members of the said Committee; (5) 
declaring unconstitutional Section 16A of the Local Government Transition Act; and 
(6) costs. The Constitutional Court was, in other words, called upon to adjudicate upon 
the constitutionality of these laws57 and resolve a dispute of a constitutional nature 
between the central authority and a provincial authority.58 
The gravamen of the complaint of the applicants was that the national government, by 
means of the impugned Section 16A of the Act and the two controversial proclamations 
made thereunder, had exercised its powers so as to encroach upon the geographical, 
functional and institutional integrity of the Western Cape in violation of the Constitution. 
For the purposes of this chapter, an attempt will be made to summarise each of the 
questions which the Constitutional Court had to grapple with in this regard and how 
each such question was resolved. 59 
The Issues Raised by the Applicants 
1) The Constitutional Principles 
The first contention of the applicants was that the impugned Proclamations violated 
Constitutional Principle XXll which provided that "the National Government shall not 
exercise its powers (exclusive or concurrent) so as to encroach upon the geographical, 
functional or institutional integrity of the provinces."60 It was argued that the 
Proclamations constituted a frontal assault by the national government on the autonomy 
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and functional and institutional integrity of the Western Cape. In support of this 
contention, much reliance was placed upon Section 232(4) of the Constitution.61 
Chaskalson P, after a careful analysis of the place and status of the Constitutional 
Principles in the transitional constitutional configuration, concluded that the argument 
of the applicants had misconceived their place in the whole scheme. The Court had no 
doubt that the Constitutional Principles were intended to be of substantive application 
in the drafting and adoption of a new constitutional text and that, by virtue of the 
provisions of Section 160(3) of the Constitution, they were applicable to any provincial 
constitution that might be adopted.62 The learned President of the Constitutional Court 
further held that the statement in Section 232(4) of the Constitution that the principles, 
as part of Schedule 4, were to all intents and purposes deemed to be part of the 
substance of the Constitution, related to their status and not to their functions or 
operation. 63 
2) Section 61 of the Constitution 
The applicants had also argued that the amendments to the Act purportedly made 
under Proclamation R58 constituted legislation, and that they, as such, violated the 
"manner and form" requirements of Section 61 of the Constitution,64 and were, 
therefore, invalid and of no force or effect. Chaskalson P held that Section 61 applied 
"only to parliamentary enactments and not to legislative action such as the making of 
proclamations or regulations in terms of such enactments. Any other construction would 
not only do violence to the language of the section, but would place a severe 
impediment in the way of effective government. "65 
3) Section 62(2) of the Constitution 
In this regard, the argument was that as Proclamations R58 and R59 amended the 
powers and executive competences of the provinces within the meaning of Sections 
126 and 144 of the Constitution, the provisions of Section 62(2) of the Constitution66 
were applicable. Pointing out that the two proclamations, if valid, amended only the Act, 
and not the Constitution,67 Chaskalson P rejected that argument as having no 
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substance as Section 62 dealt with amendments to the Constitution and not with 
amendments to national legislation such as the Local Government Transition Act. 68 
The fact that the Act was referred to in Section 245 of the Constitution did not make 
it part of the Constitution which would require to be amended in accordance with 
Section 62, Chaskalson P said.69 
To the further argument that the two proclamations were inconsistent with the proviso 
to Section 62(2),70 Chaskalson P responded by stating that the whole of Section 62(2) 
dealt with constitutional amendments, and that, therefore, the proviso thereto ought to 
be read as qualifying the substantive part of the clause71 and not as an independent 
constitutional requirement applicable to any legislation dealing with provincial powers 
and functions. 72 He further stated that the powers and functions of provinces could be 
changed by national legislation without having any regard to the provisions of Section 
62 as such changes did not involve constitutional amendments. 73 
After that, the Court had to grapple with the controversial provisions of Section 16A of 
the Act. 
4) Section 16A of the Local Government Transition Act 
The issue of the validity of the provisions of Section 16A of the Act74 was extremely 
important for the resolution of the gist of the dispute in this matter. The basic question 
to be answered in this regard was whether or not it was competent for Parliament 
to vest in the President of the Republic the power to amend the Act by 
proclamation. The answer to this question, according to Chaskalson P, depended on 
whether or not Parliament could, under the Constitution, delegate its law-making 
powers to the executive or other functionaries, and if so, under what circumstances, or 
whether such powers must always be exercised by Parliament itself in accordance with 
the provisions of Sections 59, 60 and 61 of the Constitution.75 
The most basic observation Chaskalson P made was that there was a fundamental 
distinction between how this question was handled in countries the grundnorm of which 
was parliamentary sovereignty,76 and how it was handled in countries the constitutional 
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systems of which were based on constitutionalism. In the case of the Republic, he 
pointed out, a break with the past system based on parliamentary supremacy had been 
made;77 the powers of Parliament were clearly defined in Section 37 of the 
Constitution, in terms of which Parliament itself was made subject to the Constitution 
in all respects and could, thus, no longer claim supreme power going beyond the 
powers vested in it thereunder expressly or by necessary implication. 78 
Secondly, Chaskalson P pointed out that where Parliament was established under (and 
made subject to) a written constitution, the nature and extent of its power to delegate 
legislative powers to the executive depended ultimately on the language of the 
constitution. 79 In this regard, he observed that, while Parliament may, and should, by 
necessary implication, have the power under such a constitution to delegate 
subordinate legislative powers to the executive, to delegate to the executive the power 
to amend or repeal Acts of Parliament was quite different.80 
After a careful scrutiny of our interim Constitution, Chaskalson P concluded that under 
it Parliament did not have, expressly or by necessary implication, the power to delegate 
to the executive the authority to amend or repeal Acts of Parliament.81 To hold that such 
power existed by necessary implication could be subversive of the "manner and form" 
requirements prescribed in Sections 59, 60 and 61 of the Constitution, the provisions 
of which were not merely directory.82 The only way in which Parliament could arrogate 
to itself the power to delegate legislative authority to the executive contrary to the 
Constitution was to amend the Constitution, which it had not done.83 
Though the Local Government Transition Act was itself a transient Act of Parliament, 
Chaskalson P remarked that the authorisation of legislation such as Section 16A 
allowed control over legislation to pass from Parliament to the executive.84 He further 
warned ominously that: "Later this power could be used to introduce contentious 
provisions into what was previously uncontentious legislation."85 
The members of the Constitutional Court unanimously concluded that the provisions of 
Section 16A of the Act were inconsistent with the Constitution and, therefore, invalid.86 
For the Court, it was extremely important at that early stage of the development of the 
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post-aparheid constitutional order to establish and nurture the supremacy of the 
Constitution. If what had been done was inconsistent with the Constitution, it did not 
matter that the President and Parliament had acted in good faith, or that there was no 
objection to the action taken when it was carried out. 87 
5) Section 235(8) of the Constitution 
The respondents had contended that if the provisions of Section 16A of the Act were 
indeed adjudged to be inconsistent with the Constitution,88 the proclamations were 
nonetheless made within the scope of the President's legislative powers under Section 
235(8)(b)(i) of the Constitution, which allowed him to "amend and adapt" laws 
assigned under that section. Chaskalson P scrutinised the overall purpose and scheme 
of the provisions of Section 235 and concluded that the power to amend or adapt laws 
thus assigned was given to the President to facilitate the transition from the old 
constitutional dispensation to the new order. The President was to exercise such 
discretionary power only to the extent that he or she considered it necessary to amend 
or adapt a law assigned under Section 235(8) "for the efficient carrying out of the 
assignment".89 This power, as the learned President of the Constitutional Court further 
elaborated, was to enable the President of the Republic to amend or adapt laws 
assigned to make them fit the new situation and "to achieve functional efficiency in the 
administration of the assigned laws."90 The provisions of Section 235(8)(b)(i) did not 
give the President any greater powers than those that were necessary for the 
achievement of that purpose.91 
The President of the Republic was, therefore, not at liberty to amend or repeal laws 
merely "because he did not like them, or because he felt that they would be more likely 
with substantive amendments to achieve what he considered to be the objects of the 
legislation."92 The amendments to the Act the President had effected by means of the 
two proclamations were motivated by a desire on his part to respond to the political 
antics and manoeuvres of the provincial government of the Western Cape which had 
helped them avoid referring disputed issues of demarcation to the Special Electoral 
Court. They were therefore not necessary to make the Act fit the new constitutional 
order as contemplated in Section 235(8) of the Constitution. Noting that the President 
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had in fact not purported to act under Section 235(8) of the Constitution but under 
Section 16A of the Act, the Court pointed out that if the provisions of Section 16A were 
invalid, the Section 235(8) powers were not sufficient to provide a source of power 
which the first respondent, the President of the Republic, could rely on. 93 
The Court, by a majority of 9 to 2, came to the conclusion, albeit for different reasons, 
that the two proclamations that were purportedly promulgated under Section 16A of the 
Act which was declared invalid could not be validated under Section 235 of the 
Constitution. 94 
A VICTORY FOR THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS? 
The supremacy of the Constitution was asserted in the most vigorous and 
unprecedented way in this case. Parliament and the executive were told in no uncertain 
terms that their powers were as prescribed in, and were to be exercised under and 
subject to, the Constitution. The clear message was that that which the Constitution 
did not sanction either expressly or by necessary implication could not be 
constitutionally valid. The Court gave us a foretaste of what we should expect by way 
of constitution-making in keeping with the provisions of Constitutional Principle Vl.95 
For the Court, the doctrine of separation of powers, a basic element of constitutional ism, 
is a fundamental premiss of our new constitutional order. Parliament as the national 
legislature would be acting in violation of this doctrine if it abdicated or ceded its power 
to make, amend or repeal its own legislation to the executive. This was the gist of the 
Court's ruling in this matter. 
The provincial government of the Western Cape was victorious; the Constitutional Court 
had declared the provisions of Section 16A of the Act, and, needless to say, all action 
taken thereunder and pursuant thereto, including all the proclamations made 
thereunder, invalid. It was even awarded the overall costs of the action.96 Feeling 
buoyant about this, Senator A van Breda of the National Party declared: "The Western 
Cape executive won their case in the Constitutional Court. This infamous section 16A 
of the Local Government Transition Act, in terms of which the even more infamous 
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Proclamations R58 and R59 were issued, was ruled unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court, also affecting all other proclamations."97 
However, this was a pyrrhic victory for the Western Cape provincial government. Having 
thus declared the provisions of Section 16A of the Local Government Transition Act 
to be invalid due to their inconsistency with the Constitution, and having ruled that 
Proclamations R58 and R59 of 1995 purportedly made thereunder could not be 
salvaged by Section 235 of the Constitution, the Court then had to grapple with the 
serious implications of the declaration of invalidity it had quite correctly made. 98 The 
Court, mindful of its responsibility to give meaning to the Constitution, wherever 
possible, in ways which were consistent with its underlying purposes and yet not 
detrimental to effective government,99 had to find a way of ensuring that the declaration 
that Section 16A was invalid would not jeopardise the holding of the local government 
elections then scheduled to take place on 1 November 1995 in the whole national 
territory. 
Sections 98(5) and 98(6) of the Constitution 
The Court, noting that the Constitution itself allowed it to control the consequences of 
a declaration of invalidity if it should be necessary to do so, 100 then proceeded to look 
into how it could help avert an otherwise impending constitutional crisis. The provisions 
of Sections 98(5) and 98(6) of the Constitution, which enabled the Court to regulate 
the impact of a declaration of invalidity and avoid such consequences, were resorted 
to for this purpose. 
The Court used its power under the proviso to Section 98(5) of the Constitution to give 
Parliament, the only institution which could validate the amendments to the Local 
Government Transition Act made in terms of the proclamations issued under Section 
16A of the Act, the opportunity, if it so wished, 101 to rectify the situation. Parliament was 
required to correct the defect in Section 16A by not later than 25 October 1995.102 In the 
meantime, Section 16A and the proclamations made under it would remain in force 
pending the correction of the defect or the expiry of the period specified in the Court 
order. 103 
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Though this is not clear from the Court order, the provisions of Section 98(6)(b) of the 
Constitution were used to prevent the retrospective invalidation of all action taken 
subsequent to 27 April 1994 pursuant to Section 16A of the Act, which would otherwise 
have ensued after that section was declared invalid.104 
PARLIAMENT RESPONDS 
As a result of this decision, Parliament, which had already adjourned for the year, was 
recalled to address the crisis.105 The national government placed before the two Houses 
of Parliament the Local Government Transition Act Second Amendment Bill, 106 
which was passed within two days, after a not unexpected acrimonious and yet 
entertaining debate. 
The judgment led to a constructive interaction between the judiciary and the national 
legislature at an early stage in the development of our democracy. The Court 
interpreted the Constitution and its underlying principles fearlessly and without bias, 
and the legislature deferred to the judgment and responded within its constitutional 
powers. 
In its original form, the Bill had merely sought to repeal the controversial Section 16A 
of the principal Act and enact the proclamations the Constitutional Court had 
invalidated. During committee deliberations numerous other issues were raised and 
debated before the Bill came before Parliament for enactment. The Bill was changed 
in a few areas prior to this, as Parliament had a choice in the matter.107 
In particular, the controversial Proclamations R58 and R59 were excluded from the final 
Bill because, according to Deputy Minister Moosa, "having served their purpose, having 
held the transition together'' against the wishes of the Western Cape government, they 
were no longer required. 108 Proclamation R 129, 109 in terms of which the administration 
of the Local Government Transition Act was assigned to the provinces, was 
repealed. 110 Moreover, the provisions of Section 4 of the principal Act were also 
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amended so that any three members of a provincial committee could refer disputes to 
the Special Electoral Court even if the provincial government would not cooperate. 111 
PREMIER OF KWAZULU-NATAL AND OTHERS 
In this matter, the applicants, 112 representing the Executive Council in KwaZulu-Natal, 
sought to impugn the validity of some of the provisions of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act, 113 which amended various 
sections of the Constitution, including Sections 149(10), 182, 184(5} and 245. The 
applicants, as will become clearer below, objected to the amendments for various 
reasons. The gist of their objection, however, was that the national government was 
unconstitutionally encroaching upon the legislative competences of the provinces. 
As Mahomed DP did in his judgment, it would be better to deal seriatim with each of the 
impugned sections in order to understand both the bases on which they were attacked 
and the ruling of the Constitutional Court in respect of each such section. 
1) Section 149(10) of the Constitution 
Pursuant to Section 149(10) of the Constitution, 114 the KwaZulu-Natal provincial 
legislature had enacted the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature Remuneration Act, 115 which 
provided, inter alia, for the payment of the salaries and allowances of the Premier and 
members of the executive council of their province. The 1995 constitutional amendment 
of Section 149(10) effectively removed the power to determine the remuneration and 
allowances of the Premiers and members of executive councils of provinces from 
provincial legislatures and placed that in the hands of the President of the Republic, the 
first respondent in the matter. 
As will appear more fully below, the applicants launched a two-pronged attack on the 
amendment to Section 149(10). 
Constitutional Principles 
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The applicants impugned the amendment on the basis, inter alia, that it violated 
Constitutional Principle XVlll(2) contained in the fourth Schedule to the Constitution. 
In terms of that Constitutional Principle, the powers and functions of the nine provinces, 
including the competence to adopt their own provincial constitutions, were not to be 
substantially less than or inferior to those provided for in the Constitution. 
Reaffirming the position the Constitutional Court took in the Executive Council of the 
Western Cape Legislature and Others case, 116 Mahomed DP117 pointed out that the 
applicants' reliance on the relevant Constitutional Principle appeared to him to have 
been misconceived. The Constitutional Principle dealt with a futi.;re constitutional text 
which in its entirety ought to conform to the 34 Constitutional Principles contained in 
Schedule 4 to the Constitution. It did not deal with amendments to the (interim) 
Constitution. For this reason, the learned Deputy President of the Court concluded that 
the impugned amendment to Section 149( 10) could not successfully be attacked simply 
on the ground that it offended Constitutional Principle XVlll(2). 118 
Section 62(2) of the Constitution 
The issue of the applicability of Section 62(2) of the Constitution arose in this instance 
as well, albeit from a different angle. The applicants contended that, as the amendment 
to Section 149(10) had the effect of taking away the competence of the KwaZulu-Natal 
province to pay to its Premier and to its members of the Executive Council such 
remuneration and allowances as were prescribed and determined under a law made by 
its provincial legislature,119 the special procedures prescribed in Section 62(2) had to be 
followed. In particular, the applicants contended that the amendment was flawed 
because it took away such competence without the consent of their provincial 
legislature which was required under the proviso to Section 62(2). 
The crucial question the Court had to decide was whether, as the amendment to 
Section 149(10) did not affect the provisions of Sections 126 and 144 of the 
Constitution, 120 the proviso to Section 62(2)121 was an independent and substantive 
provision which constituted an impediment to the legislative powers of Parliament. 
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Linked to this was the question relating to th~ content of the proviso to Section 62(2) 
and the meaning to be attached thereto. 
In S v Mhlungu and Others122 Mahomed J (as he then was) spelt out the general 
principle, namely that "a proviso qualifies the substantive part". However, in Premier 
of KwaZulu-Natal and Others, Ma homed DP, after carefully scrutinising various 
authorities on this question, correctly conceded that this general rule was not invariable, 
and pointed out that ''the context and object of a proviso in a particular statute might 
justify giving to a particular proviso the meaning of an independent and substantive 
content. "123 
In Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others, 124 the Court 
specifically held that Section 62(2) dealt with constitutional amendments and that the 
proviso thereto ought to "be read as qualifying the substantive part of the clause and 
not as an independent constitutional requirement applicable to any legislation dealing 
with provincial powers and functions."125 Of particular importance in this regard was the 
Court's ruling that legislative changes not entailing constitutional amendments could be 
effected by Parliament without complying with the provisions of Section 62 of the 
Constitution. 126 
Whether or not the proviso to Section 62(2) was to be read as a qualification to the 
substantive part, for Mahomed DP (as he then was) the content thereof was very 
important. Having analysed the language of the proviso, the learned Deputy President 
of the Court held that what was contemplated by the proviso was legislation 127 (whether 
or not diminishing or increasing or qualifying the relevant competencies of the 
provinces) which was targeted at one or more provinces but not one which was of equal 
application to all the nine provinces. Accordingly a law applicable to all provinces would 
fall outside the purview of the proviso. 128 The Court concluded that, because the 
amendment to Section 149(10) did not, and did not purport to, target any particular 
province or provinces, but was applicable to all nine provinces instead, the consent of 
the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature or of any other provincial legislature, was not 
required. 129 
2) Section 182 of the Constitution 
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Prior to the 1995 constitutional amendment, Section 182 of the Constitution provided 
that traditional leaders of communities observing systems of indigenous law and 
residing on land within the area of jurisdiction of elected local governments were ex 
officio entitled to be members of their respective local governments, and were as such, 
eligible to be elected to any office of such local governments. The amendment provided 
for the identification of eligible traditional leaders in a manner and according to 
guidelines prescribed by the President of the Republic by proclamation in the Gazette 
after consultation with 130 the Council of Traditional Leaders, 131 if then in existence, or if 
not, with the Houses of Traditional Leaders 132 then established. 
In this regard, as will appear more fully below, the amendment was impugned on three 
grounds. 
Violation of Section 126 and Schedule 6 of the Constitution 
The applicants tentatively challenged the validity of the amendment on the grounds that 
it offended the division of powers identified in Section 126 as read with Schedule 6 of 
the Constitution in relation to the functional areas of local government and traditional 
leaders. As Mahomed DP pointed out,133 the underlying assumption of this submission, 
which was wisely not pressed in argument, was that Section 126 as read with Schedule 
6 gave to provinces exclusive legislative competence to deal with matters which fell 
within the functional areas specified in Schedule 6. Though the relevant provisions gave 
to provincial legislatures the jurisdiction to make laws dealing, inter alia, with indigenous 
law and traditional leaders, the powers were concurrent: Subject to Section 126(3) and 
(4) of the Constitution, Parliament also had that jurisdiction.134 
"Interference" with an Act of a Provincial Legislature 
The applicants further contended that the amendment to Section 182 "interfered" with 
the assignment135 of the administration of the KwaZulu Amakhosi and lziphakanyiswa 
Act136 by the President of the Republic, the first respondent, to a competent authority 
designated by the first applicant, the Premier of the province. Responding to this 
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argument, Mahomed DP (as he then was} said that, as the amendment dealt with how 
traditional leaders who were to be ex officio members of local governments were to be 
identified, it did not constitute any "interference" with the legislative or executive 
competence of the provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal in terms of Section 126 or 
144.137 Significantly, the Court also held that the mere fact that the administration of a 
particular Act had previously been assigned by the President of the Republic did not 
preclude Parliament from making a law dealing with the manner in which such 
traditional leaders were to be identified.138 
As it was not an amendment affecting any of these two sections, the Court held that the 
amendment to Section 182 did not require compliance with Section 62(2) of the 
Constitution at all. 139 
Violation of the Proviso to Section 62(2) of the Constitution 
The applicants, as a last resort, contended that the amendment violated the proviso to 
Section 62(2) of the Constitution which operated even in those cases where the 
provisions of Sections 126 and 144 were not sought to be amended. Mahomed DP140 
said that that argument did not help the applicants because, as he had pointed out 
before, the proviso to Section 62(2) was not of any application where a particular 
province or provinces were not targeted. The amendment to Section 182 of the 
Constitution could thus not be attacked on this basis as it was applicable to all the 
provinces and not to a particular province or provinces. 141 
3) Section 184(5) of the Constitution 
Prior to its amendment, Section 184(5) of the Constitution laid down procedural 
requirements for the passing of any parliamentary Bill affecting or pertaining to 
traditional authorities or matters having a bearing thereon. Before that "manner and 
form" procedure was complied with, such a Bill could not be passed by Parliament. This 
was unfortunately because the relevant structure, namely the Council of Traditional 
Leaders, 142 to which such Bills were to be referred by the Secretary to Parliament for its 
comments, 143 was not established timeously. The amendment to Section 184(5) 
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provided an alternative procedure for the consideration of legislation relating to 
traditional authorities by obviating the need to refer such legislation to the Council while 
such Council was not yet in existence. 144 
The basic complaint of the applicants in this regard was that the Bill seeking to amend 
Section 184(5) did not comply with the requirements contained in the section. Mahomed 
DP145 correctly pointed out that there was a distinction between a Parliamentary Bill 
relating to Traditional Authorities, indigenous law, or the traditions and customs of 
traditional authorities, which would constitute ordinary legislation and not a constitutional 
amendment, and a Bill seeking to amend Section 184(5) itself. While the procedure 
prescribed in the section affected the former, the latter required only compliance with 
Section 62(1) of the Constitution. 146 Nothing prevented Parliament from amending or 
repealing Section 184(5), which was not a self-entrenching provision, so long as the 
"manner and form" requirements prescribed in Section 62( 1) were complied with .147 
Regarding the applicants' argument that the amendment provided for the 
unconstitutional retrospective recognition of a Bill, Mahomed DP said that there was 
nothing in the Constitution which precluded such an amendment. 148 He further said 
that he knew of no principle on the basis of which Parliament's power of constitutional 
amendment could be curtailed because of a Bill's retrospective application. 149 
Lastly, the applicants suggested that the intention of the amendment was to validate the 
Remuneration of Traditional Leaders Bill which Parliament had already passed and 
which was awaiting assent by the President of the Republic. Mahomed DP said that 
even if that suggestion was correct, it was irrelevant to, and had no bearing on the 
amendment to Section 184(5).150 
4) Sections 245(1) and (2) of the Constitution 
Prior to the amendment to Section 245 of the Constitution, Section 245(1) made 
provision for local government to be restructured otherwise than in accordance with the 
Local Government Transition Act, 1993 once the first democratic local government 
elections had been held under the said Act. 151 Such restructuring could be done in terms 
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of legislation enacted by "a competent authority" (which could include a provincial 
legislature), subsequent to the elections. The amendment made it incompetent for any 
such "competent authority" to embark upon any restructuring of local government prior 
to 31 March 1996. 
The applicants challenged the amendment to Section 245 on the basis that it extended 
national legislation within the field of competence of the provincial legislatures. In 
particular it was argued that the effect of the amendment was to "interfere with a power 
which the KwaZulu-Natal legislature had in terms of section 126, read with Schedule 6". 
The first democratic local government elections could not be held on the same day 
throughout the country as envisaged in Section 179(1) of the Constitution; in KwaZulu-
Natal and in parts of the Western Cape this could not be done on 1 November 1995. 
Mahomed DP (as he then was)152 held that he thought it was necessary in the 
circumstances to enact national legislation to obviate the consequences of the proviso 
to Section 179(1 ); such legislation could be enacted in keeping with Section 126(3)(b) 
of the Constitution.153 
Mahomed DP (as he then was) further pointed out that Section 245 was not immune 
from amendment.154 Nor would the amendments thereto be subject to the provisions of 
Section 62(2) of the Constitution, as they would not be affecting Sections 126 and 
144.155 All that was required for the amendment to Section 245 to be valid was that it 
should comply with the procedure for amendment prescribed in the Constitution. If that 
was done properly, the amendment would be constitutionally unassailable. 156 
Though the applicants had successfuly acquired direct access to the Constitutional 
Court, the Court dismissed the matter for the aforementioned reasons. 157 The relevant 
constitutional amendments were thus saved. 
CONCLUSION 
The Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature 158 case will undoubtedly go 
down in the annals of our legal history as the case that contained the Constitutional 
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Court's first major statement on crucial issues that did not concern Chapter 3 of the 
(interim) Constitution, such as the application of the doctrine of separation of powers, 
the constitutional nature of our new order, the constitutional limits on delegation of 
parliamentary legislative power, the extent of the authority of the President as Head of 
State and Government and the propriety of suspending a declaration of invalidity. In that 
case, Chaskalson P quite correctly noted that there is a distinction between 
Parliament appropriately delegating authority to make subordinate legislation and 
assigning plenary legislative power to another body, such as had happened in 
casu. The Learned President of the Court further pointed out that the unrestricted power 
to amend the Local Government Transition Act could not be justified on the grounds 
of necessity nor on the basis of a power granted to the President of the Republic by 
necessary implication. 
The Court ruled that Section 16A of the Local Government Transition Act and any 
executive action taken thereunder, were unconstitutional. The delegation from 
Parliament to the President of the Republic of the power to amend the Act was struck 
down for lacking any limitation, with Mahomed DP even saying that the section's 
provisions went rather too far and effectively constituted "an abdication of Parliament's 
legislative function" .159 As stated above, this was a victory, not for the government of the 
Western Cape province controlled by a minority party, but, as Jonathan Klaaren put it, 
for "constitutional democracy that vanquished parliamentary sovereignty."160 
The debates among the judges themselves, such as had happened in cases such as 
Mhlungu and De Klerk, were striking. This tendency not to agree simply in order to 
preserve the unity of the Court augurs well for our fledgling democracy. The judgment 
gave us the first tentative foundations for a South African constitutional theory proper. 
The Premier of KwaZulu-Natal 161 case, another example of a case that did not relate 
to the provisions of Chapter 3 of the (interim) Constitution, was interesting because it 
essentially sought to deal with what allegedly smacked of an abuse of the power to 
amend a constitution which was reminiscent of what had happened before in the history 
of our country. 162 In this regard, the reasoning of Mahomed DP, namely that for the 
proviso to Section 62(2) of the (interim) Constitution to be relevant and applicable, the 
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relevant legislation ought to have been targeted at one or more provinces but not be of 
equal application to all provinces 163 is cause for concern. For what could prevent a crafty 
coterie of national legislators seeking to alter radically the legislative competency of a 
particular province without referring the amending Bill to the legislature of that province 
from enacting legislation which is ostensibly applicable to all provinces whilst it in effect 
is targeted at that one province? 
THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
The Constitutional Assembly responded to these cases by enacting the provisions of 
Chapter 3 of the (new) Constitution, which seek to promote cooperative government. 
To achieve this objective, numerous basic principles are outlined in Section 41. The 
distinctive national, provincial and local spheres of government which, in terms of 
Section 40(1) of the Constitution, together constitute government in the Republic, are 
each, inter alia, required to "respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and 
functions of government in the other spheres", "exercise their powers and perform their 
functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or 
institutional integrity of government in another sphere", foster friendly relations, assist 
and support one another, and refrain from assuming "any power or function except 
those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution". 
It is hoped that these principles will at least help patch political differences and obviate 
litigation in circumstances similar to the ones depicted in the two cases discussed in this 
chapter. Thus, it is now a constitutional requirement that 
an organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable 
effort to settle the dispute by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that 
purpose, and must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the 
dispute. 164 
Courts have been given a discretion to refer matters back to the relevant organs if they 
are not satisfied that reasonable efforts have been made to settle them and that all 
other remedies have been exhausted. 165 
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provincial legislation. See Section 147(1 )(a) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the national government 
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64 .. It is noteworthy that Section 61 referred not to proclamations or subordinate legislation but explicitly 
to "Bills affecting the boundaries or the exercise or performance of the powers and functions of the 
provinces". (my emphasis) 
65 .. At 1309, paragraph 43. 
66 .. Which stipulated the "manner and form" requirements relating to the amendment of Sections 126 and 
144. 
67 .. Ibidem, at 1311, paragraph 48. 
68 .. Ibidem, at 1310-1311, paragraph 48. 
69 .. Ibidem. 
70 .. Which required that amendments to the legislative and executive competences of a province should 
be effected with the consent of the legislature of the relevant province. See Mahomed DP in Premier of 
KwaZulu-Natal and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, op cit 1570, 
paragraph 23, on what was contemplated in the proviso to Section 62(2). 
71.. See Mahomed J (as he then was) in S v Mhlungu and Others, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at 883, 
paragraph 32, in this regard. 
72 .. Op cit 1311 , paragraph 49. 
73 .. Ibidem. 
74 .. Which empowered the President of the Republic to amend the Act and any schedule thereto by 
proclamation in the Gazette and under which, as stated above, the President purportedly acted when he 
effected the relevant changes to the Act by means of the impugned Proclamations R58 and R59. As 
Deputy Minister MV Moosa reminded the National Assembly, the insertion of section 16A into the principal 
Act had initially enjoyed the support of the National Party and all other parties in the House, except for the 
Freedom Front. See the Debates of the National Assembly, col 4306, 11 October 1995. 
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75 .. Op Cit 1310, paragraph 47. See also Mahomed DP, ibidem, at 1340, paragraphs 126 to 129. 
76 .. Such as was the case in the Republic before the Constitution came into effect; as Chaskalson P 
pointed out at 1312, paragraph 52, in the past our courts, due to parliamentary sovereignty, gave effect 
to Acts of Parliament which vested wide plenary powers in the executive. 
77 .. Op cft 1317, paragraph 62. See also Mahomed DP (as he then was), ibidem at 1345-1346, paragraph 
137, on the jurisprudential philosophy which informed and underpinned the Constitution. 
78 .. Ibidem. 
79 .. Ibidem, at 1316, paragraph 61. See also Mahomed DP, ibidem at 1344, paragraph 136. 
80 .. Ibidem, at 1317, paragraph 62. 
81.. At 1319, paragraph 65, the teamed President of the Court pointed out that the general power 
envisaged in Section 16A of the Act could not even be inferred from the provisions of Section 245 of the 
Constitution. 
However, Mahomed DP, ibidem at 1347, paragraphs 141 and 142, concentrated on Section 16A as it 
stood and concluded that, as it, in that form, went rather too far and effectively constituted an abdication 
of Parliament's legislative function in terms of Section 37 of the Constitution, its provisions were then 
l!nconstitutional. He left open the question as to whether any Act of Parliament which purported to 
delegate to the President of the Republic the power to amend the Act would always be unconstitutional. 
See paragraph 150 on this question. 
82 .. Ibidem, at 1317-1318, paragraph 62. See also Mahomed DP, ibidem at 1345, paragraph 137. 
83 .. Ibidem, at 1318-1319, paragraph 64. 
84 .. Ibidem, at 1318, paragraph 63. See also Mahomed DP, ibidem at 1346, paragraph 137. 
85 .. Ibidem. 
86 .. Ibidem, at 1332, paragraph 101. Note that in terms of the Court order (at 1339, paragraph 124 ), all 
the proclamations made under Section 16A, including Proclamations R58 and R59, were also declared 
invalid. Note further the relevance of the substantive portion of the provisions of Section 98(5) of the 
Constitution in this regard. 
87 .. Ibidem, paragraph 100. 
88 .. And, therefore, in terms of Section 4(1) of the Constitution, invalid and of no force and effect to the 
extent of such inconsistency. 
89 .. Op cit 1327, paragraph 84. 
90 .. Ibidem, at 1331, paragraph 97. 
91 .. Ibidem. 
92 .. Ibidem. 
93 .. Ibidem, paragraph 98. 
94 .. Ibidem, at 1332, paragraph 101. 
95 .. In terms of which the new constitutional text was required to ensure that there was "a separation of 
powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness." See Section 71 (1 )(a) and (2) of the Constitution for the 
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significance of the 34 Constitutional Principles enshrined in Schedule 4. 
96 .. See the order of the Court at 1340, paragraph 124, in this regard. 
97 .. In the Debates of the Senate, col 3024, 12October1995. 
98 .. Op cit 1332-1333, paragraph 102, and at 1334-1335, paragraphs 109 and 110. 
99 .. Ibidem, at 1331-1332, paragraph 99, and at 1335, paragraph 110. 
100 .. Ibidem, at 1332. paragraph 100. 
1O1 .. At 1336-1337, paragraph 113, Chaskalson P made it clear that Parliament could choose either to 
correct the defect in the invalidated law within the period specified in the Court order or not to do so, but 
take any other appropriate legislative steps to address the effect of the declaration of invalidity. 
102 .. Ibidem, at 1339, paragraph 124. 
103 .. Ibidem. Note the remarks of Chaskalson Pat 1333-1334, paragraph 106, regarding the effect of the 
decision of the Court to make use of the proviso to Section 98(5) of the Constitution instead of declaring 
a law or a provision thereof invalid with immediate effect. 
104 .. See reference to this by Chaskalson Pat 1337, paragraph 113. Note also that in terms of the Court 
order, all the proclamations made under Section 16A, including Proclamations R58 and R59, would remain 
in force for the duration of the period specified therein. 
105 .. Addressing the National Assembly in the opening of the debate on this issue, Dr F Ginwala, the 
Speaker, appropriately remarked that: "This is the first time this Assembly is meeting to rectify 
constitutional defects in legislation that have been identified by the Constitutional Court. That we are 
meeting speedily to accept that ruling and comply with it bodes well for our new democracy." See the 
Debates of the National Assembly, col 4361, 11 October 1995. 
106 .. The objective of which, according to Deputy Minister MV Moosa, was to enable Parliament to 
validate in the proper manner "the whole range of proclamations issued in terms of section 16A" of the 
Local Government Transition Act. See the Debates of the Senate, col 3021, 12 October 1995. 
107 .. As Chaskalson P had pointed out in his judgment in Executive Council of the Western Cape and 
Others, op cit 1336-1337, paragraph 113, Parliament could either correct the defect in the invalidated law 
within the period specified in the order of the Constitutional Court or choose, instead, to "take any other 
appropriate legislative steps to address the effect of the declaration of invalidity." 
108 .. See the Debates of the Senate, col 3021-3022, 12 October 1995. 
109 .. Of 15 July 1994. 
110 .. See the Debates of the Senate, op cit col 3022. 
111.. Ibidem. 
112 .. Who, upon application, were granted direct access to the Constitutional Court in terms of Section 
100(2) of the Constitution read with Rule 17 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
113 .. Act No. 44 of 1995. 
114 .. Which, before its amendment, provided that the Premiers and members of executive councils of 
provinces were to be paid such remuneration and allowances as might have been prescribed by or 
determined under laws made by provincial legislatures. 
It is noted that the provisions of the original Section 149( 10) were the same as those of Section 135( 4) 
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of the Constitution, which the purported amendment did not allude to. In his judgment, Mahomed DP, 
at 1565, paragraph 8, dealt with this problem and concluded that Section 135(4) would pro tanto be 
amended or repealed by a property effected amendment of Section 149(10). 
115 .. Act No. 2 of 1994. 
116 .. Supra, at 1309, paragraphs 40 and 41. 
117 .. In Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and Others, op cit 1566, paragraph 12. 
118 .. Ibidem. 
119 .. To wit the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature Remuneration Act referred to above. 
120 .. Which related to the legislative competence and the executive authority of provinces and the 
amendments to which the substantive portion of Section 62(2) specifically sought to regulate. 
121 .. Which read as follows: " ... Privided that the boundaries and the legislative and executive 
competences of a province shall not be amended without the consent of a relevant provincial legislature." 
(my emphasis) 
122 .. 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at 883, paragraph 32. 
123 .. Op cit 1568-1569, paragraph 20. 
124 .. Op cit 1311, paragraph 49, where Chaskalson P dealt specifically with the proviso to Section 62(2). 
125 .. Ibidem. 
126 .. Ibidem. It must be stressed, however, that Chaskalson P was not, thereby, giving a licence to 
Parliament to ride rough-shod on the powers and competences of the provinces; the requirements 
prescribed in the provisions of Section 126(3) and (4) of the Constitution would still have to be complied 
with. 
It is also noted that, whereas this case dealt with non-constitutional amendments effected by proclamation 
under the successfully impugned Section 16A of the Local Government Transition Act, the Premier of 
KwaZulu-Natal and Others case, on the contrary, dealt with constitutional amendments. 
127 .. What is not clear is whether Mahomed DP used this word in a generic and all-embracing sense or 
simply confined its use to constitutional amendments as did Chaskalson P, ibidem. 
128 .. Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and Others, op cit 1570, paragraph 23. 
129 .. Loe cit. 
130 .. Which means that, while the public authority (the President of the Republic in this instance) was 
required to consult, he or she was not obliged to follow the views of those consulted, nor to reach 
agreement with them. It is noted that in our jurisprudence, where subordinate legislation must be 
accompanied, in the legislative process, by consultation and deliberation, the absence thereof will affect 
the validity of the resultant legislation. See Government of the Republic of South Africa and Another 
v Government of KwaZulu and Another, op cit 198F-201 H. 
131 .. For which see Section 184 of the Constitution. 
132 .. For which see Section 183 of the Constitution. 
133 .. In Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and Others, op cit 1571, paragraph 25. 
134.. Loe cit. 
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135 .. In terms of Section 235(8)(a) of the Constitution. 
136 .. Act No. 9of1990, passed, significantly, by the now defunct KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. 
137 .. Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and Others, at 1571, paragraph 27. 
138 .. Ibidem. 
139 .. Ibidem, paragraph 28. 
140 .. At 1572, paragraph 30. 
141 .. Ibidem. 
142 .. Which was to be established in terms of Section 184( 1) of the Constitution. 
143 .. Section 184(5)(a). 
144 .. See Section 184(5)(aA), which provided that the Bills would be referred by the Secretary to 
Parliament to those Houses of Traditional Leaders that were contemplated in and established under 
Section 183 of the Constitution. 
145 .. At 1573, paragraph 35. 
146 .. That is, that such a Bill "required to be adopted at a joint sitting of the National Assembly and the 
Senate by a majority of at least two-thirds of the total number of members of both Houses." 
14 7 .. At 1573, paragraph 35. 
148 .. Ibidem, paragraph 36. 
149 .. Ibidem. 
150 .. At 1573-157 4, paragraph 37. 
151 .. In terms of the proviso to Section 179(1) of the Constitution, such local government elections were 
supposed to take place on the same day throughout the national territory. 
152 .. At 1575, paragraph 42. 
153 .. Which allowed Parliament to pass legislation dealing with a matter that, to be performed effectively, 
required to be regulated or co-ordinated by uniform norms or standards that applied generally throughout 
the country. 
154 .. At 1575, paragraph 44. 
155 .. Ibidem. 
156 .. At 1576, paragraph 47. 
157 .. At 1577, pararaph 50. 
158 .. Op cit. 
159 .. Paragraph 141 of the case. 
160 .. See 'Case Reports', (1996) 12 SAJHR 158 at 161. 
161 .. Op cit. 
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162 .. For example, see Harris v Minister of Interior, 1952 (2) SA 428; and Minister of Interior v Harris, 
1952 (4) SA 769 (A), both of which concerned constitutional amendments seeking to exclude the Coloured 
community from the common voters' roll. 
163 .. Paragraph 23 of the case. 
164 .. Section 41(3) of the (new) Constitution. 
165 .. Ibidem, Section 41(4). 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
CERTIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
T wo constitutions, the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996, 1 and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 2 came before the 
Constitutional Court for certification3 under the (interim) Constitution. In the one 
instance, the basic task of the Court was to determine whether or not the text of the 
affected provincial Constitution was compatible with the (interim) Constitution, 
including the 34 Constitutional Principles set out in Schedule 4 thereto.4 In the other 
instance, its task was restricted to deciding whether the text adhered to the 
Constitutional Principles. 5 
In both instances, the decision of the Constitutional Court certifying or refusing to certify 
that the provisions of the relevant text complied with the (interim) Constitution would 
be final and no court of law could subsequently enquire into the validity of such text or 
a provision thereof.6 In the case of the province of KwaZulu-Natal, the Legislature could 
choose not to make another constitutional text if the first one failed to gain certification 
as provinces were under no constitutional constraint to pass their own constitutions. 
However, the Constitutional Assembly had no choice in the matter; it was required to 
pass and adopt a "new constitutional text within two years as from the date of the first 
sitting of the National Assembly ... "7 If the initial text failed to gain certification because 
of its inconsistency with any of the 34 Constitutional Principles, the Constitutional 
Assembly would still have to do its work; the Republic would otherwise be without a new 
constitutional text and, therefore, be governed continually under the (interim) 
Constitution, till the provisions of Section 73 of the (interim) Constitution were 
activated for deadlock breaking purposes. 
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The way the Constitutional Court handled these two cases amply demonstrated that it 
is not a lackey or a handmaiden of the ruling party, the African National Congress, or 
of any party or person, for that matter. As will appear below, it acquitted itself in a way 
that could only enhance its stature in the eyes of the citizenry as a whole and of 
sceptics8 who might have thought that, because of the institution's origins and the 
previous political leanings of some of its members, it was sympathetic politically to the 
majority party. In both cases the Court ruled against the decisions of duly elected public 
representatives and refused to certify the two initial constitutional drafts. 
In both cases constitutional issues of great importance arose. It is the objective of this 
chapter to discuss some these issues. Where possible, an attempt will be made to 
relate some of these issues to comparable experiences of other countries. 
THE KWAZULU-NATAL CONSTITUTION 
The Legislature of the province of KwaZulu-Natal, like the legislatures of the other eight 
provinces, was allowed in terms of the (interim) Constitution to pass its own provincial 
Constitution if it so chose.9 However, the (interim) Constitution did not prescribe or 
proscribe any form or content of a provincial constitution. It was, subject to Section 160 
of the (interim) Constitution, left to the choice of the provincial Legislature selecting to 
pass a provincial constitution to decide the form and content of the text of the 
constitution of the province. 
On 15 March 1996, after a lengthy and arduous process of political negotiations among 
the parties represented in the provincial Legislature, the Legislature of the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal unanimously adopted a Constitution for that province. 10 Despite the 
unanimity exhibited in the Legislature, the African National Congress 11 (for reasons 
which were not furnished to the Court12) and the Government of the Republic objected 
strenuously to certain aspects of the provincial Constitution when it came before the 
Constitutional Court for certification. 13 
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THE OBJECTIONS OF THE KING'S COUNCIL OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
The King's Council of KwaZulu-Natal filed its own written objections to certain provisions 
of the provincial Constitution. 14 After giving due consideration to the objections, the 
Constitutional Court ruled in In re: Certification of the Constitution of Province of 
KwaZulu·Natal, 199615 that none of them could be properly considered by it in the 
exercise of its power of certification under the (interim) Constitution. 16 
The (interim) Constitution provided that, in the case of the province of KwaZulu-Natal, 
the provincial Constitution must make provision for the institution, role, authority and 
status of the Zulu Monarch. 17 However, as the Constitutional Court pointed out, the 
(interim) Constitution did not prescribe to the Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal how such 
provision should be made in the provincial Constitution;18 in other words, the Legislature 
was, therefore, at liberty to decide how best to provide for the Zulu Monarch. So long 
as provision was made in the provincial Constitution for the Zulu Monarch, the 
Legislature would be in full compliance with the (interim) Constitution. Thus, the Court, 
in my opinion, correctly ruled that the provisions made in the provincial Constitution in 
this regard, some of which had been objected to by the King's Council of KwaZulu-
Natal, could consequently not be said to be inconsistent with any of the provisions of 
the (interim) Constitution or the Constitutional Principles. The objections, submissions 
and recommendations made by the King's Council raised issues that should more 
properly be directed to or be dealt with by the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature and did not 
relate to the certification process. 19 
"LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES" 
The (interim) Constitution provided that, while provincial constitutions made thereunder 
should not be inconsistent with any of its provisions, including the 34 Constitutional 
Principles, a provincial constitution could "provide for legislative and executive 
structures and procedures different from those provided for in this Constitution in 
respect of a province".20 In other words, a province choosing to make and appropriately 
adopt its own constitution could, if it so chose, deviate from the provisions of the 
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(interim) Constitution and have "legislative and executive structures and procedures" 
that would distinguish it from the rest of the provinces.21 
Whatever this22 might have meant or been intended to achieve, the Court pointed out 
that the reference to "legislative and executive structures and procedures" clearly 
related to the structures and procedures which may be necessary or appropriate for the 
proper functioning of the provincial organs of government.23 It did "not relate to the 
fundamental nature and substance of the democratic state created by the interim 
Constitution nor to the substance of the legislative or executive powers of the national 
Parliament or Government or those of the provinces."24 
The Court emphasised that the provisions of the (interim) Constitution which allowed 
the provinces to make and adopt their own constitutions should not be read in isolation; 
regard ought to be had to all the provisions of the (interim) Constitution and the 
Constitutional Principles.25 If the text of a provincial constitution or any provision thereof 
was inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution or the Constitutional Principles, it would 
not pass muster and be certified by the Constitutional Court.26 This, needless to say, 
was a reaffirmation of an old principle of our common law, namely that the words of a 
statute or of any provision thereof must not only be interpreted according to their 
ordinary meaning but also in their context.27 
With specific reference to the legislative powers of the provinces,28 the Court ruled that 
a province could "not by means of the bootstraps of its own constitution confer on its 
legislature greater powers than those granted it by the interim Constitution. The same 
principle must apply, mutatis mutandis, to all other powers, of whatever nature, asserted 
by a province in the provisions of its constitution."29 
THE FATAL FLAWS IN THE KWAZULU-NATAL CONSTITUTION 
The Constitutional Court identified a few areas or aspects which prevented it from 
certifying the provincial Constitution as being consistent with the provisions of the 
(interim) Constitution and the Constitutional Principles. Three of the most important 
ones were the following: 
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Usurpation of National Powers 
The Constitutional Court identified numerous attempts on the part of the KwaZulu-Natal 
Legislature to unanimously usurp the powers of the national government. 30 The 
provincial Constitution declared in Clause 1 ( 1 ), for example, that "[the Province of 
KwaZulu Natal is a self-governing Province within the Republic of South Africa". The 
Court held that it was "clearly beyond the capacity of a provincial legislature to pass 
constitutional provisions concerning the status of a province within the Republic."31 
Of great importance was the decision of the Court to characterise our provinces as 
being fundamentally different from their counterparts in the United States of America, 
for instance.32 As creatures of the (interim) Constitution, our provinces, the Court held, 
had only those powers that were specifically conferred upon them by and under the 
(interim) Constitution; there was no provision in it which empowered a province to 
regulate its own status.33 
The Constitution of the province of KwaZulu made provision for a provincial bill of rights. 
On the face of it, as the Court pointed out, there was nothing wrong with this per se. 34 
However, the Court held that it was imperative for such a bill of rights not to be 
inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution (including the provisions of the Chapter on 
Fundamental Rights) and the Constitutional Principles.35 
From this point of view, it was held to be impermissible for a provincial bill of rights to 
be utilised to venture into territory that fell outside the legislative or executive 
competencies of the provinces. 36 As far as the Constitutional Court is concerned, 
[b]ills of rights, with the exception of provisions which may not always be 
regarded as capable of direct enforcement (such as, for example, certain types 
of provisions which have come to be known as "directive principles of state 
policy''}, are conventionally enforced by courts of law striking down or 
invalidating, for example, legislation and administrative action even when such 
power of review is not expressly granted in the constitution or bill of rights 
concerned.37 
In other words, they cannot be used for anything else. As examples of what the 
KwaZulu-Natal Legislature had done in this regard in its proposed bill of rights, the 
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Court cited reference to the right to a fair trial, labour relations and detailed provisions 
for states of emergency and their suspension which it said fell "patently outside the 
domain of competence of provincial legislatures."38 
In particular, the Constitutional Court stressed that a province would be precluded from 
incorporating any provision in its bill of rights which is "inconsistent with" any similar 
provision in Chapter 3 of the (interim) Constitution.39 This was so because, the Court 
pointed out, the provisions of Chapter 3 were expressly binding upon all legislative and 
executive organs of state "at all levels of government" and applied to all law, including 
all provincial law.40 It emphasised that: 
[a)ny provision in any provincial law, including a provincial constitution, which 
purported to limit the operation of the national bill of rights in any way would be 
in conflict with ... the interim Constitution and would not meet the section 160(3) 
inconsistency qualification.41 (my emphasis) 
The KwaZulu-Natal provincial Constitution had done precisely that; in terms of Chapter 
3, clause 30(3) thereof, the rights and freedoms recognised in and conferred by the 
(interim) Constitution would be valid in that province only if, and to the extent that, they 
were not inconsistent with the provincial Constitution. The Court pointed out that that 
bore "all the hallmarks of a hierarchical inversion."42 The provincial Constitution was 
presented as the supreme law of the province and subordinating the national (interim) 
Constitution to it. As the Court pointed out, the provincial Legislature had no power to 
do so.43 
In Chapter 5 of the provincial Constitution, the provincial Legislature had also attempted 
to give itself exclusive legislative powers, and, in certain respects, executive powers to 
its executive council. The Court found it unnecessary to consider whether that was in 
conflict with any corresponding provision of the (interim) Constitution as no province 
had any authority whatsoever to confer any legislative or executive powers upon itself. 
All such power emanated exclusively from the (interim) Constitution.44 
The KwaZulu-Natal provincial Constitution further purported to make provision for a 
provincial constitutional court with powers to declare "a law of the Province" 
unconstitutional.45 The provincial constitutional court would have exclusive jurisdiction 
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to decide on the constitutional nature of a dispute and disputes in constitutional matters 
between organs and powers "established or recognised in terms of this Constitution". 46 
Pending the establishment of such a court, its powers would be exercised by the 
provincial division of the Supreme Court. Obviously being aware that it could not 
authorise such a court to strike down any law with regard to matters falling outside the 
competence of a province, the Legislature purported to limit the enforcement of the 
KwaZulu-Natal bill of rights to the "human rights recognised and protected in this 
Constitution".47 
The Constitutional Court pointed out that, as the (interim) Constitution nowhere 
conferred "any power on a province to establish courts of law, whatever their jurisdiction 
may be",48 the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature did not have the power it purported to 
exercise in this regard. Under the (interim) Constitution, provincial and local divisions 
of the Supreme Court simply did not have the powers the provincial Legislature 
purported to be giving to the proposed provincial constitutional court, the Court held.49 
Lastly, as though the province of KwaZulu-Natal was a sovereign state, the provincial 
Constitution proclaimed that it recognised the exclusive legislative and executive 
authority or competence of the "national Government" and of Parliament over certain 
matters.50 The Constitutional Court held that, as KwaZulu-Natal was not a sovereign 
state, such assertions were inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution.51 As such, the 
provincial Legislature did not have power or authority to grant constitutional 
"recognition" to what Parliament and the national Government could or could not do.52 
The Consistency Clauses 
The provincial Constitution, as stated above, provided that, to the extent that it (ie the 
provincial Constitution) was not inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution, it was the 
supreme law of the province of KwaZulu-Natal. 53 It (ie the provincial Constitution) 
further provided that any of its (ie the provincial Constitution's) provisions, other than the 
provisions of Section 160(3) of the (interim) Constitution, which was inconsistent with 
the latter document would be of no force or effect.54 
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While the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the purpose of these clauses might 
have been to render any of the clauses of the provincial Constitution inconsistent with 
the (interim) Constitution of no force and effect, they would effectively preclude the 
Court from testing any provision in the provincial Constitution against the requirements 
of Section 160(3) of the latter document and immunise the provisions of the provincial 
Constitution from ''the obligatory discipline of constitutional certification process."55 The 
Court would, in other words, be prevented from dealing with the issue of inconsistency 
in the course of the process of certification of the provincial Constitution.56 
The Court held that provinces were only given powers to make constitutions which 
could be objectively tested by it against the (interim) Constitution and the 34 
Constitutional Principles. They could, therefore, not make constitutions that effectively 
avoided the process of certification. If any province made any provisions to that effect, 
it would be acting ultra vires its powers in terms of the (interim) Constitution.57 
The Suspensive Conditions 
In terms of the provincial Constitution, some substantial portions of it would not come 
into operation until a later date or until certain conditions were met.58 This was yet 
another device which was palpably designed to avoid the process of constitutional 
certification and its consequences. 
Having seen through this device and using the analogy of our law of contract, the Court 
held that merely to suspend part of the text of a provincial constitution that was 
inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution could not save the constitution from the 
consequence of the inconsistency.59 As the Court was, in terms of Section 160(4) of the 
(interim) Constitution, required to scrutinise the text of a provincial constitution in its 
entirety, it held that, in order to glean the meaning of the constitution, it would pierce the 
veil of the suspensive clauses and evaluate and certify, or refuse to certify, the 
document as an integrated whole.60 
Apart from the fact that some of the provisions of the provincial Constitution were in 
themselves inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution, the Constitutional Court held 
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that the text, due to the suspensive clauses, was inchoate and lacking in finality; it was 
not ripe for certification in terms of Section 160( 4) of the (interim) Constitution. 61 As the 
text left many important provisions for later determination, it was not ready for 
certification, the Court further held.62 The Court was unable, and therefore refused, to 
certify that the text of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996, as 
adopted by the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature on 15 March 1996, was not inconsistent with 
the provisions of the (interim) Constitution and the 34 Constitutional Principles.63 The 
Court instead described the provincial constitution as being fatally flawed, as a result 
of which it could not be certified under the provisions of Section 160(4) of the (interim) 
Constitution. 64 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROVINCES 
South Africa is not a federal country; it is a hybrid polity borrowing from, and thus 
exhibiting features of, both federalism and a unitary state. As stated above, the 
Constitutional Court stressed that South African provinces, unlike their US 
counterparts,65 were not states; they were created by the (interim) Constitution and 
had only those enumerated powers that were specifically and appropriately conferred 
upon them. Our constitutional system does not have a provision similar to the most 
discussed US Tenth Amendment which provides specifically that: 
[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.66 
On the contrary, in terms of the (interim) Constitution, Parliament had general plenary 
power to legislate for the whole of the Republic.67 As the Constitutional Court quite 
correctly pointed out, that plenary power was not confined to specific functional 
matters.68 It was the legislative competence of provincial legislatures that was confined 
to clearly specified functional areas.69 Our provinces could thus not have or exercise 
any power that they were not specifically and appropriately given under the (interim) 
Constitution. 
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It is noteworthy that even under the (new) Constitution, 70 though the provinces now 
have exclusive powers in certain respects,71 this configuration has not undergone any 
basic metamorphosis. 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
SOUTH AFRICA, 1996 
From the elections of 27 April 1994 the Republic of South Africa was governed and 
functioning under the (interim) Constitution, which the negotiating parties had correctly 
characterised as a historic bridge between the old constitutional order and the new.72 
In the meantime, a popularly mandated Constitutional Assembly73 drafted a new 
constitutional text74 which it had to pass within a period of two years "as from the date 
of the first sitting of the National Assembly under the" (interim) Constitution75 by a 
majority of at least two-thirds of all the members of the Constitutional Assembly. 76 It was 
a further requirement of the process of constitution-making that the new constitutional 
text had to comply with the 34 Constitutional Principles; for this purpose, a special 
process, namely certification by an independent arbiter, was established. If in any 
respect the new constitutional text did not comply with any of the Constitutional 
Principles, the Constitutional Court would not give it the necessary certification. 
THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
In In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,77 
the Constitutional Court was called upon to decide whether or not the new constitutional 
text adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in May 1996 was not inconsistent with the 
34 Constitutional Principles. Its primary responsibility in this regard was, in other words, 
to determine whether every requirement of the Constitutional Principles had been 
satisfied by the provisions of the new constitutional text and whether any provision in 
the new constitutional text conflicted with any of the Constitutional Principles.78 Stripped 
to the marrow of its bones, the test the Court had to apply was whether the provisions 
of the new text complied with the Constitutional Principles. 
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It is essential to underscore that the mandate given to the Constitutional Court in this 
regard was unique and completely unprecedented.79 The making of a new constitution 
does not fit into the category of the constitutional principle of judicial review or the role 
of the courts to review legislative and executive acts of government. This principle, 
which defines the power of the courts to "check" the legislative and executive organs 
of government, is of a more restricted nature than the certification power which was 
given to the Constitutional Court under the (interim) Constitution. 
However, it has to be pointed out that the judicial certification must have been a 
necessary corollary of the Constitutional Principles which were to constitute the basis 
of the new Constitution. Furthermore, this was unavoidable, given the nature of the 
political transition, the general mistrust and the power relations between the ANC and 
the National Party, the ruling party of those days, in particular. 
The Court emphasised that its role was a judicial, and not a political one. It had no 
power, no mandate and no right to express any view on the political choices made by 
the Constitutional Assembly in drafting the new constitutional text, unless such choices 
were relevant either to compliance or non-compliance with the Constitutional Principles. 
It had no business to adjudicate upon the wisdom or otherwise of any provision of the 
text.80 
Neither was the Court basically concerned with the methodology chosen by the 
Constitutional Assembly. 81 The Constitutional Assembly was thus at liberty to follow or 
ignore formulations used in the (interim) Constitution, provided that the new 
constitutional text remained within the boundaries set by the Constitutional Principles.82 
The Court further said that "the courts have no power to alter legislation. The power of 
the judiciary in terms of the NT remains the power to determine whether provisions of 
legislation are inconsistent with the NT or not, not to alter them in ways which it may 
consider desirable."83 (my emphasis) 
This approach came as no surprise to us: Like most courts often do when confronted 
with difficult politico-legal questions, the Constitutional Court felt constrained to 
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pronounce a disclaimer that its role in this regard was purely of a legal nature and not 
political or even politico-legal. In most democracies courts use these disclaimers and 
constant reference to their "non-political" role as an ideological device to reinforce the 
belief in the rule of law and claim impartiality even where their role is clearly semi-
political and semi-legal given the nature of the disputes they are confronted with. As 
Lord Wheatley once remarked, 
[w]hen the subject enters the political arena and becomes politically 
controversial, we assume an elective sUence on the political issues and confine 
ourselves, if we intervene at all, to constitutional or legal questions or views on 
practical matters affecting the law and its administration where our views may 
naturally be expected and sought.84 (my emphasis) 
As a result of this, the Constitutional Court bent over backwards and allowed a wide 
range of conflicting interests to make representations to it, even though this was not 
required by the Constitutional Principles.as This, despite the fact that the Court 
recognised that it was its "duty to measure each and every provision of the new 
constitution, viewed both singly and in conjunction with one another, against the stated 
Constitutional Principles, irrespective of the attitude of any interested party."a6 (my 
emphasis) This, needles to say, was a clear admission on the part of the Court that it 
was aware of the various vested political and socio-economic interests, the aspirations 
of which it had to take into account in the certification process. 
THE COURT'S APPROACH TO ITS WORK 
The Court suggested that there were two essential questions to be answered before 
deciding whether to certify the new constitutional text. These were, first, whether the 
basic structures and premises of the new text were compatible with the Constitutional 
Principles and (if so), second, whether the details of the text complied with the 
Constitutional Principles.a7 
The Structures and Premises of the New Text 
Though the Court eventually refused to certify the new constitutional text as being not 
inconsistent with the Constitutional Principles, it acknowledged that the text itself 
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represented "a monumental achievement."88 It concluded that the text satisfied the basic 
structures and premises of the new constitution contemplated in the Constitutional 
Principles.89 
It stated categorically that it was not necessary for the Constitutional Assembly to repeat 
the same structures and protections that were contained in the (interim) Constitution. 
Variations and alternatives, additions and even omissions were iegitimate as long as 
the discipline enjoined by the Constitutional Principles was respected.90 This was also 
the general view at the Constitutional Assembly. In fact, in the initial phases of the 
constitution-making process some parties and participants openly "avoided" the 
(interim) Constitution. 
Compatibility with the Constitutional Principles 
For the Court, the question as to whether or not the new text was not inconsistent with 
the Constitutional Principles was a separate one. It declared that, for this purpose, the 
test was simply whether the provisions of the new text complied with the Constitutional 
Principles. That meant that the provisions of the text should not be inconsistent with any 
of the Constitutional Principles and should give effect to all of them.91 
To determine whether the provisions of the text complied with the Constitutional 
Principles, each of its provisions and each of the Constitutional Principles had to be 
interpreted so that a meaning could be given to each of them. However, the Court 
emphasised that the Constitutional Assembly was at liberty to structure the new 
constitutional text in any way it chose, as long it did not transgress the fundamental 
discipline of the Constitutional Principles. For, as the Court pointed out, the issue as to 
which of several permissible models should be adopted was not an issue for 
adjudication by it.92 The wisdom or correctness of that choice was not a matter for 
decision by the Court, it held. It was concerned exclusively with whether the choices 
made by the Constitutional Assembly complied with the Constitutional Principles, and 
not with the merits of the choices.93 
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INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
The Court held that the purposive and teleological approach to interpretation should be 
followed in interpreting the Constitutional Principles;94 any other interpretation which 
would avoid the purpose of the constitution-making process should be avoided.95 The 
purpose of the process was as stated in the first paragraph of the preamble to the 
(interim) Constitution, namely "to create a new order" based on "a sovereign and 
democratic constitutional state" in which "all citizens" are "able to enjoy and exercise 
their fundamental rights and freedoms". 96 
Of particular note was the Court's emphasis that the Constitutional Principles.as "broad 
constitutional strokes on the canvas of constitution making", should not be interpreted 
with technical rigidity.97 For this purpose, the Court held that the 34 Constitutional 
Principles must be read holistically with an integrated approach. None of them should 
be read in isolation from the rest which would give it meaning and context.98 For, at the 
end of the day, the critical question was not just the meaning, but the purpose and 
effect of the new constitutional text. 
None of the Constitutional Principles should be read in a manner that involved conflict 
with another, the Court further held. The lawmaker had intended that each of the 34 
Constitutional Principles should live together with the others so as to give them life, form 
and nuance.99 The meaning of each one of them could, in other words, be determined 
by looking at it in its context, namely the Constitutional Principles as a whole. 
Lastly in this regard, the Court held that when testing a particular provision of the new 
constitutional text, it was necessary to give such a provision a meaning. 100 Of particular 
note was the Court's decision that where more than one permissible meaning could be 
reasonably supported, it would be proper to adopt the interpretation giving to the new 
constitutional text "a construction that would make it consistent with the CPs."101 (my 
emphasis) 
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That the Court was aware of the importance and implications of this statement was 
demonstrated by the paragraph following the one in which it was contained. However, 
in my view, the position, though based on a subjective approach, was a correct one, for, 
as Barry L Strayer put it, 
courts must often form an opinion as to what they think the constitution ought to 
mean. This should not be the first consideration, but it will often be necessary 
where the text, as interpreted in the light of its history and context, is still 
ambiguous or silent and there are no meaningful precedents for guidance. Such 
decisions involve resort to some desideratum which the court perceives to be 
implicit in the constitution, and thus they may be seen as based on the non-
factual element of constitutional policy. 102 
In the final analysis, the new constitutional text must be able to stand the greater test 
of time. In interpreting it, the Court must, therefore, not be confined to its bare language 
but should be prepared, where and when necessary, to look at the surrounding factual 
context in which the text will, and must, operate to see if the essential values of our 
nascent constitutional system as encapsulated in the 34 Constitutional Principles were 
being respected. 
THE NEW BILL OF RIGHTS 
An important component of the new constitutional text was the Bill of Rights that would 
be constitutionally safeguarded and enforceable by the Courts of the land. The Bill of 
Rights was intended to be a means to enable everyone to enjoy al/ universally accepted 
fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties. 103 It was an important provision of the 
(interim) Constitution that such a bill of rights should "be drafted after having given due 
consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of this 
Constitution."104 The Constitutional Court's conclusion, after a careful scrutiny of the Bill 
of Rights, was that it was in general as extensive as any bill of rights to be found in any 
national constitution. 105 
In the course of analysing the Bill of Rights the Constitutional Court focused on two 
critical phrases used in Constitutional Principle II. These were "universally accepted" 
and "fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties". 
Penuell M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 434 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
"Universally Accepted" 
Though the Court forswore a strict literal interpretation of the word "universal", it 
acknowledged that its use established a strict test.106 From this it concluded that the 
drafters of the Constitutional Principles clearly intended that only those rights that have 
gained a wide measure of international acceptance as fundamental human rights must 
necessarily be included in the new constitutional text. 107 An obvious casualty of this 
approach was the so-called freedom of economic activity, 108 which was incorporated in 
the (interim) Constitution as a compromise with, and a concession to, the National 
Party. 
The Constitutional Assembly merely had to ensure that such "universally accepted 
fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties" were incorporated in the Bill of Rights. 
It clearly did not have an obligation to duplicate or match the rights and freedoms 
contained in Chapter 3 of the (interim) Constitution. It merely had to give due 
consideration to them, among other things. Whatever that vague formulation meant, the 
Constitutional Assembly did not have to do anything more than show that it had indeed 
given due consideration to the Chapter 3 rights. 109 
The Constitutional Court emphasised that it was certainly not for it, as a Court of law, 
but for the CA, the duly mandated agent of the electorate, to determine - within 
the boundaries of the CPs - which provisions to include in the Bill of Rights and 
which not. 110 
"Fundamental Rights, Freedoms and Civil Liberties" 
The Court held that this phrase, which encapsulated "those rights and freedoms 
recognised in open and democratic societies as being the inalienable entitlements of 
human beings", should not be read disjunctively. 111 Understood as such, the phrase 
referred to "a composite idea that is firmly established in human rights jurisprudence"112 
and conveyed nothing new as such. 
Under the rubric of "fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties", the Constitutional 
Assembly could, if it chose to, incorporate a whole range of rights and freedoms as 
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[t]here is ... no finite list of such rights and freedoms. Even among democratic 
societies what is recognised as fundamental rights and freedoms varies in both 
subject and formulation from country to country, from constitution to constitution, 
and from time to time.113 
As the Court pointed out, the "universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and 
civil liberties" required by the Constitutional Principles to be incorporated in the new 
constitutional text constituted a narrower group of rights than the group of rights in 
Chapter 3 of the (interim) Constitution.114 The Chapter 3 rights and freedoms, it will be 
recalled, went beyond the "universally accepted" norm which was prescribed for the 
new bill of rights. Beyond that prescription the Constitutional Assembly was at liberty to 
formulate rights more generously and even to establish new rights in the process of 
constitution-making. 
The Constitutional Assembly, as stated above, had no obligation to duplicate or match 
the Chapter 3 rights and freedoms; the drafters of the (interim) Constitution "expressly 
did not bind it to draft a bill of rights identical to that in the IC."115 It could thus, by the 
same token, also reduce the rights and freedoms in the new constitutional text to the 
bare minimum, namely the "universally accepted", without offending the Constitutional 
Principles. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED BILL OF RIGHTS 
Though the Constitutional Court had come to the conclusion that the Bill of Rights was 
as extensive as any that could be found in a democracy, and was thus in full 
compliance with the Constitutional Principles, it nonetheless had to determine whether 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights were not inconsistent with the Constitutional 
Principles. This was due to the fact that there were certain objections to its provisions. 
Some of these were the following: 
Horizontal Application 
The debate as to whether Chapter 3 of the (interim) Constitution was applicable 
horizontally compelled the drafters of the new constitutional text to incorporate in the 
new Bill of Rights Clause 8(2) which provided that: 
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[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic persons if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and of any 
duty imposed by the right. 116 (my emphasis) 
The basic objection to this Clause of the new constitutional text was that it would 
impose obligations upon persons other than organs of state. This, it was argued, was 
not a universally accepted proposition. However, the Constitutional Court held that 
nothing in Constitutional Principle II per se prevented the Constitutional Assembly from 
including in the new Bill of Rights provisions which are not universally accepted. 117 In 
other words, the Constitutional Assembly was at liberty to go beyond the "universally 
accepted" norm, so long as it incorporated universally accepted fundamental rights, 
freedoms and civil liberties in the Bill of Rights. 
The second ground of objection was that a clause allowing for horizontal application 
of the Bill of Rights would violate a basic tenet of our constitutional system, namely 
separation of powers, and thus be inconsistent with Constitutional Principle VI. The gist 
of this argument was that horizontality would allow the courts to encroach upon the 
sacred terrain of the legislature by allowing them to "alter" legislation and the common 
law. Needless to say, the Constitutional Court rejected this spurious argument which 
"failed to acknowledge that the courts have always been the sole arm of government 
responsible for the developmet of the common law", and suggested that the courts 
could use the power of judicial review and "alter" legislation in ways they might consider 
desirable. 118 
It was further argued that Clause 8(2) of the new constitutional text would impose upon 
the courts a task to balance competing rights which, it was said, was not a judicial 
function. This argument too was rejected as our courts will often be required to balance 
competing rights even where the bill of rights does not bind natural and juristic persons. 
No Constitutional Principle was violated by the fact that this task might have to be 
performed in circumstances where a private individual is affected. 119 
Lastly in this regard, it was argued that this Clause would impose obligations upon 
individual persons who were entitled to be beneficiaries only of "universally accepted 
fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties". This, it was suggested, would 
culminate in a diminution of their rights which was not envisaged in Constitutional 
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Principle II. The Court rejected this argument and held that Constitutional Principle II 
would not necessarily be violated with a horizontal application as its provisions implicitly 
recognised 
that even if only the state is bound, rights confe"ed upon individuals will 
justifiably be limited in order to recognise the rights of others in certain 
circumstances. 120 (my emphasis) 
Juristic Persons as Opposed to Natural Persons 
It was argued that Clause 8(4) of the new constitutional text, which provided that 
"U]uristic persons are entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by 
the nature of the rights and of the juristic persons", 121 violated Constitutional Principle 
II which catered only for natural persons as signified in the utilisation of the word 
"everyone" therein. The Court quite rightly rejected that argument and demonstrated 
that many "universally accepted fundamental rights", such as freedom of speech, 
applied to natural persons as well as to juristic persons. 122 As for the Court, the issue 
thus turned on the nature of the right and the nature of the juristic person concerned. 123 
Another objection was that giving rights to powerful and wealthy corporations, which 
presumably have ernomous resources which can be deployed to assert and defend 
their rights, would be detrimental to individual rights. Noting that "the same could be 
said of powerful and wealthy individuals", the Court rejected this bizarre objection which, 
it observed, wrongly equated juristic persons with powerful and wealthy corporations. 124 
In a nutshell, Clause 8(4) of the new constitutional text did not violate any of the 
Constitutional Principles and was, therefore, not invalid. 
The Right to Bodily Integrity 
Clause 12(2) of the new constitutional text provided that "[e]veryone has the right to 
bodily and psychological integrity". As such, everyone has the right, inter alia, "to make 
decisions concerning reproduction". 125 
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This innovation, according to members of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, is of 
great importance in the development of our human rights jurisprudence. They argued 
that the new constitutional text goes beyond a broad and vague guarantee of ''freedom 
and security of the person". 126 In our situation in particular, they contended, 
[iJt is important to have the subset of 'bodily and psychological integrity' in order 
to make it clear to the interpreting courts that the right to freedom and security 
of the person encompasses more than due process concerns.127 
It is my humble submission that this innovation so-called was unnecessary as the 
international tendency, 128 in any event, has been to give the widest possible, and 
therefore most effective, meaning to the concept of "freedom and security of the 
person". In 1923 the US Supreme Court, for instance, had already said in Meyer v 
Nebraska 129 that the concept of freedom or liberty includes 
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children [and] to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men. 
Be that as it may, this clause attracted an objection on the grounds that it would open 
the way to abortion. The Court rightly refused to be drawn into the sterile debate on 
abortion 130 as its primary responsiblity in this regard was to determine whether the new 
constitutional text did not violate any of the 34 Constitutional Principles. 131 It once again 
reiterated its recognition of the right and the wide discretion of the Constitutional 
Assembly to determine which rights should be included in the new constitutional text 
and how they should be formulated. 132 
In response to the suggestion that the Constitutional Assembly had violated 
Constitutional Principle II by not including the provisions of Section 33(1 )(b) of the 
(interim) Constitution which provided that any limitation of a right "may not negate the 
essential content of the right", the Court reiterated that the Constitutional Assembly had 
no obligation to repeat the provisions of the (interim) Constitution; it merely had to 
incorporate in the new constitutional text all "universally accepted fundamental 
rights". 133 This requirement, according to the Court, had not been breached. 
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Labour Relations 
In this regard, the Court dealt with two objections to Clause 23 of the new constitutional 
text, namely that the clause violated Constitutional Principles 11 134 and XXVlll. 135 
The Right to Strike and the Right to Lock Out 
The main complaint of the objectors in this regard was that, whereas the employees' 
right to strike had been provided for expressly in the new constitutional text, the 
employers' right to lock employees out had not been expressly recognised therein. This, 
it should be pointed out, was a basic departure from the (interim) Constitution which 
recognised and protected the right to strike and simultaneously insulated the employers' 
right to lock out employees.136 
Io this objection, the Court, while conceding that collective bargaining entails a right on 
the part of those who engage in it to exercise some economic power against their 
adversaries, quite correctly pointed out that the Constitutional Principles did not 
prescribe any particular mechanism for the exercise of economic power by employers 
and employees. It was sufficient for the purposes of Constitutional Principle XXVlll that 
the right to bargain collectively was specifically protected. 137 
Another objection was that by including the right to strike in the new constitutional text 
and omitting the right to lock out, the employers' right to collective bargaining was 
accorded less status than that of employees to engage in collective bargaining. The 
Court, needless to say, rejected this argument and correctly pointed out that the 
employers' right to engage in collective bargaining was expressly guaranteed in the new 
constitutional text. 138 
Of great importance in this regard is the fact that the Court recognised that, in reality, 
workers and their employers are not equal; whereas workers have only one form of 
economic power they can resort to by way of collective bargaining, employers have a 
whole panoply of weapons to choose from. It rejected the notion that the right to lock 
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out is equivalent to the right to strike and its corollary that in order to treat employers 
and employees equally, both rights should be included in the new constitutional text. 139 
Our law has thus been brought into line with numerous constitutional systems in which 
only the right to strike, and not the right to lock out, is entrenched as a fundamental 
right.140 The employers' right to lock out employees is, at the same time, appropriately 
located and protected in Chapter 4 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, 141 the provisions 
of which, as the Court pointed out, will always be subject to constitutional scrutiny to 
ensure that the rights of workers and employers as entrenched in the new constitutional 
text are honoured. 142 The inclusion of the right to strike and the (deliberate) omission of 
the right to lock out does not necessarily imply that legislation protecting and regulating 
the latter within the framework of the new constitutional text will be (automatically) 
unconstitutional, the Court pointed out. 143 
With regard to the objection that the omission of the right to lock out violated 
Constitutional Principle II, the Court held that: 
[i]t . . . cannot be said that the right of employers to lock out workers is a 
universally accepted fundamental right as contemplated by CP II. The right to 
lock out is recognised in only a handful of national constitutions and is not 
entrenched in any of the major international conventions concerned with labour 
relations. It cannot be said, therefore, that the omission from NT 23 of a right to 
lock out is in conflict with CP 11. 144 (my italics) 
The Right to Bargain Collectively 
It was also argued that Clause 23 of the new constitutional text violated Constitutional 
Principle XXVlll in that it recognised and entrenched only the right of employers' 
associations to bargain collectively, and not that of individual employers. This objection 
succeeded, the Court held, because the Constitutional Assembly had failed to 
recognise that, unlike workers, "[i]ndividual employers ... can engage in collective 
bargaining with their workers and often do so."145 
This, in my view, is correct. 146 Moreover, in reality, when workers, for any reason 
(legitimate or otherwise), resort to industrial action, the response, in the form of 
negotiations, normally comes from one employer, their employer, and not necessarily 
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from an association or organisation of employers. Thus, it is proper to recognise an 
individual employer's right to bargain (ie negotiate) collectively with his/her/its 
employees. 
Property 
In response to the averment that Clause 25 of the new constitutional text did not 
expressly entrench the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property as did the (interim) 
Constitution, the Court held that the right to property is not a universally accepted 
fundamental right as required in Constitutional Principle II. It further noted that several 
recognised democracies, such as Canada and New Zealand, made no constitutional 
provision for the protection of property. The negative formulation contained in Clause 
25 appeared to be widely accepted as an appropriate formulation of the right to 
property. No universal formulation existed; Constitutional Principle II was thus not 
violated by the negative formulation in the new constitutional text.147 
With regard to the provisions of the property clause dealing with expropriation and 
compensation, the Court held that there was no universally accepted approach. 
Therefore, the approach taken in Clause 25 could not be said to flout any universally 
accepted approach to the question. 148 The Court's response to the objections that the 
clause made no provision for mineral rights or intellectual property rights was similar; 
it held that mention of mineral rights or rights to intellectual property in a property clause 
could not be said to be a universally accepted fundamental practice, 149 and that, 
therefore, Clause 25 was not flawed in this regard too. 
Socio-economic Rights 
The new constitutional text gave recognition to socio-economic rights such as the right 
to housing, health, food, water, social security and basic education. The Court found 
nothing wrong with the decision of the Constitutional Assembly "to supplement the 
universally accepted fundamental rights with other rights not universally accepted", 150 
such as these socio-economic rights. 
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It further held that the inclusion of such rights in the new constitutional text did not 
necessarily entail a breach of the principle of separation of powers. 151 Of particular note 
was its recognition that socio-economic rights are not totally non-justiciable. It declared 
that it was of the view that: 
these rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable . ... many of the civil and 
political rights entrenched in the NT will give rise to ... budgetary implications 
without compromising their justiciability. The fact that socio-economic rights will 
almost inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar 
to their justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be 
negatively protected from improper invasion.152 (my italics) 
This approach on the part of the Constitutional Court has laid to rest once and for all the 
debate that raged for some time on this issue.153 Those who, like the South African Law 
Commission,154 (the late) AS Mathews155 and Didcott J,156 argued that socio-economic 
rights should not be accorded constitutional recognition on par with civil and political 
rights as they are not justiciable and impose onerous obligations upon the fiscus have 
obviously lost the battle. 
Furthermore, our human rights jurisprudence has effectively been liberated from the 
time warp which had stopped the development of history at the time of laissez-faire. It 
is now acknowledged at the level of the Constitutional Court 157 that the State, which has 
over time enlarged its reach and responsibility into the economy and the welfare of the 
people, has certain obligations "to break those economic, cultural and de facto barriers 
that make the legal system and its rights and guarantees a remote, unfulfilled promise 
for all those who, because of poverty ... are alienated from the official system, the 
courts, the administrative agencies, the legislatures, indeed, the schools."158 
THE PROSECUTING AUTHORITY 
The new constitutional text introduced a new prosecuting authority for the Republic, 
thus, subject to the new constitutional text, 159 replacing the offices of attorneys-
general.160 This new prosecuting authority must consist of a National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, who must be the head of the authority and must be appointed by the 
President of the Republic. 161 It must also consist of Directors of Public Prosecutions 162 
and prosecutors as determined by an Act of Parliament. 163 
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The Constitutional Court rejected the objection to the introduction of the new 
prosecuting authority as it was not in breach of any of the 34 Constitutional Principles, 
in particular Constitutional Principle Vl.164 In rejecting the objection, the Court quite 
correctly pointed out that: 
[t]he prosecuting authority is not part of the judiciary ... in any event, even if it 
were part of the judiciary, the mere fact that the appointment of the head of the 
national prosecuting authority is made by the President does not in itself 
contravene the doctrine of separation of powers.165 (my emphasis) 
The Court recognised the right of the Constitutional Assembly to choose the model to 
be adopted for the prosecuting authority in the new constitutional text.166 It held that the 
choice that was made was not inconsistent with any of the 34 Constitutional 
Principles. 167 
It is worthy of note that, under the new prosecuting system, a decision to prosecute or 
not to prosecute is reviewable by the National Director of Public Prosecutions. 168 Thus, 
a Director of Public Prosecutions will, for example, no longer be able simply to issue a 
certificate no/le prosequi and bring a criminal matter to an end; the matter may be 
reopened by or at the instance of the National Director of Public Prosecutions. 
Lastly in this regard, prosecutions have now been centralised. Prosecution policy must 
be determined at the national level "with the concurrence of the Cabinet member 
responsible for the administration of justice" and after consultation with the Directors of 
Public Prosecutions responsible for prosecutions in their respective jurisdictions.169 The 
National Director of Public Prosecutions may intervene in any prosecution process if the 
policy directives he or she issues are not complied with. 170 
Moreover, the new constitutional text provides explicitly that 
[t]he Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must exercise 
final responsibility over the prosecuting authority.171 (my italics) 
Thus, unlike attorneys-general, 172 unless an Act of Parliament provides otherwise, the 
new prosecuting authority will not be directly accountable to Parliament. It will be 
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subject to the control and directions of the Minister of Justice as was theoretically the 
case before the repeal 173 of Section 3(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 174 
The Court, after rejecting the objection to the choice made by the Constitutional 
Assembly, reassured us that there is no cause for concern or fear for 
NT 179(4) provides that the national legislation must ensure that the prosecuting 
authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. There is 
accordingly a constitutional guarantee of independence, and any legislation or 
executive action inconsistent therewith would be subject to constitutional control 
by the courts. 175 
IMMUNISING LEGISLATION FROM CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY 
An attempt was made under Clause 241 ( 1) of the new constitutional text to, for 
example, protect the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 1995176 from 
constitutional scrutiny. The clause provided that the provisions of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995, would remain valid until they were either amended or repealed, despite the 
new constitutional text. 
The Court held that this attempt violated Constitutional Principles IV and VII in particular 
and flew in the face of the supremacy of the new constitutional text. If allowed, it would 
impermissibly shield an ordinary statute from constitutional review without making it part 
of the new constitutional text. 177 This was more or less something which the Province 
of KwaZulu-Natal had attempted to do by means of the suspended parts of its draft 
Constitution. 
This has established a very important principle: Parliament or any legislative authority 
is not allowed under our constitutional system to shield any statute from constitutional 
review. In my view, our system will not allow us even to resort to the Canadian 
formula 178 which, according to Barry L Strayer,179 allows to Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures a legislative override of certain fundamental freedoms (such as speech, 
belief, press, assembly and association). 180 
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
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The Court also had to decide whether the provisions of Clause 7 4 of the new 
constitutional text complied with the requirements of Constitutional Principle XV which 
prescribed "special procedures involving special majorities" for the amendment of the 
new constitutional text. It found that, while the requirement of "special majorities" had 
indeed been met, the requirement of "special procedures" had not.181 
The Court pointed out that, for example, only the National Assembly and no other 
House of Parliament could be involved in the amendment of the ordinary provisions of 
the new constitutional text; no special period of notice was required; and that 
constitutional amendments could be introduced as part of other draft legislation. 182 It 
thus held that the absence of relevant procedures was tantamount to a failure to comply 
with the requirements of Constitutional Principle XV. 183 
Entrenchment of the Bill of Rights 
The Court further found that the Bill of Rights was not sufficiently entrenched as 
required in terms of Constitutional Principle 11. It regarded the notion of entrenchment 
in the Constitution as requiring a more stringent protection than that which was 
accorded to the ordinary provisions of the new constitutional text. Though it was not 
ready to prescribe to the Constitutional Assembly what the form and content of the 
special entrenchment mechanism ought to be, the Court held that "the drafters of CP 
II required that the provisions of the Bill of Rights, given their vital nature and purpose, 
be safeguarded by special amendment procedures against easy abridgement."184 A two-
thirds majority of one House of Parliament as was initially proposed in the new 
constitutional text would not constitute the bulwark envisaged by Constitutional Principle 
11, it further held.185 
INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS 
The Court was also called upon to determine whether the independence and impartiality 
of independent institutions, such as the Public Service Commission, the Reserve Bank, 
the Auditor-General and the Public Protector, were appropriately provided for and 
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adequately safeguarded in the new constitutional text as was required in terms of 
Constitutional Principle XXIX. For this purpose, the Court dealt with each one of such 
institutions separately, in each case looking at factors such as appointment to, tenure 
of, and removal from, office. 186 
Public Protector 
The institution of the Public Protector was introduced to the South African legal system 
by the (interim) Constitution.187 This was an important innovation in the country's 
attempt to protect the hard-won fundamental rights and freedoms of persons. Prior to 
that, the Republic had the office of the Advocate-General188 which was by no means an 
ombudsman in the classical sense and which, instead, constituted "a kind of special 
purpose ombudsman possessing many of the forms of an ordinary ombudsman but only 
a very limited jurisdiction."189 Moreover, as the South African Law Commission pointed 
out, the procedure for appointing the Advocate-General was contrary to one of the most 
basic characteristics of an ombudsman since the Advocate-General was appointed by 
the executive authority and not by the legislature or at least with the prior approval of 
the majority of the legislature.190 However, even if this procedure had been followed at 
the time, given the majority of the National Party in the tri-cameral Parliament and the 
dominance of the Executive, the outcome of that would have been merely cosmetic. 
Under the (interim) Constitution 191 the Public Protector could be removed from office 
only by the President on the grounds of misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence, as 
determined by a joint committee of Parliament and upon receipt of an address from both 
the national Assembly and the Senate requesting his or her removal. The relevance of 
this will soon become apparent as we grapple with the Court's refusal to certify that 
some of the terms of the provisions of the new constitutional text complied with the 
requirement of Constitutional Principle XXIX in respect of the Public Protector. 
Against this background, the Court was obviously even more watchful when scrutinising 
the provisions of Clauses 181(2),192 183, 193 193 and 194194 of the new constitutional text. 
In an otherwise strange way, it concluded that the provisions governing the removal of 
the Public Protector from office did not meet the standard demanded by Constitutional 
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Principle XXIX. 195 According to the Court, though Constitutional Principle XXIX itself was 
silent on this question, it thought that, because "[t]he independence and impartiality of 
the Public Protector will be vital to ensuring effective, accountable and responsible 
government", 196 the provision in Clause 194 that the Public Protector could be removed 
from office by resolution of a simple majority constituted inadequate protection. 197 
Auditor-General 
This was not a new institution. It had existed even under apartheid. The influence of the 
(interim) Constitution 198 was clear when the Court refused to certify that the provisions 
of the new constitutional text complied with the requirements of Constitutional Principle 
XXIX in respect of the Auditor-General. 199 To it, due to the importance of the office in 
ensuring openness, accountability and propriety in the use of public funds, the dismissal 
provisions affecting the Auditor-General were not sufficient to meet the requirements 
of the Constitutional Principle.200 It concluded that more stringent dismissal 
requirements than were provided for were required. 201 
The Public Service Commission 
The Court also had occasion to evaluate the provisions of Clauses 196 and 197202 of 
the new constitutional text and determine whether Constitutional Principles XX, XXIX 
and XXX.1 had been complied with. It observed that, while Clause 196 made provision 
for a public service commission, its powers were not dealt with in the new constitutional 
text.203 Though acknowledging that all that was required was an independent and 
impartial public service commission, the Court concluded that it could not certify that 
Constitutional Principle XXIX had been complied with. It said that the defect lay in, inter 
alia, the fact that the functions and powers of the public service commission were not 
provided for in the new constitutional text and that it was not clear from the text what 
protection the commission would have in order to ensure that it would be able to 
discharge its constitutional duties independently and impartially.204 Once again, the 
influence of the (interim) Constitution was clear in this regard. 205 
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Furthermore, while it acknowledged that there was no requirement in the Constitutional 
Principles that there be provincial public service commissions,206 it would appear that, 
on the face of it, the Court nonetheless thought that the new text should have made 
provision for such commissions because ''the powers of the national sphere of 
government and of the PSC in respect of provincial administrations are relevant to an 
evaluation of the autonomy and powers of the provinces."207 It observed that the notion 
that there should be only one public service commission was a clear departure from the 
provisions of the (interim) Constitution which empowered the provinces to establish 
their own provincial public service commissions (ie if they so chose) as the new (single) 
Public Service Commission was intended to replace both the then existing Public 
Service Commission and the provincial service commissions. 208 It refused to certify that 
the relevant Constitutional Principles were complied with without knowing what control 
the provinces would have over appointments to and the staffing of provincial 
administrations. 209 
Could it be that the Court saw through, and thus foiled, a veiled attempt on the part of 
the national government to arrogate to itself the power over appointments to and the 
staffing of the public service in general? Could it be that, had the Court not done so, it 
would have allowed the national government to exercise its powers so as to encroach 
upon the institutional integrity of the provinces in flagrant violation of Constitutional 
Principle XXll? Could it be that it would also have allowed for a substantial reduction of 
the powers of the provinces to establish their own public service commissions, 210 which 
would have constituted a glaring violation of Constitutional Principle XVlll.2?211 
For the Court, everything in this regard turned on who had the power to make the 
appointments to the public service in respect of provincial administrations.212 It did not 
matter so much that the provinces would no longer have the power to establish their 
own public service commissions (if they so chose), 213 for 
[i]fthe PSC has advisory, investigatory and reporting powers which apply equally 
to the national and provincial governments, and the provinces remain free to take 
decisions in regard to the appointment of their own employees within the 
framework of uniform norms and standards, the changes will neither infringe 
upon their autonomy, nor reduce their powers. But if the provinces are deprived 
of the ability to take such decisions themselves, that would have a material 
bearing on these matters.214 (my emphasis) 
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The Court held that the mere fact that the new constitutional text made provision for a 
single national public service commission did not mean that the legitimate autonomy of 
the provinces would necessarily be impaired or, for that matter, that their powers would 
be reduced. 215 It opined that adequate provision had been made for the provinces to 
make a contribution to the work of a single national public service commission which 
would be subject to national legislation made in conjunction with the National Council 
of Provinces. 216 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The Court observed in this regard that the new constitutional text gave more autonomy 
direct to local government structures than did the (interim) Constitution. The Court 
further observed, however, that the fact that the autonomy of such structures derived 
directly from the new constitutional text entailed a diminution in provincial powers and 
functions in so far as they pertained to the role of local government.217 
Be that as it may, the Court had to determine whether the provisions of the new text 
which dealt with the issue of local government complied with the requirements of the 
relevant Constitutional Principles. In terms of Constitutional Principle XXIV, a framework 
for local government powers, functions and structures was required to be provided for 
in the new text. The Court held that, at the very least, this requirement necessitated the 
setting out in the new text of different categories of local government that could be 
established by the provinces and a framework for their structures. Such a framework 
also required an indication of how local government executives were to be appointed, 
how local government decisions were to be taken, as well as an indication of the formal 
legislative procedures demanded by Constitutional Principle X. Providing only for one 
local government type and structure, as did the provisions of Clause 151, was 
inadequate. For its failure to grapple with this properly, the Court would not certify that 
that clause complied with the requirements of Constitutional Principles X and XXIV. 218 
Furthermore, Constitutional Principle XXV required that the local government framework 
the Court thought was envisaged in Constitutional Principle XXIV should "make 
provision for appropriate fiscal powers and functions for different categories of local 
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government." As no provision was made for such powers and functions in the new text, 
the Court refused to certify that Clause 229 complied with the requirements of 
Constitutional Principle XXV. 
PROVINCIAL POWERS 
As stated earlier on, Constitutional Principle XVlll.2 provided that the powers and 
functions of the nine provinces as defined in the new text, including the competence of 
a provincial legislature to adopt a constitution for its province, should not be 
substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in the (interim) 
Constitution. That, according to the Court, was a guarantee that provincial powers and 
functions would not be substantially reduced by the provisions of the new text.219 
For this purpose, a comparison between the structures, powers and functions of the 
provinces provided for under the (interim) Constitution and those provided for under 
the new text was necessary. The Court observed that in the application of Constitutional 
Principle XVlll.2, there were of necessity two enquiries: Were the powers, functions and 
status of the provinces in terms of the new text less than or inferior to those provided 
for in the (interim) Constitution? If not, that would be the end of the enquiry in that 
respect. If, however, they were indeed less or inferior, the second question should be 
whether they were substantially less or substantially inferior.220 
To achieve the objective of this exercise, the Court looked at a whole range of 
questions dealt with briefly below, to the extent that it is necessary to do so. 
The National Council of Provinces 
The starting point for the Court was to determine whether the National Council of 
Provinces,221 which replaced the Senate,222 was superior or inferior in status and power 
to the Senate as an institution. To achieve that objective, it had to distinguish the 
powers, functions and status of the Senate, through which the provinces expressed 
their input in the national and political institutions of the Republic under the (interim) 
Constitution, from the corresponding powers, functions and status of the National 
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Council of Provinces through which that input was to be made under the new 
constitutional text. 
For this purpose, it first contrasted how the Senate was composed223 to how the 
National Council of Provinces would be composed. Due to the fact that Senators were 
nominated by their parties, and not by their provinces, the Court concluded that the 
representation of the provinces in the Senate was indirect and weak.224 As an institution, 
the Senate, the Court held, was more a House in which party political interests were 
represented than a House in which provincial interests were represented.225 
The next question the Court considered was the role played by the Senate in the 
making of national legislation as opposed to the role the National Council of Provinces 
would play in this regard. It noted that, for instance, whereas all parliamentary bills had 
to be presented to the Senate for consideration, and that whereas the Senate had a 
veto in certain respects, the new text provided that a dissent in the National Council of 
Provinces could be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. In 
certain matters where a joint sitting of the National Assembly and the Senate was 
required under the (interim) Constitution the new text would empower the National 
Assembly to take decisions on its own. Unlike the Senate,226 the National Council of 
Provinces would not participate in the election or impeachment of the President. Neither 
would the National Council of Provinces have the power to refer bills to the 
Constitutional Court.227 As the Court observed, in some respects the Senate had greater 
power than the National Council of Provinces; in other respects it had less.228 
However, though the Court was satisfied that the structure and functioning of the 
National Council of Provinces as provided for in the new text were better suited to the 
representation of provincial interests than the structure and functioning of the Senate, 
it could not conclude from this that the collective interests of the provinces would 
necessarily be enhanced by the changes thus effected.229 As there were rather too 
many uncertainties and variables in this regard,230 though the Court was satisfied that 
there had been no reduction in the collective powers of the provinces, it was unable to 
conclude that there had been a measurable enhancement of such powers either. 231 
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It is notewothy that, in this regard, certification was not refused on the basis that the 
relevant provisions of the new text failed to comply with the requirements of a 
Constitutional Principle, to wit Constitutional Principle XVlll.2, but purely on the basis 
that the new text would not effect a measurable enhancement of the coHective powers 
of the provinces. The Court did not suggest that the structure, powers and functions of 
the provinces were in any way whatever substantially reduced by the changes that the 
new text sought to effect. To me this smacks of a departure on the part of the Court 
from its chosen path, namely to enquire whether or not the whole of the new text or 
portions thereof failed to comply with any of the requirements of the 34 Constitutional 
Principles.232 At the same time, of course, the Court's analysis of the differences 
between the Senate and the National Council of Provinces was a useful and helpful 
exercise. 
The Legislative Powers of the Provinces 
The Court compared the legislative powers the provinces had under the (interim) 
Constitution and those the new text sought to confer upon them. In the course of this 
exercise, it observed that more powers were given to the provinces in the sense that 
a category of exclusive legislative powers was introduced by the new text. 233 However, 
with regard to concurrent legislative powers the Court pointed out that the new text 
sought to impose an onerous presumption of necessity in favour of the national 
government.234 Furthermore, it noted that an override in favour of national legislation 
was imposed to ensure uniformity, by establishing "frameworks" or "national policies" 
for example. 235 
Upon comparing the lists of the powers of the provinces under the (interim) 
Constitution and those under the new text, the Court found that there was an increase 
of the powers of the provinces under the new text "only to a marginal degree."236 The 
Court also observed that none of the functional areas set out in Schedule 6 to the 
(interim) Constitution had been excluded. 237 However, after a long survey of the 
content of the powers and functions of the provinces, it came to the conclusion that the 
powers and functions of the provinces under the new text were in some instances, albeit 
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to varying degrees, less than, and inferior to, those which the provinces had and 
enjoyed under the (interim) Constitution.238 
Having come to this conclusion, the Court had to consider whether there was a 
substantial reduction of the powers and functions of the provinces under the new text. 
For this purpose, it linked this question to the fact that in the new constitutional text the 
issues relating to the powers of the provinces in regard to the appointment of their own 
employees, as well as the powers and functions of the national public service 
commission, had not been clarified. It also considered that, as matters stood, there was 
no material difference between the Senate and the National Council of Provinces. It 
looked at the areas where the powers and functions of the provinces were obviously 
less than and inferior to those which the provinces had under the (interim) 
Constitution. 
In particular, this was the case in respect of police powers, education, local government, 
traditional leadership, lotteries and sports pools,239 though the curtailment in these areas 
would not in itself be sufficient to lead to this conclusion.240 However, the curtailment in 
these areas, put together with the presumption of necessity favouring national 
legislation and the alteration in the scope of the override in respect of national 
intervention in concurrent legislative powers affected the attitude of the Court. 241 
It came to the conclusion that the new constitutional text did not satisfy the 
requirements of Constitutional Principle XVlll.2. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Though the Constitutional Court could not certify the new constitutional text as being 
consistent with all the 34 Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4 to the 
(interim) Constitution, it nonetheless commended the Constitutional Assembly for 
drafting and adopting a text which complied with the overwhelming number of the 
requirements of the Constitutional Principles. The Court concluded that, though singly 
and collectively important, the instances of non-compliance which it had identified 
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should present no siginificant obstacle to the formulation of a text that would comply 
fully with the relevant requirements. 
The Court, acting under Section 73A(1) of the (interim) Constitution,242 referred the 
new text back to the Constitutional Assembly for appropriate action. It was then left to 
the Constitutional Assembly to return to the drawing board to grapple with the 
shortcomings thus identified. 
The Constitutional Assembly reassembled243 promptly to produce an amended text. The 
amended text, which not only addressed the grounds for non-certification of the original 
text but also effected many editorial and minor changes to the text, was passed on 11 
October 1996 by more than the required majority in the Constitutional Assembly. 
CERT/FICA TION OF THE AMENDED 
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
In In re: Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996,244 the Constitutional Court was required to consider afresh whether 
the amended text complied with the Constitutional Principles. Unlike in the Certification 
judgment, the scope of the exercise was considerably narrower and much more 
focused. The Court acknowledged at the very outset that the Constitutional Assembly 
had conscientiously addressed the shortcomings the Court had identified in the 
Certification judgment and made a concerted effort to rectify them. 245 It further noted 
that the Constitutional Assembly had also eliminated many of the original grounds for 
non-certification and thus removed the major areas of contention.246 
A summary of some of the issues the Court dealt with in this case, and of the way in 
which it grappled with them, is provided hereunder. 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
Under this heading, the Court dealt with some of the following questions: 
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Freedom of Occupational Choice 
The basic objection to the amended text in this regard was that Clause 22247 tended to 
confine the enjoyment of this freedom to citizens, whereas it should be extended to 
everyone, irrespective of citizenship. For one thing, the Court was not persuaded that 
this right was a "universally accepted fundamental right" as required in terms of 
Constitutional Principle 11. 248 
It then looked at numerous international instruments of human rights to see if states are 
obliged to treat citizens and non-nationals equally as far as the choice of occupation is 
concerned. It concluded in this regard that: 
[t]here does not appear to be anything in these instruments which would prohibit 
States Parties when regulating these matters from imposing suitable conditions, 
which would not otherwise conflict with the instruments, limiting the rights of non-
nationals in respect of freedom of occupational choice.249 
I can only agree with the Court in this regard. In countries where the right to pursue a 
livelihood in the national territory of a state is constitutionally guaranteed, it is generally 
reserved for citizens and, in some instances, for persons with the status of permanent 
residents. Each country has a distinctive regime of law governing entry into each 
industry, trade, profession or occupation. 
The issue of the freedom of occupational choice arose in the Canadian case of Law 
Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker,250 for example. Non-citizens are not as a 
matter of right "entitled to be treated on the same footing as citizens in regard to the 
freedom of occupational choice."251 
Self-determination 
The Court was called upon to determine whether the provisions of Clause 31 of the 
amended text complied with Constitutional Principle Xll. 252 For the Court, the provisions 
of Clause 31, viewed in their proper context, complied with the requirements of 
Constitutional Principle Xll.253 
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Of particular note in this regard was the Court's observation that Constitutional Principle 
XII did not indicate how the collective rights of self-determination were to be recognised 
and protected.254 It held that: 
[t]hat was a matter for the CA to decide. Having regard to the CPs as a whole, 
the "collective rights of self-determination" mentioned in CPI/ are associational 
individual rights, namely those rights which cannot be fully or properly exercised 
by individuals otherwise than in association with others of like disposition. The 
concept "self-determination" is circumscribed by both what is stated to be the 
object of self-determination, namely, ''forming, joining and maintaining organs of 
civil society" as well as by CPI which requires the state for which the Constitution 
has to provide, to be "one sovereign state". In this context "self-determination" 
does not embody any notion of political independence or separateness. It clearly 
relates to what may be done by way of the autonomous exercise of these 
associational individual rights in the civil society of one sovereign state. 255 (my 
emphasis) 
I have no doubt that this judicial definition of the right to self-determination within the 
South African context has put paid to the notion of a Volkstaat, a separate territorial 
entity which, according to one commentator, some of "its proponents would understand 
to be constitutionally autonomus from government at national and regional level."256 
Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Bill of Rights 
In the Certification judgment the Court had pointed out that, in its opinion, the list of 
non-derogable rights should have been compiled more rationally and thoughtfully than 
had been done in the new text. Presumably as a result of this observation, the 
Constitutional Assembly amended the text and, in the process, included the right to 
have evidence obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights excluded at a criminal trial if its 
admission would render the trial unfair. 257 
Thus, under the {new) Constitution258 "[e]vidence obtained in a manner that violates 
any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would 
render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice." 
In this regard, our law goes a little further than the provisions of the {Canadian) Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms,259 and is now closer to the provisions of the {English) Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984,260 as well to the interpretation of the fourth, fifth and 
fourteenth amendments in the United States, for example. This is a basic shift from the 
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common law position which was based on the UK decision in Kuruma v R. 261 Thanks 
to this change, the question of the admissibility of illegally or improperly obtained 
evidence will no longer turn solely on the utilisation of a discretion by the court.262 
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
Special Procedures 
According to Constitutional Principle XV 
[a]mendments to the Constitution shall require special procedures involving 
special majorities. (my emphasis) 
As a result of the Court's ruling inthe Certification judgment that the new constitutional 
text did not comply with Constitutional Principle XV because of the absence of special, 
more stringent, procedures for the amendment of the Constitution, the Constitutional 
Assembly set out the necessary procedures in Section 7 4(4) to (7) of the amended text. 
The Court thus declared that "[w]e are satisfied that the procedures prescribed by the 
AT meet the requirements of CP XV and in the circumstances we hold that the AT 
complies with CP XV in so far as it requires special procedures to be followed for 
constitutional amendments."263 
Special Majorities 
Under the new constitutional text constitutional amendments affecting the National 
Council of Provinces, altering provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions, 
or amending a provision dealing specifically with a provincial matter, required the 
support of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly and six provinces in the 
National Council of Provinces. Other constitutional amendments, including amendments 
to the Bill of Rights, required the support of two-thirds of the members of the National 
Assembly, but did not have to be passed by the National Council of Provinces. 
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The Court noted that the 34 Constitutional Principles did not require a bicameral 
Parliament; nor, if there were to be two Houses of Parliament, did they require all 
legislation to be passed by each House.264 For this reason, the Court held that: 
[t]he CA was entitled to vest the power to effect other amendments to the 
Constitution in the NA alone, as long as it did so in a manner that complied with 
CP XV.265 
The National Assembly makes its decisions in this regard by a two-thirds majority of its 
members. This, the Court held, met the special majorities requirement of Constitutional 
Principle XV. 266 
Although the National Council of Provinces does not vote on other constitutional 
amendments, it has to be consulted in regard to them. Moreover, thirty days before 
such an amendment is introduced in the National Assembly, particulars of the bill 
amending the (new) Constitution must be published in the Government Gazette for 
public comment, submitted to each provincial legislature for their views, and to the 
National Council of Provinces for public debate. 
Amending the Bill of Rights 
However, the Court made a distinction between such amendments and amendments 
of the Bill of Rights. This was most probably because the Bill of Rights was affected by 
Constitutional Principle 11. 
As a result of the Court's ruling in the Certification judgment that for the purposes of 
the entrenchment requirement of Constitutional Principle 11 it was not sufficient that only 
the National Assembly could amend the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Assembly 
changed its position. Now the consent of a special majority of the National Council of 
Provinces267 has been added as a requirement for the amendment of the Bill of Rights. 
According to the Court, "[t]his consent may not be dispensed with by the NA acting on 
its own ... In the circumstances, we are of the view that there has been compliance with 
CP ll."26a 
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
In the Certification judgment the Court had held that the chapter dealing with local 
government failed to comply with Constitutional Principle XXIV in that it did not provide 
a "framework for the structures" of local government.269 It had further held that the 
chapter failed to comply with Constitutional Principle XXV in that it did not provide for 
appropriate fiscal powers and functions in respect of different categories of local 
government; and with Constitutional Principle X in that it did not provide for formal 
legislative procedures to be adhered to by local government legislatures. 
The Constitutional Assembly amended the new text and specified three different 
categories of municipalities that can be established in the Republic.270 The Court quite 
correctly pointed out that as Constitutional Principle XXIV contemplated that the (new) 
Constitution would provide no more than a framework and that the details of the local 
government system would be a matter for legislation,271 the requirements of the 
Constitutional Principle had since been met. 272 
Furthermore, the amended text provided for a framework for the fiscal powers and 
functions of municipalities, revenue allocation to municipalities, the preparation of 
budgets, treasury control, and the procurement of goods and services. The 
Constitutional Assembly also made provision in the amended text for how local 
government executives are to be appointed, how local governments are to take their 
decisions, and for the formal legislative procedures to be followed. The Court held that 
all this, in the context of the overall scheme of things, was sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the relevant Constitutional Principle.273 
TRADITIONAL MONARCH 
Constitutional Principle Xlll.2 required that the (new) Constitution should recognise 
and protect "[p]rovisions in a provincial constitution relating to the institution, role, 
authority and status of a traditional monarch". The Court held that Constitutional 
Principle Xlll.2 did "not require the relevant provisions of a provincial constitution to be 
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given a position of supremacy in the national constitution, allowing them to prevail over 
all other protected interests."274 What was required, it further held, was that 
the institution of the monarchy should be given the recognition and protection 
that it needs to enable it to carry out its traditional role and to maintain its status 
and authority, consistent with the constraints inherent in a republican and wholly 
democratic constitutional order.275 (my emphasis) 
The Court, after a careful survey and examination of the amended text, came to the 
conclusion that the recognition and protection required by Constitutional Principle Xlll.2 
were afforded by the relevant provisions of the amended text and held that, therefore, 
the amended text complied with the Constitutional Principle. 276 
COMPLIANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE XV/11.2 
The Presumption of Necessity 
In the Certification judgment the Court had held that the powers and functions of the 
provinces defined in the new text were, in certain respects, less than or inferior to the 
corresponding powers and functions of the provinces that were then contained in the 
(interim) Constitution. In addition, there was a problem with the Clause 146(4) 
presumption of necessity which favoured national legislation as well as with the 
alteration in the scope of the override then contained in Clause 146(2)(b) of the new 
text. The combined weight of these factors had brought the Court to the conclusion that 
the powers and functions of the provinces were indeed not only less than or inferior to 
those then contained in the (interim) Constitution, but were also substantially less or 
inferior. For that reason, the provisions of the Constitutional Principle had not been 
satisfied. 
The Constituent Assembly removed the presumption of necessity and completely 
replaced Clause 146(4). As a result, the Court observed,277 
[t]he issue as to whether or not the particular national legislation dealt with a 
matter which was necessary for the maintenance of national security or 
economic unity or the protection of the common market or any of the other 
factors listed in ... 146(2)(c) is now objectively justiciable in a court without any 
presumption in favour of such national legislation. If it is not established that the 
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legislation is necessary for any of the purposes identified by ... 146(2)(c), the 
national government will not be entitled to rely on ... 146(2)(c) in order to ensure 
that such national legislation prevails over any conflicting provincial legislation 
dealing with the matter. (my italics) 
This change satisfied the Court. 278 
Provincial Police Powers 
This was one of the areas where the Court in the Certification judgment had held that 
the powers and functions of the provinces encapsulated in the new text were less than 
or inferior to those the provinces had under the (interim) Constitution. Though the 
Constitutional Assembly effected some changes, 279 the Court held that a comparison 
between the new text, the amended text and the corresponding provisions of the 
(interim) Constitution in this regard showed that the powers and functions of the 
provinces in the amended text in respect of the police were still less than or inferior to 
those contained in the corresponding provisions of the (interim) Constitution.280 
Be that as it may, the Court noted that the amended text gave the provinces a greater 
say in the appointment of their provincial police commissioners than had been the case 
in the new text. 281 It further observed that the monitoring and overseeing functions of the 
provinces were "also given more teeth by the power given to the provinces to 
investigate or to appoint a commission of enquiry into any complaints of police 
inefficiency or a breakdown in relations between the police and any community."282 
Moreover, the amended text gave provincial legislatures "a potentially important power 
of control ... by the right to require the provincial commissioner to appear before it or 
any of its committees to answer questions."283 
The Court seems to have been persuaded to think that the provinces were adequately 
compensated for the diminution of their powers and functions in this regard. A more 
plausible explanation of its conclusion that "although the more expansive powers of the 
provinces in the area of policing provided for in the IC have not been fully restored, 
there is nevertheless a significantly greater degree of power and control which vests in 
the provinces in this area in the AT compared with the corresponding powers of 
provinces contained in the NT"284 (my emphasis) does not seem to be available. 
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The National Council of Provinces and Local Government 
After an analysis of what the Constitutional Assembly had done to enhance the powers 
of the National Council of Provinces, the Court still felt that it was unable to discern 
whether that would result in a substantial increase in the collective powers of the 
provinces.285 There appeared to the Court to be no differences relevant to the NCOP 
between the new text and the amended text which could have any influence on the 
enquiry required by Constitutional Principle XVlll.2.286 
In respect of the powers of the provinces in relation to local government, the Court held 
that the amended text did not effect any major improvement on the corresponding 
provisions of the new text. The powers and functions of the provinces were effectively 
the same as the powers they would have enjoyed under the new text and they still 
remained less than the powers the provinces enjoyed under the (interim) 
Constitution. 287 
Be that as it may, the Court, as will appear more fully below, certified the amended text 
as being consistent with the Constitutional Principles. 
INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS 
In the Certification judgment the Court had found flaws in the way in which the 
institutions of the Public Service Commission, the Public Protector and the Auditor-
General had been dealt with in the new constitutional text. As a result of the Court's 
observations in this regard, the provisions dealing with the Public Service Commission, 
including procedures for the appointment and removal of commissioners, and the 
provisions dealing with the appointment and removal from office of the Public Protector 
and the Auditor-General were appropriately amended by the Constitutional Assembly. 
The Court concluded that the amended text had substantially enhanced the 
independence of both the Public Protector and the Auditor-General as the incumbents 
can now be appointed after a resolution of the National Assembly supported by at least 
sixty per cent of its members and removed after a resolution thereof supported by at 
least two-thirds of its members.288 It was thus satisfied that the requirements of 
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Constitutional Principle XXIX had been met in respect of both the Public Protector and 
the Auditor-General. 289 
The Public Service Commission 
In this regard, the Constitutional Assembly in the amended text persisted in establishing 
a single Commission for the whole Republic and no provincial service commissions. 
After a careful analysis of the provisions of the powers of the single Public Service 
Commission in Clause 196(4), the Court concluded that the role of the single Public 
Service Commission would be far less significant than it was under the (interim) 
Constitution. 290 
The Court observed that what the Constitutional Assembly had simply done was to 
make "it clear that it is the provincial governments that are responsible for the 
recruitment, appointment, promotion, transfer and dismissal of members of the public 
service in their administration, all within a framework of uniform norms and standards 
applying to the public service."291 Furthermore, some of the powers the national Public 
Service Commission and the provincial public service commissions had under the 
(interim) Constitution were given to the single Public Service Commission or to the 
national government and provincial executives respectively. 292 Lastly, the functions of 
the Public Service Commission were clearly defined in the amended text.293 
Though the Court observed that the shift to a single Public Service Commission 
represented some diminution of provincial power, 294 in the sense that the provinces lost 
the power to establish provincial public service commissions, it concluded that this bane 
was in effect a boon! The provinces gained greater powers and functions in respect of 
the single Public Service Commission, which would consist of fourteen commissioners, 
five approved by the National Assembly, and one from each of the nine provinces, 
nominated by each premier. The Court thus held that "[t]his gives the provinces a 
majority of the commissioners. The single PSC is therefore an important site of 
collective provincial power."295 
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However, the Court felt that, though the new Public Service Commission arrangements 
would compensate the provinces for the loss of the power to establish their own public 
service commissions by affording them collective power on the single Public Service 
Commission, there would still remain "a conceptual and residual difference between an 
autonomous power of a province to create its own commission, on the one hand, and 
on the other hand the power of such a province to participate in the collective power of 
the provinces in that they appoint a majority of the members of the PSC."296 After 
weighing all the necessary factors, it concluded that "there has been a small diminution 
in the powers of the provinces arising out of the alteration in the functions of the PSC, 
the change in its composition, and the disestablishment of provincial service 
commissions."297 But this diminution would not materially affect the balancin9 process, 
the Court held.298 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Though the Court came to the conclusion that, in certain respects, "the powers and 
functions of the provinces in terms of the AT are still less than or inferior to those 
accorded to the provinces in terms of the /C',299 (my emphasis) it nonetheless certified 
that all the provisions of the amended text passed by the Constitutional Assembly on 
11 October 1996 complied with the 34 Constitutional Principles,300 because the powers 
and functions of the provinces contained in the amended text were not substantially 
less or inferior.301 Thus was the (new) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996,302 born. Most of the provisions of the (new) Constitution came into operation on 
4 February 1997.303 The exceptions were Section 160(1 )(b), which would require a 
municipal council to elect its chairperson and which would come into effect on 30 June 
1997, and a number of provisions dealing with financial matters which would only come 
into effect on 1 January 1998. 304 
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTERFOURTEEN 
1 .. As was required in terms of Rule 16( 1) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court, read with Section 
160( 4) of the (interim) Constitution. If the Constitutional Court certified that none of the provisions of a 
provincial constitution was inconsistent with the (interim) Constitution and the 34 Constitutional 
Principles set out in Schedule 4 thereto, the document would become law; if for any reason it did not grant 
certification, the document would have to be reconsidered and a new or amended constitution would have 
to be passed by the Legislature, if it still wished to pass a constitution for its province. 
2 .. As was required in terms of Rule 15(1) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court, read with Section 
71(2) of the (interim) Constitution. 
3 .. In In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SA 744 
(CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at BCLR 1264, paragraph 1, the Constitutional Court described judicial 
certification of a constitution as being unprecedented. The (interim) Constitution provided for an 
independent arbiter that would ascertain and declare whether in the one instance the text of the provincial 
Constitution complied with both the (interim) Constitution and the 34 Constitutional Principles and, in the 
other instance, whether the text of the final Constitution complied with the Constitutional Principles, before 
each could come into force. 
4 .. Which the preamble to the (interim) Constitution described as a solemn pact. It is noted that the 
Constitutional Principles were entrenched and protected by Section 74(1) of the (interim) Constitution 
from amendment and repeal. See Section 160(4) of the (interim) Constitution. In In re: Certification of 
· the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, supra BCLR at 1351, paragraphs 306 and 307, 
the Constitutional Court pointed out that, although Constitutional Principle XVlll.2, for example, was 
introduced later to, inter a/ia, encourage political formations which had refused to participate in the 
transition process to change their minds and to support the transition to a new political order, its provisions 
should not be given greater weight than the rest; none of the Constitutional Principles could be 
characterised as being more important than the others. 
5 .. See Section 71 (2) of the (interim) Constitution. 
6 .. See Sections 71 (3) and 160(5) of the (interim) Constitution. 
7 .. Section 73(1) of the (interim) Constitution. 
8 .. Such as Kierin O'Malley who said in his article, The 1993 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa -
The Constitutional Court', in Journal of Theoretical Politics (Vol. 8, Sage Publications, London, April 
1996) 177 at 178 that:" ... the Constitutional Court could well become an excessively politicized body. 
South African law, and specifically its constitutional law, and the courts generally will become increasingly 
politicized and the crucial distinction between law and politics weakened ... The result could be that the 
doctrine of the separation of powers, which Constitutional Principle VI of Schedule 4 requires the final 
constitution to comply with, will be weakened. Appointed, unaccountable judges will effectively become 
legislators in crucial areas of public policy." 
9 .. Subject to the provisions of Section 160 of the (interim) Constitution. 
10 .. In terms of Section 160(1) of the Constitution, a two-thirds majority resolution of all the members 
of the Legislature would have sufficed. 
11.. The second largest political party represented in the Legislature. See the Report of the 
Independent Electoral Commission: the South African Elections of April 1994 (Independent Electoral 
Commission, Johannesburg, October 1994) at 75. 
12 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu -Natal, 1996, 1996 (11) BCLR 
1419 at 1425, paragraph 12. 
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13.. Which in In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, op cit 1424, 
paragraph 8 the Court held required a two-step approach. At, paragraph 12, the Court correctly pointed 
out that the fact that the provincial Constitution had been passed unanimously by the Legislature in this 
instance could not in any way influence the duty imposed upon it by the provisions of Section 160 (4) of 
the (interim) Constitution. 
14.. See the decision of the Constitutional Court in In re: Certification of the Constitution of the 
Province of KwaZulu-Natal, op cit 1422, paragraph 3 for the specific objections. 
15 .. Ibidem. 
16 .. The provisions of section 160(4), read with section 160(3)(b) of the (interim) Constitution are 
important to note in this regard. 
17 .. Section 160(3)(b) of the (interim) Constitution. 
18 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, op cit 1422, paragraph 
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20 .. Section 160(3)(a). 
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5. 
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476. 
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Constitution, as well as Schedule 6 thereto. It is also noteworthy that, unlike the legislative powers of 
provinces, the plenary legislative powers of Parliament, which were exercised over the whole of the 
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to any "matters" of specific functional areas. See Ex parte Speaker of the National Assembly: In re: 
Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the National Education Bill 83 
of 1995, 1996 (3) SA 289 (CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC), paragraphs 7 and 13. 
29 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, op cit 1424, paragraph 
8. 
30 .. The provisions of chapter 1 of the provincial Constitution which dealt with "Fundamental Principles", 
the majority of which the Court suggested would be appropriate in a national constitution, was the main 
culprit in this regard. Ibidem at 1426, paragraph 14. See Ibidem, paragraph 16 for examples of this. At, 
paragraph 15, the Court said that such provisions appeared "to have been passed by the KZN Legislature 
under a misapprehension that it enjoyed a relationship of co-supremacy with the national Legislature and 
even the Constitutional Assembly." (my emphasis) 
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35 .. Ibidem at 1427, paragraph 18. 
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55 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996, op cit 1433, 
paragraph 36. 
56 .. Ibidem. 
Penuel! M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 468 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
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other than a device to avoid the express requirements of section 160( 4 )" of the (interim} Constitution. 
58 .. See, for example, Chapter 1, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 clause 1 (2), Chapter 5, Chapter 8, certain 
provisions of Chapters 9, 12, and 13, Chapter 14 clause 2(12} as well as Chapter 15 of the provincial 
Constitution. 
59 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu- Natal, 1996, op cit 1435, 
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60 .. Ibidem, paragraph 42. 
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62 .. Ibidem. 
63 .. Ibidem, paragraph 48. 
64 .. Ibidem, paragraph 47. 
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the Tenth Amendment little weight. See, for example, United States v Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In 
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67 .. Section 37 of the (interim) Constitution. 
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70 .. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
71 .. Ibidem Section 104(b)(it), read with Schedule 5 thereto. 
72 .. See the opening paragraph of the postscript to the (interim) Constitution. 
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74 .. See the third paragraph of the preamble to the (interim) Constitution. 
75 .. Section 73(1) of the (interim} Constitution. 
76 .. Section 73(2) of the (interim) Constitution. The proviso to this section was very important as far as 
the provinces were concerned. 
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81 .. Ibidem at 1273-1274, paragraph 28. 
82 .. Ibidem at 1274, paragraph 29. 
83 .. Ibidem at 1280, paragraph 54. 
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85 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1265 and at 
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paragraph 52. 
106 .. Ibidem at 1279, paragraph 51. 
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108 .. Section 26 of the (interim) Constitution. 
109 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1279, 
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Constitution (1994), at 34-41, on the provisions of Section 11 of the (interim) Constitution. See also 
Lourens du Plessis and JR de Ville, who submitted in 'Personal Rights: Life, Freedom and Security of the 
Person,.Privacy, and Freedom of Movement', in Van Wyk, Dugard, De Villiers and Davis (eds) Rights and 
Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order, (1994) at 238, that "freedom and security of 
the person" denotes the human being's somatic existence and includes both mental and physical integrity. 
127 .. See DM Davis ( ed), Chapter 2 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill: A Comparison 
with the Interim Constitution (Occasional Paper 25), (Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of 
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, July 1996), at 16. 
128 .. Which our Courts, in terms of Section 35(1) of the (interim) Constitution, were entitled to have 
regard to in interpreting the (interim) Constitution and promoting its values. 
129 .. 262 US 390 (1923) at 399. 
130 .. It is interesting to note that our law on abortion prior to the enactment of the Choice on Termination 
of Pregnancy Act, 1996, would, in Canada for instance, have been regarded as being invalid as it 
violated the right to security of the person since it forced a woman, upon threat of criminal sanction, to 
carry the foetus to term, unless she met certain criteria completely unrelated to her own priorities and 
aspirations. See Dickson CJC in R v Morgentaler, (1988) 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at 402. 
131 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 op cit 1282-1283, 
paragraph 60. 
132 .. Ibidem. 
133 .. Ibidem at 1283, paragraph 62. 
134 .. Already quoted in full above. 
135 .. Which provided that "Notwithstanding the provisions of Principle XII, the right of employers and 
employees to join and form employer organisations and trade unions and to engage in collective 
bargaining shall be recognised and protected. Provision shall be made that every person shall have the 
right to fair labour practices." 
136 .. See Section 27(4) and (5) of the (interim) Constitution. 
137 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 op cit 1283-1284, 
paragraph 64. 
138 .. Ibidem at 1284, paragraph 65. 
139 .. Ibidem at 1284-1285, paragraph 66. 
140 .. It is noted that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not recognise or protect any of 
these two rights. This, according to Ken Norman, 'Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Freedom of 
Association' in Gerald-A Beaudoin and Ed Ratushny (eds} The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Carswell, Toronto, 1989) at 242, is "[b]ecause the strike and the lock out have to do with 
intentionally causing economic harm ... "and would thus be in conflict with the fundamental freedom of 
association which Kerans JA in Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), (1985) 
DLR (4th) 359 (Alta. C.A) at 388 said meant that two or more individuals may, in concert, do that which 
they are free to do individually, "provided they do not harm others". 
141 .. Act No. 66 of 1995. 
142 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 op cit 1285, 
paragraph 67. 
Penuell M. Maduna - LLD Thesis 472 June 1997 
University of South Africa 
143 .. Ibidem. 
144 .. Ibidem, paragraph 68. 
145 .. Ibidem at 1285-1286, paragraph 69. 
146 .. Patrick Hanks and Thomas Hill Long (eds) in the Collins English Dictionary (1979) define 
collective bargaining as "negotiation between a trade union and an employer or an employers' 
organization on the incomes and working conditions of the employees." (my emphasis) 
14 7.. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 op cit 1287, 
paragraphs 71 and 72. 
148 .. Ibidem at 1288, paragraph 73. 
149 .. Ibidem at 1288-1289, paragraphs 74 and 75. 
150 .. Ibidem at 1289, paragraph 76. 
151 .. Ibidem, paragraph 77. 
152 .. Ibidem at 1289-1290, paragraph 78. 
153 .. On which debate see JD van der Vyver, 'Constitutional Options for Post-apartheid South Africa', in 
(1991) 40 Emory Law Journal 745 at 783, for example. 
154 .. See the South African Law Commission Interim Report on Group and Human Rights (1991) at 
532-533 and 536. However, while rejecting a full programme of such rights, at 495 (ibidem) as well as in 
Group and Human Rights: Working Paper 25 at 416-429, the Law Commission conceded that socio-
economic rights should be protected in a bill of rights from legislative or executive infringement albeit 
without imposing positive obligations upon the State. It was even prepared to have imposed a minimum 
of welfare obligations upon the State, such as the provision of free state education to the end of the 
primary school phase, state-aided medical care to every indigent child, and payment for necessary 
subsistance and medical needs of people who are unable to provide such for themselves by reason of 
physical or mental illness or disability. 
155 .. See AS Mathews 'The Rule of Law - A Reassessment', in E Kahn (ed) Fiat Justitia: Essays in 
Memory of OD Schreiner (Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1983) at 305 and at 307. 
156 .. See 'Practical Workings of a Bill of Rights' in JV van der Westhuizen and HP Viljoen (eds) A Bill of 
Rights for South Africa: Proceedings of a Symposium Held at the University of Pretoria on 1 and 
2 May 1986 (Butterworths, Durban, 1988) 52 at 58. 
157 .. The decisions of which were, in terms of Section 98(4) of the (interim) Constitution made to bind 
"all persons and all legislative, executive and judicial organs of state." 
158 .. Mauro Cappelletti The Future of Legal Education: A Comparative Perspective', in (1992) 8 SAJHR 
1 at 9-10. 
159 .. See paragraph 18 of Schedule 6 to the (new) Constitution. 
160 .. Which all along prosecuted crime on behalf, and in the name, of the State. 
161 .. Section 179( 1 )(a) of the new constitutional text. 
162 .. Who, in terms of Section 179(3)(b) read with Section 179(5) of the new constitutional text, shall be 
"responsible for prosecutions in specific jurisdictions". 
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163 .. Ibidem, Section 179(1)(b). However, pending the enactment of such an Act of Parliament, the old 
order remains in esse, though the appointment of a National Director of Public Prosecutions as envisaged 
in Section 179( 1 )(a) is not affected thereby. See paragraph 18 of Schedule 6 to the new constitutional text. 
164 .. Which required a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and the judiciary, with 
appropriate checks and balances. 
165 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 op cit 1307, 
paragraph 141 . 
166 .. Ibidem at 1308, paragraph 145. 
167 .. Ibidem. 
168 .. Section 179(5)(d) of the new constitutional text. 
169 .. Ibidem, Section 179(5)(a). 
170 .. Ibidem, Section 179(5)(c), read with Section 179(5)(b). 
171 .. Ibidem, Section 179(6). 
172 .. In terms of Section 5(5) and (6) of the Attorney-General Act, No. 92 of 1992, which came into 
operation on 31 December 1992 under Proc R137of1992 (Government Gazette 14458of11 December 
1992), an attorney-general was made accountable to Parliament. Under the previous system the Minister 
of Justice, whose role was confined to co-ordinating the functions of the attorneys-general, could, at most, 
only request an attorney-gneral to furnish information or a report and to give reasons as described in 
Section 5(5)(a) and (b) of that Act. 
173 .. By Section 8(1) of the Attorney-General Act, 1992, which repealed the entire Section 3 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977. 
174 .. Act No. 51 of 1977. 
175 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1308, 
paragraph 146. 
176 .. Act No. 66 of 1995. 
177 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1308-1309, 
paragraph 149. 
178 .. For which see Section 33(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982. The whole of Section 33 is 
important to study for this purpose. 
179 .. In The Canadian Constitution and the Courts: The Function and Scope of Judicial Review, 
op cit 63-64. 
180 .. To the exclusion of "democratic" rights (such as the right to vote, to candidacy and the requirement 
of regular legislative sessions and elections), mobility rights and linguistic rights. See Strayer, ibidem. 
181 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1310-1311 , 
paragraph 156. 
182 .. Ibidem. 
183 .. Ibidem. 
184 .. Ibidem at 1311, paragraph 159. 
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187.. Section 110( 1 ) thereof. 
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188 .. Which was established (in the wake of the "Information Scandal") under the Advocate-General Act, 
118 of 1979. The powers of the Advocate-General were subsequently (ostensibly) extended by the 
provisions of the Advocate-General Amendment Act, 104 of 1991. The office was also rechristened. 
Vide the South African Law Commission, Report on Constitutional Models (Vol 3, 1991) at 1263. 
189 .. Lawrence Baxter, Administrative Law (Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1984) at 289. 
190 .. South African Law Commission, Interim Report on Group and Human Rights (1991) at 606. 
191 .. Section 110(8). 
192 .. Which asserted the independence and impartiality of the institution. 
193 .. Which provided for the tenure of seven years, as was the case under Section 110(5) of the (interim) 
Constitution. 
194 .. Both of which provided for appointment and removal procedures. 
195 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 op cit 1313, 
paragraph 163. 
196 .. Ibidem. 
197 .. Ibidem. 
198 .. Section 191 (9). 
199 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1313, 
paragraph 165. 
200 .. Ibidem. 
201 .. Ibidem. 
202 .. Which together made provision for a public service for the Republic and for a single public service 
commission to which each province could nominate a person to be appointed to serve thereon. 
203 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1315-1316, 
paragraphs 172 and 173. 
204 .. Ibidem at 1317, paragraphs 176 and 177. 
205 .. A fact which the Court admitted. Ibidem at 1316, paragraph 174, where it referred to the provisions 
of Section 210 of the (interim) Constitution. 
206 .. Ibidem at 1342, paragraph 275. Section 213(1) of the (interim) Constitution merely provided that 
"[a] provincial legislature may provide by law for a provincial service commission ... "(my emphasis) 
207 .. Ibidem, at 1317, paragraph 177. 
208 .. Ibidem at 1342, paragraph 27 4. 
209 .. Ibidem at 1317, paragraph 177. 
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210 .. As was the case under Section 213(1) of the (interim) Constitution. 
211 .. Which provided that "[t]he powers and functions of the provinces defined in the Constitution, 
including the competence of a provincial legislature to adopt a constitution for its province, shall not be 
substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in this Constitution." (my emphasis) 
In In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1331, 
paragraph 229, the Court said that this requirement introduced a dimension to the certification process 
differing fundamentally from the rest of the Constitutional Principles. 
212 .. Ibidem at 1343, paragraph 276. 
213 .. After all, as the Court pointed out at 1342, paragraph 275, separate provincial public service 
commissions were not specifically required by the Constitutional Principles. 
214 .. Ibidem at 1343, paragraph 278. 
215 .. Ibidem, paragraph 277. 
216 .. Ibidem. 
217 .. Ibidem at 1393-1394, paragraph 462. 
218 .. Ibidem at 1349-1350, paragraph 301. 
219 .. Ibidem at 1351, paragraph 308. 
220 .. Ibidem at 1353, paragraph 317. 
221 .. Which, unlike the Senate, is a council of provinces and not a chamber consisting of elected party 
political representatives. It is worthy of note that the 34 Constitutional Principles did not prescribe a 
bicameral Parliament for the Republic. 
222 .. Which, in terms of Section 36 of the (interim) Constitution, was one of the two Houses of 
Parliament. 
223 .. In terms of Section 48 of the (interim) Constitution the Senate consisted of ninety Senators, with 
each province being repesented by ten Senators nominated by the parties represented in the provincial 
legislature according to a system of proportional representation. 
224 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1354, 
paragraph 319. 
225 .. Ibidem at 1354-1355, paragraph 320. See also 1358, paragraph 330. 
226 .. Sections 77(1 )(b) and 87 of the (interim) Constitution. 
227 .. A power which the (President of the) Senate had under Section 98(9) of the (interim) Constitution. 
228 .. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, op cit 1357, 
paragraph 328. 
229 .. Ibidem at 1358, paragraph 331. 
230 .. Ibidem, paragraph 332. 
231.. Ibidem, paragraph 333. See also ibidem at 1396, paragraph 474. 
232 .. Ibidem at 1273, paragraph 27, at 1274, paragraphs 29 and 30 and at 1275-1276, paragraph 39. 
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234 .. Ibidem at 1359, paragraph 336 
235 .. Ibidem paragraph 337. 
236 .. Ibidem at 1361, paragraph 340. 
237 .. Ibidem at 1397, paragraph 4 77. 
238 .. Ibidem, at 1361, paragraph 341 and at 1396, paragraph 471. 
239 .. Ibidem at 1397, paragraph 477. 
240 .. Ibidem at 1398, paragraph 479. 
241 .. Ibidem, paragraphs 480 and 481. 
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242 .. In terms of which it had a peremptory obligation to act in a particular manner. 
243 .. In terms of Section 73A(2) and (3) of the (interim) Constitution. 
244 .. 1997 ( 1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
245 .. In re: Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, op cit 10, paragraph 15. 
246 .. Ibidem. 
24 7 .. The relevant portion of which provides that: "Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, 
occupation or profession freely." 
248 .. In re: Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, op cit 11, paragraph 17 and at 12-13, paragraph 21. 
249 .. Ibidem at 11, paragraph 18. 
250 .. [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357. At issue in this case was a requirement of Ontario's Law Society Act that 
members of the bar of Ontario must be Canadian citizens. Skapinker, otherwise armed with all the 
necessary qualifications, was not a citizen but a permanent resident of Canada. On being refused 
admission to the bar, he sued for a declaration that the citizenship requirement was invalid on the grounds 
that it violated Section 6(2}{b) of the Charter. In a unanimous judgment written by Estey J, the Supreme 
Court of Canada rejected this argument and held that Section 6(2)(b} did not confer an unqualified right 
"to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in the province". 
251 .. In re: Certification of the Amend~d Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, op cit 12, paragraph 20. 
252 .. This Constitutional Principle was, according to Dawid Wyk, 'Introduction to the South African 
Constitution' in Van Wyk et al Rights and Constitutionalism: The South African Legal Order (Juta & 
Co, Cape Town, 1994), at 159-160, an "attempt, by and large successful, to involve a part of the electorate 
with strong nationalist propensities in the first election ... ",and for that purpose, ''was expanded to include 
self-determination 'in a territorial entity within the Republic or in any other recognised way'." (my emphasis) 
253 .. In re: Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, op cit 15, paragraph 27. 
254 .. Ibidem at 13-14, paragraph 24. 
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255 .. Ibidem . 
256 .. Heinz Klug, 'Historical Background' in Matthew Chaskalson, Janet Kentridge, Jonathan Klaaren, 
Gilbert Marcus, Derek Spitz and Stuart Woolman Constitutional Law of South Africa (Juta & Co, Cape 
Town 1996) at 2-14. 
257 .. In re: Certification of the Amnded Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, op cit 15, paragraph 30. 
258 .. Section 35(5). 
259 .. Section 24(2) of Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) which provides that: "Where, in 
proceedings under subsection (1 ), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that 
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if 
it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute." 
260 .. Section 78 of which provides that a court may refuse to allow evidence, on which the prosecution 
proposes to rely, if, having regard to all the circumstances - including the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained - its reception "would have such an adverse effect on the proceedings that the 
court ought not to admit if'. 
261 .. [1955] AC 197 at 203; [1955] 1 All ER 236 at 239, where Lord Goddard said:" ... the test to be 
applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If 
it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained." (my emphasis) 
See also Rumpff CJ in S v Mushimba, 1977 (2) SA 829 (A) at 840; see further S v Nel, 1987 (4) SA 950 
(W) at 953E-H. 
262 .. See Lord Goddard ibidem at [1955] AC 204; [1955) 1 All ER 239. See also Rumpff CJ, ibidem. 
263 .. In re: Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, op cit 20, paragraph 52. 
264 .. Ibidem at 23, paragraph 66. 
265 .. Ibidem. 
266 .. Ibidem at 23-24, paragraph 67. 
267 .. Namely six of the nine provinces in the National Council of Provinces in terms of the provisions of 
Section 74(2)(b) of the (new) Constitution. 
268 .. In re: Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, op cit 24-25, paragraph 71. 
269 .. A phrase which the Court described as vague and imprecise. Ibidem at 27, paragraph 82. 
270 .. Ibidem at 26, paragraph 77 for the details. 
271 .. Ibidem at 27, paragraph 80. 
272 .. Ibidem at 27-28, paragraph 82. 
273 .. Ibidem. 
274 .. Ibidem at 32, paragraph 99. 
275 .. Ibidem. 
Penuel! M. Maduna • LLD Thesis 478 June 1997 
276 .. Ibidem at 34, paragraph 110. 
277 .. Ibidem at 46-47, paragraph 155. 
278 .. Ibidem at 4 7, paragraph 157. 
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279 .. Ibidem at 49, paragraph 166 for what the Court said had been done by the Constitutional Assembly. 
280 .. Ibidem, paragraph 164. 
281 .. Ibidem at 49-50, paragraph 167. 
282 .. Ibidem at 50, paragraph 168. 
283 .. Ibidem. 
284 .. Ibidem, paragraph 169. 
285 .. Ibidem at 53, paragraph 180. 
286 .. Ibidem, paragraph 182. 
287 .. Ibidem at 52, paragraph 175. 
288 .. Ibidem at 39-40, paragraph 134. 
289 .. Ibidem. 
290 .. Ibidem at 56, paragraph 188. 
291 .. Ibidem. 
292 .. Ibidem, paragraph 189. 
293 .. Ibidem at 40, paragraph 135. 
294 .. Ibidem at 58, paragraph 195. 
295 .. Ibidem at 56-57, paragraph 190. 
296 .. Ibidem at 57, paragraph 191. 
297 .. Ibidem at 58, paragraph 198. 
298 .. Ibidem at 60, paragraph 204. 
299 .. Ibidem. 
300 .. Ibidem, paragraph 205. 
301 .. Ibidem, paragraph 204. 
302 .. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (for which see Government Gazette No. 
17678 of 18 December 1996). 
303 .. See Proclamation R6 in Government Gazette No. 17737 of 24 January 1997. 
304 .. Ibidem. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
CONCLUSION 
I n this thesis it was pointed out at the very outset that two years would be too short a period within which we would be able to accurately evaluate the work of the 
Constitutional Court. Since at the time of writing the Court had dealt with a good number 
of cases in which a whole range of issues had arisen, it would be premature for anyone 
to suggest that the Court has not had a tremendous impact and influence upon the 
development of democracy in our country .1 However, the work and the influence of the 
Court must be evaluated, and the question relating to this has to be asked on a 
continuous basis; if, in the long run, it indeed turns out that we as a polity do not need 
a special Court which, as the (new) Constitution2 has reaffirmed, deals solely with 
constitutional matters,3 future policy makers should be bold enough to take appropriate 
steps to abolish it. 
While at the beginning of our new constitutional system it might have made sense from 
a political point of view to have established the Constitutional Court, within a short 
space of time the situation has changed, so much so that "[a] vertically integrated 
system of constitutional review - where all courts have complete constitutional 
jurisdiction"4 has begun to make far more sense. For one thing, the bifurcated system 
of review that we had chosen and followed under the (interim) Constitution already 
seemed cumbersome: Trials might be delayed for significant periods of time as cases 
from the lower courts had to go to local or provincial divisions of the Supreme Court 
(now called the High Court), then be referred to the Constitutional Court, wait for a ruling 
from the Constitutional Court, return to the High Court or even the lower court for initial 
resolution, head up eventually to the Appellate Division (now called the Supreme Court 
of Appeal), which might then refer them to the Constitutional Court for a final ruling. The 
system could even prevent many people with legitimate challenges from being heard. 
A careful reading of the (new) Constitution suggests that this problem has now been 
addressed. Even the magistrates' courts now have constitutional jurisdiction; they may 
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not have the jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of legislation and of the conduct 
of the President of the Republic, but for the rest they have the necessary jurisdiction.5 
The transitional period itself is, however, far from over; the masses of our people, the 
direct victims of centuries of colonialism and four-and-half decades of apartheid, are still 
groaning and chafing under the yoke of apartheid's nefarious consequences. Inequality 
and the iniquitous distribution of resources, wealth, opportunities and income, all of 
which are characterised by race and gender, are still rampant in our society. In a society 
where opulence and ostentation are the uncomfortable neighbours of mass 
unemployment, grinding poverty, squalor, homelessness, disease and ignorance, true 
freedom and equality are indeed still residing in the realm of noble and yet distant 
ideals. 
Courts qua courts, in any event, have a limited role in social transformation. Their role 
is basically confined to judicial review of what the other organs of state do.6 The major 
responsibility for social transformation belongs primarily to Parliament and the other 
legislative authorities. It is not the business of the judiciary to make and pronounce 
policy. In the final analysis the judiciary should and does observe a fastidious regard for 
limitations of its own power, and this precludes it from giving effect to its own notion of 
what is wise or politic. 
Our appointed judges, who are not accountable to the public to the same extent as 
politicians,7 have not become legislators in crucial areas of public policy,8 though they 
are always confronted with political realities which they have to face up to. As a matter 
of fundamental judicial policy, they seem to bring a genuine sense of deference to the 
legislators. 9 
While our Courts, and the Constitutional Court in particular, will no doubt play a crucial 
role over time in the incremental eradication of apartheid and its consequences, it will 
be important at all times to bear in mind the wise words of AL Higginbatham Jr, an 
outstanding personage and a one-time judge of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, who cautioned that: 
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constitutional protections are ultimately of limited efficacy . . . Thus, while I 
maintain that constitutional protection of a viable Bill of Rights is significant and 
important, and that it would improve significantly the human rights situation in 
South Africa, I also emphasise the necessity of combatting racism in society at 
large, through individual and governmental action. The Courts can serve as the 
vanguard for social change and as a beacon in dark times, but used as the sole 
tool, they cannot eradicate racism. 10 
There is, no doubt, a lot of work that still needs to be done by all of us in our variegated 
social formations to create a truly united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South 
Africa with a society that will be predicated upon liberty and equality. It needs to be 
acknowledged, however, that, within a short space of time and within the constraints of 
its role as part of the judiciary, the Constitutional Court has done a lot of good work 
within the context of social transformation currently under way in our country. 
In the majority of cases in the past three years since the advent of the (interim) 
Constitution our Courts have generally taken full advantage of the consequences of 
our quiet revolution entailed in the move to a system of constitutional supremacy and 
protection of basic rights and freedoms. I would thus fully agree with Hugh Corder and 
Dennis Davis that, in so far as the Court's and our judiciary's performance in general 
is concerned: 
[a] general assessment might produce the answer "quite well", especially considering the 
background. Besides a small group of mainly academic lawyers, knowledge of human 
rights and constitutional law at the inception of the transitional Constitution was very poor 
... Most lawyers ... had to undergo a crash course in constitutional education in order to 
establish a basic familiarity with the tools of a new discourse of law and government. 
That many of them have grasped the opportunities created by the transitional Bill of 
Rights is reflected in the pages of the law reports. 11 
In some instances its work has indeed had tremendous influence. It has, for example, 
ruled that the death penalty in general, the sentencing of juveniles to be whipped, and 
the imprisonment of those who are unable to settle their financial debts, all constitute 
unconstitutional limitations upon fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
new constitutional system. A few areas will be looked at to show that as a result of the 
Court's action where it has acted decisively, there have already been interesting 
developments at the level of our other Courts. Other areas where there has been no 
decisive action, or no action at all, as yet on the part of the Court will also be 
highlighted. 
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DEVELOPMENTS WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT HAS ACTED 
DECISIVELY 
DIRECT ACCESS TO THE COURT 
Rule 17 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court requires that, for purposes of direct 
access to the Constitutional Court, a matter must be of such urgency, or otherwise of 
such public importance, that any delay necessitated by the utilisation of ordinary 
procedures would prejudice the public interest or the ends of justice and good 
government. Chaskalson P quite correctly stated in Minister of Justice v Ntuli12 that 
Rule 17 requires that: 
[t]he applicant must first obtain leave from the President of the Court to approach the 
Court by way of direct access. If this is granted, the matter will then be set down by the 
President of the Court for a date which will be fixed with due regard to the Court roll and 
the time necessary for the preparation of arguments by the parties to the dispute. (my 
emphasis) 
This Rule no doubt helps prevent abuse of the new Court by vexatious elements in our 
society. 
Moreover, as a result of the Court's stance on direct access to it, our Courts have now 
been prepared to go into matters and decide whether they should be referred to it for 
its decision. Our lawyers and judges, who in the majority were schooled in the 
conservative legal discourse, are thus presented with new opportunities to participate 
actively and creatively in the development of our nascent constitutional jurisprudence. 
Given the fact that the Constitutional Court's docket is too small to accommodate all 
challenges to legislation, and given that the Court's hands may soon be too full to make 
the Court an effective institution, it makes sense to take the pressure off the Court and 
allow constitutional jurisdiction to judges of the High Court. 
The decision of the Constitutional Assembly to grant constitutional jurisdiction to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal ought to be commended. Unlike its predecessor, the 
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Appellate Division, this Court may intervene in the determination of constitutional 
matters as it has a role and, as "the highest court of appeal except in constitutional 
matters", it "may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of 
Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct of the President". 13 This will further help take 
the pressure off the Constitutional Court. 
However, the provisions of Rule 17 have two apparent shortcomings. On many issues, 
because of the divergent predilections and idiosyncrasies of our judges, it is now more 
than ever before possible to get divergent and confusing judgments as long as the 
Constitutional Court has not intervened. 14 
Secondly, access to the Court will, in general, be a privilege enjoyed only by those 
persons who have the wherewithal to assert and defend their rights. The indigent, who 
constitute the majority in our polity, will solace themselves with the scarce resources of 
the Legal Aid Board and amici curiae from non-governmental bodies such as the Legal 
Resources Centre and the (Wits University) Centre for Applied Legal Studies. If 
anything, decisions of our Courts in this regard have, besides, so far focused on the 
right to legal assistance as it affects the right to a fair criminal trial. 
Moreover, in our jurisdiction the rule which permits the participation of amici curiae in 
constitutional litigation states that an amicus curiae will only be permited if new issues 
are raised by them. In other words, once a party has raised an issue in the proceedings, 
whether or not a good job has been done, an amicus curiae will not be permitted to 
participate. We have not come anywhere near the Indian system of access to court 
which has become known as "epistolary jurisdiction", for example. According to PN 
Bhagwati, 15 this has simplified the procedure followed in public interest litigation. It 
allows any person acting pro bono publico simply to address a letter to the Indian 
Supreme Court to move it in defence of the rights of the disadvantaged. Such a letter 
is a legitimate and appropriate proceeding within the meaning of Article 32 of the Indian 
Constitution. The litigant in such cases does not incur personal expenses as he or she 
does not have to approach lawyers to draw a regular petition to be filed in defence of 
the rights of the poor and disadvantaged members of the community. 
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Furthermore, as a result of the Constitutional Court's stance on direct access to it, our 
Courts have now been prepared to go into matters and decide whether they should 
indeed be referred to it for its decision. Our lawyers and judges, who in the majority 
were schooled in the conservative legal discourse, are thus presented with new 
opportunities to participate actively and creatively in the development of our nascent 
constitutional jurisprudence. Something drastic needs to be done as a matter of 
urgency to ensure that all our Courts, and particularly the Constitutional Court, cease 
being regarded by the socially alienated, the disadvantaged and the vulnerable sections 
of our society as the collective standard-bearer of the interests and privileges of the tiny, 
wealthy, and ostentatious minority drawn predominantly from the white component of 
our society. 
The Constitutional Court's numerous orders with regards to costs are an indication that 
its judges are aware of the problem of money and the indigent. One would hope that, 
with the extension of constitutional jurisdiction to other courts, the Court's attitude would 
filter down. 
BLANKET DOCKET PRIVILEGE 
As a result of the Constitutional Court's decision in Shabalala and Others v Attorney-
General of Transvaal and Another, 16 Hendler J in S v Makiti, 17 held that he saw no 
reason why the State should refuse to accede to a request by the defence for 
statements of State witnesses, especially since the case involved a matter that was not 
trivial and because no prejudice would be suffered by the State.18 In that case, where 
the accused was charged with murder, further particulars had been supplied to the 
accused's instructing attorney, but the Court held that they were inadequate and 
ordered the Attorney-General to make the statements available to the defence. 
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
Thanks to Kentridge AJ who held in S v Zuma and Others 19 that the right to a fair trial 
was broader than was provided for in Section 25(3) of the (interim) Constitution,20 and 
extended beyond procedural fairness to substantive fairness, it was easy for Claassen 
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J to deal with the problem that arose in S v Moilwa.21 Thus, according to Claassen J, 
a duty was imposed upon our Courts to question witnesses on material aspects of a 
case. Failure to do so constituted a gross irregularity.22 
DEVELOPMENTS WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT HAS NOT ACTED 
DECISIVELY (OR AT ALL) 
THE RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION AT STATE EXPENSE 
In one chapter in this thesis it was pointed out that it was regrettable that the 
Constitutional Court did not use the first opportunity it had in S v Verrnaas; S v Du 
Plessis23 to address this question adequately.24 It was conceded, however, that it was 
in our current circumstances perhaps the best possible route that the Court took. As 
matters stand, the decision as to whether an accused person is to be given legal 
representation at State expense "is pre-eminently one for the judge trying the case".25 
However, given the urgency of the question of legal representation for the indigent and 
mostly either illiterate or semi-literate accused persons who in the majority come before 
our lower courts every day, and given the fact that our High Court judges may deal with 
this question differently and come to different conclusions, it occurs to me that the Court 
could have done better than it did. It may indeed be necessary for the issue to be 
revisited by the Court in an appropriate case so that it can enunciate broad principles 
and guidelines applicable to decisions of this nature. 
Didcott J's suggestion that it is Parliament or the executive that should resolve the 
question of affordability and implement a programme of legal representation for the poor 
is also worrisome. It may encourage less robust judges who are worried about the 
public perception that if they promote the enjoyment of this right they will be giving too 
much to criminals to be even less interventionist in their determination of issues relating 
to equitable allocation of resources. 
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I have no doubt that it may well be some time before another opportunity presents itself 
to the Court to enable it to do what I am suggesting.26 In the meantime, millions of 
accused persons will continue suffering the consequences of the inadequate action 
taken by the Court in S v Vermaas; S v D Plessis. 
THE DEATH PENAL TY 
Despite the Constitutional Court's epoch-making decision in S v Makwanyane and 
Another,27 it is theoretically still possible for our Courts to sentence people to death 
under our legal system; skirting around the provisions which allow the State to hang its 
enemies, as the Court did in Makwanyane, has left a lethal weapon in the hands of 
government. This may become even more apparent when South Africa goes through 
a crisis and a post-Mandela regime which may be intolerant of dissidence emerges. Or 
even worse: when public opinion seems so vicious at some stage that some of our 
politicians are swayed, the symbolic value of Makwanyane will be lost. 
It is a matter for regret that the Constitutional Court allowed an opportunity to declare 
the death penalty unconstitutional altogether to slip through its collective fingures. The 
Constitutional Assembly did not address this issue when it made the (new) 
Constitution; it merely reiterated the provisions of Section 9 of the (interim) 
Constitution.28 Hopefully Parliament will muster sufficient courage and rid our country 
of the scourge of the death penalty once and for all.29 
However, the Court needs to be commended for its decision to mero motu extend its 
declaration of the invalidity of the death penalty to areas it was not called upon to 
consider in Makwanyane. What is regrettable is, as will be shown later on, it did not do 
this in other cases. 
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS 
In this thesis, it was accepted that the Constitutional Court was right when it ruled in S 
v Zuma and Others30 that its decision was not necessarily doing away with all statutory 
provisions which create presumptions in criminal cases. Thus, the merits and demerits 
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of each statutory presumption would have to be evaluated in each case before a 
declaration of invalidity. 
However, it was pointed out that there were instances31 where similarly worded 
presumptions which created a reverse onus were not dealt with. In other words, the 
Court, for some unfathomable reason, would not mero motu extend its declaration of 
invalidation to such presumptions the way it had done in Makwanyane. As a result, the 
issue had to be visited again in S v Julies, 32 for example. 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
A point was made in this thesis that the Constitutional Court in S v Williams and 
Others,33 had, for the right reasons, declared corporal punishment as it affected male 
juveniles invalid. The Court had refused to mero motu extend its declaration of invalidity 
to the whipping of male adults, notwithstanding the fact that "it was common cause 
between the applicants and the State that the provisions in our law which authorised 
corporal punishment for adults are inconsistent with the Constitution."34 Neither was the 
Court prepared to deal with the constitutionality of corporal punishment in schools as 
that was not the issue before it.35 
The absurdity of unwittingly preserving corporal punishment for adults was pointed out 
in the thesis. Only Parliament can now intervene and proscribe in our system of criminal 
justice system and in our polity itself corporal punishment as a mechanism for dealing 
with crime. 36 Doing so would enable us to join many other nations and societies where 
whipping as a penal option has been abolished. 
TAINTED EVIDENCE 
In contrast to the decision of Froneman Jin S v Melanie and Others,37 Claasen J held 
in S v Mathebula and Another38 that our Courts have no discretion whatsoever to 
admit evidence obtained in violation of an accused person's constitutional rights. The 
effect of this is that the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution have to be 
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treated differently and, upon their breach, they are to be "removed from the parameters 
of judicial discretion". 39 
As in the Melanie decision, the Mathebula case dealt with the issue of the admissibility 
of evidence obtained as a result of a pointing out where, prior to or at the time of the 
pointing out, there was a failure on the part of the police to advise the accused of the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights to legal representation and not to be compelled to 
make a confession or an admission that could subsequently be used in evidence 
against him. The Court was satisfied that the police had failed to advise the accused in 
casu of his constitutional rights. It thus concluded that such failure was tantamount to 
a violation of the accused's rights under the (interim) Constitution which, according to 
the Court, clearly superseded the judge's so-called common law discretion to allow or 
disallow improperly obtained evidence. 
There is obviously a conflict between the positions taken by the two judges. A conflict 
of this nature can, fortunately, now be resolved by the Supreme Court of Appea140 as 
this Court does have jurisdiction over matters of a constitutional nature. The 
Constitutional Court can then confirm an order of the Supreme Court of Appeal in this 
regard. 
The two conflicting positions show that, precisely because of the Constitutional Court's 
cautious and narrow approach to its work, its decision in Key v Attorney-General, 
Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division and Another41 has not proved to be a useful 
guide to some of our judges. They, like the Constitutional Court, tend to confine their 
judgments to what they have been called upon to decide in each case. Thus, despite 
the clear rule in Key, the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of 
pointing out, inter alia, may still have to be addressed by the Constitutional Court. 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
The Constitutional Court has not as yet ruled on the right of access to information; when 
it had an opportunity to do so in Shabalala,42 it avoided the issue. As a result, we are 
saddled with conflicting decisions in this regard. 
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One such decision was that of Van Dijkhorst J in Directory Advertising Cost Cutters 
v The Minister for Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting and Others.43 In 
that case the learned Judge held that the rights contemplated in Section 23 of the 
(interim) Constitution were confined to the fundamental rights that were set out in 
Chapter 3; in other words, the Chapter 3 rights did not include other rights against the 
State such as contractual rights and rights arising from delictual daims. The other case 
was that of Van Niekerk v City Council of Pretoria.44 In that case Cameron J 
distanced himself from the Van Dijkhorst ruling.45 According to the Learned Judge the 
wording of Section 23 of the (interim) Constitution was wide and unlimited and the 
(interim) Constitution required a broader approach to the principles which underlay the 
inclusion of Section 23. The conclusion the Learned Judge came to was that the 
approach of Van Dijkhorst 'was in consequence unwarrantably narrow.'46 
In Van Niekerk the applicant had requested the respondent to furnish him with the 
contents of a report it had prepared pursuant to a claim for damages he had lodged with 
it following a power surge which had destroyed his domestic electrical equipment. 
Responding to the question whether the information was required for the protection of 
the applicant's rights, Cameron J noted that the report would assist the applicant in 
deciding whether to proceed with, or abandon, his claim.47 Its disclosure would possibly 
promote an early settlement of the matter and quickly bring the envisaged action to an 
end either by settlement or abandonment. In this sense the report was reasonably 
required by the applicant.48 
The (new) Constitution has not settled or at the very least clarified this issue either. In 
terms of Schedule 6,49 which deals with transitional arrangements, Parliament has till 
4 February 2000 before it has to effectively enact appropriate legislation promoting 
access to information.50 Till then, Section 23 of the (interim) Constitution remains in 
force as a transitional measure.51 In the meantime, it would be better if the 
Constitutional Court acted and gave direction in this regard. Unfortunately, due its 
cautious and narrow approach, it may not do so, unless and until it is specifically called 
upon to do in a particular case. 
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IMMIGRANTS UNDER THE NEW LEGAL SYSTEM 
At the time of writing this thesis, the Constitutional Court had not heard or decided any 
immigration case under the (interim) Constitution. Thus, the validity of some of the 
provisions of the controversial Aliens Control Acf>2 has never been determined. Almost 
all the cases53 that came before some divisions of the Supreme Court turned on the 
utility and utilisation of the provisions of Section 24 of the (interim) Constitution. The 
only exception in this regard was the decision in Baloro v University of 
Bophuthatswana. 54 
While it was accepted in all the cases referred to above that the (interim) Constitution 
was applicable to aliens, in the four cases which were decided in favour of the 
government the decisions were essentially based on the notion that aliens under our 
legal system did not have any rights, interests or legitimate expectations that could be 
threatened or harmed by the provisions of the Aliens Control Act and that were able 
to trigger the operation of Section 24 of the (interim) Constitution. Thus the applicants 
could not be given reasons55 for the unfavourable decisions made by the Department 
of Home Affairs. 
In other words, aliens, merely because of their national origin, are, as matters stand, not 
entitled to any protection under our new constitutional system which is putatively based 
on freedom and equality. It is clear that the approach of the relevant judges in these 
cases was still trapped in the quagmire of the jurisprudence which depended on the 
rights-privileges distinction.56 This question, in my submission, requires the urgent 
attention of the Constitutional Court;57 while the Supreme Court of Appeal, needless to 
say, can do what the (pre-April 27, 1994) Appellate Division did in respect of the rights 
of prisoners,58 the Constitutional Court will still have to confirm the latter Court's order 
before it can have legal force. 
To complete the "bigger picture", it is imperative for me to comment on a few issues that 
have characterised the work of the Constitutional Court during the period under review. 
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METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
It is interesting to note that the Constitutional Court has generally described its 
interpretive method as seeking the "contextualised purpose" of the words used in the 
Constitution. In other words, as was pointed out by Chaskalson Pin Makwanyane,59 
the main aim of constitutional interpretation, as opposed to ordinary statutory 
interpretation, 60 is to seek the purpose of the provision being interpreted in the context 
of the rest of the Constitution and its underlying values. Mahomed J (as he then was) 
even suggested that the purposive approach is to be contrasted with a "literalist" one.61 
The Court has tended to identify the purposive with a "a broad or generous" reading. 62 
It has in many cases63 found the purpose by pursuing a generous reading. However, 
O'Regan J has quite correctly pointed out that, while on some occasions a purposive 
approach may require a generous reading, it may, on others, require a narrow one.64 
In one instance, when two of the Court's judges65 pursued a narrow approach, they 
came to differing conclusions regarding the purpose of Section 241 (8) of the (interim) 
Constitution. 
While Chaskalson P was prepared to concede that there may "possibly be instances 
where the 'generous' and 'purposive' interpretations do not coincide", he unfortunately 
did not venture an opinion on, or provide an analysis of, the possible differences for, as 
he concluded, the problem did not arise in casu.66 It might arguably be too early to 
provide a definitive analysis of the Court's approach to constitutional interpretation; the 
Court itself, whilst presumably knowing how it wants to approach this, has been rather 
very reticent. The debate among the judges in Mhlungu, whilst interesting and 
illuminating, has not been very helpful in identifying the Court's approach to the subject. 
Secondly, in the course of its work, the Constitutional Court has been prepared to 
entertain arguments on legislative history. For example, the Court solicited such 
arguments by requesting the parties in Makwanya~e67 to address it on the process of 
formulating the right to life. Chaskalson P, in the main judgment in the matter, after 
stating that the context of a constitutional provision "includes the history and 
background to the adoption of the Constitution"68 and reviewing the extent to which our 
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Courts in the past and foreign courts had dealt with the issues of capital punishment,69 
said:70 
[t}he Multi-Party Negotiating Process ... was advised by technical committees, and the 
reports of these committees on the drafts are the equivalent of travaux preparatoires 
relied upon by the international tribunals. Such background material can provide a context 
for ... interpretation ... and ... I can see no reason why such evidence should be excluded. 
Having counseled caution in this regard,71 the President of the Court then proceeded 
to say that: 72 
[b]ackground evidence may, however, be useful to show why particular provisions were 
or were not included in the Constitution. [W]here the background material is clear, is not 
in dispute, and is relevant in showing why particular provisions were or were not included 
... it can be taken into account by a Court in interpreting the Constitution. 
This approach was then used by the Court to show that the parties that were involved 
in the Multi-Party Negotiating Process had intended that the Constitutional Court should 
have the jurisdiction to grapple with and decide the constitutionality of capital 
punishment.73 The importance of "historical background" was also emphasised in S v 
Zuma and Others,74 while in S v Mhlungu and Others75 the "intention of the framers" 
was alluded to in determining the meaning of Section 241 (8) of the (interim) 
Constitution. 
One hopes that the use of "historical background", for all its shortcomings,76 will not 
increase in prominence with the passage of time. As Laurence Du Plessis and Hugh 
Corder77 have argued, it would appear that its role will be limited to tipping the balance 
where the relevant legislative history is not controversial or subject to dispute. 
Thirdly, the Court has displayed a tentative and inconclusive tendency towards 
deference to the legislature. For example, in Makwanyane78 Chaskalson P pithily put 
it thus: 
Can, and should, an unelected court substitute its own opinion of what is reasonable or 
necessary for that of an elected legislature? 
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Significantly, while the President of the Court would not provide an answer to his own 
question, which showed that he was aware of the constant tension and the dichotomy 
between the counter-majoritarian "problem" of judicial review and the legislative output 
of an elected legislature, he at least exhibited an acute awareness of the need to strike 
a fine balance between the two. He observed79 that: 
[s]ince the judgment in R v Oakes, the Canadian Supreme Court has shown that it is 
sensitive to this tension, which is particularly acute where choices have to be made in 
respect of matters of policy. 
Similarly, Sachs J80 set out clearly how he saw the roles of Parliament and the Court. 
However, the learned Judge did not expressly indicate how the Court would deal with 
clashes between itself and the legislature. Chaskalson P81 cited with approval the 
Canadian decision in R v Chaulk82 which was essentially to the effect that where 
differing reasonable policy options are in dispute the Court must defer to the legislature. 
As will appear more fully later, the Court has, at the same time, exhibited a strong 
commitment to constitutional supremacy.83 Thus, it would appear that among the judges 
of the Court there is, after all, not such a strong commitment to deference to the wisdom 
of Parliament.84 Overall, the Court has handled its relationship with Parliament and the 
executive with sensitivity and cordiality, and, at the same time, fearlessly and firmly 
where and when necessary. 
Fourthly, while the Court has been prepared to follow comparative case law from other 
jurisdictions, it is noteworthy that in respect of the interpretation of the general limitation 
clause it was not prepared to follow the Canadian approach spelt out in R v Oakes. In 
Zuma,85 Kentridge AJ observed that the Oakes test 
may well be of assistance to our Courts in cases where a delicate balancing of individual 
rights against social interests is required. But section 33(1) itself sets out the criteria 
which we are to apply, and I see no reason, in this cases at least, to attempt to fit our 
analysis into the Canadian pattern. 
The Court's reticence and ambivalence in certain respects may, on the one hand, be 
indicative of a traditional approach adopted by South African Courts in the past, namely 
to confine its interpretation and ruling to that which it has been called upon to decide in 
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a particular case. On the other, it may turn out that it is the best approach to adopt as 
a freer forum and agent of change. 
DIVERSE JUDGMENTS 
The large number of separate judgments by all the judges (and even in groups of three 
or four) in cases such as Makwanyane, Mhlungu and Western Cape, to cite a few 
examples, have at times technically made it extremely difficult for the reader to distill a 
ratio decidendi in each instance. Each separate judgment has, in other words, resulted 
in the reader being provided with an array of rationes decidendi to choose from. 
However, the Court has, in general, in the process exhibited judicial scholarship 
comparable to the best in the world, which has done South Africa proud. Our judges 
have thus enriched the constitutional and fundamental rights debate, thus setting a tone 
which it is hoped will continue. 
"UBUNTU" 
In the beginning the Constitutional Court extolled the virtues of "ubuntu", "African values 
and indegenous law". Mokgoro J even declared that "when our Courts promote the 
underlying values of an open and democratic society .. . when considering the 
constitutionality of laws, they should recognise that indigenous South African values are 
not always irrelevant nor unrelated to this task."86 It is, however, a matter for regret that 
in subsequent cases that came before all our Courts and the Constitutional Court in 
particular, this does not seem to have been borne in mind. In fact, no mention is made 
of "indigenous African values" in any of the subsequent cases. 
One hopes that the Court was not merely paying lip service to the fundamental value 
of "ubuntu" and the African perspective and context, all of which are important in the 
development of our jurisprudence. 
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THE COURT STILL HAS TO BE TESTED 
Broadly speaking, the Constitutional Court has brought positive publicity to the new 
constitutional order and the values underpinning our fledgling democracy. To many it 
has become an important agent of change and a protector of basic human rights and 
freedoms. 
It is my fervent hope, however, that the Constitutional Court will not exhibit a tendency 
to shy away from indulging in the complex and delicate balancing role which it must 
continue to "play if it is to contribute to the restoration of legitimacy to the legal system, 
while also developing the human rights culture for which so many South Africans have 
paid so dearly."87 Until the judiciary in its entirety has been fully reformed and has 
become, broadly speaking, more representative than it is currently, we are unlikely to 
have the kind of expansive constitutional review which we need; the Constitutional 
Court will, therefore, for some time remain the beacon of hope for those whose 
fundamental rights are affected or threatened. 
As steps begin to be taken by Parliament and government to address the gross historic 
imbalances in the allocation of resources, opportunities, wealth and income in our 
apartheid-riven society, I have no doubt that numerous cases and controversies will be 
brought to our Courts, especially the Constitutional Court. Whilst indeed it will be the 
responsibility of Parliament and government to develop, promote and carry out 
programmes that will give effect to our society's desire to ensure the "full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms",88 the Constitutional Court will have to be more 
robust than it has been hitherto in the promotion of substantive equality and the equal 
enjoyment of socio-economic rights that have since found their way into our new 
constitutional system. 
Thus far, as Corder and Davis89 have observed, 
the court has chosen to tread warily. In the majority of cases, the judgments have been 
neither surprising nor constitutionally controversial ... To date ... the challenges which 
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have been based on the Bill of Rights have not raised the kind of difficulty which would 
allow for clear commitments or definite divisions to be ascertained. 
Despite their awareness of the Court's role in the transformation of our society, its 
judges have on numerous occasions counseled caution. Cases such as S v Williams 
and Others,90 S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso91 and S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo,92 among 
others, show that they have been careful to decide only as much as is necessary for the 
case before them, despite the absurd results the approach sometimes led to . They 
have also emphasised what their judgement did not mean.93 They have, furthermore, 
been concerned that their judgments should not cause undue dislocation to the 
administration of justice.94 
The greatest test will be when the Court is confronted with the government's efforts to 
fulfil its electoral promises of the reconstruction and development of our apartheid-
ravaged and apartheid-riven society in line with the substantive commitments immanent 
within the new constitutional system. An appeal95 in the controversial judgment of Swart 
J in Public Servants' Association of South Africa and Another v Minister of 
Justice and Others,96 in which the issue of affirmative action in the public service was 
dealt with, might well turn out to be the beginning of that test. 
In a nutshell, a critical question that confronts the Court is: Does it have a role to play 
in making the Constitution accessible to all, especially the indigent and ignorant in our 
midst? Or, is it by definition or by its very nature as a court of law, confined to being a 
sophisticated body, dealing in a sophisticated legal way with sophisticated legal 
arguments where technicality sometimes tends to vanquish substance? 
As for me, this Court, which was established with the view to making a big difference 
in the development of our jurisprudence, has to do more than what an ordinary court of 
law does. It has to be more pro-active in recommending (not prescribing!) law reform 
in problem areas such as the ones that arose in all the matters that came before it. In 
other words, as a constitutional court, it has to play a role in setting the agenda for 
thorough-going and fundamental social transformation that will hopefully soon unfold 
in our country. It has to show much more robustly that it is aware of its important role 
in the new legal order, namely to use judicial review to protect the rights, interests and 
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legitimate expectations of all those who cannot protect themselves adequately through 
the democratic process.97 
No POLITICAL BIASI 
The Constitutional Court has, however, confounded sceptics and its critics both from the 
left98 and the right99 . Though it has already dealt with a number of controversial cases 
and issues, it has hitherto not exhibited any political bias. Instead, as Lourens 
Ackermann 100 has quite correctly observed, 
[a] quick scan of the court's cases to date will show a haphazard pattern for any person 
trying to establish a trend of political favour. 
In Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others, 101 for example, the Court struck down a 
presidential proclamation, thus upholding a challenge by hte National Party-dominated 
provincial government to the constitutional validity of (the ANC-dominated) national 
government action in respect of transitional measures for local government. 102 In the 
course of his judgment, Chaskalson P, it is noted, rapped the third respondent in the 
matter, the MEC for Local Government, over his knuckles for the latter's public remark 
that the Western Cape government had an excellent chance of winning the case in the 
Constitutional Court if the matter was not a political one. 
In In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 103 
against the wishes of the lnkatha Freedom Party, it sent back the KwaZulu-Natal 
constitution with a clear message that it was unconstitutional because it sought to usurp 
some of the powers of the national government and undermine the (interim) 
Constitution by giving the provincial legislature powers which it was not allowed. At 
the same time, in an earlier judgment, 104 the Court had upheld the lnkatha Freedom 
Party's contention that the two affected Bills, which sought to, inter a/ia, enable the 
Province of KwaZulu-Natal to pay the salaries and allowances of its traditional leaders, 
were not unconstitutional. 
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No transgressor has been spared the Court's rod. Recently, according to Lourens 
Ackermann, 105 Abdullah Omar, the Minister of Justice, was rebuked by the Court for a 
"sorry tale" of bureaucratic bungling and tardiness which saw his Department miss an 
eighteen-month deadline to amend an unconstitutional law. In Minister of Justice v 
Ntuli, 106 berated the Department of Justice and stated, 107 inter alia, that: 
[i]f the officials dealing with the matter in the Department of Justice had acted promptly 
in the period of almost 18 months which have now passed between the decision in S v 
Ntuli and the delivery of this judgment, Parliament could have been asked to bring section 
309(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act into line with the Constitution, or provision could 
have been made for the representation of convicted prisoners in custody who wish to 
appeal, but do not have the means to secure legal representation. The additional 18 
months that the Department of Justice now seeks to enable it to attend to the matter is 
the result of the neglect of the officials who were dealing with the matter and nol the 
declaration of invalidity. It is said that the courts do not have the resources to handle the 
additional appeals which will result from the declaration of invalidity coming into force. If 
this is so, it is a consequence of the rights conferred by the Constitution and departmental 
neglect, and not the order made by this Court. 
The President of the Court108 then warned that: 
[t]his Court has the responsibility of ensuring that the provisions of the Constitution are 
upheld and enforced. It should not be assumed that it will lightly grant the suspension of 
an order made by it declaring a statutory provision to be invalid and of no force and effect, 
or if it does so, that it will allow more time than is necessary for the defect in the 
legislation to be cured. 
The Court has so far behaved like the Supreme Court of the United States, the judges 
of which have tended not necessarily to follow the wishes of the Presidents, such as 
Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan, who appointed some of its judges during their 
reign, hoping that they would follow their politics. 
For these reasons , Ackermann concluded his article by praising the Constitutional 
Court profusely and declaring that 
[w]e are lucky enough to have landed up with an independent Constitutional Court. A 
court which has made it clear that the Constitution and its values are not the property of 
politicians or their parties but the property of the people - and sacred property at that. 109 
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PARLIAMENT MUST ACT 
As a result of numerous decisions of the Constitutional Court, already many of our 
statutes, particularly those that were enacted in the previous constitutional era, have 
been mutilated. An obvious casualty has been the Criminal Procedure Act, 110 which, 
as Langa J111 quite correctly observed, ''was drafted and enacted in a different 
constitutional era in which the legal validity of its provisions could not be questioned." 
Many of its provisions have already been adjudged to be in conflict with the 
Constitution and therefore invalid; in appropriate proceedings, many of its remaining 
provisions will soon suffer the same fate. Parliament has to act as a matter of urgency 
to bring this Act, among others, into line with our nascent democracy and the core 
values of freedom and equality inherent in the new constitutional system, which must 
now hold sway. 
We cannot afford to wait until appropriate cases arise before we can address piecemeal 
the crudities of some of our old legislation. A way has to be found to systematically 
comb through the statute book and weed them out. It behooves me to emphasise 
Langa J's further observation that: 
[t]he problem is that provisions of old legislation, and in particular the Act, are being 
struck down because they are inconsistent with the Constitution, leaving gaps in the law 
which only the legislature can fill. It is primarily the task of the legislature, and not the 
courts, to bring old legislation into line with the Constitution. Although understandable 
because of the transitional stage we are in, the continued operation of, and reliance by 
prosecutors on provisions which do not reflect the new constitutional order is an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. Hopefully, it will not be long before a revised Criminal 
Procedure Act, consistent with the Constitution, is put in place.112 (my emphasis) 
A possibly quicker solution might be that an injunction should be issued to all organs 
of state to scrutinise the laws they are responsible for and prepare Bills seeking to 
expunge all presumably unconstitutional provisions within a given time frame. I may 
even suggest that the South African Law Commission should also be involved in an 
exercise of that nature, magnitude and complexity. 
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